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Representation, Emotion, and the Madrigal in Sixteenth-Century Italy 
Russell Joseph O’Rourke 
 
This dissertation questions the dominant role that analogies to painting have played in the critical 
reception of the Italian madrigal—especially its flagship technique, the madrigalism—and argues 
for a more historically sensitive approach to sixteenth-century discussions of music–text 
relations in that genre. This approach centers rhetoric, understood broadly to encompass theories 
of style and subject matter, emotional response, and fictional representation, as the primary field 
of study to which musicians turned in their efforts to theorize musical expression. In its final 
chapter, the dissertation suggests that this rhetorical saturation of discourse around madrigals 
also to some degree influenced the composing of madrigals. 
 Chapter 1 traces the outlines of what I call the “Galileian critical tradition” between the 
publication of Vincenzo Galilei’s 1581 Dialogo della musica antica, et ella moderna and the 
present. This tradition is characterized by a tendency among writers to dismiss the madrigalism 
on expressive grounds and, as time passes, increasingly in visual terms. Returning to the 
sixteenth century, chapter 2 argues that the phrase “imitating the words” (imitare le parole), 
which was adopted by Galilei, Gioseffo Zarlino, and others in the mid- to late Cinquecento to 
describe those novel techniques for the musical representation of text commonly seen in 
madrigals, acquires an affective connotation, in addition to its descriptive meaning, when placed 
in the context of contemporaneous literary studies of imitation (mimesis), especially those 
stemming from the recovery of Aristotle’s Poetics. This affective dimension of the imitation 
principle, first theorized by Aristotle but creatively elaborated by his Renaissance commentators, 
 
 
highlights the cognitive pleasure that humans, because of a natural affinity for imitation, take 
from fiction—a species of pleasure, I suggest, relevant to the musical practice that “imitating the 
words” names. Turning from pleasure to passion, Chapter 3 makes a case for the presence of a 
“two-stage model for emotional arousal” (as I call it) in sixteenth-century Italian music theory. 
Surveying this model’s foundation in physiological, rhetorical, and natural-philosophical texts, I 
show how Zarlino adapted its principles to musical purposes in his 1558 Istitutioni harmoniche 
and then trace the afterlife of Zarlino’s theory across a number of texts, including both music 
theory treatises and an epic poem. Chapter 4, finally, analyzes a late Cinquecento madrigal 
cycle—the three settings in Giaches de Wert’s Ottavo libro de madrigali a cinque voci (1586) 
from the “Armida” episode of Torquato Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata (1581)—as a series of 
musical “stimuli” for listener responses patterned on the theoretical discussions studied in 
chapters 2 and 3. In its attention to the close-knit relationship between the expressive qualities of 
Wert’s music and the emotions they invite, this chapter follows the example of the ancient 
rhetorical tradition and its sixteenth-century inheritance, which emphasize the role of human 
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Example I.1  “Qual musico gentil” (prima parte), Giaches de Wert, L’ottavo libro de madrigali 
a cinque voci (1586), mm. 32–37. Text: “Fa di sospir breve concento in prima” (she made 
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Asked for comment on the music–text relationship in example I.1, a passage from Giaches de 
Wert’s madrigal “Qual musico gentil,” what says the musicologist-interviewee? In all likelihood, 
“Nothing to see here.” The use of rests to punctuate the two syllables of the Italian word for 
“sigh,” sospir, is a dog-eared chapter in the history of music, word-painting as conventional as 
that technique comes. Assessing Claudio Monteverdi’s madrigal “Cor mio mentre vi mio” in 
1910, Hugo Leichtentritt flatly states, “The beloved tone-painting on sospir (rests) is not 
missing.”1 It would be more surprising to Leichtentritt if Monteverdi had not used rests to set this 
noun, in other words. A few decades later, Alfred Einstein has the following to offer about the 
passage from “Qual musico gentil” reproduced above: “Sospir [has] its customary quarter rest.”2 
End of story, move along. 
 This dissertation will not attempt to convince readers that the sospir–rests tradition is 
more innovative or exciting than it seems, for in any given instance of the trope, the composer’s 
intention with respect to the text is clear enough. Most musicologists would agree, that is to say, 
that the composer is representing the word sospir. What the word representation means in this 
context, however, is less agreed upon, or at the least less theorized. For one, despite its 
comfortable status within musicology as the catchall term for music’s capacity to evoke 
emotions, objects of sight or hearing, or the semantics of a poetic text, sixteenth-century music 
theorists and critics did not often use that word. They were more likely to say that a passage like 
the one above “accommodates” or “imitates” its text rather than “represents” it; they certainly 
did not know the specialized terms “word-painting” or “madrigalism.” At the least, these 
 
1 “Die beliebte Tonmalerei auf sospir (Pausen) fehlt nicht,” Hugo Leichtentritt, “Claudio Monteverdi als 
Madrigalkomponist,” Sammelbände der Internationalen Musikgesellschaft 11, no. 2 (January–March 
1910): 277. 
 
2 Alfred Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, trans. Alexander H. Krappe, Roger H. Sessions and Oliver Strunk 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 2:570. 
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linguistic differences point up the anachronism of the categories we now use to discuss music–
text relations in the madrigal, including but not limited to the device commonly known as word-
painting. More pressingly, they intimate that assimilating past musical practices to present 
conceptual categories affects how we hear them. More than just a question of language, indeed, 
the purpose of devices like the sospir–rests madrigalism in sixteenth-century musical aesthetics 
is far from clear. Especially uncertain is the relationship between madrigalisms and what we 
might call listener or emotional response. To put it bluntly: what is the point of madrigalisms? 
Are they supposed to stir an emotion? (If so, which emotion?) Should they stimulate a mental 
image (word-painting)? Are they, as for Leichtentritt and Einstein, merely in the music to be 
recognized and noted, or can they serve a more exalted aim? 
 While they do not invite single answers, these questions motivate this dissertation. The 
study in the pages that follow is concerned foremost with the language that writers, both in the 
sixteenth century and later ones, have used to describe, justify, criticize, and analyze music–text 
relations in the Italian madrigal. Its methodological supposition is that studying linguistic 
patterns offers insight into both the recent historiography of the madrigal and the musical values 
that guided the genre’s reception in the sixteenth century. More than that, attending carefully to 
language offers new ways of listening to madrigals—namely, as “stimuli” for historically 
specific kinds of responses.3 In particular, I turn to sixteenth-century theories about the 
relationship between music and the emotions to reconsider standard madrigalian text-setting 
devices, including but not limited to those in the sospir–rest family, from the perspective of 
hypothetical listeners from the period. In so doing, this project aims to move past received 
 
3 Throughout this dissertation, I use the contemporary word “stimulus” as an umbrella term for “that 
which causes an emotional response.” The Cinquecento literati who serve as my primary informants on 
the emotions, although they did not have a single word for this concept, often used oggetto. 
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notions about the function and expressive value of these devices—notions that are fundamentally 
tied up with the language musicologists and critics have adopted over the centuries to describe 
them. 
 For if Einstein has little to say about example I.1, it might be because he inherited the 
word Tonmalerei to describe its contents, a concept for musical representation with a long 
history of pejorative commentary (see chapter 1). The traditional role of score-based analysis in 
guiding scholarly conversations around the madrigal is important here, too. Scores reduce 
music–text relations to visual objects that can be seen, identified, pointed at, sometimes boxed, 
and finally assessed at a scholarly remove (see chapter 4, example 4.9). But as scholars well 
know, sixteenth-century listeners—a capacious group designation including both singers and 
audience members—did not commonly use scores, which only came into wide use for vocal 
polyphony in the seventeenth century.4 If a listener had access to a visual representation of a 
madrigal, it was a part book or in some cases a printed poem absent the notation.5 From such a 
listener’s vantage point—one we are condemned to imagine—the self-evidence of text-setting 
devices like the traditional madrigalism on sospir quickly evaporates, or at the least settles into 
something more interesting. Without scores, music–text relations are not simply “there” on the 
 
4 David Charlton and Kathryn Whitney, “Score (i),” Grove Music Online, accessed July 1, 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.25241. The classic study on this topic in pre-1600 
European repertories, albeit focused on composers rather than listeners, is Jessie Ann Owens, Composers 
at Work: The Craft of Musical Composition 1450–1600 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Owens 
writes (7): “It is hard for us to imagine composing without scores: we are accustomed to thinking in terms 
of scores, and our modern editions of early music invariably translate separate parts into score format. I 
believe that composing in separate parts reflects the basic character of the music: lines woven together to 
form harmonies, and not a series of sonorities.” 
 
5 For an example of a sixteenth-century listener following along to a musical performance with a printed 
text, or libro delle parole, see the letter of Cavalier Grana dated July 21, 1582, in Anthony Newcomb, The 
Madrigal at Ferrara, 1579–97, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 1:27. So-called libri delle 
tirate, which recorded in notation those vocal ornaments professional singers commonly improvised in 
performance, also circulated at Ferrara in the 1580s (ibid., 1:26 and 1:55). 
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page like so many tone-paintings hung on a wall. To the contrary, they are ephemeral, 
themselves quickly evaporating. 
 Taking these truisms to heart, this project asks of music–text encounters in the Italian 
madrigal what experiences they afforded listeners in a particular place and time, namely Italy in 
the sixteenth century. At the same time, the pages that follow are not a history of listening or 
listeners per se. They do not report the opinions of audience members at courts, festivals, or 
other arenas where performances of madrigals took place in the late sixteenth century.6 Nor do 
they reconstruct a broad culture around the act of listening—its moral, political, social 
valences—like the one discussed in Andrew Dell’Antonio’s Listening as Spiritual Practice in 
Early Modern Italy, recently hailed as a model for new early modern histories of listening.7 
Rather, the following pages study sixteenth-century madrigals through theories of listening, as 
well as ideas about spectator or audience response more generally, that emerged from 
Cinquecento intellectual communities during the heyday of the Italian madrigal. Rephrased in 
overtly methodological terms, this project situates madrigals in the context of what Shai Burstyn, 
adapting a concept from art historian Michael Baxandall, calls the “period ear,” an imaginative 
construction of a past listening mentality that nevertheless acknowledges the subjectivity of the 
historian-as-listener.8 While it is undeniable that any scholarly effort to listen with historical ears 
 
6 Anthony Newcomb’s method in ibid. to study the listening culture at Ferrara in the 1580s is exemplary 
in this regard. See also Laurie Stras, Women and Music in Sixteenth-Century Ferrara (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
 
7 Listening as Spiritual Practice in Early Modern Italy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
“Recently hailed as a model”: Tim Carter, “Listening to Music in Early Modern Italy: Some Problems for 
the Urban Musicologist,” in Hearing the City in Early Modern Europe, ed. Tess Knighton and Ascensión 
Mazuela-Anguita (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018), 26. 
 
8 Shai Burstyn, “In Quest of the Period Ear,” Early Music 25, no. 4 (November 1997): 692–97+699–701. 
For Baxandall’s period eye, see his Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy: A Primer in the 
Social History of Pictorial Style (1972, repr: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 29–108. For a 
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is mediated through the biases, tastes, and judgments of the present—as well as those of any 
individual listener—it is possible, Burstyn argues, to synthesize one’s personal perspective with 
historical evidence, thereby to approximate past attitudes and habits around this activity, first, 
and then bring this approximation to bear on the study of music, second. Burstyn summarizes the 
project as follows: 
If “historical listening” is a chimera, the only sensible, indeed, realistic approach is to 
realize that as listeners we encounter the vast musical treasures of the past from the one 
vantage point available to us—our aesthetic experience. If, however, we wish to 
understand better the ways past listeners may have perceived their music, we can enlist 
the combined resources of our historical knowledge and musical sensitivity to construct a 
hypothetical musical-mental model of listeners in a given place and time.9 
 
Albeit a mouthful, the phrase “hypothetical musical-mental model of listeners” captures well the 
object of this project’s research, with the caveat that my focus trains narrowly on the relationship 
between music and text, rather than encompassing the wider field of internal musical processes 
Burstyn envisions for his period ear like tonal orientation, mode, rhythm, consonance and 
dissonance, and so on.10  
What kind of materials can the musicologist leverage to this end? Burstyn recommends 
studying “cultural conceptions, attitudes and skills of memory, definition of 
identity/similarity/difference, and reasoning concerning cause and effect”—in short, “cognitive 
style.”11 He is reticent about what kinds of sources make possible the study of these elusive 
mental givens, however. Although only one path forward of many possible, my own project, 
 
recent discussion of some of the methodological problems involved in writing histories of listening in the 
early modern period, see Tim Carter, “Listening to Music in Early Modern Italy.” 
 
9 Burstyn, “In Quest of the Period Ear,” 695. 
 
10 Put differently, this project studies the psychology of music–text relations, and not the psychology of 
music as such, although the latter necessarily inflects the former. 
 
11 Ibid., 696. 
7 
 
again, relies on close readings of the language sixteenth-century writers used to characterize 
music–text relations in the madrigal and related genres, as well as the relationship between music 
and emotions more generally. (And as we will see, these two sides of musical discourse are 
themselves interdependent, although not always in a clear genus-to-species hierarchy.) For it is 
in habits of language, as much as through positive statements of belief, that these writers left 
clues for the elocution of the mind Burstyn would have us seek. 
 Habits of language also point to unacknowledged sources; time and again, our 
investigations will begin in musical discourse only to spill into other domains. Three domains in 
particular will invite sustained consideration: music theory, rhetoric, and poetics. The presence 
of the latter two in these pages is motivated in large part by behavior of representatives for the 
former, in particular the liberal borrowing from rhetorical manuals and poetics treatises that 
Cinquecento music theorists practiced in their efforts to better articulate the expressive side of 
musical practice. In some respects, this borrowing is old news; historians of music theory have 
for decades mined music treatises for hidden interlocutors.12 At the same time, there is more 
work to be done, especially regarding the role that vernacular translations of ancient Latin and 
Greek texts played in shaping conversations around music. These “popularizing” editions of 
ancient philosophy, I argue in chapters 2 and 3, probably influenced music theorists like Gioseffo 
Zarlino and Vincenzo Galilei.13 Shared vocabulary between, for example, the concept of “the 
 
12 For sixteenth-century music theory, the work of Claude Palisca and Martha Feldman is especially 
germane. See chapters 12 and 13 of Palisca’s Humanism in Italian Renaissance Musical Thought (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), and chapters 5 and 6 of Feldman’s City Culture and the Madrigal at 
Venice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
 
13 For this reason, my dissertation also participates, if indirectly, in the scholarly field known as 
vernacular Aristotelianism. See the editors’ “Introduction” in Luca Bianchi, Simon Gilson, and Jill Kraye, 
eds., Vernacular Aristotelianism in Italy from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Century (London: The 
Warburg Institute 2016), 1–5. 
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listener” in mid-Cinquecento rhetorical manuals and “the listener” of contemporaneous music 
treatises suggests more-than-coincidental ties, even where direct chains of influence are 
impossible to trace. As far as the search for cognitive style goes, moreover, shared vocabulary 
leaves a valuable trail of crumbs. 
 
Dramatis personae 
It is the two aforenamed theorists in particular––the Venetian maestro di cappella Zarlino 
(1517–90) and his Florentine student and sometime adversary Galilei (1520–91)––who stand at 
the center of this project, at least its chapters oriented toward theory, as protagonist and villain, 
respectively. In depth and breadth of both Classical and contrapuntal knowledge, Zarlino 
surpasses his musical brethren to a degree we are still learning to appreciate. He read Ancient 
Greek, and his main contribution to the speculative tradition—the syntonic diatonic tuning 
system, adapted from Ptolemy—planted the seed for the theory of the triad. His intimate 
knowledge of the polyphonic practice of his Venice, moreover, stands behind the best handbook 
on sixteenth-century modal counterpoint to date. In chapters 2 and 3, respectively, I examine two 
less-studied (though by no means unknown) aspects of this subtle thinker’s published corpus: his 
mimetic theory for the relationship between music and poetry, from the Sopplimenti musicali 
(1588), and his mysterious suggestions for stimulating strong emotional responses through 
music, from Le istitutioni harmoniche (1558, rev. 1573). Galilei, meanwhile, is enlisted as the 
foil to this project’s Zarlinian musical-mental models. Although rightly famous for knocking 
Pythagorean tuning theory, of which Zarlino was an important inheritor and exponent, off its 
pedestal, Galilei has earned himself a permanent place in music history textbooks for landing a 
devastating blow to the madrigalists and their eponymous ism in his Dialogo della musica 
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antica, et della moderna (1581). The legacy of Galilei’s attack on the historiography of the 
madrigalism, and on that of music–text relations in Western Art Music generally, interests me; it 
is the subject of chapter 1, and it runs as a motif through the others. Without too much 
exaggeration, in fact, one admits that chapters 2 through 4 constitute an elaborate response to his 
foundational provocation. 
But this project looks to theory primarily for what it can tell us about practice. As my 
representative from the roster of Cinquecento madrigalists, Giaches de Wert (1535–96), court 
composer for the Gonzagas of Mantua, steps up. From one perspective, the specific choice of 
composer, even of madrigal, is not so important for this project: with “cognitive style” as my 
hermeneutical hilt, the particular musical object, so to speak, matters less than the general 
conditions of musical style. To quote a musicologist tangled in similar if not identical 
methodological problems some years ago, “Widespread devices that partially disclose the state 
of musical language involved in a particular repertory or genre” will suffice.14 At the same time, 
the texture of musical experience, at least for me, lies in the details. And what details Wert 
embroidered. Among late Cinquecento madrigalists, he is praised for his vivid, “pathetic,” even 
“psychedelic” representations of text.15 For a dissertation focused on the aural experience of the 
madrigalian music–text encounter, one could do worse. But Wert does not grace these pages 
because their author likes his music; here is here because he set to music a stanza of poetry 
that—so chapter 3 argues—alludes to the same ideas about music and the emotions that stand 
behind Zarlino’s account of this subject in his aforementioned Istitutioni. In setting that stanza to 
 
14 Gary Tomlinson, Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 235. 
 
15 “Pathetic”: Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 1:570. “Psychedelic”: Susan McClary, Modal Subjectivities: 
Self-Fashioning in the Italian Madrigal (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2004), 125. 
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counterpoint, and in a fashion that demands notice, Wert linked music theory to polyphonic 
practice as few other composers of the era did.16 
Last but not least, the literary-rhetorical theorists seated in the Family Circle: Alessandro 
Piccolomini (1508–78), Francesco Buonamici (1533–1603), Lorenzo Giacomini (1552–98), 
Giorgio Bartoli (1534–83), Filippo Sassetti (1540–88), Tommaso del Nero (1545–72), and 
Bartolomeo Cavalcanti (b. 1503), among others. To these writers I look, in chapter 2, for insight, 
first, into the philosophy of representation (imitatione) as such, and second, for an audience 
psychology germane to music. When music theorists and composers began in the mid-sixteenth 
century to claim that music could “imitate” text, what did that claim mean to them? Or at the 
least, what could have it meant—to composers, to listeners? No doubt, the writers listed above 
would have disagreed with one another over the answers to these questions; in fact, they 
probably would have gathered at the Del Nero residence for a debate over the propositione “that 
imitating words with melody and harmony is nothing other than a feigning and putting before the 
eyes” to settle things.17 Unfortunately, no record of this debate survives; these gentlemen were 
not serious musical thinkers.18 But their recorded tussles over representation in poetry, painting, 
and theater reveal general attitudes toward this concept that with some methodological verve and 
imagination (see chapter 4) can productively inflect the way we understand, and listen for, 
representation in madrigals. 
 
16 This is not to imply that making such a link is an achievement for a composer; it is simply good fodder 
for the historian. 
 
17 For debating on either side of a propositione, see this dissertation’s Conclusion. 
 
18 The Florentine Accademia degli Alterati did once hold a debate, in 1574, over the proposition “that 
music is better than conversation with friends.” See n. 5 in this dissertation’s Conclusion. 
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In chapter 3, meanwhile, I ask of this group narrower questions regarding influence: 
where did Zarlino find his theory for music and the passions? From whom did he poach his 
listener concept, the perplexing soggetto ben disposto? The answer I propose to the second 
question is a concise one—the rhetorical tradition—but I set my sights broader, too, aiming to 
show that what I call the “two-stage model for emotional arousal” left its mark on a wide variety 
of Cinquecento texts, from a lecture on Aristotelian catharsis to a fictional ottava rima stanza. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
This dissertation is organized into four chapters: the first is historiographical, the second and 
third are theoretical (for the most part), and the fourth turns from theory to practice. Chapter 1 
examines the long reception history of Galilei’s aforementioned condemnation of the 
madrigalism, what I call the “Galileian critical tradition.” Stretching between 1581, when the 
Dialogo was published, and the recent past, this tradition is characterized by a striking continuity 
of negative attitudes toward the madrigal’s famous text-setting device. Galilei’s dismissal of this 
device for its inability to stimulate meaningful emotional responses in listeners proves 
particularly lasting, adapting itself to changing tastes and musical styles over the centuries. But 
while this critical judgment of the madrigalism remains constant, the language in which it is 
expressed does not. Visual metaphors, in particular, come to dominate the discussion—terms like 
word-painting, pictorialism, hypotyposis, and Tonmalerei, among others. These metaphors are 
foreign to sixteenth-century Italian sources; tracing their emergence in writings from the 
seventeenth century onward, I show how they tangle with Galileian attitudes such that visualism 
comes, in criticism on music–text relations, to be consistently associated with an expressive lack. 
(Recall Leichtentritt: “Der beliebte Tonmalerei auf sospir…fehlt nicht.”) 
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 Chapter 2 turns from the historiography of music–text relations to sixteenth-century 
discourse on that topic. Its focus is the potent potential of the phrase imitazione delle parole, or 
“imitating the words,” which emerged in mid- to late sixteenth-century musical sources as a 
novel concept for describing music’s power to represent a poetic text. The chapter nevertheless 
opens with an historiographical argument: the scholarly tendency, evidenced in recent 
musicological literature as well as older books and articles, to associate the phrase imitazione 
delle parole with the more general aesthetic concept imitazione della natura (the imitation of 
nature) has no basis in musical sources. Rather, this common association likely reflects the 
influence of the visualist strain of madrigal criticism examined in chapter 1. In place of this 
received historiography, I argue for a concept of “imitating the words” in music that reflects the 
growing dominance of Aristotle’s Poetics within intellectual circles in the late sixteenth century, 
and in particular Aristotle’s concept of mimesis (usually rendered imitatione in vernacular 
translations). Zarlino, who directly associates “imitating the words” with the mimesis from the 
Poetics, is my primary musical informant here. After close-reading Zarlino’s discussion of 
imitation in the Sopplimenti musicali, the chapter turns to those commentaries on Aristotle’s text 
Zarlino could have read to reassess this concept from its first principles. 
 The second half of chapter 2 addresses aspects of sixteenth-century theories of imitation 
related to audience psychology. I focus in particular on the psychology of pleasure, which was 
understood by the Poetics commentators to be the natural human response to imitations 
(imitationi), no matter their medium or content. Why is art produced with imitation pleasurable 
to experience? How is this pleasure squared with the Horatian end of giovamento? In my efforts 
to answer these questions, I home in on a theory of mind espoused by numerous sixteenth-
century Aristotelian commentators including Piccolomini and Buonamici, among others. This 
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theory (I call it a “quasi-logical paradigm” for aesthetic experience) postulates that spectators 
execute rapid syllogisms in their minds to recognize and appreciate the significance of mimetic 
fictions, thereby accessing a cognitively-based and ultimately beneficial diletto. In the final 
sections of the chapter, I argue that this theory of mind can inform the way we listen today to the 
imitazione delle parole in madrigals from the same period. Measures 6–10 of Giaches de Wert’s 
“Qual musico gentil” help me forward this case. 
 Where chapter 2 looks to music and pleasure, chapter 3 focuses on music’s power to stir 
stronger emotional responses in listeners—anger, joy, fear, and the like. Here, I demonstrate the 
influence of the “two-stage model for emotional arousal” on sixteenth-century musical thought. 
According to this model, which is first articulated by Zarlino in Part 2 of his Istitutioni, different 
kinds of music have different degrees of affective power: music without text “disposes the soul” 
(disporre l’animo), a relatively weak affective mechanism that inclines a listener toward an 
emotion without his or her direct knowledge, while music with text “moves the soul” (muovere 
l’animo) to the full expression of an emotion, one marked by external signs such as tears or 
laughter. In the first part of the chapter, I argue that Zarlino’s distinction between “disposing” 
and “moving” the soul reflects assumptions about emotional arousal recorded in physiological 
studies of the passions from the sixteenth century. Next, I discuss Zarlino’s relationship to the 
rhetorical tradition, which also made use of the two-stage model to formulate its own theories of 
listener response. Among other points, I demonstrate that Zarlino likely borrowed from 
vernacular commentaries on Book 2 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric to articulate his concept of the “well-
disposed listener” (soggetto ben disposto), a misunderstood aspect of his theory. In the final part 
of the chapter, I trace the afterlife of Zarlino’s two-stage model across a number of texts, 
including music theory treatises from the seventeenth century, entries in the Artusi–Monteverdi 
14 
 
polemics, and a stanza from the Gerusalemme liberata of Torquato Tasso, namely the same 
“Qual musico gentil” (16.43), which runs as a kind of motif through this dissertation. 
 Chapter 4 marshals the theoretical sources discussed in chapters 2 and 3 to establish an 
analytical framework for Cinquecento madrigals that centers listening and audience response. 
The chapter takes three madrigals from Wert’s Ottavo libro de madrigali a cinque voci (1586) as 
its focus: “Vezzosi augelli,” “Qual musico gentil,” and “Forsennata gridava.” These three 
madrigals all set texts from canto sixteen of the Gerusalemme liberata, the famous episode from 
Tasso’s epic in which the Muslim sorceress Armida seduces and detains the Christian knight 
Rinaldo on her enchanted island. The texts of each of these madrigals, already united from a 
narrative standpoint, engages with related themes; considered together, they form a beguiling trio 
on music, emotion, persuasion, pleasure, art, nature, and concealment. What is more, these texts 
thematize—to a degree that seems more than coincidental—the distinction between linguistic 
and nonlinguistic stimuli central to chapter 3’s two-stage model for emotional arousal. 
 Wert’s settings of Tasso’s stanzas, meanwhile, foreground bold contrasts of musical 
style: “Vezzosi augelli” and the first stanza of “Qual musico gentil” feature madrigalisms set to 
melismatic, imitative polyphony, while the remainder of “Qual musico gentil” and “Forsennata 
gridava” substitute madrigalisms for rhythmically varied homophonic declamation. Scholars 
have mapped these musical contrasts onto the textual one between first-person narration and 
third-person speech; madrigalisms tend to align with lines in Tasso’s poem spoken by the 
narrator, while declamation supports direct speech. With Zarlino’s two-stage model from chapter 
3 and the Aristotelian discourse around imitation from chapter 2 I offer an alternative reading. 
While its precise contours can await the chapter itself, this argument proposes that Wert’s 
techniques for representing his poetic texts respond to the emotional progressions—and not just 
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the shifting modes of speech—recorded in Tasso’s stanzas. Reformulated from the listening 
perspective, I suggest that a homology of emotional response obtains between fictional and real-
world audiences—between Rinaldo, on the one hand, and Wert’s polyphonic listeners (perhaps 
Ferrarese courtiers, who heard the Ottavo libro first), on the other. Or rephrased once again, now 
in terms Zarlino would recognize, Wert demonstrates in his cycle the art of rendering audience 
members soggetti ben disposti, listening subjects who are prepared to be moved. 
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Chapter 1: The Galileian Tradition of Madrigal Criticism 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the historiography of the Italian madrigal, few figures loom larger than Vincenzo Galilei. This 
despite the fact that Galilei did not write any noteworthy madrigals himself; his lasting 
contribution, rather, was to criticism.1 Over a few paragraphs in his 1581 Dialogo della musica 
antica, et della moderna the Florentine theorist forwarded a strident critique of the genre’s 
flagship text-setting technique that, in various guises, has continued to resound up to the present: 
… if a text introduces ideas of fleeing or flying, they [modern contrapuntists] call it 
imitating the words when they make the music move with such speed and so little grace 
that just imagining it is enough. When the words say “disappear,” “swoon,” “die,” or 
indeed “exhausted,” they make the parts suddenly fall silent so abruptly that instead of 
inducing in listeners corresponding affections, they provoke laughter and contempt and 
make them think they are almost being made fun of. When the words say “alone,” “two,” 
or “together,” they make one sing alone, or two, or all together with unaccustomed 
gallantry. Other composers set this specific line from one of the sestine of Petrarch, “And 
with the lame ox we will go chasing the breeze,” to jerking, undulating, and syncopating 
notes that make the singers sound as if they had the hiccups.2 
 
1 Galilei did publish two books of madrigals, Il primo libro de madrigali, 4, 5vv (Venice, 1574); and Il 
secondo libro de madrigali, 4, 5vv (Venice, 1587). Only the tenor part for the first book survives. See 
Claude V. Palisca, “Galilei, Vincenzo,” Grove Music Online (2001), accessed March 31, 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.10526. 
 
2 “Altra volta diranno imitar le parole, quando tra quei lor concetti vene siano alcune che dichino fuggire, 
ò volare; le quali profferiranno con velocità tale et con sì poca gratia, quanto basti ad alcuno imaginarsi; e 
intorno à quelle, che haveranno detto, sparire, venir meno, morire, ò veramente spento; hanno fatto in 
un’instante tacere le parti con violenza tale, che in vece d’indurre alcuno di quelli affetti, hanno mosso gli 
uditori à riso, a altra volta à sdegno; tenendosi per ciò d’esser quasi che burlati. quando poi haveranno 
detto, solo, due, ò insieme; hanno fatto cantare un solo, due, e tut’insieme con galanteria inusitata. hanno 
altri nel cantare questo particolar verso d’una delle Sestine del Petrarca. Et col bue zoppo andrà cacciando 
Laura, profferitolo sotto le note à scosse, à onde, e sincopando, non altramente che se eglino havessero 
havuto il singhiozzo,” quoted and translated in Claude Palisca, Music and Ideas in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 62. For the original, see Vincenzo 
Galilei, Dialogo della musica antica, et della moderna (Florence: Marescotti, 1581), 88–89. For a 
complete English translation of Galilei’s treatise, see Dialogue on Ancient and Modern Music, trans. 
Claude V. Palisca (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 
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The practice Galilei calls “imitating the words,” which is today better known by the names 
madrigalism or word-painting, comes under fire on multiple counts, but its worst failing is in the 
kind of response it provokes in audiences. Rather than moving the emotions, as music (so Galilei 
believed) ought to do, madrigalisms make them laugh. That madrigalisms provoke derision is 
thanks not only to their obviousness but also to their extravagance. Whether through “jerking” 
“undulating” or “syncopating” musical gestures, imitations of words invite composers to 
overstep the norms of expressive decorum the Florentine theorist so valued.3 
Galilei contrasts “imitating the words” to an alternate—and in his view, superior—
approach to setting text, albeit one that was only hypothetical at the time: “Expressing the 
thoughts of the mind and feelings of the soul by means of words.”4 To achieve this end, Galilei 
instructs, the composer should make an effort to imitate the sound of a speaking voice rather than 
the semantics of a text, bypassing the individual word for a more general expressive conception, 
namely the poet’s “concetto” or idea. (Specifically, Galilei recommends that musicians emulate 
the speaking styles of commedia dell’arte actors.5) And unlike the madrigalisms he so detests, 
this alternative approach to setting a text produces the effect Galilei considers music’s proper 
aim—arousing the emotions. 
A famous entry in the history of musical criticism, Galilei’s attack on the madrigalism is 
usually interpreted as a harbinger of operatic recitative, a prophecy of emergent Baroque styles 
 
3 For an insightful and comprehensive introduction to Galilei’s musical aesthetics, see Claude Palisca’s 
“Introduction” in ibid., xvii–lxix.  
 
4 “…esprimere i concetti dell’animo col mezzo delle parole,” ibid., 224 (89 in original). 
 




from a late Renaissance dissenter.6 Within twenty years, indeed, composers like Jacopo Peri, 
Jacopo Corsi, and Emilio de’ Cavalieri were experimenting, partly in response to the polemics of 
Galilei and his Florentine coterie, with a style of “musical speech”—the so-called stile 
recitativo—that accords in many respects with the theorist’s vision. But we might also profitably 
take a longer view on Galilei’s comments, one that places them not at the border between two 
periods within a teleological history of musical style but rather at the head of a long tradition of 
criticism on music–text relations in the madrigal. There, the narrative is surprisingly static. 
Allowing for changes in terminology, manner of expression, and publication venue, Galilei’s 
perspective on the so-called madrigalism—and, by extension, the genre for which it stands as an 
emblem—is still our own.  
The present chapter examines episodes between 1581 and the present in this Galileian 
critical tradition. Its aims are two: to demonstrate the continuity of Galileian attitudes within 
European and Anglo-American commentaries on music–text relations over the past five 
centuries (section 1.2); and to examine how the language in which these attitudes are expressed 
has changed over time, with a particular focus on the early emergence—and thereafter, staying 
power—of visual metaphors (section 1.3). In the final part of the chapter (section 1.4), I consider 
some of the consequences of this tradition for Italian madrigal historiography. There, I suggest 
that Galilei and his inheritors have unduly influenced the way we understand, discuss, and listen 
to madrigalisms. In so doing, I aim to clear space for the case studies that follow in chapters 2 
through 4, which revisit this musical phenomenon from alternative sixteenth-century 
perspectives, in particular philosophies of mimesis and emotion.  
 
6 See, e.g., Palisca, Music and Ideas, 62–64; and Richard Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music 
(2005; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1:797–834. 
19 
 
From a broader perspective, the survey of Galileian criticism that follows introduces a 
general preoccupation of this dissertation with how written discourse determines our present 
understanding of past musical practices. And if this chapter is concerned solely with the 
discourse around certain musical techniques—with theorizing, if not music theory as such—the 
following ones attempt to connect theory to practice on the assumption that a reexamination of 
the language emic to sixteenth-century discussions of music–text relations will open up new 
avenues for analyzing and listening to those relations within madrigals themselves. 
 
1.2 A History of Unease 
To appreciate the full chronological sweep of the Galileian tradition, we can do no better than 
call up the authoritative voice of Richard Taruskin, who finds himself in The Oxford History of 
Western Music in open agreement with his Florentine forebear: 
But Galilei had a certain point in ridiculing “madrigalisms”: they are indirect and 
artificial imitations, based on analogies—i.e., shared features—rather than homologies, 
real structural congruities. As such they are like plays on words, or witticisms. Depending 
on mechanisms of wit, they can be taken as humor—and indeed, we often do react to a 
madrigalism, even a serious one, the way we do to a joke: we laugh with delight when we 
“get it.”7  
 
Taruskin’s critique of the madrigalism draws on concepts—artifice, analogy, structure—foreign 
to or unused by Galilei. But like him, Taruskin points to listener response as the critical measure 
of music. And for both, the madrigalism is found wanting because it provokes laughter. 
How did we get here? Although Taruskin writes as if he is in direct, unmediated dialogue 
with a sixteenth-century source, his judgment of the madrigalism is of-a-piece with the previous 
century’s attitude toward this device, where scholarly commentaries often recall the spirit if not 
 
7 Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, 1:801. This book was first published in 2005. 
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the letter of Galilei’s critique. In his article “The Madrigal” from the 1924 Musical Quarterly, for 
example, Alfred Einstein avers that “tone-painting [in the madrigal] is naïve, and may be so of 
right, because the madrigal in general, as an organ of expression, bears a sentimental character.”8 
Twenty-five years later, in his benchmark three-volume The Italian Madrigal, Einstein’s word 
choice is unchanged: “For, generally speaking, [tone-painting] is not painting with an emphasis 
on feeling as it is in the music of some of our great lyricists, for example Schubert. It is rather a 
naïve representation, an appeal to the imagination which the sixteenth century permitted itself, 
confident that the medium of music, the musical element as such, sufficed to stimulate feeling.”9 
Tone-painting, Einstein’s term for the madrigalism, stifles feeling; truer expression awaits in the 
form of Schubertian art song.10 Likewise for Charles Van den Borren, writing in 1930, the 
madrigalism is but a primitive step in the direction of a more developed form of musical 
expression that arrives only with the first operas: “As can be seen from a detailed study of the 
[madrigal] repertoire of the time, there is an indirect and naïve attempt to establish an artificial 
correspondence between music and what it is desired to express…in any event, it cannot be…a 
subjective expression of a personal nature.”11 
 
8 Alfred Einstein, “The Madrigal,” trans. Theodore Baker, The Musical Quarterly 10, no. 4 (October 
1924): 480.  
 
9 Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 1:244. (This book was never published in German.) Einstein also 
describes the madrigalism as “naïve” in his analysis of the prima parte of Giaches de Wert’s “Qual 
musico gentil,” a madrigal I analyze in chapter 4: “The first stanza [of the madrigal] is full of ‘objective’ 
tone-painting—one might even call it ‘naïve,” (ibid., 2:570). 
 
10 “Tone-painting,” from the German Tonmalerei, is a now-dated name for the madrigalism/word-painting 
stemming from 18th-century German music criticism, where it referred to instrumental or vocal music’s 
capacity to evoke objects of sight or hearing. I discuss Tonmalerei in more detail below. 
 
11 “Comme on peut le voir par l’étude détaillée du répertoire de l’époque, il y a là une tentative indirecte 
et assez naïve d’établir une correspondance artificielle entre la musique et ce que l’on désire qu’elle 
exprime…En toute hypothèse, il ne peut s’agir…d’une expression subjective à caractère personel,” 
Charles Van den Borren, “Le madrigalisme avant le madrigal,” in Studien zur Musikgeschichte: 
Festschrift für Guido Adler zum 75. Geburtstag (Vienna: Universal-Edition A. G., 1930), 78.  
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In their dualistic attitude toward techniques of musical expression and emotional 
arousal—with madrigalisms or tone-painting on one side, and a loose category of more 
expressive music on the other—these scholars are, if in a less overt way than Taruskin, in 
dialogue with Galilei.12 The madrigalism can be funny or witty, but it cannot move the soul; it is 
too obvious, or “naïve.”13 Examples from the musicological literature could be replicated. 
Musicologists are hardly unique inheritors of Galilei’s critique, however, but rather participants, 
whether wittingly or not, in a much longer musico-critical tradition, one that until the twentieth 
century took shape in writings outside the domain of the madrigal proper. Although this tradition 
intersects with a wide swath of European writings on music–text relations, a passing glance at 
some of its highlights will allow us to appreciate its striking continuity.  
The formal aesthetics treatise was one important venue. There, Galilei’s distinction 
between imitating words (parole) and ideas (concetti) was taken up as one case of a more 
fundamental opposition between musical “imitation” and musical “expression,” words that were 
essentially interchangeable to Galilei but which had solidified by the mid-eighteenth century into 
distinct concepts for the way music relates to nature and the passions.14 In eighteenth-century 
writings on the aesthetics of vocal music, for example, imitation is often associated, in a 
 
 
12 This is not to say that these scholars were themselves as reductive or totalizing as Galilei. 
 
13 Van den Borren and Einstein do differ considerably from Galilei in their perspectives on music history: 
where they look ahead for models of ideal expression in music—to opera and Schubertian art song, 
respectively—Galilei looks backward, to the music of ancient Greece. 
 
14 The literature on imitation and expression in the history of music aesthetics is vast. For an introduction 
and overview of the principal sources in the eighteenth century, see Edward Lippman, A History of 
Western Musical Aesthetics (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 83–136. On the 
interchangeability of mimetic vocabulary (imitation, expression, representation, and so on) in the early 
modern period, see Stephen Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 346–51. Halliwell in fact holds up Galilei’s polemic as a 




Galileian vein, with obvious or heavy-handed text-setting techniques, while expression is linked 
to subtler or more powerful musical styles. Eighteenth-century English critic Charles Avison 
expresses these associations clearly: 
As Dissonance and shocking Sounds cannot be called Musical Expression; so neither do I 
think, can mere Imitation of several other Things be entitled to this Name, which, 
however, among the Generality of Mankind hath often obtained it. Thus the gradual 
rising or falling of the Notes in a long Succession, is often used to denote Ascent or 
Descent, broken Intervals, to denote an uninterrupted Motion, a Number of quick 
Divisions, to describe Swiftness or Flying, Sounds resembling Laughter, to describe 
Laughter; with a Number of other Contrivances of a parallel Kind, which it is needless 
here to mention. Now all these I should chuse to stile Imitation, rather than Expression; 
because, it seems to me, that their Tendency is rather to fix the Hearers Attention on the 
Similitude between the Sounds and the Things which they describe, and thereby to excite 
a reflex Act of the Understanding, than to affect the Heart and raise the Passions of the 
Soul.15 
 
Avison’s list of offending “Imitations” recalls Galilei’s more-or-less directly, even if a shift has 
taken place in the psychology of listener response the theorist attributes to them. Where Galilei 
dismisses musical imitations of words because they induce laughter or, in a different passage, 
“delight the hearing” (this latter phrase being almost always pejorative in Cinquecento musical 
discourse), Avison holds that they “excite a reflex Act of the Understanding” whereby the 
listener assimilates, in virtue of some perceived “Similitude,” the relationship between musical 
gesture or harmony and text. In other words, they stimulate the mind, not merely the “ear.”16 
 
15 Charles Avison, An Essay on Musical Expression (London: C. Davis, 1752), 57–58. Although it is 
unclear from this quotation alone that Avison is describing vocal music in particular, rather than 
instrumental music, a few pages later he describes how the musician should capture the “Poet’s general 
drift or Intention” rather than merely his “words.” It was not until later in the century that “imitation” and 
“expression” were pitted against each other as categories for instrumental music. 
 
16 On music “delighting the hearing,” Galilei writes: “For it is unthinkable that modern music could aspire 
to or succeed in it [marvelous effects], since its goal is only to delight the hearing, while that of the 
ancient was to lead others by its means into the same affection as one felt oneself” (non havendo ella 
modo di poterlo pensare non che conseguire; per essere non altro il fine di questa che il diletto dell’udito, 
e di quella il condurre altrui per quel mezzo nella medesimo affettione di se stesso), Dialogue on Ancient 
and Modern Music, trans. Palisca, 224 (89 in original). 
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Avison nevertheless finds this response wanting, for the listener’s “Attention will be turned 
entirely on the Composer’s Art, which must eventually check the Passion.”17 Music that aims, by 
contrast, “not principally to dwell on particular Words in the Way of Imitation, but to 
comprehend the Poet’s general Drift or Intention” achieves what Avison calls “true Musical 
Expression,” which moves the emotions.18 If some of its particulars have mutated, Galilei’s basic 
opposition between parole and concetti thus remains intact. 
Another important venue for Galileian criticism, especially in the nineteenth century, was 
the middlebrow music journal. There, in addition to direct quotations from treatises like Avison’s 
Essay, one frequently reads lines that express Galilei’s opposition between parole and concetti 
literally. So, for example, the anonymous author of “On Musical Effect,” from 1838, opines, 
“What has generally misled the musician, in vocal music…has been the mistaking of words for 
ideas; or rather the over-nice observance of words in regard to accent and syllabic length, as well 
as their abstract definition, while the general spirit of the music, and the general sentiment of the 
poetry, seems to have been overlooked.”19 The usual litany of musical offenses—“flying, dying, 
crying, &c.”—follow.20 Likewise William Jackson in an 1849 letter to The Message Bird: “The 
most common mistake of composers is to express words and not ideas….There is no trap so 
 
17 Avison, Essay, 61–62.  
 
18 Ibid., 61. 
 
19 E., “On Musical Effect,” The Musical Review and Record of Musical Science, Literature, and 
Intelligence (January 1, 1838): 147. In quoting from a variety of other treatises and essays (including 
Avison’s), E.’s essay shows the extent to which the opposition between words and ideas was a kind of 
critical refrain in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., the quote from Algarotti, who writes, “The duty of a 
composer is to express the sense, not of this or that particular word, but the comprehensive meaning of all 
the words in the air” (149). To be clear, I am not arguing that any of these authors were directly 
influenced by Galilei’s Dialogo; rather, my point is that his critique of the madrigalism is the first one in 
the history of European music criticism (that I know of) to explicitly frame music–text relations vis-à-vis 
the opposition between words and ideas, and that this opposition proved long-lasting. 
 
20 Ibid., 148, quoting an 1807 essay by John Hubbard. 
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likely to catch composers as the words high and low, down and up.”21 In general, these authors 
do not delve into the psychology of listener response associated with these techniques; the 
aesthetic worth of each is taken as self-evident. As the title of “On Musical Effect” makes clear, 
however, the contest between words and ideas as objects of musical representation continued to 
be judged, centuries on, at the court of listener response.  
As we have seen, this opposition between two kinds of listener responses—themselves 
linked to two opposed, if often vaguely defined, musical styles—eventually filtered into 
academic scholarship on the madrigal, where it has, at least for some, continued to steer the 
reception of the genre in recent years. Within the specialized domain of academia, Galilei’s 
critique has also expressed itself in new ways over the past century. In studies of madrigalisms 
themselves (usually located in composer-centered articles and monographs), for example, a kind 
of offshoot of Galilei’s opposition has nested itself within one half of the original one, wherein 
some madrigalisms are seen as effective vehicles for moving or expressing the emotions and 
others are dismissed as trite. The former are often said to capture the essence of an emotion 
through concise musical means (usually dissonance), while the latter are criticized for a 
perceived overdependence on an analogy, often a visual one, between music and word. Charles 
Van den Borren might have been the first scholar to articulate this taxonomy of the madrigalism 
overtly, albeit without placing the two categories in a hierarchy (recall that he dismisses all 
madrigalisms as “naïve”). In the 1930 article cited above, he contrasts madrigalisms that “strive 
to translate a visual impression” to those “of an emotional order.”22 Einstein expresses a related 
 
21 [William Jackson], [Section] Letters by Jackson, of Exeter, The Message Bird: A Literary and Musical 
Journal 1, no. 6 (October 1849): 91. 
 
22 Full passage: “Le ‘mot’ ser de truchement à la ‘chose’: ou bien la ‘chose’ est purement matérielle, et, 
dans ce cas, le ‘mot’ qui évoque sa vision donne naissance à une formule musicale qui s’efforce à traduire 
cette impression visuelle; ou bien elle est d’ordre affectif, et alors le ‘mot’ se transpose, musicalement, en 
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if not identical stance in the section “The Rise of Pathos” in his The Italian Madrigal. Tracing an 
increase in extravagant madrigalisms like wide leaps and unprepared dissonances among 
composers who set the epic poetry of Tasso in the 1580s and 90s, he avers that “the symbol is 
giving way to naturalism, to genuine passion,” thereby positing a chronological progression from 
affectively neutral techniques of musical representation to passionate ones.23 (For Einstein, 
“symbolism” could connote both Augenmusik—i.e., notation punning—and more traditional 
madrigalisms like ascending scales on caeli and the like.) 
But, in recent years, the most influential expositor of this dualistic taxonomy—visual 
versus emotional—has been Gary Tomlinson, who first introduced the opposition between 
madrigalisms that move the emotions and those that stimulate a visual impression in a footnote 
to his 1982 article “Music and the Claims of Text: Monteverdi, Rinuccini, and Marino”: 
A “madrigalism” is a musical device constructed to reflect the meaning of the word or 
phrase it sets. The term was derived by musicologists from the polyphonic madrigal of 
the sixteenth century, where such devices frequently occur. As the related descriptive 
phrase ‘word painting’ suggests, many madrigalisms depend for their significance on the 
listener’s perception of a more or less straightforward visual correlation between musical 
gesture and textual meaning (e.g., an ascending scale at the words “He rose to heaven”). 
Such madrigalisms I qualify as ‘pictorial.’ In their static, iconic character, pictorial 
madrigalisms are inimical to musical idioms of heightened emotion. Other madrigalisms 
depend on no such visual adjuncts but constitute a direct translation of the emotional 
charge carried by the text into musical terms (e.g., unprepared dissonances or harsh 
harmonic juxtapositions at a word like ‘alas!’) Such ‘affective madrigalisms’ always 
played an important role in Monteverdi’s most impassioned styles; a famous example is 
the beginning of Ariadne’s lament [emphasis added].24 
 
 
une forme dans laquelle apparaît le rudiment d’une psychologie particulière,” Van den Borren, “Le 
madrigalisme avant le madrigal,” 79. Borren’s analysis of the madrigalism vis-à-vis “words” and “things” 
is a gloss on Lassus’ preface to his First Book of Madrigals. 
 
23 Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 2:571. 
 
24 Gary Tomlinson, “Music and the Claims of Text: Monteverdi, Rinuccini, and Marino,” Critical Inquiry 
8 no. 3 (Spring 1982): 585–86, n. 26. 
26 
 
Where Galilei sees all imitations of words as “inimical to musical idioms of heightened 
emotion,” Tomlinson censors only the so-called pictorialisms. Affective madrigalisms, on the 
other hand, receive Tomlinson’s approval—an approval here indicated by Tomlinson’s citation 
of Monteverdi’s Lament of Ariadne, a perennial critical darling and Tomlinson favorite. And if 
Tomlinson’s categories, buried in a footnote, read as an aside to his article’s analysis, they come 
to play a larger role, and one with higher stakes, in his later scholarship, especially Monteverdi 
and the End of the Renaissance.25 There, Tomlinson criticizes whole swaths of Monteverdi’s 
madrigals, especially the Giambattista Marino settings from his Seventh Book of Madrigals, for 
an overemphasis on pictorial representation at the expense of affective expression.26 For 
Tomlinson, pictorial madrigalisms offend because of their tendency to dislodge a poem’s 
semantic content from its syntactical context, thereby reducing fluid verse to a series of 
disconnected “images.” And in so doing, he argues, they sap music of its rhetorical and 
expressive potential. 
 
1.3 Visualism and the Madrigalism 
This “nested Galileian opposition” within Tomlinson’s work, which departs from Galilei in 
obvious respects but maintains his skeptical attitude toward a certain class of madrigalisms, 
 
25 Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). Tomlinson gives a nearly 
identical gloss of his madrigalism categories on pp. 62–63. 
 
26 See ibid., chapter 7, where Tomlinson writes (172): “And objective, image-laden description in 
[Marino’s] texts quickly led Monteverdi to impassive musical depiction: pictorial madrigalisms, which 
play but a small part in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books, return in full force in Book VII.” Tomlinson’s 
negative judgment of these pictorialisms is elsewhere more overt: with Book VII, Monteverdi “turned to 
the Marino of current fashion, in the process revealing the powerful urge to keep abreast of new 
developments that would sustain him throughout the last years of his career—and in the process, one 
cannot but feel, substituting at least in part the dictates of fashion for those of a deeply held expressive 
ideal” (ibid., 167). 
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raises the important question of how visualism came to play such a central role in madrigal 
criticism.27 Visual metaphors, which pervade the language musicologists have adopted over the 
past century to discuss music–text relations in the Italian madrigal, are for the most part absent in 
sixteenth-century Italian writings on the subject. (Galilei, for one, never speaks of 
“pictorialisms” or “word-painting.”28) Despite this conspicuous absence in the historical record, 
a glance at the Grove Music Online entry on word-painting—the standard catchall term 
musicologists have adopted for the madrigalism (both “affective” and “pictorial”) across style 
periods and genres—may give readers a false impression: 
Word-painting was discussed by numerous Renaissance theorists in their search for a new 
poetics (rather than science) of music. Thus musical art might be considered to imitate 
nature and also enter the Trivium alongside rhetoric. Nicola Vicentino (L’antica musica 
ridotta alla moderna prattica, 1555) argued…that ‘music is written for words for no 
other purpose than to express [esprimere] the idea [concetto], the passions [passioni] and 
the affections [effetti] of these words by means of harmony’. German theorists in 
particular sought to determine a taxonomy of musical poetics: according to Joachim 
Thuringus (Opusculum bipartitum, 1624) there are three categories of words that may be 
‘expressed and painted’ by means of music, including ‘words of affection’ (‘weep’, 
‘laugh’, ‘pity’), ‘words of motion and places’ (‘leap’, ‘cast down’) and ‘words of time 
and number’ (‘quickly’, ‘twice’).29 
 
27 Throughout the following section, I use the words “visualism” and “visualist” to refer to the dominance 
of vision as a metaphor for knowledge in Western thought. This dominance is arguably reflected in the 
critical tradition around the madrigalism examined here. In so doing, I follow Gary Tomlinson’s use of 
this word in Music in Renaissance Magic (see especially the discussion at 134–44). Others use the term 
“ocularcentrism.” See, for example, Brian Stonehill, “The Debate over ‘Ocularcentrism,’” Journal of 
Communication 45, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 147–52. 
 
28 In his famous critique, Galilei does refer in one place to musical “painting,” but there to dismiss the 
word “blue” (“azzura” [sic]) as a possible object of musical representation: “There has been no lack of 
even more corrupt composers who sought to paint the words ‘azzurra’ (blue) and ‘pavonazza’ (peacock-
blue) with notes that sound like the words, not unlike the way present-day stringmakers color gut strings” 
(non sono mancati di quelli, che hanno come piu vitiati, cercato di dipignere [sic] con le note, la voce 
azzurra e pavonazza secondo il suono delle parole, non altramente che colorischino hoggi le corde 
d’intestini, gli artefici di esse), Dialogue on Ancient and Modern Music, trans. Palisca, 224 (89). The 
meaning of this sentence is unclear to me; regardless, my point is that Galilei does not regularly use the 
verb dipingere for devices we would today call word-painting or pictorialism. 
 
29 Tim Carter, “Word-painting,” Grove Music Online (2001), accessed May 6, 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.30568. Carter appears to have mixed up Thuringus 




That this paragraph, which purports to establish an historical basis for the concept of word-
painting in Renaissance musical thought, cites the obscure music theorist Joachim Thuringus is 
surely thanks to his use of the verb “paint”; as the quotation from Nicola Vicentino suggests, one 
does not generally find these metaphors in Italian writings from the same period.30 There is in 
fact a sizeable gap between the modern concept of word-painting, itself usually defined as a 
correlation between some musical gesture and the word or phrase it sets, and the language 
typically used by Cinquecento writers to characterize music–text relations.31 Beyond the general 
absence of visual terms in their discussions, Italian theorists tended to be leery of the taxonomies 
we have observed in the writings of Van den Borren and Tomlinson. For them, devices that we 
would today place under different headings fall instead under the purview of broad concepts like 
“expression,” “imitation” (recall that Galilei calls the technique “imitating the words”) and 
 
Johannes Nucius, Musices poeticae sive de compositione cantus (Niesse, 1613), G3v, where Nucius writes 
of the so-called verba affectuum, “quae ipso sono et notarum varietate sunt exprimenda et pingenda.” 
There is considerable overlap between Thuringus and Nucius’ treatises, but, as Dietrich Bartel notes, 
Thuringus only borrows some of the verba affectuum: see Dietrich Bartel, Musica Poetica: Musical-
Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 308. For 
the passage in question, see Joachim Thuringus, Opusculum bipartitum (Berlin, 1624), 126, at “Quid est 
parthopoeia? [sic]” 
 
30 A notable exception is Gioseffo Zarlino, who invokes the rhetorical topos of enargeia or evidentia 
(defined below) in a few places in Le istitutioni harmoniche (1558). See Giuseppe Gerbino, ‘Bringing 
before the Eyes’: De Rore, Enargeia, and the Power of Visual Imagination,” Journal of the Alamire 
Foundation 10, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 11–26. The poetic phenomenon Zarlino associates with this topos, 
however, does not correspond to the technique of word-painting, at least not directly. More than that, 
Zarlino associates enargeia with raising the passions, while the Galileian critical tradition, by contrast, 
decouples visualism in music from strong emotional responses, on which topic see this chapter’s 
conclusion. 
 
31 The Grove Music Online entry defines word-painting as “The use of musical gesture(s) in a work with 
an actual or implied text to reflect, often pictorially, the literal or figurative meaning of a word or phrase” 
(Carter, “Word-painting”). Exactly what “reflect…pictorially” means is left unstated. As of May 10, 
2020, Wikipedia defines word-painting as “the musical technique of composing music that reflects the 
literal meaning of a song’s lyrics.” (The article has been flagged as “need[ing] additional citations for 




“accommodation.”32 The text-setting recommendations in Vicentino’s treatise that follow the 
sentence quoted in the Grove Music Online entry, for example, encompass a variety of music–
text relationships that overlap with both of Tomlinson’s categories.33 In fact, these writers do not 
even appear to think of what we now call word-painting as a “device,” a word that connotes a 
discreteness foreign to the more fluid terms in which the Cinquecento conceptualized and 
discussed music–text relations.34 
But word-painting is the concept we live with now. Where did it come from, if not Italy? 
The Thuringus citation points the way: without too much risk of overgeneralization, it is fair to 
say that the visualist tradition of madrigal criticism begins in earnest with the treatises of those 
seventeenth-century German music theorists who adapted classical rhetorical figures (Latin: 
ornamenta) to music, including both Thuringus and the better-known Joachim Burmeister, 
among others.35 As scholars like Dietrich Bartel have documented, these so-called musica 
poetica theorists devised a taxonomy of “figures of harmony” and “figures of melody” modeled 
on the figures of speech and figures of thought from rhetoric. Like them, the musical figures 
name techniques that fall outside the norms of the prevailing compositional style, or elocutio.36 
 
32 I delve into the terminology Cinquecento music theorists used to characterize music–text relations in 
the introduction to chapter 2. 
 
33 See Nicola Vicentino, Ancient Music Adapted to Modern Practice, trans. Maria Rika Maniates (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 270 (Part 4, chapter 29). 
 
34 I return to this point in the conclusion; see especially the James Haar quote on p. 46, below. 
 
35 For an introduction to the German musica poetica theorists, see Patrick McCreless, “Music and 
Rhetoric,” in The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory, ed. Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 854–72. As McCreless observes (855), Burmeister and his followers 
did no less than inaugurate the modern practice of music analysis. 
 
36 Bartel, Musica Poetica. In his own Musica poetica of 1606, Burmeister defines ornamentum as “a 
passage, in harmony as well as in melody, which is contained within a definite period that begins from a 
cadence and ends in a cadence; it departs from the simple method of composition, and with elegance 
assumes and adopts a more ornate character” (tractus musicus, tam in harmonia, quam in melodia, certa 
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The names themselves, moreover, are in many cases borrowed directly from their rhetorical 
counterparts—analepsis, mimesis, hyperbole, to name a few. And while most of the early 
seventeenth-century figures name melodic or harmonic procedures unrelated to text-setting, at 
least one—hypotyposis—concerns music–text relations. Moreover, as scholars have observed, it 
anticipates the modern concept of word-painting in clear ways.37  
Burmeister, the first writer to coin a musical hypotyposis, defines this figure, in his 
Musica poetica of 1606, as “that ornament through which the meaning of the text is revealed 
(deumbratur) such that those things in the text that are not living [i.e., inanimate] seem to 
possess life.”38 With its verb deumbratur (literally, “to de-shadow”) and reference to “making 
the lifeless seem living,” Burmeister’s definition is a clear adaptation of rhetorical hypotyposis, 
which is catalogued in manuals as a technique of vivid description aimed at “animating the 
lifeless” and/or (depending on the source) bringing events described “before the eyes” of the 
listener.39 Quintilian’s definition reads as follows: 
 
periodo, quae a clausula initium sumit et in clausulam desinit, circumscriptus, qui a simplici 
compositionis ratione discredit, et cum virtute ornatiorem habitum assumit et induit), Musical Poetics, 
trans. and ed. Benito V. Rivera (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 154–57. Regarding the word 
ornamentum, David Lloyd Angles cautions, “The term ‘ornaments’ is not to be confused with our modern 
understanding of ornamentation, such as trills, mordants, etc. Musical ornaments are not extraneous to the 
music, or purely decorative in nature, but have a direct effect upon musical syntax.” See “The Rhetoric of 
the Madrigal: Musical and Rhetorical Figures in Monteverdi’s Madrigali guerrieri, et amorosi (1638)” 
(PhD diss., The University of Western Ontario, 2001), 23, n. 40. 
 
37 See, e.g., Arno Forchert, “Madrigalismus und musikalisch-rhetorische Figur,” in Die Sprache der 
Musik: Festschrift Klaus Wolfgang Niemöller zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Jobst Peter Fricke (Regensburg: 
Gustav Bosse, 1989), 151–169, and the literature cited therein. 
 
38 Musical Poetics, trans. Rivera, 175 (Latin text on p. 174: “Hypotyposis est illud ornamentum, quo 
textus significatio ita deumbratur ut ea, quae textui subsunt et animam vitamque non habent, vita esse 
praedita videantur.”) 
 
39 In his Joachim Burmeister. Ein Beitrag zur Musiklehre um 1600 (Kassel and Basel, 1955), Martin 
Ruhnke identified Burmeister’s sources as Melanchton’s Institutiones Rhetoricae and reworkings of that 
text by Lucas Lossius. 
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As for what Cicero  calls “putting something before our eyes,” this happens when, instead 
of stating that an event took place, we show how it took place, and that not as a whole, 
but in detail. In the last book I classified this under evidentia. Celsus actually calls the 
Figure evidentia, but others prefer hypotyposis, that is, the expression in words of a given 
situation in such a way that it seems to be a matter of seeing rather than of hearing: “He 
came into the forum, ablaze with criminal madness; his eyes were afire, cruelty showed 
in his whole expression.”40 
 
With its emphasis on showing rather than telling and seeing rather than hearing, 
Quintilian’s hypotyposis has clear resonances with the modern concept of word-painting, whose 
name is similarly suggestive of a sensory transfer from ears to eyes. (Whether that transfer 
occurs in the mind of the composer, the notes on the page, or the ears of a listener is usually left 
unstated.) In introducing his own version of the figure in the Musica poetica, Burmeister thus 
laid the groundwork for the modern concept, even if he did not explicitly adopt either a painting 
metaphor or the “bringing before the eyes” trope.41 (He does, however, invoke both in the 
Musica autoschediastikē of 1601, albeit without reference to hypotyposis, specifically.42) 
Furthermore, although he does not elaborate in prose the techniques whereby a poetic text may 
be “de-shadowed” in music, Burmeister cites as examples four passages from motets by Orlande 
de Lassus that clearly correspond to the modern concept. More than that, Burmeister’s examples 
align with the species of madrigalism Tomlinson calls pictorial: two of the Lassus examples are 
 
40 The Orator’s Education, Volume IV: Books 9–10, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 57 (9.2.40). 
 
41 In “Madrigalismus und musikalisch-rhetorische Figur,” Arno Forchert somewhat perplexingly takes 
issue with the equation scholars tend to make between Burmeister’s hypotyposis and word-painting, 
noting that Burmeister’s definition of the figure omits references to the image-making or “seeing through 
hearing” tropes commonly seen in rhetorical definitions of the figure (see 160–64). He also points out that 
Burmeister seems unaware of the text-expressive practices in the 1580s Italian madrigal, limiting himself 
instead to citations of Lassus motets. This is all fair. At the same time, it is clear that by coining 
hypotyposis Burmeister laid the groundwork for the eventual emergence of the concept “word-painting” 
in musical discourse.  
 
42 See the extract from this treatise quoted in Don Harrán, Word-Tone Relations in Musical Thought from 




straightforward melismas on the verb laetentur (rejoice), another records a shift from duple to 
triple time at gaudebit (he will rejoice), while a third articulates a rhythmic contrast from fast-
moving notes to slow-moving ones between laborem (toil) and dolorem (anguish; see example 
1.1). All four examples, in other words, involve rhythmic transformations rather than harmonic 
ones, a choice perhaps reflective of Burmeister’s “animation” metaphor. 
 
Example 1.1  “Deus qui sedes,” Orlande de Lassus, Sacrae cantiones quinque vocum (1562), 







la bo- rem,- - - - la bo- - -
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Notably absent from Burmeister’s discussion of hypotyposis is any reference to moving 
the emotions, despite the close association of hypotyposis and its related figures with that office 
in the rhetorical tradition.43 For Burmeister, the power to move instead goes to pathopoeia, “a 
figure suited for arousing the affections, which occurs when semitones that belong neither to the 
mode nor the genus of the piece are employed and introduced in order to apply the resources of 
one class to another.”44 (In short, pathopoeia is chromaticism.) And while Burmeister does not 
define this ornament as a principle of music–text relations, as he does hypotyposis, a quick 
glance through his examples, which are again drawn exclusively from Lassus motets, confirms 
that this device occurs only at emotionally-charged phrases in the text: Burmeister flags passages 
on the words crudelem mortem (cruel death), dolose agebant (they acted deceitfully), Mulier 
 
43 See Gerbino, “‘Bringing before the Eyes,’” 14: “In all its shades of meaning, enargeia is associated 
with the reciprocal relation between mental visualization and emotion.” 
 
44 “Pathopoeia παθοποιία est figura apta ad affectus creandos, quod fit quando semitona carmini 
inseruntur, quae nec ad modum carminis, nec ad genus pertinent, sed unius beneficio in aliud 
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quid ploras? (woman, why do you lament?) and et flebant (and they wept) as examples of the 
figure.45  
 Zooming out, what emerges from Burmeister’s two figures is a schematization of music–
text relations that not only anticipates the modern concept of word-painting in obvious ways but 
also aligns with Tomlinson’s two varieties of madrigalism, the affective and the pictorial—
themselves, as we have seen, derived from earlier scholarly accounts like Van den Borren’s. 
Hypotyposis animates a text, primarily through rhythmic contrasts and melismas, thereby 
engaging listeners’ visual imaginations; pathopoeia introduces chromatic melodic motion, 
thereby moving their emotions. The split between hypotyposis and pathopoeia, in other words, 
mirrors the “nested Galileian opposition” in twentieth-century musicological commentaries on 
the madrigalism, not only with respect to the musical techniques these figures name but also with 
regard to the varieties of listener response they are said to provoke. For both Burmeister and 
Tomlinson, that is, the semitone is the musical marker of pathos, while the melisma provokes a 
visual response.46 It would nevertheless be unwise to put too much stock into Burmeister’s 
reticence regarding the emotional charge of hypotyposis.47 He certainly does not, like Tomlinson, 
criticize the figure on grounds of failing to engage the emotions, and there is no evidence to 
suggest that he viewed the figure anything but positively. All the same, it is surely 
 
45 It is also worth noting that pathopoeia and hypotyposis are adjacent to one another in the Musica 
poetica, indicating that they form a pair. 
 
46 Of course, Tomlinson emphasizes vertical semitones—i.e., dissonances—while Burmeister only 
mentions melodic ones. One of Burmeister’s examples of pathopoeia does include suspensions, however. 
(See example B.44 on p. 278 in Musical Poetics, trans. Rivera.) 
 
47 Brian Vickers notes that, in addition to being ignorant of the late Cinquecento madrigal, Burmeister “is 
unaware of the increasing stress in rhetoric on the ways in which rhetorical figures should describe and 
arouse strong feelings.” See Vickers, “Figures of Rhetoric/Figures of Music?” Rhetorica: A Journal of the 
History of Rhetoric 2, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 37. 
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noncoincidental that the European theorist responsible for establishing the conceptual 
foundations of word-painting does so within the parameters of a dualistic taxonomy that 
anticipates the one we still live with, even if some of the details differ. 
 
 To trace the complete path from Burmeister’s hypotyposis and pathopoeia to 
Tomlinson’s pictorial and affective madrigalisms would require its own study; an examination of 
two intervening points in that history will help us to see it in outline. One is nineteenth-century 
rhetorical manuals. Although outside musical discourse proper, these manuals offer an origin 
story for the exact phrase “word-painting” while also serving as a possible bridge between 
Burmeister’s nascent seventeenth-century musical poetics and the fully-fledged taxonomies of 
twentieth-century musicologists. The bridge itself is unsurprising: “Word-painting” was a 
standard English translation in the nineteenth century for hypotyposis, evidentia, and their kin. I 
have found this usage of the phrase as early as 1862; the definition of word-painting in James De 
Mille’s 1878 Elements of Rhetoric is typical:  
Rhetoric, under its conception as belles-lettres, and as a fine art, may be considered as 
analogous sometimes to painting, and at other times to music. It assimilates itself with the 
art of painting where a portrayal is made by vivid description, so that the scene lives 
before the mind, and the artist can easily reproduce it to the eye. The truth of this 
resemblance is expressed by the very term commonly applied to this kind of writing, 
“word painting.”48 
 
Although its Latin and Greek equivalents go unmentioned, De Mille’s definition of word-
painting is clearly derived from the classical figures for vivid description; he proceeds to offer a 
 
48 James De Mille, Elements of Rhetoric (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1878), 265. De Mille, who 
lived in Canada, is known today primarily for his fiction. For the 1862 reference to word-painting, see 
Philip Gilbert Hamerton, A Painter’s Camp in the Highlands, and Thoughts About Art, vol. 2 (London: 
MacMillan and Co., 1862), chapter 5 (“Word Painting and Colour Painting”). 
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conventional example of the genre with a lengthy quotation from John Ruskin.49 At the same 
time, De Mille does not seem to be aware of any parallel usage of the phrase “word-painting” in 
music. In fact, quite the opposite, for De Mille explicitly contrasts word-painting, which he sees 
as the link between literature and the visual arts, to a rhetorical figure he calls “the music of 
words.” This latter figure, he explains, is “brought about when the writer devotes much attention 
to the music of his words and the rhythmic flow of his sentences; so that in the very sound there 
is something that affects the ear and helps the meaning by its suggestiveness.”50 Where word-
painting stimulates the mind’s eye through an accumulation of detail, the music of words 
engages the ear through sonority and rhythmic play, “help[ing] the meaning” of those words. The 
exact mechanism by which the latter occurs is nevertheless left unspecified. De Mille’s phrasing 
is almost mysterious: “Something”—what?—“affects the ear.”51 
A more thoroughgoing account of word-painting is found in Agnes D. B. Atkinson’s essay 
“On Word-Painting” from 1892, which elevates this concept from a rhetorical technique to a 
“literary faculty,” in particular, “this gift of calling up before the mental vision, by means of 
words, the image of a scene, whether of landscape or of dramatic actions, with its pictorial and 
 
49 Among the nineteenth-century literary critics I have consulted, Ruskin’s prose seems to have been the 
gold standard for word-painting. As Alexandra Wettlaufer notes, however, “Ruskin himself strenuously 
resisted this designation. In 1874 he wrote to a friend who was working on an abridged anthology of 
passages from Modern Painters: ‘I was a little scandalized at the idea of your calling the book 
‘wordpainting.’ My dearest Susie, it is the chief provocation of my life to be called a “word painter” 
instead of a “thinker.”’” In the Mind’s Eye: The Visual Impulse in Diderot, Baudelaire and Ruskin 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003), 244.  
 
50 De Mille, Elements of Rhetoric, 265–66. 
 
51 De Mille’s “music of words” figure has intriguing resonances with the sixteenth-century Italian 
commentaries on the musical properties of language discussed in Giuseppe Gerbino, “Music of Words 




emotional significance.”52 Atkinson also characterizes word-painting as an art form with a 
history subject to change over time “as the pendulum of taste swings to and fro”; in her article, 
she catalogues examples of the art from Homer to Ruskin.53 Although her comments do not offer 
insight into this concept’s relation to music—like De Mille, she treats it as a literary technique 
that borrows from the visual arts, not music—Atkinson’s praise of word-painting’s “pictorial and 
emotional significance” (emphasis added) seems worth noting if only for its divergence from the 
strain of madrigal criticism we have been tracing through this chapter. When used properly, that 
is, literary word-painting not only stimulates readers’ visual imaginations but also moves their 
emotions; the two go hand-in-hand. As noted previously, this positive attitude toward the role of 
the imagination in emotional response is a staple of the rhetorical tradition around hypotyposis 
and its related figures but for the most part absent within the Galileian critical tradition, where 
visual representation is consistently decoupled from affective expression. 
 
 How and when—or if—the phrase “word-painting” made the jump from literary criticism 
to musical discourse remains elusive; nevertheless, the correspondence between Burmeister’s 
hypotyposis and Atkinson and De Mille’s “word-painting” suggests that it could have been a 
straightforward matter of translation. Somewhat complicating this hypothesis, however, is the 
closely related but distinct term Tonmalerei, or tone-painting, our second intervening point in the 
path from Burmeister to Tomlinson. In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German music 
criticism, this word refers to the capacity of music, whether instrumental or vocal, to evoke 
 
52 Agnes D. B. Atkinson, “On Word-Painting,” The Portfolio: An Artistic Periodical 23 (January 1892): 
206. The close association Atkinson posits between vivid description as an art and the artist/orator’s 
lively imagination stretches back to ancient times, on which see Kathy Eden, Poetic and Legal Fiction in 
the Aristotelian Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 71–72. 
 
53 Atkinson, “On Word-Painting,” 206. 
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“external” objects of the senses, especially objects found in nature (bird calls, the motion of 
water, and so on).54 For this reason, it played a role in eighteenth-century debates over the 
relative merits of musical “imitation” and “expression,” and, in the nineteenth century, related 
quarrels over program music and absolute music.55 What Tonmalerei is, in which contexts it may 
be used properly, its relationship to the emotions—all were up for discussion.56  
On the whole, these debates have little to do with the history of madrigal criticism per se. 
As Susan McClary has observed, however, they are suffused with anxieties around musical 
 
54 Grove Music Online’s entry on Tonmalerei is a stub: “The depiction or imitation of optical and auditory 
events, impressions, sensations etc., particularly those found in nature or in everyday life; its nearest 
English equivalent is Word-painting. See also Symphonic poem.” “Tonmalerei,” Grove Music Online 
(2001), accessed May 21, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.28134. 
 
55 For a good introduction to these debates, see Mark Evan Bonds, Absolute Music: The History of an 
Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), Part III.  
 
56 I have not yet traced the first use of the noun Tonmalerei (often just Malerey) in music criticism. 
Important early discussions of this concept include Johann Jakob Engel’s Über die musikalische Malerey 
(Berlin, 1780), the two entries “Mahlerey” (2:738–39) and “Gemähld in Musik” (1:455) in Johann Georg 
Sulzer’s Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der 
Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden Artikeln abgehandelt (Leipzig, 1771–4), and the entry “Malerey, 
oder musikalische Gemälde” (cols. 924–25) in Heinrich Christoph Koch’s Musikalisches Lexicon 
(Frankfurt am Main: August Hermann der Jüngere, 1802). For Sulzer’s entries in English translation, see 
Nancy Baker and Thomas Christensen, eds., Aesthetics and the Art of Musical Composition in the 
German Enlightenment: Selected Writings of Johann Georg Sulzer and Heinrich Christoph Koch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 89–91.  
 Criticism of Haydn’s two late oratorios The Creation (1798) and The Seasons (1801) was an early 
flashpoint in tone-painting discourse; for a discussion, see Thomas Tolley, Painting the Cannon’s Roar: 
Music, the Visual Arts, and the Rise of an Attentive Public in the Age of Haydn (London: Routledge, 
2001), chapter 7. A famous example of nineteenth-century Tonmalerei anxiety is Beethoven’s expressive 
marking at the start of his Pastoral Symphony (1808), “Mehr Ausdruck der Empfindung als Malerey,” 
which scholars have linked Engel’s treatise; see Shelley Davis, “Engel, Johann Jakob,” Grove Music 
Online (2001), accessed May 15, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.08801. On 
Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony marking, see also Elaine Sisman, “Beethoven’s Cavatina, Haydn’s 
Seasons, and the Thickness of Inscription,” in The New Beethoven: Evolution, Analysis, Interpretation, 
ed. Jeremy Yudkin, Eastman Studies in Musicology (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2020), 
483–89, who draws attention to the problems for its interpretation posed by Beethoven’s birdsong labels 
in the second movement. I am grateful to Elaine Sisman for sharing this chapter with me prior to 
publication. For a synoptic overview of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century debates around 
tone-painting with reference Engel, Sulzer and others, see Richard Will, The Characteristic Symphony in 




representation that call Galilei to mind.57 For her part, McClary notes a parallel between Galilei’s 
condemnation of the pictorialism’s tendency to license otherwise indecorous musical gestures 
(recall the “syncopating,” “undulating,” and “jerking” syncopations that so perturb him) and the 
disdain of absolute music apologists for the formal experiments of composers like Liszt and 
Berlioz, who in a similar way used programs to license their departures from prevailing stylistic 
norms like sonata form. For mine, I would add that discussions of Tonmalerei’s relationship to 
the emotions also reflect what we might loosely call a Galileian bias. In his essay “Über 
Tonmalerei” of 1825, for example, the critic and composer Gottfried Weber explicitly associates 
tone-painting with unserious musical styles, defining this technique as “the striving of the 
composer to generate the representation (Vorstellung) of external objects of hearing or sight 
through musical tones, certainly not belonging to the noble, high, lofty, or pathetic style, but 
rather in tune with a naïve, humorous, comic, burlesque, and (generally speaking) not high-
pathetic one.”58 (“Naïve” and “humorous” are, as we have seen, staples of the Galileian critical 
tradition.) In a footnote that expands on this definition, Weber explicitly contrasts Tonmalerei 
with techniques aimed at expressing emotions: 
This is indeed the actual definition of the concept “tone-painting”; namely, I place the 
expression “external objects of the hearing and sight” against expressions of feeling. To 
express feelings is, where not the only, at least the most characteristic job of music, and 
insofar as [music] expresses feelings—or, as it were, paints feelings—such painting is in 
no way “tone-painting” in this sense of the word; rather, [tone-painting is] when [music] 
 
57 McClary, Modal Subjectivities, 124–25. See also Bonds, Absolute Music, 127, who also perceives a 
Galileian connection in the nineteenth-century debates. 
 
58 “das Bestreben des Tonsetzers, die Vorstellung äusserer Gegenstände des Gehöres oder Gesichtes 
durch musikalische Töne zu erzeugen, im edleren, höheren, erhabneren, pathetischen Style allerdings 
nicht zu Hause gehören, wohl aber im naiveren, humoristischen, komischen, burlesken und überhaupt 
jedem nicht hochpathetisch gestimmten,” Gottfried Weber, “Über Tonmalerei,” Cäcilia: Eine Zeitschrift 
für die musikalische Welt 3 (August 1825): 126. Except where noted, all translations from German are 
mine. Galileian anxieties are also evidenced in Sulzer’s two entries on tone-painting; see n. 56. 
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wants to emulate objects of sensory perception—the ascent of the moon’s disk, the luster 
of rising light, rolling thunder, battle- and hunting-related tumult, and the like.59 
 
Even if his reasoning differs considerably from Galilei’s, Weber’s valuation of “expressions of 
feeling” (Ausdrücken von Empfindungen) over and above Tonmalerei echoes Galilei’s judgment 
of concetti as superior objects of musical representation to parole in virtue of the former’s ability 
to stimulate emotional responses when imitated properly. (To gesture toward that reasoning: 
Weber views Tonmalerei as the analogue in music to pre-linguistic modes of human 
communication, especially hand gestures and mimetic cries. In virtue of this “primitive” 
connection, Tonmalerei should be confined in musical compositions only to humorous 
contexts.60) The musical phenomenon they both criticize is, moreover, about the same: Weber’s 
 
59 “Das ist ja wohl die eigentliche Definition des Begriffes Tonmalerei. Ich stelle nämlich den Ausdruck 
‘äussere Gegenstände des Gehöres und Gesichtes’ den Ausdrücken von Empfindungen entgegen. 
Empfindungen auszudrücken, ist eben, wo nicht der einzige, doch wenigstens der eigenthümlichste Beruf 
der Tonkunst, und soweit sie Empfindungen ausdrückt oder, wenn man so sagen will, Empfindungen 
malt, ist solches Malen keineswegs Tonmalerei im hier fraglichen Sinne des Wortes; wohl aber, wenn sie 
äussere Gegenstände sinnlicher Wahrnehmung durch Töne nachbilden will, das Aufsteigen der 
Mondesscheibe, den Glanz des über dem Chaos aufgehenden Lichtes, das Rollen des Donners, Schlacht- 
und Jagdgetümmel u. dgl.,” ibid., 126–27. 
 
60 To expand in a bit more detail on the differences between Weber and Galilei’s conceptions of musical 
representation: in the first place, Weber, unlike Galilei, sees tone-painting as a viable technique when 
used properly—i.e., when deployed within burlesque and comic contexts. (Hence he dismisses, on pp. 
130–31, passages featuring the technique in a Mass by Gossec, but praises a passage in Don Giovanni 
featuring tone-painting because it is sung by Leporello—see p. 141.) Second, the grounds for Weber’s 
association of tone-painting with humor differ considerably from Galilei’s, themselves left unspecified in 
the Dialogo. (As I have suggested above, decorum seems like the best interpretive framework for 
Galilei’s anxiety around madrigalisms, along with a concern for text intelligibility.) Drawing from a 
Herderian theory of language (as noted by Nicholas Mathew; see below), Weber sees tone-painting as the 
musical analogue to those “primitive” gestures, both physical and sonic, people used to communicate in 
ancient times before language first emerged—for example, raising the hand up high, mimicking the sound 
of a lion, and so forth. In short, he yokes musical tone-painting to natural signs (“näuturliche, lebendige 
Zeichen,” p. 127). The emergence of language, which according to Weber is constituted of arbitrary signs, 
obviated the need for humans to communicate with natural signs, and thus when educated men do use 
natural signs nowadays to communicate, they do so properly “nur im Komischen, ja im 
Niedrigkomischen oder Burlesken…im Humoristischen, im Naiven, u. dgl.” (130). For a short discussion, 
see Nicolas Mathew, “History under Erasure: ‘Wellingtons Sieg,’ the Congress of Vienna, and the 
Ruination of Beethoven’s Heroic Style,” The Musical Quarterly 89, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 24–25. Needless 
to say, Weber’s framework for Tonmalerei also differs considerably from the rhetorical one around 
hypotyposis and literary word-painting, which is concerned not with the character of linguistic or musical 
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examples of tone-painting are, allowing for inevitable differences in style, genre, and so on, no 
different in premise from the practices Galilei knew. 
In an even clearer way, Weber’s schema anticipates Tomlinson’s subordination of 
pictorialisms to affective madrigalisms on the grounds that the former are “inimical to musical 
idioms of heightened emotion.”61 And at the linguistic level, at least, there is a possible through-
line from the one to the other via early twentieth-century German musicologists, who regularly 
use the word Tonmalerei in articles on the madrigal: Adolf Sandberger, Hugo Leichtentritt, and 
Alfred Einstein, to take three examples, all use the term in articles from 1907, 1910, and 1913, 
respectively.62 It should not surprise us, furthermore, if connections between nineteenth-century 
critics and twentieth-century musicologists reach beyond words to ideas. In “Claudio Monteverdi 
als Madrigalkomponist,” from 1910, Hugo Leichtentritt reserves Tonmalerei and tonmalerisch 
for those passages in Monteverdi’s madrigals that evoke objects of sight or hearing—in addition 
to qualities like sweetness—via melismas, rests, or unexpected harmonies like those resulting 
from the introduction of E-flat. These techniques, needless to say, correspond both to Weber’s 
Tonmalerei and Tomlinson’s pictorial madrigalism. For Monteverdi’s use of chromaticism and 
unprepared dissonance (what Tomlinson would later call the affective madrigalism), by contrast, 
Leichtentritt uses the adjective “pathetisch”—but not “tonmalerisch.”63 More important than the 
 
signs per se but rather with those signs’ ability to stimulate listeners’ or readers’ visual imaginations 
and/or emotions when used properly.  
 
61 Tomlinson, “Music and the Claims of Text,” 586, n. 26. 
 
62 Adolf Sandberger, “Roland Lassus’ Beziehungen zu Frankreich und zur französischen Literatur,” 
Sammelbände der Internationalen Musikgesellschaft 8, no. 3 (1907): 355–401; Leichtentritt, “Claudio 
Monteverdi als Madrigalkomponist”; Alfred Einstein, “Augenmusik im Madrigal,” Zeitschrift der 
Internationalen Musikgesellschaft 14 (1912–13): 8–70. 
 
63 Of Monteverdi’s “Ohimè se tanto amate,” from Book 4, for example, Leichtentritt writes that it is “in 
the pathetic declamatory style of Monteverdi’s best works. The piece is full of freely-treated dissonances, 
melodic seventh leaps, and unusual chordal sonorities” (im pathetisch deklamierenden Stil eines der 
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fact of terminological overlap with Weber, which is not too surprising, is the manner in which 
Leichtentritt deploys the term: throughout, he uses Tonmalerei casually, suggesting that by the 
early twentieth century to write of musical “painting” demanded little fanfare, much less a 
formal definition like Weber’s. 
Alfred Einstein uses the word Tonmalerei in a similarly casual way throughout his 1913 
article “Augenmusik im Madrigal,” the majority of which was later transplanted word-for-word 
(albeit in English translation) into The Italian Madrigal. Einstein’s language is in fact saturated 
with visualism throughout; in one place, he goes so far as to characterize the late Cinquecento 
madrigal repertory writ large as a “veritable hunt for images” (wahren Jagd nach Bildern).64 In 
elaborating this point, moreover, Einstein invokes Galilei’s famous critique in a manner that 
brings us full circle: 
In any case this hunt for images had already found, by 1581, a sharp and spirited 
opponent in Galilei. We can summarize his critique by saying that in setting poetry it is 
not the musical representation (versinnlichen) of single images (Bildern) that matters, but 
rather the poetic model’s dramatic essence as spoken by a person who is in such-and-such 
a mood. This is his answer in the Dialogo (p. 89) to the question, “Da chi possino i 
moderni prattici imparare l’imitazione delle parole.” In so doing, musicians will get away 
from their childish paintings (kindischen Malereien) and come nearer to the correct 
expression “di qual si voglia…concetto che venire gli potesse tra mano.”65 
 
besten Monteverdi’schen Stücke. Von frei einspringenden Dissonanzen, Septimensprüngen, 
ungewöhlichen Akkordverbindungen (trotz bescheidener Anwendung der Chromatik) ist das Stück voll), 
“Claudio Monteverdi als Madrigalkomponist,” 281. 
 
64 Einstein, “Augenmusik im Madrigal,” 19.  
 
65 “Jedenfalls hat auch diese Jagd nach Bildern schon 1581 in Galilei einen scharfen und gesitvollen 
Gegner gefunden. Seine Kritik läßt sich dahin zusammenfassen, daß es nicht gelte, bei der Komposition 
eines Gedichtes einzelne Bildern musikalisch zu versinnlichen, sondern daß man auf den dramatischen 
Kern der poetischen Vorlage zurückgehen müsse, sie gleichsam einer so oder so gestimmten Person in 
den Mund zu legen habe. Man vergleiche in seinem Dialogo S. 89 seine Antwort auf die Frage, “Da chi 
possino I moderni prattici imparare l’imitazione delle parole.” Dann wede man von solchen kindischen 
Malereien abkommen und sich dem richtigen Ausdruck “di qual si voglia…concetto che venire gli 
potesse tra mano” nähern,” ibid., 19–20 (emphasis in original). My translation is based closely on the 
parallel passage in The Italian Madrigal at pp. 242–43, which appears to have been translated from a 
nearly-identical German original. Absent in that book, however, is Einstein’s memorable phrase “Jagd 




Parole versus concetti: Einstein’s interpretation of Galilei here differs little from our own. But 
there is a difference all the same: Einstein summarizes what he considers to be Galilei’s 
perspective using visual metaphors that, as noted previously, are absent from the Dialogo itself. 
Instead, that language is a product of the long tradition, stretching back at least to the seventeenth 
century, of discussing musical representation, whether of individual words or “objects of sight 
and hearing,” in visual terms. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
The foregoing historiography raises a number of questions, some of which will be discussed in 
the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. To my mind, the most important question is the 
relationship between the emotions and the musical technique that has been variously called 
imitating the words, hypotyposis, Tonmalerei, word-painting, and the madrigalism. As we have 
seen, the Galileian critical tradition dismisses any meaningful relationship between the two: in 
their childlike or “naïve” character, madrigalisms at best delight listeners and at worst insult 
them. This dismissal originated with Galilei himself, and it has echoed down the centuries. But 
Galilei is only one listener, and his perspective does little to explain the proliferation of this 
technique in the madrigal of the late Cinquecento. What might composers and listeners have 
found valuable about it? What did they hear that Galilei did not?  
 The role of visualism, especially painting metaphors, in the decoupling of madrigalisms 
from the emotions is another important issue, albeit one that pertains less to the sixteenth century 
than later ones. As mentioned previously, the rhetorical tradition from Aristotle onward prizes 
 
Malereien” is translated as “childish attempts at literal representation.” (The English term “tone-painting” 
is, however, used throughout that book.) 
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techniques of visualization as an effective means for moving the emotions, which, along with 
instructing and delighting, is one of the three traditional offices of rhetoric.66 There is some 
evidence that sixteenth-century Italian writers who invoke these topoi of visualization—Zarlino, 
for example—sit comfortably within this rhetorical tradition.67 As we have seen, however, from 
at least the eighteenth century onward the relationship between “painting” in music and moving 
the emotions rests on shaky ground. Even those writers who endorse the technique, like Johann 
Jakob Engel, offer restrictive advice for its use on the assumption that music must always be 
written in the service of movere.68 In the historiography of the Italian madrigal, the tendency to 
decouple musical painting from emotional response culminates with Tomlinson’s condemnation 
of pictorial madrigalisms as “inimical to musical idioms of heightened emotion,” but it is also 
felt in subtler habits of language, as when Einstein places the words “kindischen Malereien” on 
Galilei’s tongue. Why is a technique so valued in oratory and prose writing consistently 
dismissed as ineffectual in music? (Of course, the techniques themselves are hardly comparable. 
So then why have they been given the same name?) As this question pertains more to the 
historiography of the madrigal than to sixteenth-century discourse around the genre, it is not 
 
66 For the three aims of rhetoric, see Quintilian, Institutio Oraotria 8 (Prooemium, 7); or Cicero, De 
Optimo Genere Oratorum 1.3–4: “The supreme orator, then, is the one whose speech instructs, delights, 
and moves the minds of his audience,” On Invention. The Best Kind of Orator. Topics, trans. H. M. 
Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 357. 
 
67 See Gerbino, “‘Bringing before the Eyes.’” Zarlino invokes this rhetorical figure in reference to the 
sonorities of poetry, i.e., word-sound. 
 
68 According to Tomas Tolley, Engel’s Über die musikalische Malerey “takes a…positive view of the role 
of painting in music, but still emphasizes that ‘the composer should always paint feelings rather than 
objects of feelings,’” Painting the Cannon’s Roar, 273. Weber seems to take issue with Engel when he 
delimits tone-painting to the musical representation of objects of sight and hearing, writing, “and insofar 
as [music] expresses feelings—or, as it were, paints feelings—such painting is in no way ‘tone-painting’ 
in this sense of the word” (see above, p. 39). 
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addressed substantively in the pages that follow. (It is, however, one to which I would like to 
return in the future.) 
 A third issue raised in both eighteenth- and nineteenth-century accounts of tone-painting 
and in recent scholarship on the madrigal is the nature or character of madrigalian “signs” 
themselves, what we might call the semiotics of the madrigalism. Are madrigalisms, to borrow 
Weber’s terms, “natural, living signs”; “arbitrary, conventional signs”; or some combination of 
both? Over the years, musicologists have given different answers to this question, just as in 
previous centuries it was debated with respect to tone-painting in instrumental genres.69 
Although an important one, it is not my intention to wade into this debate. It is not clear that 
these distinctions mattered to the sixteenth-century writers with which this dissertation’s 
subsequent chapters are concerned; at the least, they did not discuss music–text relations in 
semiotic terms. (When they did pen loose taxonomies of musical representation, Italian theorists 
tended, instead, to categorize techniques according to the affections.) Moreover, assimilating 
madrigalisms to one kind of sign or the other can entail an implicit valuation—for example, 
natural signs as primitive and arbitrary ones sophisticated.70 Although not addressing the issue of 
semiotics, specifically, James Haar elegantly warns against the impulse to taxonomize—and 
 
69 The most substantive conversation around this topic in the past thirty years has centered on the 
explanatory power of Foucault’s theory of the “episteme,” from The Order of Things, for techniques of 
musical representation in the Renaissance and early Baroque periods. See Tomlinson, Music in 
Renaissance Magic; Tim Carter, “Resemblance and Representation: Towards a New Aesthetic in the 
Music of Monteverdi,” in Con che soavità: Studies in Italian Opera, Song, and Dance, 1580–1740, ed. 
Iain Fenlon and Tim Carter, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 118–34; and, for a critique of Tomlinson’s 
argument, Karol Berger, “Contemplating Music Archeology,” The Journal of Musicology 13, no. 3 
(Summer 1995): 404–23. 
 
70 Musicologists are, of course, aware of this danger, and Tomlinson, for one, goes to great lengths in 
Music in Renaissance Magic to distance himself from it.  
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judge—in summing up the various techniques by which music and text relate to one another in 
the mid-Cinquecento madrigal: 
We see in this apparently naive combination several kinds of response to words in tone, 
where, I think, the sixteenth century saw only one, with appearance, sound, and meaning 
all fused rather than being distinct characteristics; and I think we must be careful not to 
look with a patronizing eye on an attitude toward verbal and musical language different 
from our own. To the end of the Renaissance, composers went on thinking that the way to 
capture the essence of a poem was to bring to musical life the affetti of individual words 
and phrases, and they continued to use a mixture of what we consider naive and 
sophisticated methods to do so.71 
 
Following Haar’s advice, the pages that follow do not categorize madrigalisms or judge 
them according to the standards of later repertories. Nor do they attempt to trace a broader shift 
between the way music and text relate over time in the madrigal or other genres. As this 
dissertation’s Introduction has previewed, they ask instead how meaning is created in the mind 
of a listener; semiosis rather than semiotics is their subject. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 
question how auditory and mental processes of signification can, according to Cinquecento 
philosophers who addressed this subject, stimulate various kinds of emotional responses, ranging 
from subtle cognitive pleasure to deeply felt sadness or joy. For if there is one lacuna in the 
Galileian critical tradition more conspicuous than the others, it is a lack of attentiveness to 
emotions themselves: what they are, what causes them, their degrees of intensity and qualitative 
differences, their utility or danger.  
Subtle cognitive pleasure is tackled in the next chapter (for sadness and joy, readers may 
skip to chapter 3). First, however, it remains for us to consider the historiographical legacy of the 
phrase Galilei himself adopted to name the musical object of his disdain: imitare le parole. 
 
71 James Haar, Essays on Italian Poetry and Music in the Renaissance, 1300–1600 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1985), 111. 
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Chapter 2: “Imitating the Words” in Music and the Psychology of 
Pleasure in the Poetics Commentary Tradition 
 
2.1 Introduction: “Imitazione della natura at all costs”1 
In Part 4, chapter 32, of Le istitutioni harmoniche, Gioseffo Zarlino offers advice to composers 
on how to set words to music. By means of changes in harmony, hexachord, and rhythms, the 
composer must 
accompany, as far as he can, each word, such that when it denotes harshness, hardness, 
cruelness, bitterness, and other similar things, the harmony should be similar to it; that is, 
somewhat hard and harsh, but not to the degree that it offend. Similarly, when one of the 
words demonstrates tears, sadness, grief (cordoglio), sighs, tears, and other similar 
things, the harmony should be full of sadness.2 
 
In describing the composer’s task as the accompanying (accompagnare) of the words of a text –
and elsewhere as the “accommodation” (accommodare) of them—Zarlino uses the language of 
rhetorical decorum.3 As the speechwriter accommodates the style of his oration (verba) to its 
subject matter (res)—and accommodating both of these to the speech’s time and place of 
delivery, its audience, and other factors—so does Zarlino’s musician match his harmonies and 
 
1 Alfred Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 1:233. 
 
2 “…accompagnare in tal maniera ogni parola, che dove ella dinoti asprezza, durezza, crudelità, 
amaritudine, e altre cose simili, l’harmonia sia simile a lei, cioè alquanto dura, e aspra; di maniera però, 
che non offendi. Simigliantemente quando alcuna delle parole dimostrarà pianto, dolore, cordoglio, 
sospiri, lagrime, e altre cose simili; che l’harmonia sia piena di mestitia,” Gioseffo Zarlino, Le istitutioni 
harmoniche (Venice: Francesco dei Franceschi, 1573; first ed.: Venice: n.p., 1558), 4.32.339. For all 
citations of Zarlino’s treatises throughout this dissertation, I use the following citational format: Book (or 
Part), chapter, page. Except where noted, all citations from Zarlino’s Istitutioni (hereafter abbreviated Ist. 
harm.) are taken from the 1573 edition, which makes small revisions to the 1558 edition. All translations 
of Italian texts in this dissertation are mine except where noted. 
 
3 For accommodare, see, e.g., the title Part 4, chapter 32: “In What Way Harmonies Should Be 




rhythms to his chosen words, resulting in a decorous alignment.4 Don Harrán’s compendium of 
primary-source excerpts, Word-Tone Relations, confirms that the language of decorum underlies 
the similar text-setting prescriptions of many of Zarlino’s contemporaries.5 This common usage 
reflects decorum’s ubiquity in sixteenth-century Italian culture, which looked to rhetoric as a 
guide to both civic and intellectual life: decorum’s injunctions to “accommodate” and 
“moderate” infused discourses ranging from the art of painting to that of the courtier.6  
By 1588, when Zarlino published his response to Vincenzo Galilei’s Dialogo della 
musica antica, et della moderna, the Sopplimenti musicali, his framework for the musical 
expression of words had shifted noticeably. Now the composer, like the poet, imitates: 
For as it is conceded to the poet to imitate things with words accommodated to verse…so 
is it conceded to the musician and melopoeist (melopeio) to imitate with melody and 
harmony, in the best way he can, that which the words contained in the text express, 
which [text] he wants to express in song (canto).7 
 
 
4 For decorum or propriety in Roman rhetorical theory, see (among others) Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 
11.1. The essential study on decorum in Zarlino’s Istitutioni, understood there primarily as a Ciceronian 
principle of expressive moderation and variety, is Feldman, City Culture, chapter 6. In this case, however, 
Zarlino learned his lesson from Horace: just prior to introducing the text-setting prescriptions reproduced 
above, he quotes Ars poetica 89 (“Versibus exponi Tragicis res Comica non vult”). See Ist. harm. 
4.32.319. 
 
5 See Don Harrán, Word-Tone Relations in Musical Thought, 364–84. 
 
6 For decorum as a principle in painting, see Rensselaer W. Lee, Ut Pictura Poesis: The Humanistic 
Theory of Painting (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1967), 34–41; and Mark W. Roskill, Dolce’s 
“Aretino” and Venetian Art Theory of the Cinquecento (New York: College Art Association of America, 
1968).  
 
7 “percioche si com’al Poeta è concesso d’imitar le cose con parole accommodate nel Verso…così è 
concesso al Musico e Melopeio, imitar con la Modulatione e con l’Harmonia; con quel modo migliore 
ch’ei può fare, quello che esprimono le parole contenute nell’Oratione, la quale vuole esprimere col 
canto,” Sopplimenti musicali: Terzo volume (Venice: Francesco dei Franceschi, 1588), 8.11.316. Zarlino 
defines melopeio a few pages later as “the making, crafting, or designing of the kind of song treated in 
this book” (Fattione, Fabrica, ò Fattura di Canto, la qual si tratta in questo Libro), Sopplimenti musicali 
8.11.318. In short, he seems to mean polyphonic composition. See also n. 51 below. 
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For the precise method of “imitating with melody and harmony,” Zarlino refers his readers back 
to Part 4, chapter 32, of the Istitutioni harmoniche,8 indicating that his ideal of text expressivity, 
despite its new conceptual clothes, is unchanged in its practical prescriptions for the composer, 
which include setting “hard”- and “harsh”-connoting words (like aspro) with vertical intervals 
including major seconds and thirds, and “soft” and “sad” ones (like dolce) with their minor 
equivalents.9 The two passages’ agreement on the means for text expression, indeed, belies the 
conceptual gap between them—between decorum in the Istitutioni, on the one hand, and 
imitation in the Sopplimenti, on the other. In part because of their prescriptive identity, in fact, 
this difference has been overlooked by scholars, more than one of whom has transported the 
imitation described explicitly in Book 8, chapter 11, of the Sopplimenti back into Part 4, chapter 
32, of the Istitutioni, despite its absence there as a strong theoretical construct.10 Don Harrán, for 
example, writes that Zarlino “did not refer to imitation by name [in Part 4, chapter 32, of the 
Istitutioni], but that the doctrine lay at the heart of his discussion is clear from his remarks in the 
Sopplimenti musicali.”11 Paolo Cecchi, in an otherwise sensitive account of Zarlino’s position, 
 
8 “Thus it is necessary that [the composer] understand what is involved in this “imitation”—of which I 
have spoken sufficiently (I believe) in chapter 32 of the Fourth Part of the Istitutioni” (Onde è necessario 
ch’egli intenda quello che concorre in cotale Imitatione; delche ne hò parlato (com’io credo) à sufficienza 
nel Cap. 32 della Quarta parte delle Istitutioni), Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.316. 
 
9 His text-setting prescriptions there also include advice on matching rhythms to words. For a 
thoroughgoing analysis of these prescriptions, see Timothy McKinney, Adrian Willaert and the Theory of 
Interval Affect: The ‘Musica nova’ Madrigals and the Novel Theories of Zarlino and Vicentino 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 56–93. 
 
10 The phrase imitare le parole is used once in the Istitutioni (1558 ed.: 4.32.340), along with one instance 
of the phrase imitare il soggetto contenuto nella oratione (1558 ed.: 3.66.263), so clearly the idea of 
“imitating the words” was in the air in the 1550s. What changes in the Sopplimenti, as we will see below, 
is (1) a new emphasis on imitation—it now titles and frames a chapter on music–text relations—and (2) 
an assimilation of imitation to Aristotle’s concept of mimesis from the Poetics. 
 
11 Don Harrán, In Search of Harmony: Hebrew and Humanist Elements in Sixteenth-Century Musical 
Thought (Neuhausen-Stuttgart: American Institute of Musicology/Hänssler-Verlag, 1988), 121. 
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similarly describes the theorist’s text-setting rules in the Istitutioni as a prescription for 
“imitation,” even while also acknowledging that the word itself only appears with any 
consistency in the later treatise.12 
 This tendency, which seems borne of a desire for conceptual tidiness rather than a 
misreading of Zarlino as such, speaks to imitation’s status in musicological writing writ large as 
a transparent historical or “emic” category for the text-setting device whose critical legacy we 
examined in chapter 1: word-painting. The basic compatibility between word-painting and the 
imitation described in Book 8, chapter 11, of the Sopplimenti is, indeed, clear, for both concepts 
refer to the local matching of rhythms and harmonies to the meaning of the words they set. To 
my mind, however, two problems adhere to the treatment of imitation in recent music 
historiography, both of which, while exemplified by scholarship on Zarlino, have implications 
beyond him. First, it is worth considering that imitation only emerges as a commonplace 
descriptor for music–text relations—usually within the phrase imitazione delle parole (and 
variants)—in music treatises of the late sixteenth century: witness, among others, Zarlino (1588), 
Vincenzo Galilei (1581), Giovanni Gabrieli (1587), Pietro Cerone (1613), and G.B. Magone 
(1615) using it in their treatises and dedicatory prefaces, but not Zarlino (1558), Adrianus 
Coclico (1552) or Giovanni del Lago (1540) in theirs, all of whom describe music–text relations 
using the language of decorum.13 In taking imitation for granted as a conceptual given for the 
 
12 Paolo Cecchi, “Il rapporto tra testo letterario e intonazione musicale nei teorici italiani di fine 
Cinquecento,” in Claudio Monteverdi: Studi e prospettive, ed. Paola Besutti, et al. (Florence: Leo S. 
Olschki, 1998), 549–604. Cecchi alludes to the possibility of the present project (tracing the increasing 
influence of the Poetics on Zarlino’s thought) at 561, n. 34. 
 
13 See the excerpts from these treatises in Harrán, Word-Tone Relations in Musical Thought, 364–84. For 
the Gabrieli citation, see Cecchi, “Il rapporto tra testo letterario e intonazione,” 562, n. 36. Nicola 
Vicentino is an exception; see his L’antica musica ridotta alla moderna prattica (Rome, 1555), 4.29.85, 
with my n. 27, below. Decorum did not disappear as a metalanguage for music–text relations even as 
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whole period, musicologists have lost sight of its novelty at the time of its emergence within 
musical discourse in the mid- to late sixteenth century. In the case of Zarlino, the rare theorist 
whose publications span this transitional period, we have neglected the possibility that his 
position may have changed over time in response to wider cultural currents. What might 
“imitating the words” have meant at a time when imitation itself was the subject of rigorous 
debate in literary communities? Why was it a newly attractive concept for characterizing music’s 
relationship to text? That Zarlino in 1558 advised composers to “accommodate” their texts, and 
in 1588 to “imitate” them, in other words, is a shift worth exploring. 
The second problem, which motivates the core inquiry of this chapter, relates to the 
meaning of the latter concept. In musicology, imitation is often described as a singular “doctrine” 
(see Harrán’s quote above, for example), when it is better characterized as a loose family of 
concepts that are related to varying degrees. The would-be “imitator” in Cinquecento Italy—say, 
a literary academy member who dabbles in music—has options. He can imitate in the rhetorical 
sense by modeling his writing on that of great authors of the past (in rhetoric, Quintilian’s theory 
of imitatio; in music, the practice of polyphonic modeling or “parody”); he can imitate 
contrapuntally by writing two similar, overlapping lines of polyphony (imitatione or fuga); he 
can imitate according to the sense used by Plato in the Republic, Book 3, by writing first-person 
dialogue in place of third-person narration (imitazione as a translation of Plato’s mimesis, in 
contrast to narrative diegesis, a distinction mainly relevant to theories of poetry); he can imitate 
in the manner of Aristotle’s Poetics by fashioning a verisimilar artistic fiction in a particular 
 
imitation emerged, however: see, e.g., Pontio (1588) and Morley (1597) in the section of Harrán’s Word-
Tone Relations in Musical Thought cited at the top of this note. 
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medium (imitazione for Aristotle’s mimesis); or he can strive in his art to “imitate nature” (imitar 
la natura or ars imitatur naturam)—among others.14 
On the ground, these strands of imitation were not always clearly distinguished from one 
another, and sometimes their differences were willfully flattened. Representative in this regard 
are the many Cinquecento commentaries on the imitation of the Republic and the Poetics that 
attempt to harmonize the discrepancies between Plato and Aristotle’s treatments of the subject, 
often at the expense of offering a clear-eyed exposition of either.15 Mutatis mutandis, recent 
musicological writings on the imitazione delle parole have continued in this synthetic tradition. 
In most accounts, the motto is attributed to the influence of the more general principle “the 
imitation of nature” (imitazione della natura) or “art imitates nature”; the artistic imitation of 
nature is in turn traced back to mimesis, the Greek term made famous by Plato and Aristotle for 
which “imitation” served as the standard translation in Latin and vernacular languages from the 
Middle Ages through the nineteenth century. (Today the anglicized “mimesis” is preferred.) As 
 
14 For Quintilian’s imitatio, see Institutio Oratoria 10. For imitatio in Renaissance literature, see Martin 
L. McLaughlin, Literary Imitation in the Italian Renaissance: The Theory and Practice of Literary 
Imitation from Dante to Bembo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). For the same in Renaissance music, see 
Lewis Lockwood, “On ‘Parody’ as Term and Concept in Sixteenth-Century Music,” in Aspects of 
Medieval and Renaissance Music: A Birthday Offering to Gustave Reese, ed. Jan LaRue (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 1966), 560–75, where Lockwood rejects “parody” for “imitation” as the proper 
historical term for polyphonic modeling, citing instances of phrases like Missa ad imitationem… on title 
pages. For contrapuntal imitatione and fuga, see James Haar, “Zarlino’s Definition of Fugue and 
Imitation” in The Science and Art of Renaissance Music, ed. Paul Corneilson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 121–48. For the differences between Plato’s and Aristotle’s concepts of mimesis 
(on which a vast literature exists), see Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, Parts 1 and 2. For ars 
imitatur naturam/“the imitation of nature,” see ibid., chapters 5 and 12. Zarlino uses the word imitazione 
or imitatione in his Istitutioni in every sense listed above. 
 
15 See Bernard Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1961), 1:60–70. As scholars since Weinberg have argued (notably Javitch), 
Cinquecento literary critics were not, in general, trying to offer sober analyses of their ancient sources, 
but rather using them to construct novel theories of poetry. See Daniel Javitch, “The Assimilation of 
Aristotle’s Poetics in Sixteenth-Century Italy,” in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, ed. Glyn 
P. Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3:58–59. 
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the classicist Stephen Halliwell has shown, however, the “imitation of nature” is a hazardous 
motto to interpret in both ancient and Renaissance texts. In his words, “There can be no 
straightforward equation between mimesis and ‘the imitation of nature,’ because the latter was 
never a unitary principle but a formula interpreted in various, and sometimes incompatible, 
ways.”16 In its earliest documented usage, from Aristotle’s Physics, the phrase refers to the 
inevitable conformity of all human craft (technē) to natural principles, both in its “imposition of 
form on matter and in its ordered pursuit of ends,” to quote Halliwell.17 In the same manner that 
a tree gives a particular form to wood, for example, so does a house give form to bricks, or a 
song to consonances, the processes of artificial craft mirroring those of natural growth. As such, 
the original meaning of “art imitates nature” has nothing to do either with the artistic stylization 
of things in the world, as mimesis does in Aristotle’s Poetics and Plato’s Republic, or with 
aspects of creative emulation, as in rhetorical imitatio. Even during Aristotle’s lifetime, however, 
the phrase accrued some of the meanings by which it is better known today, including its status 
as the pithy injunction that artists, especially painters and sculptors, should represent their chosen 
objects naturalistically, rather than with excessive artifice, as well as overtones suggesting that 
art should imitate nature as its rival rather than its subordinate.18  
In musicological writing, it is this naturalistic sense of the motto that is most often 
associated with the concept of “imitating the words,” with “words” understood to be the element 
of “nature” imitated by the composer. This association in turn feeds directly into the visualist 
strain of madrigal criticism we examined in chapter 1, with all its attendant values. In a much-
 
16 Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 351–52. 
 
17 Ibid., 153. Halliwell also describes this principle as referring to the “analogousness” between human 
activity and natural processes, in contrast to the conscious modeling involved in poetic mimesis.  
 
18 Ibid., 352–53. 
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cited article of the 1940s, for example, Armen Carapetyan attributes the emergence of “imitating 
the words” in both theory and practice to the influence of the imitazione della natura, one of 
whose senses he characterizes as painterly depiction: 
The idea of mechanically copying nature was simple, appealing, and practical. But what 
was there for the composer equivalent to the natural objects available to the painter? Only 
the words to which he set music. And, in fact, we find that the sixteenth-century 
musicians refer to word-setting as imitare le parole. In order to ‘imitate’ the words in the 
same sense as the painter imitated objects in their natural appearance, there was nothing 
to do for the composer but to invent a pictorial device of his own.19 
 
Carapetyan posits a direct chain of influence from imitating nature, to imitating the words, to 
word-painting. His reference to “mechanically copying nature” in proximity to “pictorial device” 
also implies a negative judgment of the latter in line with Galileian attitudes; following this 
passage, his article proceeds to tabulate other, more expressive means than the pictorialism by 
which composers achieved this same end of “imitating nature” through music. 
  If it is not now expressed with the same sweep of historical inevitability, nor always in 
visual terms, Carapetyan’s association of imitar la Natura with imitare le parole has continued 
to steer the musicological discourse around imitation in recent years. Of Monteverdi’s use of 
word-painting in his late works, for example, Tim Carter writes, “This is just an extension of the 
notion of mimesis, that art should somehow ‘imitate’ nature.”20 In the Oxford History of Western 
Music, Richard Taruskin similarly characterizes the madrigalism and other text-expressive 
practices of the late Cinquecento as supporting the Renaissance project to imitate nature in art, in 
 
19 Armen Carapetyan, “The Concept of Imitazione della natura in the Sixteenth Century,” Journal of 
Renaissance and Baroque Music 1, no. 1 (1946): 53. This quotation belies Carapetyan’s overall subtlety 
with respect to the various possible meanings of the imitazione della natura principle in musical 
discourse. On my reading (and Halliwell notes this, too; see The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 354, n. 23), the 
major issue is that he conflates all appearances of the word “imitation” (here, within the phrase imitare le 
parole) in musical sources from the period with “imitating nature.”  
 
20 Tim Carter, “The Search for Musical Meaning,” in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century 
Music, ed. Carter and John Butt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 165. 
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the name of capturing the “natural spontaneity” valued by the humanists. In a chapter on 
humanist critiques of the madrigal, for example, he writes that madrigal composers “already 
claimed to be imitating nature in their work,” a claim Taruskin himself, as we have seen, views 
with Galileian skepticism.21 The Grove Music Online entry on word-painting, too, invokes the 
imitation of nature as the foundation for the modern musical concept: “Word-painting was 
discussed by numerous Renaissance theorists in their search for a new poetics (rather than 
science) of music. Thus musical art might be considered to imitate nature and also enter the 
Trivium alongside rhetoric.”22  
Evidence suggests, however, that the alliance between “imitating the words” and 
“imitating nature” as a species to its genus is likely a product of what we might call scholarly 
reverse engineering. Having inherited concepts like word-painting from previous generations of 
critics, that is, musicologists have turned to discourses of Renaissance visual naturalism, and in 
particular the “imitation of nature” motto, to justify these concepts’ historical authenticity even 
where concrete connections in the primary sources are lacking. Pace Taruskin, for example, 
there is little documentation for how madrigalists themselves characterized their text-setting 
 
21 Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, 1:800. 
 
22 Tim Carter, “Word-painting,” Grove Music Online (2001), accessed May 6, 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.30568. Other scholars who have associated the 
imitation of nature with the imitation of words include Don Harrán, who writes (Word-Tone Relations, 7): 
“The duple relation of music to grammar and to rhetoric may be subsumed under the heading of that 
Aristotelian dictum, the imitation of nature….Since music has limited capacity to reproduce nature in 
sound, what the theorists expected of it, it seems, is an imitation of language (referred to, in their writings, 
as the imitatio verborum or imitazione delle parole).” Albeit less directly, James Haar writes in a similar 
vein (Italian Poetry and Music, 110–11): “As the [sixteenth] century goes on there are more remarks 
about the matching of verbal affetti with corresponding musical inventions, the result being a heightening 
of the affective properties of the text….None of this was generalized into aesthetic theory, nor was there 
any need to do so. By universal agreement, the aesthetic basis for both poetry and music was the 
Aristotelian doctrine of imitation of nature.” Haar’s “matching of verbal affetti with corresponding 
musical inventions” corresponds to what Galilei calls imitare le parole, as Galilei’s discussion of 
Willaert’s “Aspro core et selvaggio” makes clear. See Galilei, Dialogue on Ancient and Modern Music, 
trans. Palisca, 221 (88 in original). 
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practices beyond laconic references to “imitating” or “expressing” words found in dedicatory 
prefaces and personal correspondence.23 Sixteenth-century music theorists like Zarlino and 
Galilei, meanwhile, can be observed employing the two phrases to divergent purposes. In the 
above-cited chapter of the Sopplimenti musicali (8.11), “imitating nature” is nowhere mentioned 
in the context of Zarlino’s discussion of “imitating the words.” (As we will see below, he 
invokes imitation in this chapter in relation to Aristotle’s Poetics, a text that imposes a different 
set of values on the concept.) When Zarlino does reference the artistic imitation of nature—for 
example, in Part 3, chapter 45, of the Istitutioni—it is clear that this imitation is fundamentally 
different from the kind he uses to describe music–text relations in the Sopplimenti: 
Truly in this and in all things we should imitate Nature, whose workings are most 
orderly. Thus if we observe motion in Nature, we shall see that it is somewhat slower at 
its start than in midcourse or at the end—as can be seen in a stone, the motion of which 
when dropped is surely faster at the end than at the beginning. Let us therefore imitate 
Nature by proceeding in such a way that the movement of contrapuntal voices is not very 
fast at the outset. We should also observe this in the middle and end of any voice part, 
whenever that part begins to sing after some rests.24 
 
23 On dedicatory prefaces, including some that refer to the imitazione delle parole, see James Haar, “Self-
Consciousness About Style, Form and Genre in 16th-Century Music,” in Studi musicali, Anno III, ed. 
Agostino Ziino (Florence: Olschki, 1974), 219–32. Despite often invoked as evidence of the influence of 
imitazione della natura on musical discourse, Claudio Monteverdi’s famous reference to the “via naturale 
alla imitazione” in his first letter, of 1633, to Giovanni Battista Doni does not read to me as an 
unambiguous reference to the art/nature dualism; he certainly does not equate imitating words with 
imitating nature there, nor does he contrast nature with art or artifice. Cf. Roseen Giles, “Monteverdi, 
Marino and the Aesthetic of meraviglia,” Early Music 45, No. 3 (August 2017): 418; and Walther Dürr, 
“Zum Verhältnis von Wort und Ton im Rhythmus des Cinquecento-Madrigals,” Archiv für 
Musikwissenschaft 15, vol. 1/2 (1958): 90. Monteverdi’s second letter, of 1634, to Doni, however (as 
Massimo Ossi has observed) does frame his latest musical researches in terms of the ars imitatur naturam 
principle, albeit without naming “imitation” or “imitating the words” specifically, for which see Massimo 
Ossi, Divining the Oracle: Monteverdi’s Seconda Prattica (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 189–90. 
 
24 “Et veramente in ciò e in ogn’altra cosa dobbiamo imitar la Natura, il cui procedere si vede esser molto 
regolato; conciosia che se noi haveremo riguardo alli Movimenti naturali, ritrovaremo, che sono ne i loro 
principij alquanto più tardi, di quello, che non sono nel mezo e nel fine; come si può vedere in una Pietra, 
che sia lasciata cadere dall’alto al basso; della quale il Movimento è più veloce, senza dubio, nel fine, che 
non è nel principio. Imitaremo adunque la Natura e procederemo in tal maniera, che li Movimenti, che 
faranno le parti delli Contrapunti non siano molto veloci nel principio; ilche osservaremo etiandio nel 




Zarlino advises that the rhythms of contrapuntal soggetti mirror the natural acceleration of falling 
bodies because he believes that musical compositions, as products of art, should conform to 
principles given by nature, and nature is a condition toward which art must strive in its pursuit of 
the Good.25 More to the point, Zarlino’s remarks suggest neither that a soggetto’s rhythms should 
render it recognizably “stone-like” to a listener, nor, more generally, that the laws of physics are 
to be considered part of the work’s expressive content. Zarlino’s use of imitar la Natura, here 
and elsewhere, is instead closer in meaning to Aristotle’s formulation of the principle in the 
Physics, mentioned above, though divergent in Zarlino’s emphasis on the composer’s conscious 
(rather than inevitable) emulation of natural principles as an aspect of his craft.26 The 
relationship between art and nature also figures into Zarlino and Galilei’s decade-long dispute of 
the 1580s; again, however, the theorists use the dualism to center questions that have nothing to 
 
quoted and translated in Harr, “Zarlino’s Definition of Fugue and Imitation,” 132. See also Ist. harm. 
3.29.205, where Zarlino allies the contrapuntal injunction to avoid successive perfect consonances with 
the imitation of nature, now in the name of variety: “Variety gives our emotions great pleasure. Therefore 
every composer should follow such beautiful order, for he will be thought good insofar as his procedures 
resemble nature” (Varietà molto piacere porge alli nostri sentimenti. Debbe adunque ogni Compositore 
imitare un tale, e tanto bello ordine: percioche sarà riputato tanto migliore, quanto le sue operationi si 
assimiglieranno à quelle di essa Natura), quoted and translated in Feldman, City Culture and the Madrigal 
at Venice, 185–86. 
 
25 For an analysis of Zarlino’s position on art and nature, which is elaborated more fully in the 
Sopplimenti (at 1.4.18) and turns principally on the proper tuning of musical instruments, see Chadwick 
Jenkins, “Ridotta alla perfettione: Metaphysics and History in the Music-Theoretical Writings of 
Giovanni Maria Artusi” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2007), 178–89. Jenkins writes: “We see [in 
Zarlino’s writings] a two-fold movement: one of emanation from God through nature to art…and another 
that attempts to return in the opposite direction toward the Good by most closely approximating nature 
and accommodating the demands of the natural objects used within the construction of the artwork” (188–
89). 
 
26 See Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 354, where Halliwell makes a similar point about Leon 
Battista Alberti’s use of ars imitatur naturam in his treatises on architecture and painting 
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do with the expression or representation of a poetic text, and which instead concern the basic 
principles governing musical systems, namely tuning.27  
In Book 8, chapter 11, of the Sopplimenti, by contrast, the composer is instructed to 
imitate his text by fashioning an audible representation of it. He imitates, to adapt a formulation 
of Halliwell, so that attentive listeners may both recognize the music’s expressive mediation of 
its text and appreciate the result as the product of the artist’s intention.28 As Zarlino puts it in that 
chapter, musical imitations (imitationi) of words “can be made with the voice and heard with the 
senses,” an oblique nod to the role of the listener in the theorist’s conception of musical 
mimesis.29 The “natural” melodic motion prescribed in the Istitutioni, in other words, is not an 
imitation of nature in the same sense that a madrigalism is an imitation of a word. The one is a 
precondition of musical beauty; the other we might call a technique for expression or 
representation.30 
 
27 The principal texts of this dispute are Galilei’s Dialogo (1581) and Zarlino’s Sopplimenti (1588). For a 
thorough analysis, see Randall E. Goldberg, “Where Nature and Art Adjoin: Investigations into the 
Zarlino–Galilei Dispute, Including an Annotated Translation of Vincenzo Galilei’s Discoro intorno 
all’opere di messer Gioseffo Zarlino” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 2011). 
 One possible exception to the foregoing argument is Nicola Vicentino’s chapter on text 
expression in L’antica musica, titled “How to Pronounce Long and Short Syllables Under the Notes, and 
How Their Nature Should Be Imitated, as well as Other Useful Remarks” (Modo di pronuntiare le sillabe 
lunghe e brevi sotto le note; e come si dè imitare la natura di quelle, con altri ricordi utili), Ancient Music 
Adapted to Modern Practice, 269 (4.29.85 in the original). This title could very well be interpreted as a 
yoking of “imitating nature” to “imitating the words.” It seems to me, however, that the theorist is using 
natura in a colloquial sense—note the lowercase n—roughly meaning “aspects” or “properties,” rather 
than referring to a specific body of natural principles that artists must adhere to, like Zarlino does. 
Vicentino’s phrasing does not suggest, in other words, that one imitates nature by imitating the words, 
with the latter understood as a specialized technique for achieving the former. Within the chapter itself, 
Vicentino does not refer again to nature. 
 
28 See Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, chapter 6. Halliwell emphasizes the presumption in mimesis 
of a meaningful communication between a work of fiction and its audience. 
 
29 “si possono far con la voce e udire col senso,” Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.319. 
 
30 This is not to argue that “imitating the words” and “imitating nature” are mutually exclusive categories. 
To the contrary, they work together in Zarlino’s system of thought, but toward different ends. “Imitating 
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Zarlino in fact endeavors at some length in the Sopplimenti to show that his use of the 
word imitatione has a specific classical pedigree, allowing us to cut through the ambiguity that 
typically attends its appearance in musical sources. In particular, the theorist brings his concept 
of musical imitation into explicit association with the imitation (mimesis) from Aristotle’s 
Poetics, a text that had seen an explosion of commentary in Italy in the intervening years 
between Zarlino’s two publications.31 Zarlino’s efforts in the Sopplimenti, in fact, amount to an 
unusual attempt, for its time, to grapple with Aristotle’s concept of mimesis in the context of 
modern polyphonic music, its modes of text expression in particular.32 As such, his remarks 
allow us to flesh out a richer concept for the musical imitazione delle parole than the one 
bequeathed by the “imitation of nature” motto and the Galileian critical tradition to which it has 
been assimilated. This richer concept will take into account not only Zarlino’s perspective, which 
is somewhat limited, but also the wider discourse around imitation that circulated in 
commentaries on the Poetics during the same period. 
 
nature,” both in the manner described above and in the more speculative sense of using natural tuning 
systems (for Zarlino, the most natural is Ptolemy’s syntonic diatonic), supports the musician’s aim to 
instantiate the eternal and unchanging principles of musica speculativa through his ephemeral 
compositions. “Imitating the words,” as a more quotidian tool of musica prattica, provides him the means 
to delight his listeners, another telos of music-making for Zarlino. For the relation between the 
speculative and practical aspects of music in Zarlino, see Ist. harm. 1.11.25–27, with Jenkins, 
“Metaphysics and History,” 156–59. On music delighting listeners, see Ist. harm. 3.26.199, where Zarlino 
adapts Horace’s “aut prodesse…aut delectare” dictum from the Ars poetica. On Zarlino’s skeptical 
attitude toward moving the emotions, see chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
 
31 On the reception of the Poetics in the Cinquecento, see Javitch, “The Assimilation of Aristotle’s 
Poetics.” Zarlino’s citation of Aristotle’s treatise is consistent with his rigorous approach to ancient 
sources in the Sopplimenti, which Palisca describes as “eloquent testimony to the diffusion of ancient 
learning” (Humanism, 273). 
 
32 Before Zarlino, Girolamo Mei and Giulio del Bene, both under the influence of the Poetics, classified 
music among the mimetic arts, on which see ibid., 335–38. Their attempts to rationalize music with 
Aristotle’s precepts, though considerably earlier than Zarlino’s in the Sopplimenti (1560 and 1575, 
respectively), are also vaguer, grounded in questions related to ancient theory rather than modern practice. 




To embark on this task, we will first review Zarlino’s chapter on imitation in the 
Sopplimenti in more detail (section 2.2). There, I argue that it was Aristotle’s flexible generic 
scaffolding in chapter 1 of the Poetics which attracted the theorist’s attentions. In Aristotle’s 
medium, object, and mode, Zarlino identified a metalanguage for music–text relations that 
supported his case—contra Galilei in the Dialogo, to which the Sopplimenti musicali is directed 
as a rebuttal—for modern polyphonic music’s independence from rhetoric and acting, the arts 
from which Galilei would have musicians take instruction. The potential Zarlino saw in Poetics 1 
for a refutational strategy, in other words, seems to have motivated his decision to swap decorum 
for imitation in reformulating his text-expressive ideal. 
For this reason, perhaps, Zarlino leaves many aspects of Aristotle’s concept, as it was 
understood by his age, unexplored. Although significant in virtue of its foundation in the Poetics, 
in other words, his theory of imitation is sketchy. To put the motto imitazione delle parole as 
well as the musical practice it names in a wider intellectual context, this chapter then turns to the 
Poetics commentaries of Zarlino’s contemporaries. For it was here, in the pages (and sometimes 
margins) of translations and paraphrases of Aristotle's teachings that imitation was subject to its 
most creative interpretations during the period when the musical motto came into use. These 
detailed studies invite careful consideration not only of what imitation is, in the sense of a 
working definition of the concept (section 2.3), but also of features of Cinquecento mimeticism 
not usually addressed in writing about music, most importantly, imitation’s role in shaping 
conversations about the psychological effects of artworks on viewers and listeners. 
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Questions related to audience response were a major animating force behind discussions 
of Aristotle’s text in sixteenth-century literary criticism.33 By homing in on sections within these 
commentaries devoted to spectator psychology (section 2.4), I establish a provisional 
“psychology of imitating the words”—my first response, as it were, to the Galileian critical 
tradition—and, in a case study, demonstrate its applicability to the madrigal repertory of the late 
sixteenth century.34 Advanced by the Poetics commentators as a general model for audience 
response, this psychology holds that works of imitation stimulate feelings of pleasure in 
spectators by inviting them to make inferences about the fictional representation before them. 
This “quasi-logical paradigm” (as I call it), emphasizing the ties between cognition and emotion, 
recasts the madrigalism as a heuristic device that instructs listeners as it delights them. To 
conclude, finally, the chapter turns from discussions of imitation to those of metaphor (section 
2.5), which transfer the psychology of imitation—usually expressed in visual terms in the 
commentaries—to an aural context. 
 
2.2 Zarlino’s “New Mode” of Imitation in the Sopplimenti musicali 
Book 8, chapter 11, of the Sopplimenti musicali is a response to Vincenzo Galilei’s polemical 
attack on the “contrapuntists” in the Dialogo, from 1581, in particular the passage in which the 
Florentine theorist advises musicians to model themselves on commedia dell’arte actors, the 
 
33 On the “rhetorical orientations” of Cinquecento Poetics commentators, often manifesting in their 
treatises as an emphasis on the moral or didactic uses of poetry, see Javitch, “The Assimilation of 
Aristotle’s Poetics,” 56–57, and the literature cited therein. 
 
34 The full payoff of my case studies in this chapter (sections 2.3.1 and 2.4.1), both of which address a 
five-measure passage in Wert’s “Qual musico gentil,” must await chapter 4, where I test this listener 
psychology against a three-madrigal cycle. 
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better to capture in music the concetti conveyed through speech.35 It is within this context that 
Zarlino’s citation of the Poetics must be understood. Like many literary critics who turned to 
Aristotle’s treatise in the later Cinquecento, Zarlino uses the Poetics as a source of legitimation, 
in the face of critique, for what he considers the perfected version of his art.36 From this 
perspective, the most important claim Zarlino makes in the chapter is simply that modern 
polyphonic music is imitation in the Aristotelian sense of that word, a move that puts it in the 
exalted company of the arts treated in the Poetics, which include tragedy (tragedia in Zarlino’s 
quotation from Poetics 1), comedy (comedia), dithyrambs (dithyrambi), dance (arte del saltare), 
 
35 The passage, which Zarlino quotes in full at Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.317, reads as follows: “When 
they go for entertainment to the tragedies and comedies recited by the Zanni, let them (the modern 
musicians) restrain their immoderate laughter and instead observe if they would in what manner and at 
what pitch (high or low), volume of sound, accents and gestures, speed or slowness of articulation a 
gentleman speaks quietly with another. Let them pay attention to the difference with respect to all these 
qualities when one of them speaks with his servant, or a servant to another. Let them consider when this 
happens to be a prince talking with his subjects or vassals, or a suppliant pleading, how a furious or 
excited person speaks, how a married woman, a girl, a mere tot, a clever harlot, someone in love speaking 
to his beloved when he is trying to bend her to his well, how someone who laments, or one who cries out, 
how a timid person or one exulting in joy sounds. From these characteristics, observed with attention and 
diligently examined, they could take the norm of what suits the expression of any other idea that might 
come to hand” (Quando per loro diporto (i moderni prattici) vanno alle tragedie e alle comedie, che 
recitano i zanni; lascino alcuna volta da parte l’immoderate risa; i lor vece essermino, di gratia, in qual 
maniera parlano; con qual voce, circa l’acutezza e gravità; con che qualità di suono; e col qual quantità; 
con qual sorte d’accenti e de gesti; come proferite, quanto alla velocità e tardità del moto, l’uno con l’altro 
quieto gentil’huomo. Attendino un poco la differenza, che occore tra tutte quelle cose; quando un di essi 
parla con un suo servo, over l’un con l’altro di questi; considerino quando ciò accade al principe, 
discorrendo con un suo suddito e vasallo; quando al supplicante nel raccommandarsi, come ciò fà 
l’infuriato ò concitato; come la donna maritata; come la fanciulla; come il semplice putto; come l’astuta 
meretrice; come l’innamorato nel parlar con la sua amata, mentre cerca disporla alle sue voglie; come 
quelli che si lamentano; come quelli che gridano; come il timoroso; e come quello ch’esulta d’allegrezza. 
Da quali diversi accidenti, essendo da essi con intentione avertiti e con diligentia essaminati, potranno 
pigliar nome di quello, che convenga, per l’espressione du qualsivoglia altro concetto, che venir gli 
potesse tra mano), Dialogue on Ancient and Modern Music, trans. Palisca, 224–25 (89 in the Dialogo). 
The parenthetical remark “i moderni prattici” is added by Zarlino. 
 
36 On the flexible role of the Poetics in sixteenth-century literary debates, Weinberg writes (A History of 
Literary Criticism, 2:712): “What happens here is that Aristotle becomes, simultaneously, the authority 




and music for instruments (l’arte del citharizare, e del sonare i flauti ò pifferi).37 Zarlino’s 
invocation of Aristotle is a defensive tactic, in other words. Where Galilei hears only degeneracy 
in the elaborate, text-expressive counterpoint of the moderni prattici, Zarlino discerns a modern 
iteration of an ancient principle.38  
Central to Zarlino’s argument for music’s status as a mimetic art, of course, is his 
understanding of imitation. In the Poetics, mimesis39 is first and foremost a “tool” for artistic 
creation.40 As Aristotle establishes in chapter 1, mimesis is used in various artforms, including 
comic, epic, and tragic poetry, and music. United by their shared use of mimesis, these arts differ 
from one another with respect to its three subdivisions—medium, object, and mode—whose 
various possible combinations yield different types of poetry. In a tragedy, for example, the 
media are “diction” and “lyric poetry” (spoken and sung speech), the object is human action, and 
the mode is direct discourse.41 An epic poem, while sharing its media and object with tragedy, 
contrasts in its mode, making use of both direct discourse and third-person narration (think of the 
Odyssey, which alternates between narrated and spoken verse). Music for aulos, on the other 
hand, uses rhythm and melody, but not speech, for its media. 
 
37 As translated in Zarlino’s quotation from Poetics 1 at Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.318. The edition and 
translator are unknown. 
 
38 On this corner of the Galilei–Zarlino dispute, see Harrán, In Search of Harmony, 186–96. While rightly 
emphasizing the influence of the rhetorical tradition (especially theories of pronuntiatio, or delivery) on 
both Zarlino and Galilei, Harrán downplays the influence of Aristotle on Zarlino, instead comparing his 
position on music–text relations to Plato’s (who is not cited in Sopplimenti 8.11!). For brief comments, 
see also Lydia Goehr, et al., “Philosophy of Music,” Grove Music Online (2001), accessed July 8, 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.52965.  
 
39 When discussing Aristotle’s concept (rather than its early modern reception), I use the anglicized Greek 
“mimesis.” 
 
40 Eden, Poetic and Legal Fiction, 69, citing Richard McKeon (see her n. 9).  
 




Like his literary contemporaries, Zarlino recognized in Aristotle’s tripartite division of 
mimesis a flexible genre theory that could serve his interests.42 The chapter nevertheless begins 
in unassuming fashion, as Zarlino affirms the importance of Aristotle’s concept of imitation to 
both poetry and music and then divides imitation into medium, object, and mode: 
Imitation, or action, is a thing of importance not only in poetry, as Aristotle teaches, but 
also in music; in fact it is one of the principal resources (parti) that the poet and musician 
should both have. In the beginning of his Poetics, he says that epic, tragedy, comedy, 
dithyrambs, and likewise most of the arts that use the aulos, pipes, or cithara are all 
commonly found to be imitations. But they differ from one another in three respects, for 
[the poet and musician] either make imitations using things that are different from one 
another by nature, or they imitate objects (cose) that are different from one another, or 
they make imitations differently and not in the same mode.43 
 
Shortly thereafter, Zarlino introduces the analogy between poet and musician that opened this 
chapter: 
For as it is conceded to the poet to imitate things with words accommodated to verse…so 
is it conceded to the musician and melopoeist to imitate with melody and harmony, in the 
 
42 On the role of Poetics 1—specifically—in literary debates, Javitch writes (“The Assimilation of 
Aristotle’s Poetics,” 59): “Aristotle’s announcement, at the beginning of the Poetics, that the different 
kinds of mimesis can be distinguished according to their means, their objects, and their modes, and his 
very brief discussion of the last two categories, were used as the basis for a generic grid in which tragedy, 
epic, and comedy were given dominant places, but which could also be made to accommodate genres 
either disregarded by or unknown to Aristotle.” 
 
43 “Ma perche non è cosa di poca importanza non solo nella Poesia, come c’insegna Aristotele; ma anco 
nella Musica, la Imitatione ò Attione; anzi è una delle parti principali, che debbe haver’il Poeta e il 
Musico; essendo che nel principio della sua Poetica dice; che l’Epopeia e la Poesia della Tragedia, la 
Comedia etiandio e la Poesia de i Dithyrambi, e la maggior parte medesimamente dell’Arti, che si 
servono delle Tibie ò Pifferi e della Cetera nel loro uso; si trovano communemente esser’ Imitationi. Sono 
però in tre cose differenti; percioche over fanno l’Imitatione con cose per natura diverse tra loro, 
over’imitano cose tra loro diverse, overamente fanno diversamente l’Imitatione e non in un’istesso 
modo,” Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.316. Intriguingly, Zarlino at various points throughout this chapter (as 
here) yokes imitatione to attione, which he seems to be using as shorthand for the rhetorical art of 
pronuntiatio, or delivery. His inclusion of attione (with this valence) in a discussion of mimesis likely 
stems not from his engagement with Aristotle’s Poetics but rather from the provocation of Galilei’s 
Dialogo, which advised musicians to learn the art of gesture from orators and actors (see Dialogue on 
Ancient and Modern Music, trans. Palisca, 225 [90]). In any case, the word attione is not used in the 
vernacular translation of Poetics 1 from which Zarlino quotes at Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.318. As I 
discuss below, Zarlino dismisses attione as an inappropriate resource for his “Melopeio ò Compositor” 
(8.11.316). For a discussion of attione, see also this dissertation’s Conclusion. 
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best way he can, that which the words contained in the text express, which [text] he wants 
to express in song.44 
 
Although not explicitly framed as such, Zarlino’s analogy registers to me as an effort to 
accommodate polyphonic canto to Aristotle’s tripartite mimetic scheme: its media are melody 
(modulatione) and harmony (harmonia) and its object is the semantic content of words (“that 
which the words contained in the text express”).45 (Mode in Aristotle’s sense is not accounted for 
here by Zarlino, likely because it has no clear analogue in polyphony except insofar as a poetic 
text set to music may use one or another mode.) In making this analogy, the theorist suggests 
with something approaching eloquence that the poet’s medium becomes the musician’s object. 
 Directly upon comparing these two artists, however, Zarlino contrasts them, and it is here 
that the significance of his classificatory effort emerges: “The mode of the musician is very 
different from that which the poet uses, for [imitations] are expressed in one mode by the poet 
and the orator, and in a different mode by the musician: by means of harmony.”46 By flagging 
harmony, Zarlino reveals that the dispute with Galilei hinges on the mimetic medium. In the 
Dialogo, Galilei had advised the moderni prattici to model their musical practice on the zanni of 
the commedia dell’arte, in particular the way these actors’ vocal inflections and bodily gestures 
shifted according to the social position and gender of their interlocutors.47 Defending modern 
 
44 Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.316. For the Italian, see n. 7. 
 
45 The semantic content of words is to be distinguished from the sonority of words; some Cinquecento 
literary theorists (most famously Bembo) held sonority itself to be expressive of affetti. On this 
distinction, see Giuseppe Gerbino, “Music of Words and Words in Music,” 265: “It is the meaning of 
words together with their affective content, and not sound, that music imitates.” 
 
46 “se bene il modo che tiene il musico, è molto diverso da quello ch’usa il poeta: essendo che ad un modo 
sono espresse da questo e dall’oratore, e ad altro modo da quello, col mezo dell’harmonia,” Sopplimenti 
musicali 8.11.316. Zarlino’s use of the word modo throughout this chapter seems, confusingly, to 
correspond to the mimetic medium in most cases. 
 
47 See n. 35 for the passage. For Galilei’s instructions on gesture, specifically, see Dialogue on Ancient 
and Modern Music, trans. Palisca, 225 (90 in original): “After the poet clothed these ideas in words suited 
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practice, Zarlino asserts repeatedly that musicians need not learn from the zanni (“What does 
music have to do with those people who recite comedies and tragedies?”48), and he takes 
particular offense at Galilei’s suggestion that musicians make use of gestures, a resource Zarlino 
considers proper to the orator and actor. In a telling comment, Zarlino contrasts the orator’s 
“good use of action, which principally consists in movements of the body and the voice” to the 
expressive medium of the contrapuntists: “But musicians need not use similar actions because, 
for them, those imitations that can be made with the voice and heard with the senses are 
enough.”49 In arguing that music uses harmony, and not gestures, to execute its imitations 
successfully, Zarlino thus stakes his claim for polyphony’s legitimacy with the authority of 
Aristotle’s medium, object, and mode behind him. Just as the arts of “fistole (pan-pipes) and 
sampogne (bag pipes) use harmony and rhythm,” and poetry likewise “imitates things with 
words accommodated to verse,” so does polyphony—with equal claim to the designation 
imitatione as those other two arts—“imitate with instrumental and vocal sounds those words [the 
musician] wants to express in song.”50  
Zarlino does admit in one place that its particular bond of music to poetry makes the 
imitation of contemporary polyphonic music something without historical precedent: “It is 
 
to their needs, the musician expressed them in that tonos, with those accents, gestures, quantities and 
qualities of sound, and with a rhythm that suited the action of the personage.” Galilei’s opinion on whom 
modern musicians should learn from is a bit slippery. Ancient poets, orators, and musicians are the ideal 
models, but because they are not around, the zanni should be imitated.  
 
48 “che hà da fare il Musico con quelli che recitano Tragedie ò Comedie?” Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.317. 
 
49 “la buona Attione, che consiste principalmente ne i Movimenti del corpo, e in quelli della Voce. Ma i 
Musici non hanno di bisogno di simili Attioni; percioche li basta solo quelle Imitatione, che si possono far 
con la Voce e udire col Senso,” Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.319. 
 
50 “Arti…com’è quella delle Fistole ò Sampogne, si servono dell’Harmonia e del Rhythmo,” Sopplimenti 
musicali 8.11.316; “vada imitando co i Suoni e Voci quelle parole, che’egli vuole esprimere col Canto,” 
Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.318.  
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necessary to say that [cantilena] is a thing in itself”—that is, not one of the arts named in the 
Poetics—“for which, in reciting and expressing the words of melopoeia, our moderns found a 
new mode of imitation, made partly with melodic motion, and partly with the harmony that is 
found in song.”51 This lack of precedent does not bother him, however. In bringing ancient 
theory to bear on the musical practice of his day, Zarlino allows for and even celebrates the 
inevitable modifications to music brought by the passing of history, modifications that Galilei, 
nostalgic for the music of the ancients, could not.52 Among them are both the medium and object 
of imitation (counterpoint and words, respectively). This new manner both extends the mimetic 
principle and, as Zarlino seems to admit here, departs from it. 
 With this chapter’s introduction in view, it appears to have been imitation’s flexibility in 
accommodating arts both ancient and modern that motivated Zarlino to reformulate his concept 
for text expression as a species of imitation in the Sopplimenti musicali. Decorum, while it 
served as an adequate metalanguage for the relation between music and text—style and subject 
matter—in the Istitutioni, did not offer anything like a genre theory. Medium and object did: just 
as late-century Italian literary critics argued for the legitimacy of (say) the tragedy that ends 
happily according to precepts borrowed and adapted from the Poetics, so did Zarlino locate an 
 
51 “Onde bisogna dire, che sia una cosa da sè, per la qual cosa nel recitare e esprimer le Parole della 
Melopeia, ritrovarono i Nostri Moderni un nuovo modo d’Imitatione, fatta parte col movimento della 
Modulatione, e parte con l’Harmonia che si trovano nell Cantilena,” Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.318. 
Zarlino does not seem to be using the word modo in the technical sense from Poetics chapter 1, but rather 
in a more general sense meaning “way” or “method.” On Zarlino’s classicizing concept of melopoeia, see 
Harrán, In Search of Harmony, 123–36. 
 
52 This observation draws from Javitch’s argument that Aristotelian genre theory emerged in part to 
accommodate a felt need among poetic theorists to legitimize poems that did not correspond to ancient 
models (or Petrarch), a need which the then-dominant “single-model” imitation theory for poetic 
composition did not serve. See Daniel Javitch, “The Emergence of Poetic Genre Theory in the Sixteenth 
Century,” Modern Language Quarterly 59, no. 2 (June 1998): 139–69. These themes seem to be reflected 
in the Galilei–Zarlino dispute: Galilei adopts ancient music as the single model; Zarlino, while 
acknowledging the value and importance of ancient music, accepts historical change. 
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effective counterattack to Galilei’s critique of counterpoint within that same text.53 It should also 
be clear from the foregoing how strongly Zarlino’s concept of imitatione in the Sopplimenti 
diverges from Carapetyan’s influential historiography of “imitating the words” as “mechanically 
copying nature,” on the model of naturalistic painting. Although he perceives (and resists) 
various commonalities between musicians, poets, orators, and actors throughout this chapter, 
painting goes unmentioned. More than that, it seems that for Zarlino imitation is more a strategy 
of argumentation than a positive principle for how music and text relate. 
 All the same, by assimilating his text-expressive ideal to the imitation from Aristotle’s 
Poetics, no matter how sketchily, Zarlino brought the conceptual vocabulary of music–text 
relations up to date. And in so doing, he pulled the motto “imitating the words” into the orbit of 
other theoretical writings on imitation from the same period, including, not least, the vernacular 
Poetics commentaries that flourished in the later decades of the Cinquecento following Bernardo 
Segni’s watershed 1549 translation of Aristotle’s treatise into Italian.54 These treatises admittedly 
do not discuss what Zarlino variously calls the canto or cantilena of the moderni prattici; when 
they do address music, it is usually to question the role of singing or instrumental music in 
ancient theatrical representations. But they offer a wealth of evidence for Renaissance ideas 
about the conditions of representation as such, ideas rarely addressed head-on by music theorists 
that are nevertheless germane to polyphonic repertories, including madrigals. These ideas range 
from definitions—what it means for one thing to “imitate” another—to intricate theories of 
 
53 See, e.g., Javitch on G. B. Giraldi Cintio in “The Assimilation of Aristotle’s Poetics,” 62–64. 
 
54 For a brief account of the reception history of the Poetics in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, see 
ibid., 53–56. The authoritative source on these commentaries is still Weinberg, A History of Literary 
Criticism. A multi-author edited volume was recently published on this subject: Bryan Brazeau, ed., The 
Reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in the Italian Renaissance and Beyond (London: Bloomsbury, 2020). 
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audience response. With the madrigal and its listeners in mind, it is to these commentaries that 
we now turn. 
 
2.3 The Concept of Imitation in Vernacular Poetics Commentaries 
As we have seen, imitation was a multifaceted and unstable concept in sixteenth-century Italy. 
Even within the narrow halls of the poetics treatise, the word took on individual meanings and 
emphases from publication to publication, reflecting not only any given author’s particular 
allegiance to Plato or Aristotle but also centuries of accumulated tradition of commentary on 
these authors and on poetry in general.55 Even for those authors who explicitly aligned 
themselves with Aristotle, clarifying the philosopher’s use of the concept was not easy: Aristotle, 
for whom defining key terms almost always comes first, never defines mimesis in the Poetics or 
in any of his other treatises. Francesco Buonamici, a Pisa-based philosopher, is one such 
Aristotle apologist. In his Discorsi poetici nella Accademia fiorentina in difesa d’Aristotile 
(1597), he devotes a full chapter, titled “Delle imitazione et sue appartenenze,” to the question of 
imitation. In its fluid amalgamation of various sources and strands of interpretation, his account 
attests to the Renaissance’s complex heritage of Aristotle, while also representing a fairly 
“developed” stage of thinking about imitation—one that hews reasonably close to Aristotle’s 
usage.56 Insofar as it discloses the state of Aristotelianism in the late Cinquecento, moreover, 
 
55 See Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 1:60–63 on the confusion around the meaning of the 
word imitation in Cinquecento literary criticism. 
 
56 Weinberg considers Buonamici’s interpretation of Aristotle one of the “best” of the century, and a 
“correction of much that had gone before,” including the tendency to conflate Aristotle’s imitation with 
that described by Plato in the Republic, Book 3, where it is characterized as a kind of dramatic 
impersonation (ibid., 2:699). 
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Buonamici’s definition of imitation is a fruitful context for the musical imitazione delle parole of 
the same period.  
What is imitation? To imitate, according to the Pisan philosopher, 
is nothing other than to counterfeit and to put before the eyes of the head and the mind a 
thing that is taken to be so; and although the imitation (l’imitante) can stand on its own, it 
is nevertheless always referred to another thing, of which it is an image.57 
 
Buonamici’s imitator is, first of all, a maker of images (imagini), a word that in this context 
means “likenesses.” The images produced by imitation are not necessarily visual icons, as the 
word “image” suggests in today’s usage: the poet-imitator, for example, fashions images with 
words, the musician, with sounds. This characterization of the poet’s activity, while filtered 
through later traditions, reaches back to Plato, who associates the activity of mimesis with 
image-making in his dialogues. (In the Poetics, by contrast, Aristotle does not associate mimesis 
with images or image-making.58) While Plato, in the Republic, views the poet’s mimetic images 
with suspicion, Buonamici, in keeping with his Aristotelian perspective, treats them more 
positively. As the fictional product of the poet’s “counterfeiting” (contraffare), Buonamici’s 
imagine stands in neither a factually true nor a deceptively false relationship to reality, but rather 
a verisimilar one, a standard reflected in Buonamici’s assertion that the poet’s image “is taken to 
be so” (si tenga esser cosi). As verisimilar objects, imitations reflect what could be true 
according to commonly-held opinion (quanto all’openione, p. 80), even if their specifics (names, 
 
57 “imitare niente altro, è che contraffare, e porr’avanti alli occhi della testa, e della mente una cosa, che si 
tenga esser cosi; e anchor che l’imitante possa stare da per se, nondimeno sempre si riferisce com’ad altra 
cosa, della quale questa sia com’imagine,” Francesco Buonamici, Discorsi poetici nella Accademia 
fiorentina in difesa d'Aristotile (Florence: Marescotti, 1597), 40.  
 




actions, and so on) depart from historical truth.59 Any given work of imitation is thus considered 
verisimilar to the degree that it meets these standards of plausibility, which change according to 
the nature of audiences (their capacities for imagination, for example) or historical 
circumstances.60 Down the line, verisimilitude guarantees that art works have their intended 
effects on audiences, whether it be to move their emotions, bring them pleasure, or—as 
Buonamici holds—instill virtue.  
 Its truth-status aside, a mimetic image must refer, by design, to something else, a 
condition Buonamici repeatedly stresses in his chapter. “Imitation consists in this,” he writes, 
“that the imitation is not taken as an absolute thing that is sustained by itself; rather, it is referred 
to another thing that stands on its own.”61 To contemplate an imitation as an “absolute thing” is 
possible but defective, comparable to an illiterate person’s apprehension of alphabetic letters as 
mere shapes on the page, rather than, properly, as “signs of things mediating concepts” (segni 
delle cose medianti i concetti, p. 40). Buonamici in fact repeatedly turns to language for an 
 
59 Verisimilitude was a standard shared by virtually all of Buonamici’s contemporaries (and by early 
modern critics in general), although they differed over its purported psychological effects on audiences, as 
we will see below. In the words of Torquato Tasso, “the verisimilar…is proper and intrinsic to [poetry’s] 
essence” (“il verisimile…è propria, e intrinseca dell’essenza sua”). See Discorsi del signor Torquato 
Tasso del arte poetica; et in particolare del poema heroico (Venice: Giulio Vassalini, 1587), 4r. 
Alessandro Piccolomini, another commentator on Aristotle, holds that verisimilitude “is the material of 
poetry,” for which see Annotationi di M. Alessandro Piccolomini, nel libro della Poetica d’Aristotele; con 
la traduttione del medesimo libro, in lingua volgare (Venice: Giovanni Guarisco, 1575), 72. For 
Piccolomini as for others, verisimilitude mitigated the question of whether poetry should treat true or false 
subjects: although both true and false elements may be used “accidentally” in a poem—the former, for 
example, in a poem on a historical subject—neither is the “proper” material of poetry. 
 
60 In its recourse to audience opinion and belief, the early modern concept of verisimilitude differs from 
probability, Aristotle’s standard for evaluating the truth-status of artistic representations. Aristotle’s 
probability measures what is likely to be true in most circumstances according to the “unpredictable 
nature of human affairs” (Eden, Poetic and Legal Fiction, 43), rather than according to an audience’s 
beliefs. In the Cinquecento, differing opinions on the audience’s imaginative capacity led theorists to 
endorse either historical or invented subjects for the basis of poems.  
 
61 “L’imitatione consiste in questo, che l’imitante non si prenda come cosa assoluta, e che da per se si 
sostenga: ma che si riferisca ad un’altra, che si regge da se,” Buonamici, Discorsi poetici, 40. 
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object lesson in imitation’s signs and signifieds, as when he avers that “the imitating thing cannot 
exist without the thing that is imitated, just like a noun is nothing without its signified.”62 The 
relationship between words and the things they denote, in other words, mirrors that between 
works of imitation and their objects of representation. Among the imitative arts, painting serves 
as his commonest point of reference. In one amusing passage demonstrating another defective 
case of mimetic appreciation, for example, he imagines a “coarse man” (un’huomo grossolano) 
who, never having seen a hippopotamus, mistakes a painting of one for a portrait of a man (p. 
40). 
To contemplate an imitation in reference to another thing of which it is a likeness, by 
contrast, is to perceive the pair’s shared qualities, which structure their relation. Redefining 
imitation as a property of art works (rather than an activity of the artist, as we saw above), 
Buonamici names this relation their similitude: 
Imitation is therefore the similitude of two forms, of which one is represented, the other 
represents, the one [apprehended] immediately, the other through mediation 
(mediatamente), knowing the representing thing not in itself, but as similar to the 
represented.63 
 
62 “l’imitante non può stare senza la cosa, che si imita, si come il nome non è niente senza la cosa 
significata,” ibid., 40. 
 
63 “È adunque imitazione similitudine di due forme, delle quali una è rappresentata, l’altra rappresenta, 
d’una immediata, dell’altra mediatamente, conoscendosi la rappresentante non da per se, ma come simile 
alla rappresentate,” ibid., 41. It is worth noting that Buonamici uses the verbs rappresentare and imitare 
interchangeably throughout this chapter, in keeping with the practice of his contemporaries (see Halliwell, 
The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 346). In other chapters of his treatise, however, Buonamici uses the words 
rappresentare and rappresentazione more specifically to refer to the “dramatic manner” of discourse (i.e., 
first-person speech, usually in the context of a play), in contrast to the third-person narration used in epic 
and lyric poetry. This latter dualism stems from Plato’s definition of mimesis as enactment in the 
Republic, Book 3. I have identified other writers who use the verb rappresentare in this second, more 
delimited way when discussing the “modes” of imitation. These writers include Lodovico Castelvetro, 
who contrasts rappresentatione with racconto (narration), and Torquato Tasso, who contrasts 
rappresentare with narrare. See the former’s Poetica d’Aristotele vulgarizzata et sposta per Lodovico 
Castelvetro (Basel: Pietro de Sedabonis, 1576), 12 (“rassomiglianza per modo, sotto il quale si 
comprendono il racconto, e la rappresentatione, è’l mescolamento del racconto, e della 
rappresentatione”); and the latter’s Discorsi, 6r–6v (“Il modo è il narrare, ed il rappresentare: narrare è 




That the similitude of an image and its object inheres in their “forms” suggests that the two do 
not correspond in all their particulars. A painting of a hippopotamus, for example, is 
recognizable not because of its material identity with the hippopotamus in question (impossible), 
but because of its evocation of some of the animal’s recognizable features in its own medium. 
Buonamici himself clarifies this point by identifying the “form” of a painting with those “colors 
and features” it shares with its object: “Painting or anything else which represents and imitates 
has a similitude of the represented form, e.g., colors and features, through which, [although] 
being different, the imitation is taken as the same thing [as the object].”64 In a similar way to a 
painting, a play uses language to imitate both characters’ speech—with which it has a clear 
correspondence of medium—and also their mental activity and passions, two objects of 
representation without clear-cut sensory imprints. (How, exactly, language could or should 
accomplish the latter was a subject up for debate.65) Despite inevitable differences resulting from 
the imitation’s mediation of its object, the latter should nevertheless be apprehended by the 
audience “without effort” (senza fatica, p. 41): absent in his concept of imitation are modes of 
representation that presuppose arbitrary (thus less readily apprehended) relationships between an 
imitation and its object, such as symbolism or allegory.  
 
gl’istrioni”). These subtle distinctions point up the caution that must be taken in gauging the precise 
meaning of mimetic jargon when it appears in musical sources—for example, the early Baroque term stile 
rappresentativo. 
 
64 “la pittura, e qualunque altra cosa, che rappresenta, e imita hà una similitudine della forma 
rappresentata, si come colori, e fattezze, per le quali ella essendo diversa, si tiene come la medesima,” 
Buonamici, Discorsi poetici, 41. 
 
65 On this debate, literary historian Blair Hoxby writes: “Neither critics nor dramatists agreed on what a 
natural and passionate speech should sound like. The disagreement turned on whether dialogue should 
reproduce what men and women actually said when fraught with passions…or should instead create an 
audible similitude of their hidden thoughts and feelings.” What Was Tragedy? Theory and the Early 
Modern Canon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 80–81.  
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The viewer’s ability to recognize the imitated object, of course, depends not only on the 
artist’s skill in rendering it but also on his or her choice of an object that is imitable in the first 
place. Buonamici’s discussion of the mimetic object, which he interchangeably calls the 
rappresentata and the imitata, deserves brief comment in light of the views of his 
contemporaries. In chapter 6 of the Poetics, Aristotle divides the objects of tragic mimesis into 
plot (muthos), character (ethos), and thought (dianoia), while placing emphasis on the first of the 
three. Cinquecento commentators variously followed or diverged from Aristotle in assigning 
action or plot (attione, favola) a prominent place in their theories of imitation, a controversy 
stemming from its irrelevance to certain genres of modern poetry, particularly those in the 
Petrarchan vein such as sonnets and canzoni.66 The second two categories, character and thought, 
were then adapted to early modern predilections: Aristotle’s dianoia, which in the Poetics 
encompasses a range of mental activity including deliberation and emotion, was usually replaced 
with affetti or passioni—two essentially synonymous terms for the emotions—while ethos 
became costumi, referring to those aspects of a character’s personality determined by his or her 
age, gender, or moral disposition.67 Many commentators also expanded the field of possible 
objects beyond what Aristotle explicitly addressed in his treatise. An anonymous marginal gloss 
in a manuscript copy of the Poetics from the late Cinquecento voices this capacious attitude 
succinctly: “All things are imitated by poetry, but principally humanity is represented, that is, our 
mores, actions, and passions.”68 
 
66 On the relationship between the “qualitative” parts of tragedy and sixteenth-century genre theory, see 
Javitch, “The Emergence of Poetic Genre Theory.” 
 
67 Hoxby, What Was Tragedy?, 69–72. On early modern adaptations of Aristotle’s ethos, see also Javitch, 
“The Assimilation of Aristotle’s Poetics,” 57. 
 
68 “e ben che si simiglino da poesie tutte le cose, nondimeno principalmente si rappresentano l’humane 
cioè i costumi l’attioni passioni nostre,” BNCF Magl. VII, 1199 (added title: Aristotelis Poetica cum notis 
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Scholars have shown in detail how each of Aristotle’s objects was adapted to early-
modern attitudes. Especially relevant to music–text relations are disagreements over the 
imitability of certain classes of objects, like those not directly perceptible to any of the five 
external senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch). This category could include patently unreal 
things, like mythical creatures, as well as objects that are knowable only to the higher faculties of 
the soul, like abstract concepts and emotions. Verisimilitude, we have seen, was the general 
standard by which the success of any given representation was measured; theorists nevertheless 
disagreed over which classes of objects could plausibly undergo verisimilar treatment. In his 
chapter on imitation, Buonamici divides imitable objects into the “true” and the “imagined”: 
In imitation, the idea that nature is found again comes first, represented either truthfully, 
or such as it comes into the imagination, as is said of words that signify either things that 
are or things that are believed to be. Thus a painter who paints a man represents 
something that is, while a painter who paints a chimera represents something that is 
imagined to be—otherwise it would not be representation.69 
 
 
Petro Victorio Interprete), 3r. For an analysis of some of the annotations in this manuscript, see Debórah 
Blocker, “The Accademia degli Alterati and the Invention of a New Form of Dramatic Experience: Myth, 
Allegory, and Theory in Jacopo Peri’s and Ottavio Rinuccini’s Euridice (1600),” in Dramatic 
Experience: The Poetics of Drama and the Early Modern Public Sphere(s), ed. Katja Gvozdeva, Tatiana 
Korneeva, and Kirill Ospovat (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 77–117. Blocker has identified the anonymous 
annotators of this manuscript with members of the Accademia degli Alterati, a Florentine literary 
academy I discuss in this dissertation’s Conclusion. For a personal reflection on her discovery of this 
fascinating manuscript, see Blocker, “Shedding Light on the Readings of Aristotle’s Poetics Developed 
within the Alterati of Florence (1569–c.1630): From Manuscript Studies to the Social and Political 
History of Aesthetics,” in The Reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in the Italian Renaissance and Beyond, ed. 
Bryan Brazeau (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 97–132. 
 
69 “nell’imitazione precede un concetto, che si ritrovi la natura rappresentata, ò veramente, ò pure che tale 
nell’imaginazione sia caduta, come si dice delle voci, che significano, ò cosa che sia, ò cosa che si creda 
essere, onde il pittore dipingendo un’huomo, rappresenta cosa che è, dipingendo una chimera, rappresenta 
una cosa, che s’imagina d’essere, altramente non saria rappresentazione,” Discorsi poetici, 40–41 
(translation adapted from Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 2:693). Buonamici’s distinction here 
likely reflects the influence of Plato’s division of mimesis, in the Sophist, into icastic and fantastic kinds. 
The former came in the Renaissance to be associated with “known” objects and the latter “invented” and 
often marvelous ones. On this tradition, see Baxter Hathaway, The Age of Criticism: The Late 
Renaissance in Italy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 390–96; and James Biester, “Fancy’s 
Images: Wit, the Sublime, and the Rise of Aestheticism,” in Wonders, Marvels, and Monsters in Early 
Modern Culture, ed. Peter G. Platt (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1999), 298–303. 
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Even when an object does not exist in reality (veramente), it still inheres in the faculty of 
imagination—first the poet’s, then the viewer’s—such that the work of imitation maintains its 
necessary referent; Buonamici’s example of the painted chimera rests at one end of a spectrum 
that presumably includes all the verisimilar objects (“things that are taken to be so,” to recall his 
definition of imitation) poetry may represent. Writing earlier in the century, Giovan Pietro 
Capriano corroborates and expands Buoanmici’s comments on the objects of imitation, 
anchoring more precisely the method by which an imagined object can be represented by a work 
of art: 
All things that either can be comprehended by the intellect, or which fall under one of the 
senses, are through some way and by some means imitable—these [of the senses], in that 
state (in quell’essere) that the sense presents them to us, and those [of the intellect]—
such as matters related to angels, God, spirits, and the soul—not in that state that they 
truly are, but in that [state] in which we imagine them reducible to the senses.70 
 
Capriano brings more directly to the fore the difficulty in representing things that cannot be 
perceived. Like Buonamici, he stresses the importance of the imagination as the mediator 
between objects and their artistic rendering: objects that are known to the intellect but 
unknowable to the senses can be represented only insofar as we imagine them “reduced” to 
sensorial form. Objects that can be directly perceived, on the other hand, may be represented as 
they appear to us, thus preserving a sensory match between the object and the work. 
 A different perspective on the object of imitation is taken by the poet Torquato Tasso, 
whose “Qual musico gentil” we previously glimpsed in this dissertation’s Introduction, in his 
1581 Allegoria della Gerusalemme liberata, a short text on the author’s famous epic poem. 
 
70 “Le cose tutte, che o con l’intelletto si comprendono, o che cascano sotto a qualchedun’ de sensi, sono 
per qualche via, e con qualche mezzo imitabili, queste, in quell’essere che il sense ce le appresenta, e 
quelle, non in quell’essere che veramente sono, ma in quello, che le imaginiamo al senso reducibili, come 
le cose de gli Angeli, di Dei, di spiriti, e dell’anime,” Giovanni Pietro Capriano Bresciano, Della vera 
poetica (Venice: Bolognino Zaltieri, 1555), chapter 1, n. pag. [1].  
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Addressing Aristotle’s triad of mimetic objects, Tasso suggests that costumi, affetti, and the 
discorsi dell’animo are imitable only as accompaniments to action—that is, only insofar as they 
are directly perceptible by the senses: 
Imitation concerns the actions of man which are subject to the external senses…nor does 
it consider characters or passions or the discoursings of the mind insofar as these are 
intrinsic, but only insofar as they issue forth and accompany action by manifesting 
themselves in speech and in actions and in deeds.71 
 
In stressing that imitation exclusively concerns objects “subject to the external senses,” Tasso 
rejects the imagination as a mediator between non-sensory objects and their representation in 
works of imitation. Action, as for Aristotle, is given the prime spot in Tasso’s scheme, with 
costumi and passioni strictly subordinate. 
 
 One more facet of Buonamici’s initial definition of imitating (see above, p. 70) demands 
notice. To ensure its ready apprehension, the poet’s imagine puts itself “before the eyes of the 
head and the mind,” a turn of phrase that points to the pervasive influence of the rhetorical 
tradition, with its elaborate techniques of persuasion, on Renaissance theories of poetry. In 
ancient Greek and Roman rhetorical manuals, where the motto “putting before the eyes” 
originates, this vivid quality—which we previously glimpsed in Burmeister’s Musica poetica—is 
called enargeia (in Ancient Greek) or evidentia (in Latin), and the concept generally names a 
quality of speeches that makes audiences feel as if they are eyewitnesses to the events being 
 
71 “Ma l’imitazione riguarda l’azioni dell'uomo, che sono a i sensi esteriori sottoposte; ed intorno ad esse 
principalmente affaticandosi, cerca di rappresentarle con parole efficaci ed espressive, ed atte a por 
chiaramente dinanzi a gli occhi corporali le cose rappresentate: nè considera i costumi, o gli affetti, o i 
discorsi dell’animo in quanto essi sono intrinseci; ma solamente in quanto fuori se n’escono, e nel parlare 
e negli atti e nell’opere manifestandosi accompagnano l’azione,” quoted and translated in Tomlinson, 
Music in Renaissance Magic, 219.  
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narrated—and therefore likelier to arrive at the judgment desired by the orator.72 Enargeia relies 
for its effectiveness on an Aristotelian model of cognition wherein the mind thinks in “images,” 
which in the psychological context can be roughly defined as the immaterial forms of data 
received from the five senses.73 As Kathy Eden has argued, the poetic “images” associated with 
mimesis came over time to be associated in literary criticism with the mind’s thinking “images,” 
such that the poetic image came to be conceived of as a rhetorically persuasive construct ideally 
suited to move the mind.74 That Buonamici defines imitare in his Discorsi in overt enargetic 
terms testifies to that close association. 
To summarize so far: for Buonamici, the word “imitation” refers both to an activity of the 
artist (image-making), and to the formal relationship between a work of art and its object of 
representation, one predicated on similitude. Through its verisimilitude and enargeia, moreover, 
imitation finds the means to move spectators. With the former, the fiction is made to seem 
plausible; with the latter, life-like.  
 
 
72 For Burmeister’s hypotyposis, see chapter 1, section 1.3. Quintilian discusses enargeia in the Institutio 
Oratoria among other places at 6.2.32, 4.2.64, 8.3.61, and 11.3.63.  
 
73 Eden, Poetic and Legal Fiction, 74: “Although cognition, according to Aristotle, entails both logical 
and psychological operations, the mind is moved to action—the aim of rhetorical persuasion—by the 
vividness of particularity.” And on enargeia, see ibid., 71–75. For an introduction to sensory perception 
in the Renaissance, see Katharine Park, “The Organic Soul,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, ed. Quentin Skinner and Eckhard Kessler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
464–84. 
 
74 Poetic and Legal Fiction, chapter 4. See especially 168–70 for the discussion of the role of the 
enargetic image in Philip Sidney’s An Apology for Poetry: “The poetic image…derives its power to 
instruct and to move from the psychological image which it imitates” (170). 
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2.3.1 Case Study: Canto (“Qual musico gentil,” mm. 6–10) 
Each aspect of Buonamici’s concept of imitazione thus far examined can be marshaled to 
evaluate imitations of words in the late sixteenth-century madrigal. As a representative example, 
take the following excerpt from Giaches de Wert’s five-voice madrigal, “Qual musico gentil,” 
from 1586, noting in particular his setting of the word canto (example 2.1). 
 
Example 2.1  “Qual musico gentil” (prima parte), Giaches de Wert, L’ottavo libro de madrigali 
a cinque voci (1586), mm. 3–11. Text: “Altamente la voce al canto snodi” ([the refined 
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 The melismatic treatment of canto in the Canto, Alto, and Basso parts is the bread-and-
butter of late sixteenth-century word-painting. It hardly needs comment. And yet, Buonamici’s 
concept of imitation brings to the surface complexities that are easily missed by the Galileian 
strain of criticism we examined in chapter 1.  
To begin with Buonamici’s cosa imitata, or the imitated object, recall that according to 
Zarlino it is not words themselves but rather the things they denote that constitute music’s proper 
object of imitation. The word canto, in other words, should not be treated as a cosa assoluta, but 
rather as an object which itself points to something else—in this case, the concept “song.” (Were 
we to do the former, we might attend, in quasi-Bembist fashion, to canto’s vowel sounds, 
syllables, and other sonic properties as potential objects of musical imitation.75) Having 
 
75 For the modern strain of madrigal analysis stemming from Bembo’s teachings on the affectivity of 
word sound, see (among others) Dean Mace, “Pietro Bembo and the Literary Origins of the Italian 
Madrigal,” Musical Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1969): 65–86; Feldman, City Culture and the Madrigal at 
Venice, chapter 6; and Cecchi, “Il rapporto tra testo letterario e intonazione.” With Gerbino (“Music of 
Words and Words in Music,” 265–66, citing Zarlino), I tend to view the imitazione delle parole as a 
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identified the imitata, song, we can proceed to Buonamici’s division of imitative objects into 
“real” and “imagined” things. Song falls squarely into the former category: unlike Buonamici’s 
chimera, song does not need the exclusive intervention of the artist’s imagination to be imitated. 
Recalling Capriano, it is also useful to acknowledge that canto denotes a sensory object of 
imitation, and one that appeals to the sense of hearing in particular. Wert’s object of imitation, in 
other words, corresponds to the mimetic medium. 
Proceeding from Wert’s imitata (the word canto) to his imitante (the musical setting of 
that word), it emerges that the relationship between the two is structured by what Buonamici 
calls a similitude of form. As in Buonamici’s example of the painting that evokes some “colors 
and features” of its object, the melismas in Wert’s Canto, Alto, and Basso parts represent canto 
with a high degree of selectivity. Much that could be predicated of a sixteenth-century song, in 
other words, is left out, such as (say) a catchy tune, common rhythmic patterns, a clear beginning 
and an ending marked by cadences, a text (somewhat ironically), and so on. In their place, Wert 
has chosen to represent, it seems, the sonority of song: its central vowel stretched over sixteen 
notes, canto becomes a vivid representation of the sound of singing, but reduced to its essential, 
perhaps even universal, qualities, with much left outside the musical frame. Despite its clear 
differences from “song” as practiced in sixteenth-century Italy, then, we hear Wert’s imitazione 
della parola as an efficacious and verisimilar representation of its object, which has been 
“reduced” (to borrow Capriano’s phrase) to an easily recognizable form. 
In its vividness, moreover, Wert’s madrigalism exudes enargeia. The melismas on canto 
pop out of their musical context like color accents in a black-and-white photograph: up to this 
spot in the madrigal, the text-setting in the madrigal has been entirely syllabic. Owing to the 
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contrast with what surrounds them, canto’s melismas place themselves before the mind’s eye as 
a veritable musical image of their object.76 
 
2.4 Pleasure, Inference, and Learning in Chapter 4 of the Poetics 
In his chapter on imitation, Buonamici refers again and again to the mind of the person who 
encounters the imitante and reacts, whom the philosopher usually calls the uditore (listener), 
spettatore (spectator), or veggente (viewer). For Buonamici, that is to say, imitation presumes 
not only certain kinds of relationships between an art work and its object of representation but 
also a meaningful channel of communication between the artist, his or her fictional product, and 
the person who experiences it. While the success of that communication is predicated on many 
factors (verisimilitude and enargeia, for example), it relies, at base, on the viewer or listener’s 
ability to recognize the object behind the image; I can hardly appreciate Wert’s melismas on 
canto, so this way of thinking goes, if I have never heard a song before. (Recall Buonamici’s 
examples of the illiterate person’s apprehension of words as meaningless forms on the page, or 
the man who failed to recognize a hippopotamus. As negative exempla, they serve to underscore 
the foundational role that the spectator’s recognition of the object plays in mimetic experience.) 
The audience member’s successful recognition of the object of imitation paves the way in turn 
for other responses to the work, such as the evaluation of a character’s motive (as in a play), an 
appreciation of the artist’s craft, or an emotional response that facilitates moral instruction.77 
 
76 For an analysis of a madrigal (by Cipriano de Rore) with respect to its enargeia, see Giuseppe Gerbino, 
“‘Bringing before the Eyes,’” 11–26. See also brief comments on this topic in Tim Carter, “Beyond 
Drama: Monteverdi, Marino, and the Sixth Book of Madrigals (1614),” Journal of the American 
Musicological Society 69, no. 1 (March 2016): 13, 23. 
 
77 This view of the role of recognition in audience response reflects the influence of Halliwell (The 
Aesthetics of Mimesis, chapter 6), whose discussion of the psychology of mimesis informs my argument 
in this section. 
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As we saw in chapter 1, the effects stimulated by the imitazione delle parole have been 
the subject of criticism since the end of the sixteenth century, with this act of recognition on the 
listener’s part bearing the brunt of the animus. Galilei’s blistering attack on the “contrapuntists” 
in his 1581 Dialogo, especially his claim that text-setting tropes such as dissonances for 
harshness and quick rhythms for flight “provoke laughter and contempt” in audiences “and make 
them think they are almost being made fun of,” has been especially influential.78 (Witness 
Taruskin, in 2005: madrigalisms “usually depend on the uncovering of unsuspected 
correspondences and are basically humorous no matter what is actually described.”79) On 
Galilei’s reading, the listener’s identification of the object of imitation is an occasion for derision 
rather than a springboard for other responses. The commentaries have been examining, by 
contrast, associate the audience’s recognition of this object not with humor, but rather with an 
experience of cognitive pleasure.80 In so doing, they follow Aristotle.  
 
 In chapter 4 of the Poetics, Aristotle investigates the origins of poetry within the natural 
human tendencies that facilitated its emergence, and one of these tendencies is the pleasure 
humans take in this very same act of recognition.81 For Aristotle, importantly, the enjoyment of 
mimesis does not derive from the particular quality of any given mimetic object, which can range 
 
 
78 Dialogue on Ancient and Modern Music, trans. Palisca, 222 (89 in original).  
 
79 Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, 1:727. 
 
80 My use of the word “cognitive” to qualify the pleasure of mimesis throughout this section reflects 
Halliwell’s use of this word in The Aesthetics of Mimesis, chapter 6. As we will see, Cinquecento 
commentators discussed the psychology of imitation with reference to both cognitione and intelletto. 
 
81 Throughout this section, I use the word “recognition” in reference to the discussion of audience 
psychology in Poetics 4, and not the internal element of the tragic fictional plot Aristotle calls anagnorisis 
at Poetics 11. 
84 
 
from delightful (e.g., comedy) to grave (tragedy), but rather to the basic cognition involved in 
engaging with mimesis: to experience a work of mimesis is to experience pleasure. As Halliwell 
argues, Poetics chapter 4 sketches the “genus of poetic pleasure” under which the more 
particular pleasure of tragedy (“the experience of pity and fear through mimesis”—that is, of 
catharsis), discussed later in the treatise, falls.82 By implication if not exposition, then, any 
product of mimesis, in any medium, ought to produce such an effect as is accounted for in 
Poetics 4, a position taken up by at least one of Aristotle’s Renaissance commentators, as we will 
see below. The example Aristotle gives is nevertheless the pleasure taken in the contemplation of 
visual images: 
[It is] natural that everyone enjoys mimetic objects. A common occurrence indicates this: 
we enjoy contemplating the most precise images of things whose actual sight is painful to 
us, such as the forms of the vilest animals and of corpses. The explanation of this too is 
that understanding gives great pleasure not only to philosophers but likewise to others 
too, though the latter have a smaller share in it. This is why people enjoy looking at 
images, because through contemplating them it comes about that they understand and 
infer what each element means, for instance that “this person is so-and-so” [as in a 
portrait]. For, if one happens not to have seen the subject before, the image will not give 
pleasure qua mimesis but because of its execution or colour, or for some other such 
reason.83  
 
Aristotle asserts that pleasure results from the contemplation of art works no matter what 
is represented, including objects “whose actual sight is painful.” That a representation of a 
painful object does delight depends on our maintaining awareness of the distinction between the 
 
82 Stephen Halliwell, “Aristotle’s Poetics,” in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 1, ed. 
George Kennedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 162: “The proposition put forward in 
Poetics 4, that the pleasure derivable from mimesis rests on the enjoyment of learning and understanding, 
constitutes the foundation on which the specific and appropriate pleasures of individual genres can be 
defined. When we are later told that tragic pleasure arises ‘from the experience of pity and fear through 
mimesis’ (14.1453b12–13), the species confirms and illuminates the genus of poetic pleasure by not only 
adapting it to, but also enriching it with, the distinctive character of the particular genre.” 
 
83 Poetics, trans. Stephen Halliwell, 37, 39 (1448b7–19). The explication of Poetics 4 that follows is a 
paraphrase of arguments made by Halliwell in The Aesthetics of Mimesis, chapter 6. 
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two—that is, of the image’s status as a fiction. In Halliwell’s apt phrase, our recognition, in 
experiencing a mimetic work, of the object’s “mediated fact of representation” gives rise to the 
pleasure of understanding, which unfurls, in time, as we “infer” how “each element” of the work 
stands in relation to the possible realities (or, in the case of a portrait of a historical person, actual 
realities) it depicts.84 This act of understanding, Aristotle maintains, is contingent on our 
previous knowledge of the work’s object of representation, even if (by implication) it is only of 
the kind of thing the work portrays—for example, an emotion we have previously experienced. 
Without this foreknowledge, we are only able to appreciate the work’s technical artifice (its 
“execution of color,” for example), not gaining access to the richer experience of appreciating 
that same artifice as an artistic mediation of some recognizable object. And understanding is 
pleasurable, finally, because it constitutes an instance of learning, an activity Aristotle associates 
with pleasure in the Metaphysics (1.1) and the Rhetoric (3.10.2). We enjoy a work of mimesis, in 
sum, because of our coming into awareness of the fiction it creates, a process characterized in 
Aristotle’s example of the portrait (the portrait is only implied by the phrase “this person is so-
and-so”) as the result of a natural process of cognition. This is not to say that other emotions, 
such as those we might feel toward the represented object in reality, do not figure into our 
experience of the work of art.85 The experience of art “qua mimesis,” however, necessarily gives 
rise to pleasure by this account. 
In his paraphrase of chapter 4 of the Poetics, Buonamici follows Aristotle in emphasizing 
the importance of the spectator’s intellect (intelletto) in any encounter with a work of imitation. 
No mere stimulus to the sense, imitation spurs the spectator’s reasoning faculties to distinguish 
 
84 Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 184. 
 
85 On this point, see ibid., 185–86. 
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the work of imitation from its object of representation. As a consequence, Buonamici’s audience 
is always aware of an imitation’s fictional status, and never deceived into mistaking it for the 
truth.86 Like Aristotle, moreover, Buonamici centers pleasure (diletto) and learning (imparare) in 
the spectator’s mimetic experience, the former understood to be a natural consequent of the 
latter. To experience a work of imitation is to recognize its object of representation, to recognize 
its object is to learn something, and learning is pleasurable.87 In an intriguing turn of phrase, the 
Pisan philosopher calls imitation a “species of discourse” (una spezie di discorso), a word he 
associates throughout his treatise with activities such as reading and writing.88 By allying 
imitation with discorso, Buonamici underscores its appeal to the intellect and affirms its origins 
as an activity to which humans are naturally drawn. 
 
86 While of little relevance to the madrigal, the spectator’s maintaining awareness of the distinction 
between truth and fiction is central to the aesthetics of the theater with which Buonamici is primarily 
concerned. See Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 2:695: “The spectator [for Buonamici] is 
constantly aware that he is seeing a spectacle, not a real action. He knows that what he sees on stage are 
‘signs’ of an action and that an operation of his own mind is necessary at every step to pass from the sign 
to the ‘thing signified.’” Buonamici differed from some of his contemporaries in this regard. Both Agnolo 
Segni and Torquato Tasso, for example, held that imitation appeals to an audience’s irrational faculties, 
and that at its best a work of imitation deceives those faculties into mistaking fiction for truth. 
 
87 Buonamici’s most concise formulation of this argument reads as follows: “[Imitation] is delightful not 
only to the imitator but also to the viewer because the recognition that is acquired by means of imitation is 
delightful—indeed, for it is a species of discourse, and the most perfect kind” (Dicesi ancora che non 
all’imitante solo, ma anch’al veggente è dilettevole, perché il riconoscere apporta piacere, il quale si 
acquista per l’imitazione, si perché è una spezie di discorso, e quella perfettisima), Discorsi poetici, 44.  
 
88 For “una spezie di discorso,” see n. 87. On Buonamici’s use of the word discorso, Maurizio Padoan 
writes, “Non è del tutto chiaro cosa intenda il Buonamici per discorso: l’interpretazione più convincente, 
suffragata anche da altri ambiti espositivi del suo trattato, è che con questo termine il teorico designi un 
tipo di lettura razionale, disposta alla piena intelligenza del testo.” Padoan, “Dalla ‘potentia auditiva’ 
all’‘universal genio de’ spettatori:’ La ricezione della musica nel pensiero teorico tra Rinascimento e 
Barocco (II),” Rivista Italiana di Musicologia 37, no. 1 (2002): 45. The meaning of this word becomes 
clearer when, later in his treatise, Buonamici argues that the emotions associated with theatrical catharsis 
are stirred in spectators “without any discourse” (senza alcun discorso)—that is, without the intervention 
of the spectator’s rational faculties (see ibid., 45). 
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Buonamici goes considerably further than Aristotle in specifying the type of “learning” 
that occurs when a viewer recognizes an object of imitation, however. Where Aristotle describes 
the spectator’s recognition of the object of representation with a concision subject to multiple 
interpretations,89 Buonamici’s elaborates this mental act by means of an analogy to the first 
instrument of logic, the syllogism:  
Through imitation one learns: because a type of learning is by syllogism; imitation 
contains a semblance of the syllogism, proceeding from the image one sees to the thing of 
which it is an image, which one does not see. Indeed, it is necessary that in such a way 
one learns something new (n’habbia notizia), because otherwise one would not learn, 
neither using the mind (discorrendo), nor doing [any] more than if one saw some other 
thing that existed in itself [i.e., not as part of an imitation], adopting only the work of the 
senses, and leaving by the wayside the work of the intellect.90 
 
This intriguing but obscure passage configures the relationship between a work of imitation and 
its object of representation as a logical puzzle. Buonamici’s viewer is presented with an image 
that has certain qualities; to understand their significance, this viewer proceeds by means of a 
“syllogism”—a mode of deductive reasoning leading from accepted premises to a new 
conclusion—toward the object of representation, which shares at least some of those same 
 
89 One ambiguity hinges on the meaning of the sentence “People enjoy looking at images, because 
through contemplating them it comes about that they understand and infer what each element means, for 
instance that “this person is so-and-so,” in particular the Greek verbs manthanein (“learn” or 
“understand”) and sullogizesthai (“infer”). Some commentators, including the sixteenth-century authors 
surveyed here, interpret Aristotle’s sullogizesthai as a reference to reasoning with syllogisms, while 
others take Aristotle to mean reasoning or inference in a looser sense. For the latter opinion, see Halliwell, 
The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 192, with his n. 40. For a recent advocate of the former, see Charles 
McNamara, “Quintilian’s Theory of Certainty and Its Afterlife in Early Modern Italy” (PhD diss., 
Columbia University, 2016), 33–39, which focuses on audience members’ inferences in a rhetorical 
context.  
 
90 “Per l’imitazione si impara: perché una spezie d’imparare è per sillogismo; l’imitazione contiene una 
sembianza di sillogismo, procedendo dalla imagine, che ella vede alla cosa di chi ell’è imagine, che non la 
vede. È ben vero che bisogna, che in qualche modo ella n’habbia notizia, perché altramente non 
imparerebbe, non discorrendo, né più si farebbe, che se vedesse qualunque altra cosa, che fusse da per se, 
adoprando solo l’opera del senso, e da banda lasciando l’opera dell’intelletto,” Buonamici, Discorsi 
poetici, 43. It is ambiguous to whom or what the pronoun ella refers to in this passage. It could be 
l’imitazione itself, or perhaps la veduta. In any case, in the following sentence Buonamici affirms that 
imitation is natural for both the artist and the spectator. 
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qualities. (Recall that for Buonamici the relationship between imitante and imitata is predicated 
on a similitude of form, i.e., shared features.) The completion of this syllogism is not an end in 
itself, but rather the catalyst for an instance of learning, an activity for which a strong natural 
desire, Buonamici elsewhere writes, “is born with man.”91 Buonamici clarifies the cognition 
involved in viewing a work of imitation by contrasting it to a person’s ordinary experience of the 
world. When someone encounters an object in reality (Buonamici’s phrase is per se, or “in 
itself”), rather than in a work of imitation, only the senses are needed to recognize what it is—no 
inference needed. 
Buonamici’s incorporation of syllogistic reasoning into his psychology of imitation is not 
unique or even unusual. Cinquecento translations often render Aristotle’s phrase “understand and 
infer” (manthanein kai sullogizesthai) from Poetics chapter 4 into the vernacular as the phrase 
“coming to know through syllogisms,” or a variation on it. This habit of translation seems to 
have stemmed at least in part from their interpretation of the Greek verb sullogizesthai, a word 
that, for Aristotle, referred not only to the use of syllogisms but also to reasoning in a more 
general sense.92 Although Buonamici’s treatise is not a translation (or even a close paraphrase) of 
Aristotle’s text, he therefore probably took the word “syllogism” from other Italian translations 
and commentaries that do use this word. Alessandro Piccolomini’s influential vernacular 
translation of the Poetics, from 1575, renders the relevant section of chapter 4 as follows: 
 
91 “Ultimately learning—that is, the desire to know—is born with man” (Ultimamente l’imparare, cioè il 
desiderio da sapere, è nato con l’huomo), Buonamici, Discorsi poetici, 42. 
 
92 On scholarly disagreements over the meaning of this verb, see n. 89. The Renaissance translation habit 
may also have stemmed from medieval Arabic poetics, which to an even greater degree than the authors 
surveyed here center syllogisms in the listener’s experience of mimesis (itself understood as a principle of 
figurative language rather than a theory of artistic representation in the Aristotelian sense). See Deborah 
L. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1990); 




Per questo adunque senton piacere di riguardare i ritratti, e le immagini delle cose, perché 
in così fatto riguardamento accade lor d’acquistar notitia, e di conoscer quasi per 
sillogismo che cose quelle tali cose siano; com’à dire, che questi sia colui. Imperocché se 
accaderà, che quelle cotali cose non siano state vedute, o conosciute prima, non 
cagioneranno le immagini d’esse, per causa dell’imitatione dilettatione alcuna: ma solo la 
cagionerà forse la qualità dell’artificio, o la vaghezza dei colori, o altra somigliante cosa 
[emphasis added].93 
 
Piccolomini’s use of the word sillogismo is one instance among many: in Giorgio Bartoli’s 
manuscript translation (1573), Piccolomini’s “conoscer quasi per sillogismo” is simply 
“sillogizzare”; in Castelvetro’s commentary and translation (1576), “comprendano per 
sillogismo.”94 Buonamici, as we have seen, asserts that imitation “contains a semblance of the 
syllogism” (l’imitazione contiene una sembianza di sillogismo), as if the syllogism were a kind 
of “meta-object” of mimesis preceding any given work’s actual content. Even when, in 
sixteenth-century Latin translations such as Piero Vettori’s, Aristotle’s verb sullogizesthai is 
translated as ratiocinor (to “infer” or “conclude”), marginal annotations reveal that 
commentators inferred the use of syllogisms, regardless of the word’s presence or absence in the 
translation.95 A copy of Piccolomini’s treatise owned and annotated by the literato Filippo 
 
93 Piccolomini, Annotationi, 67–68.  
 
94 Bartoli’s translation, which is unsigned but dated (to 1573), is preserved in Biblioteca Medicea 
Laurenziana MS Ashburnham 531, fols. 1–38 (each item in the manuscript has separate foliation). 
Bernard Weinberg attributes the translation to Lorenzo Giacomini (see A History of Literary Criticism, 
1:523–29), but Anna Siekiera convincingly makes a case for Bartoli’s authorship. Bartoli was 
Giacomini’s longtime assistant and scribe. See Siekiera, “Una traduzione del 1573 della Poetica di 
Aristotele,” Rinascimento 34 (1994): 365–76. For Castelvetro’s translation of Poetics 4 (first published in 
1570), see Poetica d’Aristotele vulgarizzata, 63.  
 
95 See the annotated manuscript copy of Vettori’s Poetics translation in BNCF Magl. VII, 1199. At 11r 
(supra) is Vettori’s phrase “per discere, ac ratiocinari quid unum quodquam eorum sit eu quod hic ille 
est” (reason and infer what each element is and conclude that this is that). At 10r, a marginal gloss on the 
words “Quod hic est ille” (underlined in the manuscript) offers an extensive description of the syllogism a 
spectator works through to identify the object of imitation, along similar lines to Piccolomini and 
Bartoli’s analyses (discussed below). The gloss here (10r) indicates that it is the phrase “because this is 
that,” and not ratiocinari, that cues a syllogism: “Quod hic est ille and this is the conclusion Aristotle 
places by itself, letting us make the syllogism” (Quod hic est ille e questa è la conclusione la qual’ 
Aristotele pon sola, e lascia à noi far il silogismo). 
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Sassetti (now at Florence’s National Library) confirms the association by putting it in reverse. In 
figure 2.1, Sassetti has underlined Piccolomini’s “di conoscer quasi per sillogismo” and penned 
the Greek “sullogizesthai” in the margin, as if to suggest the noteworthiness of the syllogism’s 
place in Aristotle’s passage. 
 
Figure 2.1  Detail from Filippo Sassetti’s annotated copy of Piccolomini’s Annotationi di M. 
Alessandro Piccolomini, nel libro della Poetica d’Aristotele (BNCF Postillati 15, 68). My 
photo. 
 
Commentaries on the passage bear out the implication of the translations. Together, they 
establish what we might call a quasi-logical paradigm for aesthetic experience—a sixteenth-
century theory about how the human mind naturally responds to fictional representations in all 
media. Hardly idle speculation, this paradigm is intimately connected to the benefit (giovamento) 
and delight (diletto) many Poetics commentators established, following Horace, as the ends of 
poetry—ends, it is worth noting in passing, that Zarlino extended to music.96 In short, the 
 
 
96 In the period prior to the reemergence of Aristotle’s Poetics in the mid-sixteenth century, critics 
followed Horace in naming pleasure and/or utility as the aim of poetry and related art forms. As Bernard 
Weinberg and others have shown (see, e.g., A History of Literary Criticism, 1:422–23), those ancient texts 
that subsequently rose to prominence within literary discourse, including the Poetics, were made to 
accord with these Horatian principles, which at least for some continued to hold through the century. (The 
relative degrees to which poetry should either benefit and/or delight were debated, however. See also 
ibid., 2:713, on theorists who held imitation itself to be poetry’s end.) For a lucid account of mid-
sixteenth-century adaptations of Horace’s pleasure/benefit motto, see Marvin Herrick, The Fusion of 
Horatian and Aristotelian Literary Criticism 1531-1555 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1946), 39–
47. See also Javitch, “The Assimilation of Aristotle’s Poetics,” 57. These Horatian principles in turn 
reach back to the rhetorical tradition (Herrick, Fusion, 41), where the duties of the orator were usually 
characterized as teaching, delighting, and moving an audience. (This note continues below.) 
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syllogism a spectator uses to work out the relationship between a work of imitation and its object 
facilitates the audience member’s instruction, thereby serving poetry’s first end; this act of 
learning gives rise, in turn, to an experience of cognitive pleasure, fulfilling the second. While 
the scaffolding of this psychology was supplied by Aristotle in chapter 4 of the Poetics, as we 
have seen (albeit without the moralistic valence of giovamento), Renaissance commentators 
elaborated it creatively. Piccolomini, for the clarity of his prose and the thoroughness of his 
commentary on the relevant section of the Poetics, makes for a good representative of the 
tradition. Like Buonamici, Piccolomini explains the cognition involved in a spectator’s 
recognition of an object of imitation by means of the syllogism. He goes into considerable detail 
about the process: 
I will discuss a few things about the knowledge (notitia) that we procure for ourselves 
when we take in imitated things, and of the delight we savor in doing this. Such 
knowledge is generated in this way. If I, perchance, see a painted portrait of something 
that is known to me—for example, a friend of mine—in such a case, through the 
similarity that the portrait has with my friend, I’ll work through it, arguing almost by 
means of the fastest syllogism, and conclude that the portrait is of my friend. For there 
are in every syllogistic discourse necessarily three terms, of which one is a known thing 
and two [others] have convenience with it. Through this convenience one concludes that 
those [other] two have convenience between themselves to an equal degree, as I have 
explained clearly in my Instrumento della Filosofia. We should therefore maintain that in 
the example of the painting the three terms are these: my friend, the painted portrait of 
him, and the internal image of my friend that I keep in my mind (anima). In offering up 
that portrait to myself, I know to assimilate both of those first terms—that is, the friend 
and the portrait—to that internal image, and through this [method] I conclude that they 
are similar between them, and that the portrait is, by necessity, a portrait of my friend. 
And this, which we have explained with the example of painting, can be demonstrated in 
every other sort of imitation, above all in that of poetry.97 
 
 At Ist. harm. 3.26.199, Zarlino states that the ends of music are both to benefit (giovare) and to 
delight (dilettare) listeners, citing Horace. At Ist. harm. 1.3.11–12, Zarlino instead adopts a position with 
respect to the ends of music more in line with Book 8 of Aristotle’s Politics than with Horace’s Ars 
poetica. Of course, different writers held different views on the ends of music. Some argued that music’s 
only end was to please, while others emphasized the necessity of moving the emotions. For the former 
position, see Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 1:219–20; for the latter, see chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
 
97 “anderò toccando alcune poche cose della notitia, che noi à noi stessi procacciamo con l’occasione, che 




The specific notitia—translated most literally, “item of news”—resulting from the viewer’s 
completion of what we might call the “portrait syllogism” is no more than the recognition, to 
quote Halliwell’s translation of Aristotle’s phrase, that “this person is so-and-so.” And yet, for 
Piccolomini, even this straightforward act of recognition entails the viewer’s comparison of two 
images—a mimetic image, presented by the portrait, and a psychological one, retained in the 
mind—according to logical procedures. Piccolomini’s “internal image” is the “known thing” 
(cosa nota) or term, whose confirmed correspondence (convenienza) with both the portrait and 
the friend himself leads the viewer to discover the portrait’s representational significance. Just as 
for Aristotle the appreciation of an art work qua mimesis depends on the viewer’s foreknowledge 
of its object of representation, so for Piccolomini the syllogistic act of recognition depends on the 
viewer’s previously held “internal image,” which assumes the crucial role of the syllogism’s 
middle term. (Here, the philosopher simply calls this middle term the cosa nota, or known thing.) 
To put it another way, using terminology devised by the American philosopher Charles Peirce, 
Piccolomini’s “internal image” is the “interpretant” in virtue of which sign and object are related 
 
in questa guisa. Poniam per caso, ch’io vegga in pittura il ritratto di qualche cosa, che mi sia nota, ch’ à 
dire, d’un mio amico; in tal caso per la somiglianza, ch’il ritratto tiene con l’animo, anderò io quasi per 
modo di velocissimo sillogismo argomentando, e concludendo, che quel sia ritratto del mio amico. 
Percioche essendo in ogni discorso sillogistico necessarij tre termini, dei quali sia cosa nota, che due 
habbian convenientia col terzo; mediante questa convenientia si conclude, che quei due parimente 
convenghin tra lor medesimi; come chiaramente hò dicchiarato nel mio Instromento della Filosofia. 
dobbiamo dunque stimare, che nell’essempio del detto ritratto li tre termini sian questi; il mio amico, il 
depinto ritratto suo, e l’imagine interna del mio amico, la quale io tengo nell’animo. alla qual’immagine 
interna, in offerirmisi quel ritratto, conosco assomigliarsi ambidue quei primi termini, cioè l’animo, e’l 
ritratto; e conclude per questo, che sian simili frà di loro, e cher per ciò bisogni, che quel ritratto sia 
ritratto del mio amico. Et questo, che haviam discoro con l’essempio della pittura, si può dimostrare in 
ogni altra sorte d’imitatione, e principalmente in quella della poesia,” Piccolomini, Annotationi, 68–69. 
For a discussion of this passage in the context of Piccolomini’s “ethical hedonism,” see Eugenio Refini, 
Per via d’annotationi: Le glosse inedite di Alessandro Piccolomini all’Ars Poetica di Orazio (Lucca: 
Maria Paccini Fazzi, 2009), 101–2. 
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to one another. In Aristotle’s example, a Peircean account might go, the portrait is represented 
“to” the mind’s image, which makes possible the intelligibility of its relation to its object.98 
For all his rigor, Piccolomini does not actually spell out the syllogism or directly trace the 
steps involved in completing it beyond alluding to the importance of similarity, the crucial 
quality, as we learned from Buonamici, that binds a work of imitation to its object. Turning, as 
Piccolomini suggests, to the author’s own treatise on logic, the Instrumento della Filosofia 
Naturale (1551), we read that a syllogism necessarily links three terms (termini) in a chain of 
three propositions (proposizioni), progressing from two propositions that are conceded as true—
in modern terminology, these are the syllogism’s major and minor premises—to a third that is 
concluded to be so, which produces notitia. The “middle term” (mezzo termine) must be present 
in the first two propositions; its correspondence (convenienza) or lack thereof (disconvenienza) 
with the other two terms determines the syllogism’s outcome.99 According to this model, 
Piccolomini’s portrait syllogism might resemble the following if written out: 
• This portrait resembles a mental image I have. 
• This mental image resembles my friend. 
• Therefore, this portrait is of my friend. 
 
Here, the three terms of the syllogism are “portrait,” “mental image,” and “friend,” and each 
proposition compares two of them. The spectator’s mental image is the mezzo termine, which is 
present in the first two propositions. This mental image’s convenienza with the other two terms 
allows him to conclude, in the third and final proposition, that the first and third terms do indeed 
correspond with one another: “This portrait is of my friend.” 
 
98 For an introduction to Peirce’s semiotics, see Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/peirce/. 
 
99 Alessandro Piccolomini, L’instrumento del la filosofia naturale di m. Alessandro Piccolomini (Rome: 
Vincenzo Valgrisi, 1551; Venice: Daniel Zanetti, 1576), 24r–25r. 
94 
 
The deduction is admittedly rudimentary.100 For Piccolomini, however, the value of the 
inference lies not in its degree of complexity, which is low, but rather in the fact that the 
audience member executes it alone and of his or her own volition. The notitia generated from 
appreciating a work of imitation as a representation of something, he explains, is “procured for 
us by ourselves,” and imitations bring the spectator more delight than other, more standard forms 
of instruction “because things that come from us, and that are our own works, render us more 
amiable (amabile) than other things.”101 Imitations thus not only teach through the cognition they 
stimulate—the velocissimo sillogismo discussed above—but also delight in virtue of their 
heuristic quality. The pleasure and learning described in the context of the “portrait syllogism,” 
moreover, mirror Piccolomini’s ideas about the aims of poetry in general, wherein pleasure is 
subordinated to utility “as a servant and companion, so that man may more willingly allow 
himself to receive that usefulness.”102 On this reading, the “pleasure of inference” invited by an 
 
100 It is best to think of Piccolomini’s syllogism as an analogy for the rapid thought involved in 
recognizing a mimetic object rather than a theory of cognition as such. He does not, for example, make 
recourse to the faculty psychology current in the sixteenth century, a domain of knowledge he draws on 
extensively in his earlier commentary on Book 2 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the Piena, copiosa et larga 
parafrasa di M. Alessandro Piccolomini nel secondo libro della Retorica d’Aristotile (Venice: Giovan 
Francesco Camozio, 1569). It is also worth noting that neither this one nor any of the syllogisms 
discussed in Poetics 4 commentaries are valid, perhaps the reason why Piccolomini qualifies this 
intellection as quasi-syllogistic. 
 
101 The full passage reads as follows: “With this and other similar examples that could be added one 
learns how imitation causes us to acquire knowledge that is procured by us for ourselves, almost won for 
ourselves. And because things that come from us, and that are our own works, render us more amiable 
than things that come from others, it follows that they bring us greater pleasure” (Con questo dunque, e 
con altri così fatti essempi, ch’addur si potrebbero, si può conoscere, come l’imitatione ci faccia acquistar 
notitia, procacciata in noi da noi medesimi, e quasi da noi stessi guadagnata. Et perche le cose, che 
vengon da noi, e sono opere nostro, ci si rendon sempre più amabili, che le altrui, nasce da questo, che 
conseguentemente ci rechino maggior diletto), Piccolomini, Annotationi, 69. 
 
102 “alquale utile è dato per compagnia il diletto, come ministro, e compagno, accioche più voluntieri 
l’huom si ponga à ricever quel giovamento,” quoted and translated in Weinberg, A History of Literary 
Criticism, 1:546 (original in Piccolomini, Annotationi, 372). On Piccolomini’s position with respect to 
literary debates over the ends of poetry, see also the useful discussion in Refini, Per via d’annotationi, 
98–106. As Refini characterizes it (99), Piccolomini’s stance was a compromise between those of 
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imitation is a mechanism of receptivity, rather than an end in itself. Delighted by the pleasure of 
imitation qua imitation—that is, the conditions of fictional representation—a spectator becomes 
open to whatever moral or didactic lesson the work’s content may communicate.103  
Other commentaries on Poetics chapter 4 do spell out the “portrait syllogism” 
Piccolomini adumbrates, but with different emphases. Giorgio Bartoli’s unpublished Italian 
translation of the Poetics, preserved in manuscript at the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, 
renders Aristotle’s phrase “understand and infer what each element means” as “imparare et 
sillogizzare quelche ciascuna cosa è.”104 The verb sillogizzare is then treated to a lengthy gloss in 
the margin of the manuscript, likely in the same hand: 
In seeing images, one makes syllogisms and one concludes and one learns that this 
image is that exemplar or that man, as in: 
 
b. properties or common accidents a. that exemplar or that man c. this image 
 
that exemplar has these properties 
this image has the same ones 
therefore, this image is that exemplar 
 
….The middle term (il mezzo) will therefore be the properties common to the image 
and the exemplar, which alone has all of them.105 
 
Lodovico Castelvetro, who considered poetry to be a vehicle of pure hedonism, and Vincenzo Maggi, 
who prioritized the “moral value” of poems over their pleasure. 
 
103 I borrow the phrase “pleasure of inference” from McNamara, “Quintilian’s Theory of Certainty,” 34–
39. Piccolomini’s espousal of the heuristic value of imitation also mirrors his philosophical project at 
large, wherein by translating Aristotle’s writings into the vernacular he aimed to make the philosopher’s 
teachings accessible to readers outside university contexts, women included. On this topic, see Letizia 
Panizza, “Alessandro Piccolomini’s Mission: Philosophy for Men and Women in Their Mother Tongue,” 
in Vernacular Aristotelianism in Italy, 57–74.  
 
104 BML MS Ashburnham 531, fols. 1–38 (each item in the manuscript has separate foliation). See my n. 
94 on the authorship of this unsigned translation. 
 
105 Full transcription of the marginal annotation: “Nel veder le immagini si fa sillogismi et si conchiude et 
si impara, che questa immagine è quello essemplare ò quel huomo, cosi 
 





In Bartoli’s account, the middle term of the syllogism is not the viewer’s mental image, as it is 
for Piccolomini, but rather the “properties or common accidents” shared by the image 
(immagine) and its object (essemplare, or exemplar). Anticipating Buonamici’s account of the 
“similitude of form” between the imitante and imitata, Bartoli’s mimetic image only shares some 
of the properties of its object, “which alone has all of them.” It is then up to the viewer to make 
the leap from one to the other, despite their inevitable differences. As for both Piccolomini and 
Buonamici, moreover, this leap of the mind is a source of pleasure, as Bartoli explains in a 
marginal gloss on the previous folio.106 This pleasure, it is worth emphasizing, stems not from 
the content of the work but rather from the conditions of imitation as such—that is, the play of 
similarity and difference between imitation and object.107 
 
quello essemplare ha queste proprietà 
questa immagine ha le medesime 
Adunque questa immagine è quello essemplare 
 
E ne la seconda figura et buono perche si puo convertire, la maggior dicendo chiunque ha queste proprietà 
è quello essemplare; o senza convertire così quello essemplare solo ha queste proprietà. Il mezzo adunque 
sarà la proprietà comuni à la immagine et à la essemplare che solo le ha tutte,” BML Ashburnham 531, 4r. 
Bartoli’s essemplare corresponds to Buonamici’s imitante, Bartoli’s immagine to Buonamici’s imitata. 
Weinberg made a partial transcription and translation of this annotation in A History of Literary Criticism, 
1:526. 
 
106 “In seeing images there is learning, in learning there is delight. Therefore, in seeing images there is 
delight” (Nel veder l’imagini è l’imparare, nel imparare è diletto. adunque nel veder le immagini è 
diletto), Ashburnham 531, 3v. This gloss, itself an argument by syllogism, is transcribed and translated in 
Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 1:525. 
 
107 This is not to say that other forms of emotional response, such as sympathetic ones, may not also arise 
in response to that content, a problem that was vigorously debated with respect to the pleasure of 
imitation in the commentaries under discussion. For his part, Piccolomini holds that the pleasure of 
imitation is essential and other forms of emotional response are “accidental,” deriving from contingencies 
of the work or the audience rather than from imitation itself. Addressing a scenario in which a spectator 
gazes on a painting of his loved ones being murdered, Piccolomini reasons that “each person can see for 
himself that all this pain and sadness are accidental things that do not derive from imitation, but rather 
from causes conjoined by accident with it” (potendo ciascheduno per se stesso vedere, che tutti i detti 
dolori, e tristezze son cose per accidente, che non da imitatione, derivano, ma da cagioni congiunte per 
accidente con quella), Annotationi, 70–71. In a similar vein, he elsewhere reports (ibid., 246–47) that 
representations of “deaths, blood, and torments” (morti, sangue, tormenti) in certain ancient tragedies 
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Buonamici does not explore the syllogistic cognition provoked by images in as much 
detail as Bartoli or Piccolomini do. He does echo Piccolomini’s comments on the heuristic 
quality of imitation, however, by singling out for praise imitation’s ability to delight “without 
effort” (senza fatica) on the audience’s part, a phrase found in other sources of the period.108 
Indeed, it is in large part the ease of recognizing mimetic images to which Buonamici attributes 
the audience’ experience of pleasure. Imitation may be a “species of discourse,” and it may 
engage the intellect by means of the syllogism, but it does so without overly burdening the mind. 
(The audiences imagined by Cinquecento Poetics commentators were generally assumed to have 
middling intellectual capacities and short attention spans.109) In a digression on this point, 
 
“caused in the souls of spectators a horror and movement and perturbation of the emotions that in large 
part clouded the delight of imitation” (causando negli animi degli spettatori un così fatto horrore, e 
commuovimento di affetti, e di perturbationi, che in buona parte intorbidava quasi il diletto 
dell’imitatione). Again, Piccolomini’s assumption, which was not shared by all of his contemporaries, is 
that pleasure is essential and other emotions accidental.  
 
108 “Without effort”: see n. 110. “Other sources of the period”: in the aforementioned heavily-annotated 
Florentine manuscript containing Piero Vettori’s Latin translation of the Poetics (BNCF Magl. VII, 1199, 
9v; see my n. 68), for example, the phrase “massimamente tosto e senza fatica” (especially quickly and 
without effort) is penned above the verb discere (learn) in the sentence, from Poetics chapter 4, “The 
explanation of this too is that understanding gives great pleasure not only to philosophers but likewise to 
others too” (Causa autem huius rei est etiam quia discere non solum philosophis vivundissimum est, 
verum etiam alijs similiter). Vettori’s discere translates Aristotle’s manthanein; the Italian annotation 
above this verb suggests that learning quickly and without effort is especially pleasurable (presumably for 
non-philosophers). This precept is absent in the Poetics but is mentioned in the Rhetoric, as I discuss 
below. The annotation is shown below in figure 2.2: 
 
 
Figure 2.2  BNCF Magl. VII, 1199, 9v, detail. My photo. 
 
109 See, e.g., Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 2:546–47, where Weinberg draws attention to 
Piccolomini’s characterization of the audience for a tragedy as a “multitude” (moltitudine) whose short 
attention span must be accommodated in various respects by the playwright.  
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Buonamici distinguishes between two types of mental activity: cognitione, which requires effort, 
and ricognitione, which is habitual and requires no effort. The psychology of imitation falls 
under the domain of the latter: 
Habit is acquired with effort: however, [the acquisition] does not bring much delight. But 
if one already knows something, to consider it again is easy (senza fatica) and very 
pleasurable. In imitation, we already knew; through imitation we do not simply learn 
(impariamo), but rather that which we already knew is demonstrated to us, and it is 
recognized, not learned for the first time (e si riconosce, non si conosce). Therefore it 
brings delight. Indeed, because that which we are accustomed to is less annoying than 
new things, and we are accustomed to seeing represented objects (il 
rappresentato)….[When it encounters an imitation] the soul almost says, “Ah, ah, this is 
that thing that I once knew.”110 
 
The precept that easy learning is a source of pleasure has no basis in the Poetics, but it is possible 
that these authors picked up the idea from another of Aristotle’s treatises, the Rhetoric, where the 
philosopher avers, “To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all people.”111 There, the maxim 
serves Aristotle’s advice to rhetoricians that they employ metaphors and enthymemes (a form of 
argument suitable for rhetorical persuasion) neither too obvious nor obscure, but rather those that 
fall in the mean, lest they fail to hold an audience’s attention. In a similar way, Buonamici 




110 “l’habito s’acquista con fatica: però non porta seco molto diletto, ma sapendosi una cosa, il 
considerarla di nuovo è senza fatica, e con sommo piacere, nell’imitazione noi sapevamo gia, per 
l’imitazione noi non impariamo semplicemente, ma ci si dimostra quello che già sapevamo, e si 
riconosce, non si conosce. adunque ella apporta diletto; si ancora perche quello a che siamo avvezzi, è 
manco noioso che la cosa nuova, e noi siamo advezzi a veder il rappresentato….quasi dica l’animo. Ah ah 
quest è quella cosa, che io conobbi alcuna volta,” Buonamici, Discorsi poetici, 44–45. Buonamici’s 
quotation of the soul’s inner dialogue (“Ah ah…”) has overtones of Platonic anamnesis. 
 
111 On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 218 (1410b2). 
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2.4.1 Case Study: Canto Redux 
Considered in light of the foregoing, the imitazioni delle parole that populate the late 
Cinquecento madrigal reemerge as stimuli for effecting a response basic to the human perception 
of representational art, one the Poetics commentators accorded value centered on the pleasure 
and benefit that follow easy learning.112 There is no direct evidence that these ideas were 
extended to music. But people did refer to what we now call madrigalisms as imitations of 
words, and Zarlino, as we have seen, directly traced this principle back to Aristotle’s Poetics.113 
At least one musicologist, moreover, has recently reached similar conclusions for a different 
repertory. In her 2016 dissertation, Melinda Latour convincingly demonstrates the instructive 
and pleasurable potential of word-painting in moral songs from late sixteenth-century France, 
likewise drawing on an Aristotelian ethical-rhetorical framework.114 In a similar vein to Latour, 
albeit with more granularity, the paragraphs that follow look to imitations of words for the 
experiences they invited in the late Cinquecento. More precisely, they imagine how audience-
minded literary critics like Piccolomini and Buonamici might have written about the imitazione 
delle parole had their interests extended to music. For this reason, what follows is perhaps best 
 
112 It is worth emphasizing that these writers invoke the portrait syllogism to illustrate an aspect of human 
nature—the fact that humans take pleasure from imitation—rather than a quality of portraits. Recall also 
that Poetics 4 is an investigation of the origins of poetry with respect to the natural human behavior that 
catalyzed its emergence (see Halliwell The Aesthetics of Mimesis, chapter 6). 
 
113 One implicit point I am making here, admittedly impossible to prove, is that in calling those text-
expressive techniques characteristic of madrigals “imitations of words” Cinquecento writers were perhaps 
responding to a commonality they perceived between polyphonic music and other forms of mimesis. 
Although they did not identify it as such, this commonality could have been the pleasure of recognition. 
Zarlino claims that musical imitations can be “heard with the senses” (udire col senso; see n. 29), which 
could be interpreted as an allusion to a listener’s ability to recognize the mimetic relationship between 
music and word, medium and object. At the very least, the phrase acknowledges a listener. As we will see 
in chapter 3, Zarlino’s theory of music and the emotions affords the listener—theorized there as the 
soggetto ben disposto—no such recognition. 
 
114 “Music and Moral Repair in Early Modern France” (PhD diss., UCLA, 2016), 198–217. 
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considered a thought experiment—an appeal to my own experience of music–text relations in the 
madrigal, but filtered through a method, or perhaps a cognitive style, for describing that 
experience and understanding its significance culled from the vernacular Poetics 
commentaries.115 In drawing from my own experience for insight, I follow in spirit if not letter 
the example of Piccolomini, who observes, in introducing his own syllogism, that Aristotle 
“confirms in this chapter [of the Poetics] the naturalness of this pleasure with a sign taken from 
experience and from the fact itself.”116   
 
 What might a mental syllogism of the madrigalism look like? Its form will depend on 
what one assumes to be the conclusion drawn from the listening experience. Consider once again 
Wert’s melismatic representation of the word canto (see example 2.1, p. 79). From one 
perspective, a listener may infer, following Aristotle’s argument in chapter 4 of the Poetics, the 
fact that Wert’s melismas constitute a meaningful representation of the word they set. Giorgio 
Bartoli’s syllogism, which encourages the spectator to compare the qualities shared by an artistic 
immagine and its real-world essemplare, provides an apt structure. These “properties or common 
accidents,” as Bartoli calls them, assume the place of the syllogism’s “middle term” (mezzo 
termine), while the word canto and its musical setting serve as the other two. The structure of the 
“propositions” is then arranged such that the resulting notitia—to borrow Piccolomini’s term—is 
the listener’s recognition of an intentional relationship between the imitation and its object. 
Applied to measures 6–10 of Wert’s madrigal, the syllogism reads as follows: 
 
115 For the notion of cognitive style, borrowed from Shai Burstyn, see this dissertation’s Introduction.  
 
116 “conferma egli in questa particella la naturalità di tal diletto, con un segno preso dall’esperientia, e dal 




• Wert’s music has certain qualities here: it is melismatic, has a rich sonority, an 
open vowel sound, a regular rhythmic pattern, and an arched contour. 
• This music sets the word canto, which refers to an object—song—that shares 
these same qualities.117 
• Therefore, Wert’s music must be a meaningful representation of canto. 
 
As in Bartoli’s scheme, the correspondence of both Wert’s music and its object of representation 
to the mezzo termine determines the syllogism’s positive outcome.118 
The syllogism may appear obvious to modern readers, especially those well-versed in the 
tropes of word-painting. To my mind, however, the inference it facilitates looks less simple from 
the perspective of a sixteenth-century listener, who in most cases would not have followed a 
performance of Wert’s music with the aid of a score or part book. From this hypothetical 
listener’s vantage point—and we will address a different perspective below—the array of 
sonorities heard at the moment the word canto is sung presents a tangle of sounds that must be 
carefully parsed. Not only does canto sound simultaneously with other words in the text, owing 
to the passage’s imitative texture (“altamente/ la voce al canto snodi”), but the word itself, 
 
117 Here I elide the fact that the word canto may not register to the listener immediately, owing to its 
polyphonic context and melismatic setting. (My subsequent analysis does take text intelligibility into 
account.) 
 
118 In its highlighting of those qualities that necessarily mediate between the medium and object of 
imitation, this syllogism accords with Bernhard Meier’s general theory of text expression in The Modes of 
Classical Polyphony Described According to the Sources With Revisions By the Author, trans. Ellen S. 
Beebe (New York: Broude Brothers Limited, 1988), 238: “If the musician wants to express words, he 
must invent certain analogies between the content of the word on the one hand and what he can do 
musically on the other—which it is possible for the listener to apprehend as such by a tertium 
comparationis.” Likewise with reference to the tertium comparationis, Cecchi theorizes a closely related 
semiotic system for sixteenth-century music that he calls “imitazione di secondo grado” (“Il rapporto tra 
testo letterario e intonazione musicale,” 568, n. 52): “Tale mimesi si attua non in modo diretto, come 
avviene nel processo di significazione della lingua, ove vi è una corrispondenza immediata, di ‘primo 
grado,’ tra parola e cosa, bensì mediante un procedimento di ‘imitazione indiretta,’ analogo a quello, 
eminentemente connotativo, che nella retorica classica viene chiamato tertium comparationis.” The 
present case study establishes a sixteenth-century foundation for Meier and Cecchi’s discussions. For an 
approach to the semiosis of music–text relations based in cognitive science, see Lawrence M. Zbikowski, 
Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory, and Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), chapter 2 (“Cross-Domain Mapping”). 
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stretched like putty by its lengthy melisma, escapes clear enunciation until the second quarter 
note of measure 10, when its latter half, “-nto,” is sung simultaneously in all voices but the 
Alto—i.e., at the tail end of the relevant passage. Making matters more complicated, Wert’s 
madrigalism on canto overlaps with his representation of altamente, which commences in 
measure 3 and continues through measure 7. Given that this adverb is both imitated by means of 
a markedly high register and accentuated with syllabic declamation to a concise rhythm and 
single pitch, this word stands out from the musical texture to a much greater degree than canto 
does.  
Divested of the visual clarity afforded by a score or part book, we can imagine a listener 
engaging in a cognitive process roughly similar to the one outlined in the syllogism above. First, 
this listener might notice new and striking qualities in the music when the Alto, the first to sing 
canto, begins executing its long melisma. At this stage, the identity of this word has probably not 
registered in the listener’s mind yet, owing to the Canto and Basso’s concurrent singing of 
altamente, followed closely by Tenore and Quinto entering on the same word—both, moreover, 
on notes higher in pitch than the Alto. (At the nadir of its melisma, on the downbeat of measure 
7, the Alto is in fact lower in register than all the other parts, virtually guaranteeing the word’s 
disappearance into the overall sonority.) The listener is afforded another opportunity when Canto 
and Basso together execute canto, beginning on beat 3 of measure 7. Clearer yet is the Alto’s 
repetition of this word, which spans just one measure, from beats 1 through 4 of measure 9. By 
this time, our listener may have both registered the identity of the word and executed the rapid 
syllogism necessary to correlate it to its setting. And even if he or she has not didactically listed 
the qualities shared by the music and its object, as in the syllogism above, perhaps this uditore 
has, more in the manner of Piccolomini’s velocissimo sillogismo, compared Wert’s musical 
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representation of canto—itself, to crib from Buonamici, an immagine of its object—to a 
previously held “internal image” of song and rapidly assimilated the two into a meaningful 
correlation. 
The sixteenth-century singer of Wert’s madrigal, by contrast, has access to the same 
passage’s visual representation within a part book. A woman singing the Alto part from Angelo 
Gardano’s 1586 edition, for example, would have seen the following (figure 2.3):119 
 
Figure 2.3  “Qual musico gentil” (prima parte), Giaches de Wert, L’ottavo libro de madrigali a 
cinque voci (Venice: Gardano, 1586), Alto book, 13. 
 
The mere spacing of the text on the page tells a story: the initial words from Tasso’s stanza are 
closely spaced, indicating syllabic text setting, while canto’s two syllables are splayed, rendering 
the melisma visible. The significance of the notes setting canto, in other words, is not in 
question; to the contrary, the marked visual contrast between syllabic and melismatic text-setting 
makes it readily apparent. A singer well-versed in the tropes of madrigalistic word-painting, 
moreover, could probably identify the basis for Wert’s imitation without much thought. To quote 
Einstein’s to-the-point analysis of this passage: “Canto has its long melisma.”120 What inference 
could be made from Wert’s setting, then? 
 We might rearrange the structure of our previous syllogism such that its conclusion is no 
longer the fact of representation, as before, but rather the qualities that Wert’s music ascribes to 
 
119 Giaches de Wert, L’ottavo libro de madrigali a cinque voci (Venice: Gardano, 1586), Alto book, 13. 
 
120 Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 2:570.  
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its object. This new inference is premised on the assumption that hearing the word canto sung in 
a madrigal is a fundamentally different experience from hearing or reading the same word 
outside of its musical setting—a truism, to be sure, but one whose implications the new 
syllogism helps to bring to the surface. Canto emerges from its melismatic representation in 
Wert’s madrigal, in other words, with a particular shading. With the previous syllogism’s 
conclusion now serving as its first premise, the revised syllogism reads as follows: 
• The word canto is imitated by Wert’s music in measures 6–10. 
• Wert’s music is melismatic, has an arched contour, a regular rhythmic pattern, 
and a rich, open vowel sound. 
• The concept of song shares these same qualities. 
 
In this inference, what is learned is not the fact that Wert’s music has imitated its text, but rather 
a normative lesson about song: in its most universal, essential, or recognizable aspect—Wert’s 
madrigalism seems to suggest—canto has a rich vocal sonority and an arched, flowing melody 
evenly dispersed in musical time.121 In other words, whereas the previous syllogism requires the 
listener to match Wert’s music to his or her preconceived notion of song, thereby to perceive 
their intentional relation, this new syllogism deduces that same notion as the lesson learned—or 
better, reaffirmed. (Buonamici: “nell’imitazione…si riconosce, non si conosce.”) This circular 
logic in turn suggests a deeper cultural process at work—namely, through repeated exposure to 
 
121 That poetry conveys universals by means of vivid particulars is a common refrain in discourse on 
imitation from the sixteenth century. The notion derives from Poetics 9 but was often overlaid with a 
Platonic patina of the “ideal” in Renaissance literary criticsm; see Hathaway, The Age of Criticism, 129–
43. On the power of poetry to “combin[e] the particular instance with the universal consideration” in 
Sidney, see Eden, Poetic and Legal Fiction, 170. On the imitation of universals in Buonamici, see 
Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 2:693: “The poet [for Buonamici] imitates not the particular 
things, but the Idea or the universal that lies behind them.” With respect to musical representation, what I 
am suggesting here is that madrigalisms not only represent words in their most universal or perhaps 
idealized aspects but also determine to some degree what those universals or ideals are. The repertory of 
melismatic madrigalisms on words like canto, cantare, and musica, that is, has an effect on listeners, 
reinforcing the idea that canto, cantare, and musica are somehow “essentially” melismatic, flowing, in 
some instances cast in triple time, and so on. 
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musical representations of canto (or of similar verbal objects like cantare or musica), listeners 
learn a set of values around this object.  
 According to the sixteenth-century psychologists of imitation we have been consulting, 
moreover, these inferences about canto and its musical setting lead the listener to experience a 
kind of pleasure, namely that of hearing in Wert’s music a meaningful representation of its object 
and appreciating the result as a product of the composer’s craft.122 This pleasure, recall, is 
predicated on the listener’s ability to work out the relationship between imitante and imitata 
without much difficulty: Buonamici’s spectator enjoys recognizing the object “without effort,” 
rather than by working through a complex problem (as a philosopher might), while Piccolomini’s 
is empowered through self-instruction. The listener’s recognition of the object of imitation leads, 
in turn, to the pleasure that flows naturally from habit.123 And so, I suggest, does this variety of 
cognitive pleasure have relevance to the late sixteenth-century madrigal, where tropes of 
representation delimited the field of possibilities for the imitazione delle parole. A listener who 
heard Wert’s “Qual musico gentil” performed around the time of its composition, or in the 
decades that followed, was unlikely to have been ignorant of the tradition whereby composers set 
words relating to the concept of “song” with melismas, arched contours, and placid rhythms. 
With previous knowledge of this tradition to hand, this listener would likely have identified 
Wert’s madrigalism on canto with little effort, perhaps executing a nearly imperceptible 
velocissimo sillogismo, such as one of those outlined above. On this reading, discovering the 
 
122 For a Cinquecento writer praising the pleasure taken in the artist’s craft, see, e.g., Lorenzo Giacomini, 
“De la purgazione de la tragedia,” in Trattati di Poetica e Retorica Del Cinquecento, ed. Bernard 
Weinberg, vol. 3 (Bari: G. Laterza, 1972 [1586]), 352. Naming several ends for poetry, and assigning 
them each to either diletto or giovamento, Giacomini identifies one as “the noble relaxation of the mind 
[attained] through knowledge of the exquisiteness of the work” (‘l nobile diporto de la mente per la 
conoscenza de la esquisitezza de l’opera). 
 
123 On the pleasure taken in habit, see the quotation from Buonamici on p. 98, above. 
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representational intent of Wert’s measures 6–10 is pleasurable because it is habitual. Rather than 
cheapened by their ubiquity or obviousness, as Galilei would have us believe, the tropes of 
madrigalistic text-setting become a powerful heuristic. 
 
2.5 The Psychology of Metaphor: Of Lamps and Suns 
This latter type of syllogism, in which the conclusion drawn is not the “fact” of representation 
but rather the qualities the work of imitation ascribes to its object, has a precedent in the Poetics 
commentaries we have been examining, in particular within passages devoted to metaphor. In his 
commentary on chapter 4 of the Poetics, in fact, Piccolomini admits to giving an adumbrated 
account of the delight taken in imitation because of its overlap with the pleasure of metaphor, 
about which he writes at length in his two publications on the relevant Aristotelian texts.124 And 
in his account of that psychology, Piccolomini not only reformulates the quasi-logical paradigm 
such that it comes to resemble our second syllogism on canto but also wholesale transfers this 
paradigm from a visual to an auditory, if not musical, context.  
Following Aristotle, Cinquecento commentators characterized metaphors and similes as 
logical relations between two words or phrases, one of which replaces the other. In his 
Annotationi, Piccolomini defines metaphor as “a carrying that is made by taking a word from the 
place where its meaning is proper and bringing it to mean something for which it is not 
 
124 “And because the type of learning that takes place in imitation is very similar to that which takes place 
in metaphor, about which I have written extensively in my Paraphrase of Book 3 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
I will for the most part refer back to what I wrote there, in order to avoid repeating myself” (Et perche 
queste modo d’imparare, che si fà nell’imitatione, è molto simile à quello, che si fà nelle metafore, e io di 
quello hò abondantemente discorso nella mia Parafrase del terzo libro della Retorica d’Aristotele; io per 
non replicar’il medesimo, mi rimetto per la maggior parte à quanto in quel luogo n’hò ragionato), 
Piccolomini, Annotationi, 68. The relevant Aristotelian texts are the Rhetoric and the Poetics. For the 
relevant section in his Rhetoric commentary, see Piccolomini, Piena, et larga parafrase di M. Alessandro 
Piccolomini, nel terzo libro della Retorica d’Aristotele (Venice: Giovanni Varisco, 1572), 44–90. 
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appropriate—and driving out the appropriate word, if it is found [there], in place of which [the 
metaphorical word] is put.”125 Aristotle himself defines metaphor in chapter 21 of the Poetics 
(1457b6–7) with language taken from natural philosophy and logic: “The application of a word 
that belongs to another thing: either from genus to species, species to genus, species to species, 
or by analogy.” Of these four types of metaphor, the “analogy” (or “proportional metaphor”) is 
the most logical in its construction: “I call ‘by analogy’ cases where b is to a as d is to c: one will 
then speak of d instead of b, or b instead of d.”126 
The constitutive elements of a metaphor, like those of imitation, are related in virtue of 
shared qualities; in Buonamician terms, the word or phrase for which a metaphor stands is the 
imitata, while the metaphorical word is the imitante.127 Given this connection, it is not too 
surprising that the close relationship between metaphor and imitation extends in sixteenth-
century commentaries to their audiences. Just as the viewer of a portrait must execute a rapid 
syllogism to recognize its subject, someone who hears a metaphor proceeds from the 
metaphorical word to its “object”—the replaced word—by using his or her intellect to uncover 
the basis for their relation.128 To borrow an example from Aristotle, if I hear the phrase “the 
 
125 “Un trasportamento, che noi facciamo, togliendo una parola da quel luogo, dove è posta propriamente 
à significare; e portandola à significar cosa, à cui non sia appropriata, scacciandone l’appropriata, se ve la 
trova, in luogo della quale ella si pone,” Annotationi, 295–96. 
 
126 Poetics, trans. Halliwell, 105, 107 (1457b15–19). 
 
127 Italian commentators did not so far as I know define metaphor as a species of imitation or use words 
like imitante and imitata to characterize the components of a metaphor, but, as Piccolomini demonstrates, 
they acknowledged a similarity between the two domains. Medieval Arabic writers including Avicenna 
and Averroes, whose theories of figurative language may have influenced the commentaries under 
consideration, did characterize metaphors using the language of imitation; see Schoeler, “The ‘Poetic 
Syllogism’ Revisited,” 4 (“Figurative statements rely on ‘imitation’ [muhākāh]).” On the relationship 
between metaphor and mimesis in Aristotle’s writings, see Eden, Poetic and Legal Fiction, 71–72; and 
John Kirby, “Aristotle on Metaphor,” American Journal of Philology 118, no. 4 (1997): 531–40. 
 
128 Following Aristotle, Renaissance commentators discuss the psychology of metaphors as heard (as in a 
speech or from reading aloud), rather than as read. 
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evening of life,” I must infer that it means “old age” if I am to understand the writer or speaker’s 
intention properly. (Taken literally, “evening” is not a viable predicate of “life.”) To make the 
correct inference, I reason that “evening” relates as a species to the genus “day” analogously to 
the way that “old age” relates as a species to the genus “life” because both species lie at the 
respective chronological ending-points of their genera. The metaphor “the evening of life” thus 
swaps in one species (“evening”) for another (“old age”), while retaining the genus (“life”) to 
which the missing or unspoken species (“old age”) properly belongs. The result is a metaphor by 
analogy or proportional metaphor. A marginal gloss in the aforementioned annotated manuscript 
copy of Piero Vettori’s Latin translation of the Poetics visualizes this transfer by drawing lines 
between “day” (giorno) and “old age” (vecchiaia), and “evening” (sera) and “life” (vita): 
 
 
Figure 2.4  Diagram of the structure of a proportional metaphor, unknown hand (BNCF Magl. 
VII 1199, 66r). My photo.  
 
Commentators discussed the notitia generated by a listener’s recognition of the “objects” 
of metaphors, as well as the pleasure and benefit that flows from the experience, in terms 
overlapping with their accounts of the psychology of imitation. Piccolomini compares the two 
domains directly: “And that this increase in knowledge (notitia) occurs in metaphorical speech, 
just as it occurs to an equal degree in the imitation that one makes while painting or writing 
poetry or in any other mode, is manifest and can be amply demonstrated with both reason and 
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experience.”129 The example Piccolomini gives to exemplify the notitia generated by metaphors 
relates closely to the psychological model I suggested for Wert’s madrigalism on canto, where 
the conclusion drawn by the listener is not the simple fact of representation but rather the 
qualities that become attached to canto through Wert’s setting of that word. The phrase under 
Piccolomini’s consideration is “lamp of the world,” a metaphor for the sun: 
If we take, as an example, someone telling me that the sun has arrived above our heads, it 
is certain that new knowledge (altra notitia) will not be generated in me by these words 
other than that which they frankly convey, namely the fact that the sun has arrived above 
our heads. But if someone tells me that the “lamp of the world” has arrived above our 
heads, these words will without a doubt not give me explicit knowledge, nor will they tell 
me expressly that the sun has arrived over there. But they will give me a good occasion—
by means of the similarity that is found between the lamp and the sun in making light—to 
earn for myself with quick and imperceptible thought, and almost a syllogism, this 
knowledge in arguing, that through the sun corresponding with the lamp via this third 
term of rendering light, they come to agree equally between themselves, in the manner 
that “the sun” could, in a certain way, be understood through “the lamp” when it is joined 
to this word “world,” which distinguishes it from a lamp that makes light in a temple. In 
this way I come by myself to acquire the knowledge that “the sun” is found in its place, 
since the word “lamp” does not tell me this expressly. Furthermore, in hearing “lamp” 
said—and not “sun”—I come to conceive with my intellect, in working out that by 
“lamp,” “sun” is intended, not only the signified thing itself, namely that planet, but also 
that light, and that illumination, things I would not have thought of had I heard the word 
“sun.” And as a consequence the metaphorical word generates in me greater knowledge 
than the appropriate word does [emphases and quotation marks added].130 
 
129 “Et che questo accrescimento di notitia adivenga nel parlar metaforico, si come parimente adivien 
nell’imitatione, che si fà, o depingendo, o poetando, o in qual si voglia altro modo imitando; è cosa 
manifesta, e con ragione, e con esperientia si potrebbe ampiamente dimostrare,” Piccolomini, Annotatoni, 
320. Refini alludes to this connection between imitation and metaphor in Piccolomini’s thought in Per via 
d’annotationi, 102, n. 291. 
 
130 “Percioche poniam per essempio, ch’alcun mi dica esser già il Sole arrivato quasi sopra dei capi nostri; 
certa cosa è, ch’altra notitia non si genera in me con questa parole, se non quella, che puramente mi è data 
con esse, cioe ch’il Sole sia già sopra dei capi nostri. Ma se alcuni mi dirà, che già si trova la lampada del 
mondo sopra dei capi nostri; tai parole senza dubio non mi daranno espressa notitia, ne mi diranno 
espressamente ch’il Sole sia quivi arrivato; ma mi daran bene occasione, che mediante la somiglianza, che 
si truova tra la lampada, e’l Sole nel far luce; io vada per me medesimo con veloce, e impercettibil 
discorso, e quasi sillogismo, guadagnandomi tal notitia argomentando, che per convenir il Sole con la 
lampada in questo terzo termin di render luce, venghino à convenir parimente trà lor medesimi, in 
maniera ch’il Sole in un certo modo puo intendersi per la lampada, aggiuntavi questa parole, del mondo, 
che lo fa distinguer da quella lampada, che fà lume nel tempio. Vengo io dunque da me medesimo ad 
acquistar’in qualche parte questa notitia, ch’il Sole si ritruovi in quel sito, poi che quelle parole non me lo 




Here, Piccolomini makes a case—admittedly, a long-winded one—for the value of metaphor not 
only as a delightful ornament of speech but also as a tool of instruction. Like works of imitation 
do their objects of representation, metaphors teach us something about the words they replace by 
highlighting qualities about them that might otherwise go unnoticed. When “lamp” replaces 
“sun,” it is the sun’s light (luce) and illumination (illuminatione) that the metaphor brings to the 
surface of the listener’s thought. In the case of canto, as we saw, it is the sensuous sonority of 
song, among other qualities, that Wert’s setting brings to the fore—qualities not suggested by the 
word alone (nor its immediate context within Tasso’s stanza).131 As with imitation, moreover, it 
is the listener who supplies the basis for the connection between the metaphorical word and its 
“object,” and who thereby teaches him- or herself something new. In a nearly word-for-word 
 
lampada s’hà da intender’il Sole, à concepir con l’intelletto, non solamente la stessa cosa significata, che 
è quel pianeta, ma ancor quella luce, e quella illuminatione; la quale non harei conceputo per le sole 
parole. e per conseguente viene à generar’in me maggior notitia la parole metaforica, che l’appropriata,” 
Piccolomini, Annotationi, 320–21. 
 While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to trace the metaphor-syllogism literary tradition in 
greater detail, Piccolomini’s “lamp of the world” syllogism is closely related to (perhaps modeled on?) 
what Schoeler calls the Avicenna II type of poetic syllogism in medieval Arabic poetics (“The ‘Poetic 
Syllogism’ Revisited,” 8–9; see also my n. 92). An Avicenna II syllogism “is centered on the audience 
because it leads the listener to the conclusion that the thing in question has certain properties and should 
be aspired to or avoided” (ibid., 8). Schoeler cites the following example of an A II syllogism from 
Avicenna’s Qiyās (quoted and translated in ibid., 8): 
 
The rose is a mule’s anus, in the middle of which dung is visible. (minor premise) 
Everything that resembles a mule’s anus (i.e. that is red on the outside and yellow on the inside) is dirty 
and disgusting. (major premise) 
Therefore, the rose is dirty and disgusting. (conclusion) 
 
131 A major difference between the premise of metaphors and that of madrigalisms is that metaphors rely 
on “distant similarity” for their proper effect—according to Aristotle, the best metaphors lead a listener to 
learn “something different from what he believed” (On Rhetoric, trans. Kennedy, 223 [3.11.6])—while 
madrigalisms, especially the one I have chosen for this chapter’s case study, tend to be predicated on a 
close similarity between music and word. There is still a “surprise” element in the imitazione delle parole, 
however: the fact of representation. (Composers can set the word canto without “imitating” it.) For a 
discussion of a rare attempt by a Cinquecento music theorist (L’Ottuso Accademico) to coin a musical 
topos on the model of metaphor, see Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 55–56. Ottuso compares the psychology 
of dissonance—and not that of music–text relations—to this figure of speech. 
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recall of a passage from his earlier discussion of chapter 4 of the Poetics, in fact, Piccolomini 
follows the analysis above by praising metaphor’s heuristic quality, which like a work of 
imitation invites listeners to acquire new knowledge on their own. And the result of this self-
directed pursuit, as we have come to expect, is diletto. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Fundamental to the philosophy of imitation in the late Cinquecento is the power of similarity—as 
a structuring quality between imitante and imitata, as a field of play for the mind. While the 
Cinquecento artist may be judged by his or her ability to perceive similarities in the world and 
bring them to life in a work, the psychological accounts we have surveyed place the onus of 
uncovering them in the finished product on the viewer (or spectator, or listener), who both 
delights in the process and learns something as a result. In the case of the imitazione delle parole, 
however, the similarities between any given musical gesture and its lexical object are less self-
evident than they might seem at first brush, especially for those of us who inherited a Galileian 
historiography that casts madrigalisms as the foil to Baroque recitar cantando—as pictorial 
“imitations of nature” that are “humorous no matter what is actually described.”132 A 
madrigalism, unlike a painting, is a multimedia phenomenon. From the vantage point of a 
historical listener imagined along the lines of Buonamici, Piccolomini, or Bartoli’s uditori, it 
takes an attentive ear to parse out a madrigalism’s elements and evaluate their convenienza or 
disconvenienza with one another. And while an imitation of a word may bring an image of this 
object “before the eyes” of the listener’s mind in virtue of its enargeia, this image—we can infer 
from Piccolomini’s lessons—must be compared to the mind’s previously retained image of the 
 
132 Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, 1:727. 
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object in question and evaluated against it with the aid of the syllogism. Perhaps alluding to 
some of these complexities, Buonamici observes in one place in his Discorsi that “he who hears 
must work harder with his mind than he who sees.”133 While admittedly in reference to the 
experience of hearing epic poetry declaimed in performance, this comment discloses an 
assumption Buonamici held about listening: it’s hard. And in the preceding, I hope to have 
demonstrated that comments like these, even when voiced outside musical contexts, can 
rightfully bear on the musical species of representation Zarlino once dubbed the new mode. 
 
133 “più de’lavorare con la mente quello che ode, che quel che vede,” qtd. and trans. in Weinberg, A 
History of Literary Criticism, 2:694 (Discorsi poetici, 100). 
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Chapter 3: A Two-Stage Model for Emotional Arousal in 
Cinquecento Musical Thought 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Readers may have noticed that the previous chapter omits consideration of the musical office 
whose checkered legacy we examined in chapter 1: moving the emotions. This omission 
responds in part to the way that music–text relationships are discussed by Cinquecento music 
theorists, few of whom, not least Galilei, unambiguously associate madrigalisms with the arousal 
of strong emotional responses in listeners. As I hope to have shown, the musical representation 
of text by means of imitation, what Francesco Buonamici calls the “similitude of two forms,” is a 
technique better associated with the pleasure of recognition, itself an emotional response, to be 
sure, but one nevertheless distinct from the more traditional gamut of “passions” like anger, love, 
fear, and envy. To represent an emotion, in other words, is different, so far as the imitazione delle 
parole goes, from arousing one.  
 As Galilei’s protestations in the Dialogo testify, however, the aim of moving the passions 
through music became an urgent concern of music theorists, composers, and performers in the 
late sixteenth century. In addition to Galilei’s book, witness such documents as Girolamo Mei’s 
1572 letter to Vincenzo Galilei or Giulio Caccini’s Preface to Le nuove musiche, from 1602.1 In 
these texts, music is evaluated according to the degree to which it moves the emotions, as the old 
emphasis on pleasure and decorum gives way to a new aesthetic, one aimed at procuring the 
 
1 For an English translation of Mei’s letter, which strongly influenced Galilei’s critique of counterpoint in 
the Dialogo, see Claude Palisca, The Florentine Camerata: Documentary Studies and Translations (New 




“mirabili effetti, che ammirano gli scrittori” (wonderful effects admired by the great writers).2 
Indeed, this new preoccupation sprang in part from humanistic currents. Responding to the 
recovery of Classical stories about the remarkable power of music over listeners in ancient times, 
theorists and practitioners sought, with increasing resolve, to replicate the ancient effects in the 
present. This effort inspired the famous polemics associated in music historiography with the rise 
of opera, monody, and ultimately the Baroque style period—in other words, with major changes 
in compositional practice on the European continent.		
	 For all the musicological attention that has been directed to late Cinquecento 
pronouncements regarding music, text, and the emotions in ancient and modern music, however, 
comparatively little work has gone into uncovering the specific models of emotional arousal that 
underpinned them.3 Although rarely articulated overtly, these models are often detectable in 
patterns of language. If the notion of “moving the passions” (muovere l’affetti) seems self-
evident, a closer look at the sources, at the level of word choice, points to historically specific 
ideas about emotional arousal that have in some cases escaped our notice. These ideas not only 
point to the sources music theorists consulted when devising their theories of music and the 
passions but also clarify some of the more perplexing aspects of those theories. And as I will 
suggest in chapter 4, an awareness of the models for emotional arousal that informed musical 
discourse clears paths for new listener-oriented analyses of sixteenth-century music.  
 
2 Giulio Caccini, Preface to Le nuove musiche (Florence: Marescotti, 1602). 
 
3 Although in the context of early seventeenth-century music, a notable recent exception is Dell’Antonio’s 
Listening as Spiritual Practice in Early Modern Italy, which places musical pronouncements about 
moving the affetti in theory treatises and prefaces to music publications in the context of “the discourse of 
Post-Tridentine Catholic reform” (16). For a good introduction to sixteenth-century humanistic theories of 
music and the passions in the context of the broader history of emotions, see Palisca, Music and Ideas, 
179–202 (“Theories of the Affections and Imitation”).  
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 For an example that brings us to the heart of this chapter’s subject, consider the following 
passage from Part 2, chapter 12, of Zarlino’s Istitutioni harmoniche, in which the theorist defines 
harmonia propria, a concept he elsewhere equates with counterpoint.4 The translation is Guy A. 
Marco’s: 
Proper harmony (harmonia propria)…is a composition or mixture of high and low sounds, 
mediated or not [by other sounds], that strikes the hearing smoothly. This kind of harmony 
arises from the parts of a vocal composition as they proceed in concordance from the 
beginning to the end, and it has the power to induce the mind to various passions.5 
 
As it is rendered by Marco, Zarlino’s claim that harmonia propria “has the power to induce the 
mind to various passions” does not seem out of place among various attestations of music’s 
affective power from the sixteenth-century. The verb Zarlino uses in this clause, however, is not 
indurre, as the translation suggests, but rather disporre. To understand why the difference 
matters, we must turn a few chapters earlier, to Part 2, chapter 7, where Zarlino makes clear that 
he considers disporre l’animo and muovere (or indurre) l’animo to be related but distinct actions. 
 In that chapter, Zarlino introduces a theory of music and the passions to explain the 
yawning gap between the marvelous effects of music on listeners as reported by ancients such as 
Boethius and Cicero and the relative dearth of similar effects attributed to modern music—the 
typical frame, as mentioned, for inquiries into music and the emotions during this period. 
Breaking polyphonic music (cantilena) down into its constituent parts—harmony (harmonia), 
 
4 Zarlino establishes the identity of harmonia propria and counterpoint at Ist. harm. 3.1.171, where he 
writes that counterpoint “is what I called harmonia propria in Part 2, chapter 12” (è quello, che nel Cap. 
12 della Seconda parte io nominai Harmonia propria). 
 
5 “Harmonia propria adunque è compositione, o mescolanza di suoni gravi e di acuti tramezati, o non 
tramezati; la qual percuote suoavemente il senso; et nasce dalle parti di ciascuna cantilena, per il proceder 
che fanno accordandosi insieme fin a tanto, che siano pervenute al fine: et hà possanza di dispor l’animo a 
diverse passioni,” quoted and translated in Zarlino, The Art of Counterpoint: Part Three of Le istitutioni 
harmoniche, 1558, trans. Guy A. Marco and Claude V. Palisca (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968), 1. For the same passage in the 1573 edition, see Ist. harm. 2.12.94–95. 
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rhythm (numero), text (oratione), and a willing listener (soggetto ben disposto)—Zarlino assigns 
a particular function vis-à-vis the emotions to each. Namely, where harmony and rhythm have 
the power to “dispose” the soul, only by combining with a text may they fully move it into an 
emotional state: 
If we take simple harmony (la semplice harmonia), without adding anything else, it will 
not have the power to render any of the extrinsic effects narrated above. Still, it would 
have the power in a certain way to dispose the soul intrinsically (di dispor l’animo 
intrinsecamente) to more easily express some emotions (passioni) or effects, like laughing 
or crying. As is manifest: when someone hears a song (cantilena) that does not express 
anything except harmony, he only takes pleasure in it through the proportion that is found 
in the distance between the instrumental sounds or voices (suoni, o voci): and he is 
prepared and disposed (si prepara e dispone) in a certain way intrinsically toward 
happiness or sadness: he will not, however, be induced (indutto) by it to express any 
extrinsic effect like laughing or crying….Adding to these two things [harmonia and 
numero] a text that expresses morals by means of the narration of some history or plot 
(favola), it is impossible to say how great the force of these three things combined together 
is. Keep in mind that if he does not find a disposed subject (il soggetto disposto), that is, a 
listener (uditore) who hears these things voluntarily, no effect will be seen, and the 
musician will accomplish nothing, or little.6 
 
For Zarlino, emotional arousal contains distinct stages or levels: a “dispositional” one marked by 
an “intrinsic” preparation for emotion in a listener—who is ideally already “disposed” to some 
degree—and the arousal itself, signaled here by the verb indurre, which has an “extrinsic” effect 
like laughing or crying. The dispositional stage is the province of harmony and rhythm, while the 
 
6 ⁵“senoi pigliamo la semplice harmonia, senza aggiungerle alcuna altra cosa; non haverà possanza alcuna 
di fare alcuno effetto estrinseco delli sopranarrati: ancora che havesse possanza ad un certo modo, di 
dispor l’animo intrinsecamente ad esprimere più facilmente alcune passioni, overo effetti: si come ridere, 
o piangere: come è manifesto: che se alcuno ode una cantilena, che non esprima altro che l’Harmonia; 
piglia solamente piacere di essa, per la proportione, che si ritrova nelle distanza de i suoni, ò voci: e si 
prepara e dispone ad un certo modo intrinsecamente alla allegrezza, overo alla tristezza: ma non è però 
indutto da lei ad esprimere alcuno effetto estrinseco si come è ridere o piangere….Aggiungendo poi à 
queste due cose la Oratione: cioè il Parlare, il quale esprima costumi col mezo della narratione di alcuna 
historia, o favola: è impossibile di poter dire quanta sia la forza di questre tre cose aggiunte insieme. E’ 
ben vero, che se non vi si trovasse il Soggetto disposto: cioè l’Uditore, ilquale udissi volentieri queste 
cose, e in esse si diletasse; non si potrebbe vedere alcuno effetto: e nulla o poco farebbe il Musico,” Ist. 




arousal stage belongs to a narrative text, whose combination with harmony and rhythm yields the 
affective musical composite Zarlino calls melodia, after Plato.7 
 Without yet delving into this complex passage any further, we can easily infer why the 
theorist recycles the phrase disporre l’animo in his subsequent definition of harmonia propria, 
quoted above: operating alone, musical harmonies—whether semplice harmonia or harmonia 
propria—have the capacity to “dispose” the soul but not to move it. The verb disporre, in other 
words, reemerges in the later passage with a specific meaning vis-à-vis emotional response—
one, moreover, that to some degree counters prevailing assumptions about attitudes toward music 
and the emotions in this period. (That Zarlino claims only limited affective power for 
counterpoint, the practice he is famous for codifying and the calling-card of the so-called prima 
prattica, seems noteworthy.) But Zarlino’s distinction between disporre l’animo and muovere 
l’animo raises more questions than it answers. What, exactly, is an emotion for Zarlino? What 
 
7 On the term melodia, see Ist. harm. 2.12.95: “Therefore from all these three things added together—
harmonia propria, rhythm, and text—melodia, as Plato calls it, is born” (La onde poi da tutte queste tre 
cose aggiunte insieme: cioè dall’Harmonia propria, dal Rithmo et dall’Oratione, nasce (come vuol 
Platone) la Melodia). Zarlino also uses the word melodia, seemingly interchangeably with cantilena, 
throughout Ist. harm. 2.7, e.g. on p. 85. Discussions of Zarlino’s theory of music and the passions in 2.7–9 
of the Istitutioni are relatively scarce: see especially Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 51–54; Jenkins, 
“Metaphysics and History,” 240–42; and Palisca, Music and Ideas, 187. 
 “The dispositional stage is the province of harmony and rhythm”: I have elided Zarlino’s 
comments on rhythm in the block quotation above both for the sake of concision and because his position 
is inconsistent. In the passage above (Ist. harm. 2.7.84), he writes, “If we add determinate and 
proportionate rhythm to this [simple] harmony, suddenly it takes on great force and moves the soul, as is 
seen at dances” (Ma se à tale Harmonia aggiungiamo il Numero determinato e proportionato subito piglia 
gran forza, e muove l’animo: come si scorge ne i Balli). He then briefly mentions the “movimenti 
estrinsechi col corpo” that dances inspire. On the next page (Ist. harm. 2.7.85), Zarlino seems to clarify 
his opinion: “For if harmony by itself has a certain power to dispose the soul and make it happy or sad, 
and if its power is doubled through rhythm, so are they nevertheless unable, even together, to generate any 
extrinsic effects in the aforementioned manner in a listener. Because this power is acquired from the text 
that expresses morals” (percioche se bene l’Harmonia sola hà una certa possanza di dispor l’animo e di 
farlo allegro, o mesto; e che dal Numero posto in atto le siano raddoppiate le forze; non sono però potenti 
queste due cose poste insieme di generare alcuna passione estrinseca in alcun soggetto, al modo detto: 
conciosache tal possanza acquistano dalla Oratione, che esprime alcuni costumi). Due to the judgment of 
rhythm Zarlino conveys here, I link numero to the dispositional stage of arousal throughout this chapter. 
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does it mean to be “prepared and disposed” toward an emotion? Why is this preparation 
associated with pleasure? And what is so special about text? 
 This chapter seeks to address these questions. In what follows, I will make the case for 
the broader salience of a “two-stage model” for emotional arousal to the history of sixteenth-
century theorizing about music and the emotions. Zarlino’s theory was not a purely musical 
invention, in other words, but rather a conscious adaptation to music of ideas about the emotions 
that originated elsewhere. Evidence for this model can be found in a wide array of sixteenth-
century discourses: physiology, music theory, rhetoric, natural philosophy, and poetry, among 
others. Although it is probably impossible to pinpoint Zarlino’s specific source among these 
texts, it is clear that the distinction between affective disposition and emotional arousal was 
widely disbursed among Italian intellectuals. (Girolamo Mei, for one, alludes to it in such a way 
that suggests he was not relying on Zarlino but rather articulating commonly-held assumptions 
about the way emotions work.8) And then there is the matter of direct influence: evidence for the 
reception of Zarlino’s adaptation of the two-stage model in Part 2 of the Istitutioni can be traced 
more or less directly across various texts well into the seventeenth century. Although Zarlino’s 
mapping of harmony to disporre and text to muovere was not universally accepted, we will find 
traces of Zarlino in such wide-ranging places as Torquato Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata (1581), 
Giovanni Artusi’s Seconda parte dell’Artusi (1602), and the treatises of lesser-known 
seventeenth-century music theorists including Cesare Crivellati (1624) and Severo Bonini 
(1649). What emerges, all told, is a tangible substratum of Renaissance discourse on music and 
 
8 See Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 53, n. 88. 
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the passions—certainly not pervasive or totalizing in its reach, but one that nevertheless 
continued to influence conversations on this subject as the Renaissance passed into the Baroque. 
3.2 Disposition and Emotion: The Physiology 
When he distinguishes between “disposing” and “moving” the soul through music, I suggest that 
Zarlino is drawing on a commonly held set of beliefs about the biological basis of emotional 
arousal. According to this tradition, all humans are conditioned by a natural-born bodily 
disposition—determined by diverse factors such as humoral balance, place of birth, parentage, 
even astrology—that inclines them toward certain patterns of emotion, thought, and actions, and 
away from others. Also known as “complexion” or “temperament,” this disposition accounts, in 
modern terms, for differences in personality. Accounts of affective dispositions stretch back to 
antiquity.9 For an entry point to the concept roughly contemporaneous to Zarlino, the teachings 
of Lorenzo Giacomini, a Florentine academician known for his application of medical learning to 
literary pursuits, serve well.10 In his “De la purgazione de la tragedia,” from 1586, Giacomini 
takes up catharsis, Aristotle’s notoriously vague term, in the Poetics, for the strong emotional 
response tragedies provoke.11 His assessment of catharsis (with whose particulars we are not 
 
9 For a useful introduction to Galenic complexion theory, see Nancy G. Siraisi, Medieval and Early 
Renaissance Medicine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 101–4. 
 
10 Giacomini is primarily known to musicologists today through the work of Claude V. Palisca and 
Barbara Russano Hanning on the origins of opera. See Palisca, “The Alterati of Florence: Pioneers in the 
Theory of Dramatic Music (1968),” in Studies in the History of Italian Music and Music Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 408–31; and Hanning, Of Poetry and Music’s Power: Humanism and the 
Creation of Opera (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980), chapter 2. On Giacomini’s theory of 
catharsis, see Hathaway, The Age of Criticism, 251–58. 
 
11 Lorenzo Giacomini, “De la purgazione de la tragedia,” in Trattati di Poetica e Retorica Del 
Cinquecento, ed. Bernard Weinberg, vol. 3 (Bari: G. Laterza, 1972), 347–71. 
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concerned) relies on his conviction that the emotional tendencies of humans depend on bodily 
constitutions, a thesis he develops in light of ancient sources and contemporary medical opinion: 
Now, although it is impossible that every born man, being composed of dissimilar natures, 
does not experience in life both joy and trouble, both happy and sad emotions (affetti), 
nevertheless, instrumental bodily virtue (virtù instrumentale corporea) being their 
subject—according to the diversity of their temperaments—he is more or less inclined to 
happy [emotions], or to the contrary ones. Some, therefore, are more dedicated to anger, to 
hope, to impudence; others more to meekness, to desperation, to fear, to compassion. What 
is rather more marvelous is that the same man is now ready for this and now for that 
[emotion], about which Aristotle testifies.12 
 
The disposition of the body, Giacomini proceeds to explain, serves as a kind of filter for 
those stimuli that would move the soul: someone generally predisposed to anger, for example, 
might be gravely disturbed by a slight annoyance (think: a buzzing fly), while another person of 
a more temperate disposition, when confronted with the same stimulus, will not react in the 
slightest. It is nevertheless all the “more marvelous” to Giacomini that emotional responses are 
fundamentally unpredictable, a puzzle raised by Aristotle in the De Anima and the Problems for 
which Giacomini finds a solution in the mind-body relationship.13 Given that a single person can 
have more than one kind of emotional response to a stimulus in a way that is hard to predict, he 
reasons, it must be that those responses 
wouldn’t follow if the corporeal part, mother of the emotions, weren’t accommodated and 
disposed (accomodata e disposta) more to one than to the other [emotion]. And the 
dispositions (disposizioni) seem to consist in this: heat, subtlety, and agility of the spirits 
prepare us for joyful emotions, because the young are more [often] moved toward these 
than the old; and food and wine—heating and arousing the spirits, and reinvigorating the 
body—beget happiness. On the other hand, the aggravation of the sensitive part by turbid 
 
12 “Or benché impossibile sia che chiunque nasce uomo, di nature dissimiglianti composto, non provi ne 
la vita e gioie e noie et affetti piacevoli e dolorosi, nondimeno, essendo il loro soggetto virtù 
instrumentale corporea, secondo la diversità del temperamento di esso, chi più chi meno è a’ lieti o a’ 
contrarii inchinevole. Alcuni dunque più son dediti a l’ira, a la speranza, a l’ardire; altri più a la 
mansuetudine, a la disperazione, al timore, a la compassione. Anzi, è più maraviglioso, un istesso uomo 
or a questi, or a quelli è pronto, del che rende testimonianza Aristotele,” ibid., 356–57. 
 
13 Ibid., 357. Giacomini cites Problems XXX, I and De Anima I (403a19); see Weinberg’s editorial notes 
in ibid., 515. 
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and impure vapors, and the reduction of internal heat, prepare us for sadness and fear, and 
make us seem sluggish, slow, and useless.14 
 
This passage reveals two important points about emotional predisposition. First, while a person’s 
disposition is primarily predetermined by inborn factors like age or gender, it can be temporarily 
altered by external ones like food or wine. Although disposition is a relatively stable quality, in 
other words, it can undergo a change in response to a stimulus. This push-and-pull between what 
we might call “stable” and “temporary” disposition in turn explains why one person’s emotional 
responses vary according to circumstances: someone normally predisposed to anger, for 
example, might react more kindly to an anger-inducing stimulus if he or she is (say) well sated 
after a meal. Second, underlying disposition as its material cause are the so-called “spirits,” a 
vaporous substance that acts as a mediator between the body and soul according to the medical 
learning of the period.15 As Giacomini explains elsewhere in his lecture, the spirits originate in 
the heart, but travel to the brain, where they serve as instruments of sense perception, emotion, 
and the higher faculties of the intellect.16 Themselves difficult to characterize straightforwardly, 
the spirits provide a physiological explanation, if an elusive one, for the reciprocal relationship 
between the activity of the body and the life of the mind. 
 
14 “non seguirebbero se la parte corporea, madre degli affetti, non fusse più ad uno che ad un altro 
accomodata e disposta; e le disposizioni in questo pare che consistano. Il calore, la sottigliezza, e l’agilità 
degli spiriti ci preparano ad affetti giocondi, il perché i giovani più de’ vecchi si muovono ad essi; et il 
cibo et il vicno riscaldando e destando gli spiriti e rinvigorendo il corpo, partorisce letizia. Da l’altra parte 
l’aggravamento de la parte sensitiva per li vapori torbidi et impuri, e la diminuzione del calore interno, 
preparano a mestizia et a timore, e ci fanno parere pigri, tardi, et inutili,” ibid., 357. 
 
15 For a useful introduction to the spirits as with respect to theories of music and the passions, see Palisca, 
Music and Ideas, 183–86. 
 
16 Giacomini, “De la purgazione,” 356. On the spiritus, see Park, “The Organic Soul,” 469. 
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 The stable variety of affective disposition is also commonly attributed to the influence of 
the four bodily humors, those liquid substances responsible for the body’s basic functioning.17 In 
his commentary on Book 2 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1569), for example, Alessandro Piccolomini 
holds that “in dispositions…the complexion and temperature of the person has a great influence 
on making him more or less angry, the cholerics (for example) becoming angry more easily than 
the sanguinics or phlegmatics.”18 Giacomini also highlights the effect of the humors on 
dispositions. Of “those who have an abundance of melancholy heat,” he maintains that “without 
knowing the cause, they now feel sad, now happy, now timid, now ardent, now taciturn, now 
loquacious, now compassionate, now angry, now inclined toward love, now toward hate, now 
confident, now desperate.”19 Underlying these comments is the assumption, widespread for its 
time, that all people are born with a particular humoral balance “held to be responsible for 
psychological as well as physical disposition.”20 The “cholerics” Piccolomini refers to are so 
called because they have a high proportion of choler (also known as yellow bile) relative to the 
other humors; this overabundance of choler in turn expresses itself as an angry disposition. In a 
similar way, the emotional unpredictability of melancholics stems from an excess of black bile. 
 
17 The four humors are blood, yellow (or red) bile, phlegm, and black bile. On the humors, see Siraisi, 
Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine, 104–6, who remarks (106) that “humoral theory is probably 
the single most striking example of the habitual preference in ancient, medieval, and Renaissance 
medicine for materialist explanations of mental and emotional states.” 
 
18 “Nelle dispositioni…gran momento porta à far l’huom più ò manco iracundo, la complessione, e la 
temperatura della persona, più (per essempio) accendendosi d’ira i colerici che i sanguigni ò i flegmatici,” 
Piccolomini, Piena, copiosa et larga parafrase…nel secondo libro della Retorica, 52. As noted by Siraisi 
(Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine, 106), the connection between complexion and emotional 
tendency is preserved in the adjectives sanguinic, choleric, phlegmatic, and melancholic. 
 
19 “coloro che abondano di melancolia calda…senza saper la cagione si senton gli uomini or mesti, or 
lieti, or timidi, or arditi, or taciturni, or loquaci, or compassionevoli, ora stizzosi, or inchinati a l’amore, or 
a l’odio, or confidare, or disperare,” Giacomini, “De la purgazione,” 357. This is of course the condition 
known as melancholy. Giacomini cites Pseudo-Aristotle’s Problems, XXX.1. 
 
20 Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine, 106. 
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Although it is expressed in a somewhat offhand way, Giacomini’s remark that melancholics 
experience a gamut of emotions “without knowing the cause” (senza saper la cagione) also 
offers the important insight that affective dispositions tend to be hidden from a subject’s view. 
As consequences of the body’s constitution (whether their exact cause is localized to the spirits 
or the humors, or to some combination of the two), dispositions are imperceptible states that 
incline people toward certain emotions without their direct knowledge. 
 That said, an affective disposition can also be—and here we are introduced to a third 
kind—an acquired trait, one Piccolomini calls the disposition dell’animo: “Nor does the 
disposition of the soul,” he writes, “have less import [than that of the body], this or that vicious 
habit (for example) making someone more ready for anger, than this other one, or that other 
one.”21 Although to some degree thought of as uncontrollable perturbations, emotions were also 
believed to respond to conscious habituation. For this reason, learning to feel emotions 
“correctly”—loving good things, hating evil things, and so on—was considered a pillar of any 
young person’s training in virtue; in fact for followers of Aristotle’s ethical program virtue and a 
certain kind of disposition toward the good were one and the same.22 As we will see below, the 
phrase dispor l’animo is sometimes used by musical commentators, including Zarlino, in this 
sense, as a characterization of music’s ability to affect moral habits. 
 
21 “né minor momento porta à questo la disposition dell’animo, più (per essempio) facendo alcun’atto 
all’ira questo ò quell’habito vitioso, che quest’altro, ò quell’altro non fa,” Piccolomini, Piena, copiosa et 
larga parafrase…nel secondo libro della Retorica, 52. 
 
22 See Nichomachean Ethics 1106a1–20. It is likely that Piccolomini’s phrase disposition dell’animo 
corresponds to Aristotle’s hexis, which is often translated into English as disposition. On hexis, Paula 
Gottlieb writes, “Virtue of character…is not to be identified with an emotion, or the capacity to have an 
emotion, but with an acquired disposition (hexis) to have the appropriate emotions at the appropriate time, 
in the appropriate way, for the appropriate reasons and so on, and to act accordingly”; see Gottlieb, 
“Aristotle’s Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Oxford 




 If coaxed by the right means, an affective disposition—whether inborn, acquired over 
time, or temporarily activated by a stimulus—leads to a genuine arousal of emotion. How do the 
two differ? In contrast to disposition, Giacomini characterizes emotion as a temporary movement 
of the soul compelled by some oggetto, or object: in his words, affetto is “nothing other than a 
following or flight of the soul toward or away from something it has ascertained to be either 
suitable or unsuitable.”23 The soul’s “flight”—Giacomini’s fanciful substitute for the more 
commonly used word motion—is attended by pleasure, pain, or some combination thereof. If 
objects are judged suitable (convenevole), the soul embraces them and feels delight; if unsuitable 
(disconvenevole), the soul rebukes them and feels pain.24 While emotion thus entails cognition, 
this mental activity is of a lower order than reason: emotions move us to act, sometimes in 
concert with our best interests, sometimes against them.25 In Piccolomini’s words, 
“Emotions…have the power to make changes in us—not only our choices and actions but also 
 
23 “Sì che altro non è affetto che seguitamento o fuga de l’anima di alcuna cosa appresa da lei, o come 
convenevole o come disconvenevole,” Giacomini, “De la purgazione,” 356. 
 
24 The notion that emotions involve the judgment of an object goes back to antiquity. Describing the 
Stoics’ philosophy of emotion, for example, Peter King writes, “According to [the Stoic] typology, 
emotions are intrinsically objectual, bound up with a conception of their targets as good or evil.” King, 
“Emotions in Medieval Thought,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 170. This “objectual” model persisted through the early modern 
period. See also Eden, Poetic and Legal Fiction, 54–61, for the relation between judgment, emotion, and 
reason in Aristotle; and ibid., 169–72, on judgment and moving to action in Renaissance poetic theory 
(Sidney). 
 
25 Although absent from Giacomini’s account, theorists of emotion often associated emotions with the 
appetitive faculty of the sensitive soul, which governs motion of various kinds, including sense perception 
(itself a cognitive rather than appetitive faculty). See, e.g., Piccolomini’s definition of affetto in n. 26, 
below. On the relation between parts and faculties of the soul in the medieval philosophy of emotion, see 
King, “Emotions in Medieval Thought,” 174–75. For a good introduction to faculty psychology in the 
Renaissance, see Park, “The Organic Soul.” 
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our views, judgments, and opinions.”26 The rhetorical theorist Bartolomeo Cavalcanti asserts this 
capacity to affect judgments as the defining feature of emotions, calling them precisely “those 
things which cause a certain change in us such that we judge something differently, upon which 
follow pleasure or pain.”27 Whether emotions are therefore beneficial or dangerous was a matter 
up for debate. For our purposes, the point to take away is that, in contrast to dispositions, they 
stimulate the mind to judgment.28 
 The differences between disposition and emotion are also tabulated by Francesco 
Buonamici, who provides a useful digest on these two concepts late in his Discorsi poetici, 
improbably inserted into a discussion of metaphor. Although departing somewhat from the 
preceding in its disregard for the physiology of emotion, Buonamici’s account does call to mind 
 
26 Piccolomini’s full definition of affetto reads as follows: “And by emotions I mean those impetuses and 
movements of our appetite that are capable of changing us—not only our choices and actions but also our 
views, judgments, and opinions. These are (for example) anger, hope, love, fear, and similar things—as 
well as their contraries—upon which either pain or pleasure always follows, or let us say either sadness or 
happiness, as we will explain in the following digression.” (Et per affetti, e passioni intendo io quelli 
impeti, e movimenti de l’appetito nostro, i quali sono potenti à far variare in noi, non solamente le nostre 
elettioni, e le nostre attioni, ma i pareri, i giuditii, e le oppenioni ancora, come son (per essempio) l’ira, la 
speranza, l’amore, il timore, e simili, e i loro contrarii: à i quali tutti seguon sempre, l’un de i due di loro, 
che sono ò la molestia ò il diletto, ò vogliam dire, ò il dolore, ò l’allegrezza, come dichiararemo nella 
seguente digressione), Piccolomini, Piena, copiosa et larga parafrase…nel secondo libro della Retorica, 
8–9. 
 
27 “quelle, le quali causando in noi una certa mutatione, fanno che delle medesimo cose diversamente 
giudichiamo, et alle quali seguita piacere, o dispiacere,” La retorica (Pesaro, 1559), 180. Both 
Piccolomini and Cavalcanti’s definitions of emotion are close to Aristotle’s in the Rhetoric at 2.1.8. 
 
28 The question of whether and to what degree emotions are useful is an ancient one, and the ancient 
philosophical debates on this subject set the terms for the early modern ones. Countering the Stoic 
position that emotions are negative “perturbations,” for example, Giacomini argues that “emotions are in 
themselves neither good nor bad nor praiseworthy nor blameworthy but become so through the [nature of 
the] object, or through too much or too little intensity” (gli affetti in se stessi non essere né buoni né rei né 
laudevoli né biasimevoli, ma divenir tali per l’oggetto, o per troppo o per poco di vigore). Emotions can 
in fact be highly beneficial to man, he continues, if they are directed at the right oggetti: “Who would call 
love, hate, desire, hope, and happiness ‘perturbations’ if they are love of country or friend, hate of vice, 
desire of wisdom, hope for happiness, happiness at having property…?” (chi dirà perturbazione l’amore, 
l’odio, il desio, la speranza, l’allegrezza, se l’amore de la patria o de l’amico, l’odio del vizio, il desiderio 
de la sapienza, la speranza de la felicità, l’allegrezza del possedimento di essa…?), Giacomini, “De la 
purgazione,” 361–62. As we will see below, Zarlino takes a more skeptical stance toward the emotions. 
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Zarlino, in particular the latter’s association of moving the soul with the production of an 
“extrinsic effect” (effetto estrinseco) in a listener and disposing the soul with an “intrinsic” one: 
One should know that in our soul there are extrinsic properties and intrinsic ones. The 
extrinsic are emotions, which are movements made by objects toward anger, love, hope; 
and habits, which are qualities through which we are, over a long period, made capable of 
being moved either a little or a lot, more or less…and they [emotions and habits] are 
extrinsic because an emotion is moved in us by [objects]…and a habit is not inborn, but is 
acquired by work—if good work, good [habits], if bad work, bad [habits]. There are [also] 
in us natural potencies, which are attitudes through which we are ready to be moved, 
indeed, like the hare is timid, the bull ferocious, the dog bizarre.29 
 
Emotions are “extrinsic” because they arise from people’s encounters with things in the world. 
To quote Peter King, “We are not merely distressed but distressed by (or ‘at’ or ‘over’) 
something.”30 This something is the oggetto both he and Giacomini include in their definitions of 
emotion. Dispositions, by contrast—Buonamici calls them potenze naturali and attitudini 
(natural potencies and attitudes), but the referent is clearly the same—are natural and “intrinsic,” 
a trait humans share with animals.31 Habits, finally, occupy a middle ground. Like emotions, 
Buonamici classifies them as “extrinsic” because they are acquired; like affective dispositions, 
they incline people toward certain feelings and away from others. 
 
29 “Per la qual cosa è da sapere che nell’animo nostro sono proprietà estrinseche, e intrinseche, le 
estrinseche sono li affetti, che sono commovimenti fatti dalli oggetti ad’ira, amore, speranza, e habiti, che 
sono qualità, per le quali noi siamo fatti per lungo uso habili ad essere commossi poco, ò assai, e più, e 
meno che non si conviene, ò si mezzanamente, come si conviene, e sono estrinsechi percioche ne in noi si 
moverebbe l’affetto…e l’habito non nasce nosco, ma operando s’acquista, e bene operando buono, malo, 
mal adoprando. Sono in noi le potenze naturali, che sono attitudini, per le quali noi siamo parati ad essere 
commossi sì, e sì, come la lepre è timida, il toro feroce, il cane bizzarro,” Buonamici, Discorsi poetici, 
146. 
 
30 King, “Emotions in Medieval Thought,” 170. 
 
31 For a discussion of Buonamici’s distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” motions of the mind 
with reference to this passage, see Padoan, “Dalla ‘potentia auditiva’ all’ ‘universo genio de’ spettatori,’” 




 To sum up: emotion and disposition exist on a continuum. Dispositions lay the 
groundwork for emotions and affect the kinds of judgments people make when stimulated by 
objects. (Recall the buzzing fly.) Both are things that happen to people; we don’t will an 
emotion. (Piccolomini’s notion of the disposition dell’animo suggests that we can habituate 
ourselves to certain patterns of emotional response, however.) Finally, although it is a fair 
assessment to say that dispositions are primarily states of the body and emotions are primarily 
states of the mind or soul, both phenomena can be accounted for from both psychological and 
physiological perspectives: in his lecture, for example, Giacomini explains how the emotions 
sadness and fear, once fully aroused, cause spirits to rush to the head, where they catalyze the 
expulsion of liquid from the body as tears—sadness made visible. (Recall that Zarlino also 
associates genuine emotional arousal with “extrinsic” signs, namely tears or laughter.) Despite 
their clear differences, then, emotion and disposition stand in a reciprocal relation. 
3.3 Disposition and Emotion in Zarlino’s Istitutioni harmoniche 
How is this discourse reflected in Zarlino’s account of music and the passions in Part 2, chapters 
7–9, of the Istitutioni? In the first place, Zarlino makes frequent recourse to the notion that 
people differ in their susceptibility to emotions according to their affective dispositions, a 
phenomenon he accounts for with physiological evidence. Citing a well-known passage from the 
first chapter of Boethius’ De institutione musica, for example, the theorist avers that 
each person naturally delights more in that harmony which is similar, agreeable 
(conveniente), and proportionate to his nature and complexion, and according to which he 
is disposed, than in that harmony that is contrary to him. The different dispositions of 
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people arise, therefore, from nothing other than the different motions of the spirit, which is 
the first organ of the sensitive and motive faculties (Virtù) of the soul.32 
 
Although the lesson is an old one, the language Zarlino uses to express it evinces a contemporary 
understanding of disposition in line with the opinion of theorists like Giacomini. 
 Disposition is also central to Zarlino’s concept of the listening subject, or soggetto ben 
disposto. Apart from the clear linguistic connection to the topic at hand, Zarlino’s account of his 
listener is instructive insofar as it supports the consensus that disposition is primarily an inborn 
and stable quality roughly akin to personality. As we have seen, the theorist introduces the 
soggetto ben disposto as the fourth ingredient in his recipe for musical pathos, where he defines 
it as a listener “ready to receive some emotion” (atto à ricevere alcuna passione) on account of 
being favorably inclined toward the three components of melodia.33 Thereafter, it serves 
primarily as a tool for literary analysis, as Zarlino endeavors to show that the listeners who 
populate the famous laus musicae anecdotes are soggetti disposti. The ancient Greek musician 
Timotheus could only inflame a young Alexander the Great’s passion for battle with his aulos, 
for example, because Alexander was naturally disposed toward warlike subjects.34 Had 
 
32 “Ogn’uno naturalmente si diletta più di quella Harmonia, la quale è più simile, conveniente e 
proportionata alla sua natura e complessione, e secondo che è disposto: che di quella, che gli è contraria. 
Nascono adunque le dispositioni diverse negli huomini, non da altro, che da i diversi movimenti dello 
Spirito, ilquale è il primo Organo si delle sensitive, quanto delle motive Virtù dell’anima,” Ist. harm. 
2.8.87–88. Zarlino cites Boethius’ De istitutione musica 1.1 in the margin. I will explore the role of 
pleasure in Zarlino’s theory of emotional arousal below. 
 
33 This paraphrase combines Zarlino’s two definitions of his listener (both at Ist. harm. 2.7.84.): (1) 
“Well-disposed subject, fit to receive some emotion” (Soggetto ben disposto, atto à ricevere alcuna 
passione); and (2) “Disposed subject, that is, a listener who hears these things [harmony, rhythm, and 
text] and delights in them” (Soggetto disposto: cioè l’Uditore, ilquale udissi volentieri queste cose, e in 
esse si diletasse). It seems clear that the latter definition explains the former; that is, the listener is “fit to 
receive some emotion” because he or she listens voluntarily and delights in the music. 
 
34 “If Alexander, the son of Philip, King of Macedonia, was induced by the musician Timotheus and by 
Xenophanes (as some say) to take up arms with great fury, we should not be amazed, for [Alexander] was 
in such a way disposed that he listened voluntarily and with great pleasure to discourses that treated 
warlike subjects” (se Alessandero figliuolo di Filippo re di Macedonia fu indutto da Timotheo musico e 
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Alexander been of a peaceful and quiet disposition, Timotheus’ music, with its bellicose text and 
Phrygian mode, would have left him cold, for “everyone listens voluntarily to what he delights in 
the most” and “hates those things that do not conform to his nature”35 
 In a different vein, Zarlino also accords untexted music (semplice harmonia) the power to 
“dispose” the souls of listeners, echoing the notion, from Giacomini, that an emotional 
disposition can be temporarily established by an external stimulus. To recall the quotation that 
opened this chapter: 
If we take simple harmony, without adding anything else, it will not have the power to 
render any of the extrinsic effects narrated above. Still, it would have the power in a 
certain way to dispose the soul intrinsically (di dispor l’animo intrinsecamente) to more 
easily express some emotions or effects, like laughing or crying.36 
 
Like Giacomini’s food and wine, which prepare a subject for happiness by heating his spirits, 
harmony disposes the soul by causing a material change in the body. As Zarlino explains in the 
following chapter (2.8.87), harmonies—in particular, the harmonie, or modes—catalyze an 
emotional effect in listeners by disturbing the balance of their complexionate qualities (heat, 
cold, wet, dry).37 More specifically, it is the shared proportions between the harmonie and the 
above-named qualities that cause this change: 
Because the passions that predominate in the body in virtue of the aforenamed qualities 
[heat, cold, wet, and dry] are similar (they say) to the complexions found in the harmonie, 
we can easily understand how the harmonie are able to move the soul and dispose it to 
various passions. For if someone is subjected to some emotion with delight or sadness, and 
 
da Senofanto (come alcuni vogliono) à prender l’arme con gran furore; non dobbiamo prender maraviglia: 
percioche era in tal maniera disposto, che volentieri et con sommo piacere udiva ragionamenti, che 
trattavano delle cose della guerra), Ist. harm. 2.7.84–85. 
 
35 “ogn’uno volentieri ode ragionare di quella cosa, della quale maggiormente si diletta…e per il 
contrario, hà in odio quelli, che non sono conformi alla sua natura,” Ist. harm. 2.7.84. 
 
36 Ist. harm. 2.7.84. For the Italian, see my n. 6. 
 
37 According to Zarlino (Ist. harm. 2.8.87), any disturbance in the body’s natural balance of the four prime 
qualities gives rise to an emotion. 
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hears a mode that is similar in proportion, that emotion will increase, and the cause of this 
is similitude, which (as Boethius says) is friendly to all, and diversity is contrary and 
odious.38 
 
Those harmonie aligning with a listener’s natural disposition, Zarlino proceeds to explain, will 
cause an arousal of emotion similar to its own nature—Phrygian, for example, excites anger, 
Dorian temperance—while those harmonie whose natural affect is contrary to the listener’s 
disposition will mitigate his prevailing emotion and draw him partway in the other direction. As 
for Giacomini, a subject’s innate disposition for Zarlino thus serves as a kind of filter for any 
stimulus received by the senses. While the harmonie are themselves expressive of particular 
emotions, in other words, the causal relationship between expression and arousal is not 
guaranteed, but rather determined by the disposition of the listener. And although he does not 
specify the exact mechanism of change in as much detail as we might like—Zarlino’s readers are 
expected to accept the force of “similitude” at face value—it is clear enough that the underlying 
principle here is musica humana, namely the belief of distinguished pedigree that the human soul 
has an affinity with music in virtue of their mutual basis in numerical proportions. Zarlino 
discusses musica humana from a general standpoint with reference to the qualities and humors in 
 
38 “Essendo adunque le passioni, che predominano ne i corpi per virtù delle nominate qualità, simili (dirò 
cosi) alle complessioni, che si ritruovano nelle Harmonie; facilmente potiamo conoscere, in qual modo, le 
Harmonie possino muover l’animo e disporlo a varie passioni: percioche se alcuno è sottoposto ad alcuna 
passione con diletto, over con tristezza: e ode un’Harmonia, la quale sia simile in proportione; tal 
passione piglia aumento, e di questo ne è cagione la Similitudine; la quale (come vuole Boetio) ad 
ogn’uno è amica, e la Diversità gli è contraria e odiosa,” Ist. harm. 2.8.87. Note that Zarlino seems to use 
the verbs muover and dispor as synonyms here. Although he is usually clear about distinguishing them, 
sometimes he does not. It is also possible that in this passage harmonie refers to music in combination 





Part 1, chapter 7, of the Istitutioni. Here he demonstrates its adaptability to a physiologically-
inflected understanding of emotional arousal.39 
 
 If harmonies prepare listeners for an emotion by altering their bodily dispositions, then 
how does a text move their souls? And why is text so important in comparison to harmony? 
Zarlino does not answer either of these questions directly. In a general way, his position that 
harmony “disposes” while text “moves” simply reflects the logocentrism typical of Renaissance 
music theory. Writers of such varying tastes as Glareanus, Aron, Zarlino, Mei, Galilei, and 
Artusi all emphasized the importance—sometimes even the primacy—of text in musical 
expression; music serves the text.40 With Giacomini’s definition of affetto in mind, however, it 
seems possible to suggest, with a bit more precision, that for Zarlino only the textual component 
of melodia offers itself to the mind as an “object” suitable for judgment—that is, for a genuine 
emotional response marked by the production of an “extrinsic effect.” Harmony and rhythm, 
while able to indirectly access the soul’s higher faculties through the spirits, are on this reading 
limited to working their effects on the body, in particular its qualities of heat, cold, wet, and dry. 
Text stimulates the mind; harmony stimulates the humors. 
 
39 It is worth noting as an aside what appears to be a fundamental difference between Zarlino’s theory of 
emotional arousal at Ist. harm. 2.7–9 and his theory of “imitating the words” at Sopplimenti musicali 8.11, 
which was examined in chapter 2 of this dissertation. Imitations of words, being representations, invite 
listeners to infer the “similitude of form” (Buonamici) that obtains between music and word and thereby 
access a cognitively-based experience of pleasure. The harmonie invite no such inference, eliciting their 
emotional effect instead by means of the similitude that obtains between harmonic proportions and the 
humors. Representation does play a role in melodia when the oratione is added, however. 
 
40 This hierarchy, novel to the sixteenth century, relates in part to the emergence of the concept musica 
poetica in music theory, on which see Palisca, Musica and Ideas, 51. See also Bonds, Absolute Music, 49, 
n. 24, who notes (citing Warwick Edwards) that “the idea of the ‘primacy of the text’ in musical settings 
becomes credible only from the 1540s onward.” 
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 Zarlino in fact comes close to saying as much, albeit outside his discussion of the 
passions proper. Summarizing the conclusions of a chapter on the acoustical differences between 
instrumental and vocal sounds (suoni and voci, respectively), the theorist slips in a cognitive 
insight: 
Suono is that which one can hear only; and it is a repercussion of unmixed air that reaches 
the sense of hearing; and it does not represent anything to the intellect. And voce is a 
repercussion of air, breathed from the vocal artery, that is sent outwards with some 
signification (significatione)—leaving aside the barking of dogs and other similar things 
that do not fit our purpose here.41 
 
Acoustical details aside, the message is clear: suoni reach the hearing, while voci, by which 
Zarlino primarily means words, reach the intellect.42 While this distinction does not originate 
with Zarlino, it takes on a new significance in the context of his theory of emotional arousal. 
Given that Renaissance theorists, as we have seen, define emotions as judgments of the mind 
accompanied by pleasure or pain, it seems reasonable to infer that it is because they bear 
“signification” that voci, under the right conditions, move the soul. Likewise, harmony and 
rhythm cannot induce a passion because they do not “represent anything to the intellect.” 
 Further bolstering this supposition are Zarlino’s specifications in Part 2, chapter 7, for the 
passions-moving text itself. As we have seen, Zarlino initially defines the textual component of 
melodia as “the oration, that is to say, the speech, that expresses morals by means of the 
 
41 “il Suono è quello, che solamente si ode; e è repercussione di Aria non sciolta, che perviene fino 
all’Udito: e non rappresenta cosa alcuna allo intelletto; e la Voce è repercussione di aria respirata 
all’arteria vocale, che si manda fuori con qualche significatione; lasciando da un canto il Latrar de cani e 
altre come simili, che non fanno qui al proposito,” Ist. harm. 2.10.92. 
 
42 On Zarlino’s concept of voce, Chadwick Jenkins writes (“Metaphysics and History,” 233, n. 44), “Voce 
is a species of sound. However, specifically voce implies a signifying power that sounds in general may 
lack. As such, voce must have some identifiable meaning and is thus tied to the signifying function of 
words: that is, voce is sound in the form of melody wedded to text.”  
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narration of some history or fable.”43 Later, he adds that the oratione “expresses imitations,” 
likely in reference to the kind of mimesis Plato treats in Book 3 of the Republic, namely direct 
personation or dialogue.44 These textured requirements make clear that the oratione is no 
ordinary text; indeed, Zarlino later clarifies that he is thinking in particular of epic poetry. In fact, 
he outright rejects the passions-moving potential of the smaller poetic forms more typical of 
sixteenth-century polyphony like madrigals and canzonettas.45 Only epic, it seems, stimulates the 
active contemplation that can in turn catalyze true emotional arousal: by considering the costumi 
(moral behavior) imitated by lifelike characters in an episodic narrative, audience members are 
compelled to make moral judgments, which in turn train them in feeling the right emotions and 
promote virtuous behavior.46 Given their lack of access to the higher faculties of the soul, 
harmony and rhythm cannot play this crucial role in stimulating the passions. 
 
43 “la Oratione: cioè il Parlare, il quale esprima costumi col mezo della narratione di alcuna historia, o 
favola,” Ist. harm. 2.7.84. 
 
44 “One can thus conclude that through melodia, and principally through a text containing some history, 
fable, or other similar thing that expresses imitations and morals, these effects have been—and yet can 
be—put into action” (Si può adunque concludere, che dalla Melodia: e principalmente dalla Oratione, 
nella quale si contenga alcuna Historia, o Favola, overo altra cosa simile, che esprima imitationi e 
costumi, siano stati e ancora si possino porre in atto cotali effetti), Ist. harm. 2.7.86. On the various 
possible meanings of the word imitatione, see chapter 2, section 2.1, of this dissertation. 
 
45 Ist. harm. 2.9.89–90. For discussions of this passage, see Gerbino, “‘Bringing before the Eyes,’” 11–13; 
and Palisca, Humanism, 370–73. Zarlino reaffirms this stance at Sopplimenti musicali 8.8.309, now 
adding motets to the list of music unable to move the passions: “We listen voluntarily and with pleasure 
to a musician who recites some beautiful and honorable subject to the sound of the lyre. I will not, 
however, say anything of modern songs like those that are named with the barbarous word ‘motets’ or 
‘madrigals,’ but rather of that beautiful ‘episode,’ so to speak, in which by hearing a musician recite 
something sad with beautiful gestures the listeners are often moved to tears. And if by contrast they hear 
something facetious, they erupt into laughter” (noi ascoltiamo volentieri e con piacere un Musico, ch’al 
suono della Lira recita qualche bel Soggetto e honorato; non dico però un de canti moderni, come quelli 
che chiamano con nome Barbaro Motetti ò Madrigali; ma qualche bello Episodio, dirò cosi; nel quale 
udendosi recitare dal Musico con bella Attione alcuna cosa lagrimevole, sono sforzati gli Uditori di venir 
spesse fiate alle lagrime; e se per il contrario odono qualche facetia, di ridere qualche fiata 
squaccheratamente). 
 
46 This assessment draws from Eden’s insight that—for Philip Sidney—“artistic imitation elicits ethical 
imitation” (Poetic and Legal Fiction, 172). 
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 Zarlino in fact considers emotions to be a vice if unmoored from ethics: “Undoubtedly,” 
he writes, “these passions are reputed to be vices in moral persons unless the excesses of the 
qualities are reduced to a certain moderation through a mediating operation that may be said to 
be virtuous and laudable.”47 While this “mediating operation” is in large part thanks to the 
didactic subject matter Zarlino requires of text—he repeatedly reminds his readers that the 
oratione should express costumi, or morals—harmony and rhythm also have a role to play, one 
that brings us back to the notion of affective disposition. Citing the precept from Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics that virtues and vices are acquired through habit rather than inborn 
(“secondo la dottrina del filosofo le virtù morali, e le vitii non nascono con esso noi: ma si 
generano per molti habiti buoni, o tristi frequentati”—according to the philosopher’s doctrine, 
moral virtues and vices are not inborn but rather generated through many good or bad habits), 
Zarlino avers that “becoming accustomed to harmonies and rhythms is no different from 
becoming accustomed and disposed to various passions and moral habits and customs of the 
soul.”48 Here, Zarlino’s use of the verb disporsi likely reflects Piccolomini’s concept of the 
disposition dell’animo, namely an emotional disposition acquired through conscious 
 
 
47 “Et queste passioni tutte senza dubbio sono riputate vitiose nell’Huomo morale: ma quando tali 
soprabondanze si riducono ad una certa mediocrità, nasce una operation mezana, che non solo si può dire 
virtuosa: ma anco lodevole,” Ist. harm. 2.8.87. Recall that at Ist. harm. 3.26.199 Zarlino avers (citing 
Horace) that the musician “is moved by this same end [as the poet] of benefitting and delighting the souls 
of listeners with harmonic accents” (è mosso dallo istesso fine di giovare e dilettare gli animi degli 
ascoltanti con gli accenti harmonici).  
 
48 “lo assuefarsi alle Harmonie e alle Numeri, non sia altro, che uno assuefarsi e disporsi à diverse 
passioni e à diversi Habiti morali e costumi dell’animo,” Ist. harm. 2.8.88. Zarlino’s specific source for 
this latter claim is Problems, XIX.19, as he notes in a marginal citation on p. 88, but it also relates to 
Aristotle’s discussion of music in Book 8 of the Politics. 
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habituation.49 Through listening to the right kind of music repeatedly and over time, one 
becomes in this way “disposed” toward virtue.50 
 Thus Zarlino incorporates all three kinds of affective disposition into his theory: stable or 
inborn (via his soggetto disposto), temporary (via semplice harmonia “disposing” the soul 
toward an emotion), and consciously acquired (via his precept that one can become “disposed to 
various passions and moral habits” through listening to the right kind of music). Likewise, his 
lessons on full-on emotional arousal, as we have seen, reflect sixteenth-century philosophies of 
affetto through their emphasis on the relationship between emotion, judgment, and action. The 
theorist’s paradigmatic soggetto disposto, Alexander the Great, does not merely become aroused 
to a passion, but acts on it by taking up arms for battle. 
 
 
49 For Piccolomini’s concept of the disposition dell’animo, see p. 123, above. 
 
50 This interpretation of disporsi is bolstered both by its pairing here with assuefarsi (see n. 48), which 
connotes a process taking place over time, and by concordances with other writings on music and ethics 
from this period. Felice Figliucci’s commentary on Book 8 of Aristotle’s Politics, for example, regularly 
uses the phrase disporre l’animo to describe music’s ability to inculcate virtue, as for example here: “Just 
as exercise renders the body well-disposed to deeds, so does music dispose our soul to good morals, 
accustoming us to take joy in honest and virtuous things” (si come l’arte esercitatoria fà il corpo ben 
disposto a le fatiche, cosi parimente la Musica disponga l’animo nostro a i buoni costumi, avvezzandolo à 
rallegrarsi di cose honeste, e virtuose), De la politica overo scienza civile secondo la dottrina d’Aristotile. 
Libro otto. (Venice: Gio. Battista Somascho, 1583), 251. 
 Zarlino in fact anticipates Figliucci’s usage of disporre l’animo in his own exposition of 
principles from Book 8 of Aristotle’s Politics at 1.3.11 of the Istitutioni. Reviewing possible justifications 
of musical education, Zarlino writes: “Then, others wanted music to be learned for no other reason than 
its being one of the liberal arts, which were only practiced by the nobility, and because it disposes the soul 
to virtue, regulates its passions, accustoms it to feel joy and pain with grace, disposing [the soul] to good 
manners in the same way that gymnastics trains the body to such good dispositions and habits” (Altri poi 
voleuano, che ella s’imparasse, non ad altro fine, se non per esser posta tra le discipline liberali, nelle 
quali solamente i nobili si essercitauano; e perché dispone l’animo alla virtù, e regola le sue passioni, con 
auezzarlo a rallegrarsi, e a dolersi virtuosamente, disponendolo alli buoni costumi, non altramente di 
quello, che fa la Ginnastica il corpo a qualche buona dispositione e habitudine). Translation adapted from 
Lucille Corwin, “Le istitutioni harmoniche of Gioseffo Zarlino, Part 1: A Translation with Introduction” 
(PhD diss., CUNY, 2008), 165. 
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3.4 A Rhetorical Precedent for the Soggetto ben disposto 
In the previous section, we saw how Zarlino’s concept of the soggetto ben disposto, or listener, 
reflects the general consensus among physiologically-inclined theorists of emotion that a suitable 
affective disposition is needed for emotional arousal. A closer examination of the language with 
which Zarlino defines his soggetto disposto points to rhetoric, rather than physiology, as the 
theorist’s more immediate source, however. In particular, Zarlino’s specifications that the 
soggetto disposto “listens voluntarily,” “delights in” the music, and—on account of the first two 
conditions—is “ready to receive some passion” echo descriptions of listeners in rhetorical 
treatises written by Zarlino’s contemporaries, who taught that voluntary listening, delight, and 
emotional arousal were mutually-reinforcing aims of rhetorical practice.51 More than that, the 
rhetorical discourse around emotional arousal can illuminate aspects of Zarlino’s theory that 
physiological commentaries on arousal like Giacomini’s do not explain. 
 Zarlino’s debt to the rhetorical tradition is well known; the title of his magnum opus, an 
homage to Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, advertises it. But his reliance on sixteenth-century 
commentators on the ancients, whom he almost never cited, is less well understood. Not since 
Martha Feldman’s pathbreaking City Culture and the Madrigal at Venice, in fact, has Zarlino’s 
Istitutioni been studied in light of the broader rhetorical conversations taking place in Italy at 
midcentury.52 In that book, Feldman demonstrated the theorist’s adherence in the Istitutioni to a 
distinctly Venetian strain of Ciceronian rhetoric that centered the rule of decorum—understood 
as a principle of both expressive moderation and stylistic variety—in speechwriting. For 
 
51 The necessity of both delighting and moving audience members is captured in Cicero’s oft-repeated 
maxim that the orator must “move, teach, and delight” his audience. See, e.g., De Optimo Genere 
Oratorum 1.3–4. 
 
52 Feldman, City Culture and the Madrigal at Venice, chapter 6. 
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evidence of Ciceronian influence, Feldman points to Zarlino’s insistence that contrapuntal 
textures should be continuously varied, lest the ear become satiated; to his disdain for the 
expressive licenses of the so-called “chromaticists” (i.e., Nicola Vicentino), who advocated the 
revival of arcane tuning systems; and to his cautionary advice that singers moderate their voices 
in performance in order to avoid calling attention to themselves.53 All told, “Beauty for Zarlino 
required elegance, purity, and restraint, all of which superseded other expressive demands.”54 
The soggetto disposto Zarlino describes in Part 2, chapter 7, is an ingredient not of beauty, 
however, but rather of pathos—for Zarlino, an exceptional technique that by its very nature 
bypasses the norms of moderation in the name of heightened expressiveness. (Recall that 
Zarlino, even when explaining how to achieve pathos in music, views this technique with some 
suspicion, and he does not seem to associate it with polyphony.) As such, we must imagine that 
Zarlino looked beyond Ciceronian decorum to lay the conceptual foundations for his listener. 
Two textual traditions are worth examining in particular: commentaries on Book 2 of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric and accounts of speech prologues, or proemia.  
 
 Like the Poetics, Aristotle’s Rhetoric attracted little interest from humanists until the 
sixteenth century, and even then, rhetorical discussions continued to be dominated by Cicero and 
Quintilian. Italy was an early locus of discussion for Aristotle’s treatise, however: four Italian 
translations of the Rhetoric were published in the sixteenth century, compared to zero in French 
or English.55 For its students in Italy, one attractive feature of the Rhetoric was this book’s 
 
53 Ibid., 171–76. 
 
54 Ibid., 174. 
 




systematic inquiry into the emotions in Book 2, which in depth and detail goes beyond the 
treatment of the subject in Cicero or Quintilian. There, in the first major European philosophical 
inquiry into the passions, Aristotle discusses sixteen human emotions useful to the orator 
according to three categories of analysis, which read as follows: 
There is need to divide the discussion of each [emotion] into three headings. I mean, for 
example, in speaking of anger, what is their state of mind when people are angry and 
against whom are they usually angry and for what sorts of reasons; for if we understood 
one or two of these but not all, it would be impossible to create anger [in someone].56 
 
In their paraphrases and translations of this passage, Aristotle’s vernacular commentators 
rendered the first of his categories—“the state of mind when people are angry”—in language that 
closely recalls Zarlino’s listener. Take Bartolomeo Cavalcanti’s paraphrase in his influential 
1559 vernacular treatise, La retorica, as a representative example: 
The emotions are moved in subjects fit to receive them (soggetti atti a riceverle), on 
account of some cause, and toward some person. We see this clearly in the case of anger 
because it is easily kindled in someone who is in such a way disposed (chi è in un tal modo 
disposto), and for some cause, and against somebody.57 
 
In translating Aristotle, Cavalcanti adopts a vocabulary strikingly similar to Zarlino’s. In the first 
place, Cavalcanti uses the word soggetto for the person whose emotions are to be aroused. 
(Although Cavalcanti, like Zarlino, is concerned with listeners—uditori or auditori—here he is 
considering the soggetti of emotions from a general standpoint.) Second, Cavalcanti maintains 
that this person must be “ready to receive” (atto a ricevere) a passion, a phrase echoed by 
Zarlino (“Soggetto ben disposto, atto à ricevere alcuna passione”). Finally, Cavalcanti’s soggetto 
 
56 On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. Kennedy, 113 (1378a8–9). 
 
57 “et conciosia, che le passioni si muovano in soggetti atti à riceverle, et per qualche causa, et verso di 
qualche persona; come veggiamo manifestamente nell’ira, perche facilmente s’accende chi è in un tal 
modo disposto, et per qualche cagione, et contra à qualcuno,” Cavalcanti, La retorica, 176. For an 




meets this condition of preparedness on account of being “in such a way disposed” (in un tal 
modo disposto). 
 Mutatis mutandis, Zarlino’s listener. Although Cavalcanti’s treatise was published a year 
after the Istitutioni, making the possibility of its direct influence on Zarlino unlikely, the 
correspondence of terms is striking enough to warrant our attention.58 The connection is further 
strengthened by Cavalcanti’s subsequent discussion of what it means to be “in such a way 
disposed,” which, like Zarlino’s analysis of the soggetto disposto, addresses the roles that both 
intrinsic factors and accidental circumstances play in disposing subjects to receive particular 
emotions. Both the young and the old, Cavalcanti maintains, are naturally predisposed to anger, 
while anyone harboring a strong feeling of desire (like thirst) is more temporarily inclined to the 
same: “Thus we can say universally that those people who are inflamed by some desire and not 
able to achieve it are easily moved to anger. And this is the reason that they are prepared and 
disposed.”59 (The connection to Giacomini’s physiology of emotional disposition is also evident 
here.) This same distinction, we have seen, is central to Zarlino: listeners can either be 
predisposed because of their natural inclination—as when Alexander, inherently warlike, heard 
Timotheus’ musical call to arms—or become disposed, albeit more temporarily, in response to 
 
58 Cavalcanti did begin work on La retorica in the 1540s, however, on which see Mack, A History of 
Renaissance Rhetoric, 172. Cavalcanti’s language is shared by other rhetorical treatises from midcentury. 
In his discussion of anger within his own commentary on Book 2 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (published in 
1569), for example, Piccolomini writes: “Moreover, we can also say that man becomes disposed and 
prepared by every sort of perturbation and annoyance of the soul to become angry easily [in response to] 
each offence that may happen to him” (Otra che potiam ancor dire che da ogni sorte di perturbatione, e 
molestia d’animo vien’ à disporsi, e à prepararsi l’huomo, à facilmente adirarsi per ogni offesa che gli sia 
fatta), Piena, copiosa et larga parafrase…nel secondo libro della Retorica, 51. 
 
59 “Puossi adunque dire universalmente, che coloro, i quali sono accesi di qualche desiderio, e non 
possono conseguirlo, si muovono facilmente ad ira: e di ciò è cagione, che questi tali sono preparati, e 
disposti,” Cavalcanti, La retorica, 178. I am using anger to exemplify the kind of analysis Cavalcanti 
subjects to each of Aristotle’s sixteen emotions because both authors treat anger first. Cavalcanti’s 
language is consistent throughout his discussion of each emotion. 
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the musician’s manipulation of harmony and rhythm, the stimuli Zarlino assigns to this task. 
Zarlino in fact seems to bring these two varieties of disposition— stable and temporary—
together at the end of Part 2, chapter 7, when he writes (and note the echo of Cavalcanti’s 
adjectives), “Harmony and rhythm are the things that dispose the soul; because the listener 
should always be prepared and disposed.”60 
 This last quote hints at an aspect of pathos only latent in Zarlino but explicit in 
Cavalcanti: it is the orator’s (or musician’s) responsibility to evaluate the dispositions of his 
audience members and match his persuasive techniques accordingly. The speech-giver does not 
simply wait for an ideal audience to find him, that is, but rather suits his speech to the particular 
needs of whatever audience is at hand. As Cavalcanti puts it: 
I hold that when we want to move [the emotions], considering well the dispositions of 
those whom we want to move is not of little importance, as is knowing (as much as is 
possible) to which emotion he is more disposed to receive, and which less: because some 
are taken easily by anger, others fear, others envy; for others, some other passion is 
aroused with ease.61 
 
Although not directly expressed by Zarlino, we can extrapolate a similar lesson from his repeated 
warnings that a naturally bellicose listener like Alexander will be unmoved by tranquil music, or 
vice versa, indicating that the musician must be able to intuit which listeners are bellicose and 
which are not. Likewise, the theorist advises that a musician will “always exert himself in vain” 
to move the passions in the absence of a soggetto disposto.62 Although such a comment could be 
 
60 “l’harmonia e il numero esser cose, le quali dispongono l’animo: pur che’l Soggetto sia sempre 
preparato e disposto,” Ist. harm. 2.7.86–87. 
 
61 “dico, che quando noi gli vorremo muovere; non sarà di leggier momento il considerare bene la 
dispositione di colui, che noi vogliamo commuovere, et conoscere (quanto si puo) a qual passione 
ricevere e’ sia piu disposto, e a qual meno: perche alcuni son preda agevolmente dell’ira, in altri il timore, 
in altri l’invidia, in altri altre passioni con facilità si destano,” Cavalcanti, La retorica, 218. 
 




interpreted as a reference to an “ideal listener”—that is, a hypothetical listening subject crafted 
solely to substantiate the writer’s claims about musical perception—Zarlino’s insistence that 
soggetti respond to music according to their individual dispositions suggests a more pragmatic 
attitude.63 All listeners are disposed in one way or another. The musician’s task is not to seek out 
an ideal listener, then, but rather to discern the disposition of his audience and play suitable 
music. 
 
 Or withhold it altogether. Although outside rhetorical discourse proper, an intriguing 
reference to well-disposed listeners bearing on this point, as well as on the rhetorical orientation 
of Zarlino’s listener in general, crops up in one of the better-known texts on persuasion from the 
sixteenth century: Baldasare Castiglione’s Il libro del cortegiano (1528).64 In Book 2 of that text, 
two of the author’s fictional characters, Gaspar Pallavicino and Federico Fregoso, debate the 
proper place of music at court. As musicologists have observed, their discussion relates a number 
of interesting details about amateur music-making in the sixteenth century. Federico opines that 
the ideal courtier should be able to sight-sing a libro (i.e., from polyphonic notation), to declaim 
poetry to the tune of a bowed or plucked instrument (il cantare alla viola per recitare), and to 
 
63 For an interpretation of Zarlino’s soggetto as a nascent concept of an ideal listener, see Jairo Moreno, 
Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects: The Construction of Musical Thought in Zarlino, 
Descartes, Rameau, and Weber (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), chapter 1. In general, my 
conclusions in this chapter push back against Moreno’s dismissal of Zarlino’s soggetto disposto as both 
“ancillary” (7) to the Venetian theorist’s larger project and theoretically underdetermined: “It is 
significant,” Moreno writes (182, n. 76), “that Zarlino’s discussion does not delve into questions of 
aesthetic empathy between music and listener by appeal to the Aristotelian psychology available to him.” 
Empathy may not figure into Zarlino’s discussion, but it seems clear that he is in dialogue with 
contemporary psychology. 
 
64 (Venice: nelle case d’Aldo Romano e d’Andrea d’Asola suo Suocero, 1528). Italian quotations from Il 
libro del cortegiano are transcribed from this edition, which is not paginated. 
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hold his own in a viol quartet.65 Federico also offers brief advice on the right “time” (tempi) or 
circumstances for musical performance, and it is here that the notion of disposition comes into 
play. In short, not every occasion is an apt one for making music, and the courtier should be able 
to notice which is which: “And if the Courtier is a good judge of himself,” Federico says, “he 
will adapt himself to the occasion and will know when the souls of his listeners are disposed to 
listen and when not.”66 
 Unlike Zarlino or Cavalcanti’s invocations of the soggetto disposto, which both have 
evident pretensions to theoretical depth, Castiglione’s reference to the soul’s “disposition” seems 
colloquial here. Nor is he, like them, addressing the topic of emotional arousal as such, but rather 
more simply an audience’s willingness to listen. Castiglione’s use of two of the key terms we 
have been tracing (gli animi…disposti), however, suggests that he is in the same conceptual 
ballpark as the two theorists. Like Cavalcanti’s orator, who must evaluate the disposition of his 
audience before beginning to speak, Castiglione’s courtier is an audience psychologist. Likewise, 
Federico’s association of the “disposed soul” with voluntary listening clearly presages Zarlino’s 
characterization of the soggetto disposto as one who listens voluntarily and with pleasure. Given 
these connections, the overt social-rhetorical thrust of Castiglione’s use of the phrase can enrich 
our understanding of Zarlino’s. Whereas the Venetian theorist’s discussion of soggetti ben 
disposti comes across as dry—steeped, as it is, in ancient sources and the laus musicae anecdotal 
tradition—Castiglione’s perspective on animi disposti is eminently practical, addressed as one 
 
65 For a translation of the passage, see The Book of the Courtier, ed. Daniel Javitch (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2002), 76–77. For a discussion, see James Haar, “The Courtier as Musician: 
Castiglione’s View of the Science and Art of Music,” in The Science and Art of Renaissance Music, ed. 
Paul Corneilson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 20–37. 
 
66 “E se il Cortegiano sarà giusto giudice di se stesso, s’accomoderà bene à i tempi, e conoscerà quando 




factor among many the status-seeking courtier must take into account before advertising his 
musical skill.67 So, can we infer, must Zarlino’s musico adapt himself to audiences in a similar 
way. Given the well-known influence of the rhetorical tradition on Il libro del cortegiano, 
moreover, the overlap between Castiglione and Zarlino only strengthens the likelihood that 
rhetoric lays at the foundation of the music theorist’s listener concept.68 
 
 Further connections to Zarlino’s soggetto within the rhetorical tradition are found in 
theories of the exordium or proemium, the traditional first part of a speech. Offering a more 
specialized perspective on emotional response than commentaries on Book 2 of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, these accounts help to clarify the qualities of pleasure and voluntarily listening Zarlino 
ascribes to his soggetto—qualities glimpsed, if not fully explained, in Castiglione’s Courtier. 
(These features, recall, are mentioned in Zarlino’s second of two definitions for his listener 
concept: “Soggetto disposto, that is, a listener who listens voluntarily to these things [harmony, 
 
67 Castiglione refers to the concept of well-disposed souls in a few other places, for example, when 
Federico advises that the Courtier ensure a good reputation precedes his arrival at court: “Therefore I 
would have our Courtier bring talent and art to support his own worth; and always, when he has to go 
where he is a stranger and unknown, let him see to it that a good repute precedes him and that men there 
know that he is highly esteemed in other places, among other lords, ladies, and gentlemen; for a fame that 
is thought to result from many judgments generates a certain firm belief in a man’s worth, which then, in 
minds already disposed and prepared in this way, is easily maintained and increased by actual 
performance” (Però voglio chel nostro Cortegiano il meglio che pò, oltre al valore, s’aiuti anchor con 
ingegno, e arte, e sempre che ha d’andare in loco, dove sia novo, e non conosciuto, procuri che prima vi 
vada la bona opinion di se, che la persona: e faccia, che ivi s’intenda che esso in altri lochi, appresso altri 
Signori, donne, e cavalieri sia ben estimato: perche quella fama, che par che nasca da molto giudicii, 
genera una certa ferma credenza di valore, che poi rovando gli animi cosi disposti, e preparati, facilmente 
con l’opere si mantiene, e accrescie), The Book of the Courtier, ed. Javitch, 94. 
 
68 On Castiglione and the rhetorical tradition, see, e.g., Wayne A. Rebhorn, “Baldesar Castiglione, 
Thomas Wilson, and the Courtly Body of Renaissance Rhetoric,” Rhetorica 11, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 
241–74; and Jennifer Richards, “Assumed Simplicity and the Critique of Nobility: Or, How Castiglione 




rhythm, and text] and delights in them.”69) As Cavalcanti relates in a marginal sidebar to his 
treatise (he will again serve as our Cinquecento representative of the rhetorical tradition), the 
proemium has “three offices” or persuasive purposes: “To make the listener (1) favorable; (2) 
attentive; (3) informed [of the orator’s intention].”70 To achieve these aims, he explains, the 
introduction should lay out the orator’s argument in an easily digestible and summary form; 
Cavalcanti additionally provides context-dependent suggestions according to the nature of the 
case at hand, the audience, and the rhetorical genre (judicial, demonstrative, deliberative). 
 In discussing these aims and techniques, which clearly relate to the notion of voluntary 
listening in a general way, Cavalcanti makes frequent recourse to the notion of disposition we 
have been tracing in this chapter. In particular, the proemium corresponds to the temporary kind: 
like Giacomini’s food and wine, or Zarlino’s semplice harmonia, the first part of a speech elicits 
a subtle effect, rendering listeners “well disposed” to the orator regardless of their individual or 
inborn dispositions (these latter, as we have seen, determined by factors including age, ethnicity, 
and humoral balance). Unlike in his commentary on Book 2 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, however, 
which addresses a wide variety of affective dispositions, Cavalcanti’s chapter on the proemium 
consistently lends disposition a positive valence as an expression of alert, friendly, and 
uninhibited listening.71 Here, for example, Cavalcanti argues that exordia would be unnecessary 
were audiences not in need of being “prepared and disposed to listen favorably” first: 
 
69 Ist. harm. 2.8.84. For the Italian, see n. 33. 
 
70 “Tre Ufficii del Proemio per far l’auditore 1 Favorevole. 2 Attento. 3 Avvertito.,” Cavalcanti, La 
retorica, 371. 
 
71 In other words, Cavalcanti’s discussion of the exordium applies the general notion of affective 
disposition he outlines in his commentary on Book 2 of the Rhetoric (his own Book 4) to a particular 
emotion, one he gives various names including benevolence (e.g., in a sidebar in ibid., 371: “Come 
s’acquistino quelle tre cose. 2 Benivolenza”) and friendliness (amicità, e.g.: “Quell’amica dispositione 
d’animo…variamente si acquista,” 371). 
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And in truth, if the listener had a well-composed soul (l’animo ben composto) and was free 
of emotions, we could be content with this preludial material, and everything that fell 
outside of the case would be said to be vain and superfluous. But, because the listener for 
the most part is [lacking a well-composed mind], such that it is necessary at the start of our 
speech to prepare and dispose him to listen to us favorably (preparalo, et disporlo ad 
ascoltarci favorevolmente), it is fitting that in respect of him the proemium should be 
accommodated to this intention.72 
 
The exordium is like a dry-erase marker: encountering listeners marked up by various individual 
perturbations of the soul, it wipes them down such that they may attend to the rest of the orator’s 
speech with a “well-composed mind.” In a similar vein, Cavalcanti elsewhere remarks that 
speakers should “prepare and dispose the soul of [listeners], most often at the start of our speech, 
so that they are well-disposed for the rest.”73 In Zarlinian terms, we might say that the function of 
the exordium is to make listeners soggetti ben disposti. Not only do Cavalcanti’s verbs “prepare 
and dispose” again recall various lines from Zarlino (Cavalcanti: “Fa di mestieri…prepararlo, et 
disporlo ad ascoltarci favorevolmente.” Zarlino: “Il soggetto sia sempre preparato e disposto”) 
but his adverb “favorably” (favorevolmente) also echoes, if indirectly, Zarlino’s claim that a 
soggetto disposto listens “voluntarily” (volentieri); both words highlight the listener’s openness 
to the orator or musician’s aims. Both Cavalcanti’s and Zarlino’s listeners, finally, are described 
as ben disposto—a common-enough phrase, to be sure, but here perhaps significant in light of 
the similarity of the concepts they modify. 
 
 
72 “Et nel vero, se l’auditore havesse l’animo ben composto, e fusse libero dalle passioni, noi potremo di 
questa materia di proemio essere contenti: e tutto quello, che fuori della causa si dicesse, verebbe ad esser 
vano, e di superchio. Ma, percioche l’auditore per lo più è tale, che’ei fa di mestieri nel principio del 
nostro parlare, prepararlo, et disporlo ad ascoltarci favorevolmente, conviene, che per rispetto di lui sia il 
proemio à questa intentione accommodato,” ibid., 370–71. 
 
73 “preparare, e disporre l’animo di quegli [auditori] (ilche massimamente nel principio del nostro parlare, 
si conviene) per havergli nel restante ben disposti,” ibid., 27. 
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 In a few places, Cavalcanti in fact posits direct ties between the proemium, music, and 
emotional predisposition, as Warren Kirkendale long ago showed in an important article.74 In 
that article, Kirkendale traces the rhetorical tradition of theorizing ties between instrumental 
music and speech prologues. This tradition commenced with Aristotle, who in the Rhetoric (at 
3.14.1) compares the prooemion to preludial music for aulos, and it was subsequently passed 
down through the centuries, with Aristotle’s reference to the aulos taking on different 
translations as musical tastes shifted. In his own discussion of the prologue Cavalcanti takes part 
in this tradition, and in so doing—I suggest—echoes not only Zarlino’s assignation of distinct 
levels of affectivity to music with and without words but also his association of disposing the 
soul with pleasure. In the passage below, Cavalcanti is discussing the proemia for demonstrative 
(or epideictic) rhetoric in particular: 
Therefore I state, having said above that proemia (universally speaking) are similar to the 
prologues of poets and ricercars of musicians because all of them are a beginning, that the 
proemia in this demonstrative genus, insofar as it primarily aims to praise and blame, are 
similar to the ricercars of musicians. For just like those musicians who, playing that 
ricercar before the canzone they intend to play, connect the canzone with the ricercar [i.e., 
in a sequence], so we said that we will have something pleasing (c’haremo quello, che ci 
piacerà) before we come to our main material; we start with that.75 
 
74 “Ciceronians versus Aristotelians on the Ricercar as Exordium, from Bembo to Bach,” Journal of the 
American Musicological Society 32, no. 1 (1979): 1–44. 
 
75 “Dico adunque, che havendo di sopra (universalmente parlando) detto, che i proemij son simili a i 
prologi de i Poeti, e alle ricercate de i sonatori: percioche tutti sono un principio: i proemij in questo 
genere dimostrativo, in quanto massimamente e’ si distende a lodare, e a biasimare, sono simili alle 
ricercate de’sonatori: percioche, si come essi facendo quella ricercata, che vogliono innanzi alla canzone, 
la quale intendono di sonare, congiungono la canzone con la ricercata: cosi noi detto, c’haremo quello, 
che ci piacerà, prima, che vegniamo alla materia nostra, l’apiccheremo con quella,” Cavalcanti, La 
retorica, 403.  
 For other relevant excerpts from Cinquecento rhetorical treatises, see Kirkendale, “Ciceronians 
versus Aristotelians,” 42–44. There, Kirkendale reproduces a passage from Cavalcanti’s La retorica, 
although not this one in particular. In his article, Kirkendale is concerned to elucidate the rhetorical 
background for the generic designation “ricercar” in musical sources rather than a theory of emotional 
arousal as such (he does not discuss 2.7–9 of Zarlino’s Istitutioni, nor the notion of affective 
predisposition). The wealth of evidence he gathers there is an important corroboration of and context for 





Zarlino does not discuss any individual genre of instrumental music in Part 2, chapter 7, of the 
Istitutioni, nor does he assert that textless music should precede song in a performance setting, as 
Cavalcanti does here for the ricercar and canzone. (Zarlino’s discussion of music and the 
passions, framed as an historical inquiry into the power of ancient music, is generally abstracted 
from practical considerations.) At the same time, Cavalcanti’s characterization of the ricercar as 
pleasurable to listen to does seem to support, if indirectly, Zarlino’s claim that semplice 
harmonia disposes the soul by inviting listeners to “take pleasure through proportion.” Likewise 
Cavalcanti’s suggestion that the canzone is the more persuasive of the two musical genres, 
corresponding to the main part of a speech in rhetoric, accords with the theorist’s stance on the 
power of melodia to move the souls of listeners. 
 It is a striking feature, indeed, of Zarlino’s discussion of music and the passions that he 
associates the first stage of arousal with pleasure, even in cases even where the musician intends 
to move his listeners to tears.76 Pleasure is not an essential feature of emotional predisposition as 
such; in general accounts of the phenomenon like Giacomini and Cavalcanti’s, it certainly does 
not accompany the onset of emotions like sadness or fear.77 In a loose sense, we can understand 
Zarlino’s appending of pleasure to pathos as a consequence of his adaptation of the two-stage 
model of emotional arousal to an aesthetic context: recall that the end-goals of music for the 
theorist are the “delight and benefit” of listeners. It is, moreover, a truism of the sixteenth century 
 
76 “As is manifest: when someone hears a song that does not express anything except harmony, he only 
takes pleasure in it through the proportion that is found in the distance between the instrumental sounds or 
voices: and he is prepared and disposed in a certain way intrinsically toward happiness or sadness; he will 
not, however, be induced by it to express any extrinsic effect like laughing or crying,” Ist. harm. 2.7.84. 
For the Italian, see n. 6.  
 
77 See, e.g., Giacomini’s discussion of the “turbid and impure vapors” that accompany sadness and fear in 
“De la purgazione,” 357. Pleasure does, however, play an important role in Giacomini’s theory of tragic 
pathos (ibid., 363–65). 
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that music provides a pleasurable ornament to text.78 It also seems possible, however, that 
Zarlino’s entailment of pleasure stems more specifically from the rhetorical notion of favorable 
disposition as expounded in theories of the proemium like Cavalcanti’s, or even from social 
accounts of musical performance like Castiglione’s. In other words, we might interpret Zarlino’s 
use of the adjective disposto in the phrases soggetto disposto and soggetto ben disposto in a more 
delimited sense, as a reference to the “friendly disposition of the soul” (amica dispositione 
d’animo) characteristic of Cavalcanti’s own well-disposed listeners. 
3.5 The Afterlife of Zarlino’s Theory 
Zarlino’s musical application of the two-stage model for emotional arousal made its way into 
various conversations regarding music and the emotions over the next hundred years. Some 
writers, like the seventeenth-century Italian music theorists Cesare Crivellati and Severo Bonini, 
took up Zarlino’s theory explicitly. Although these theorists did not radically overhaul their 
source, each introduces subtle changes to Zarlino’s account that are worth noting, if only in 
passing. The former’s Discorsi musicali (1624), for example, describes Zarlino’s soggetto 
disposto using the hylomorphic language of matter and form, and in so doing reveals connections 
between the two-stage model for emotional arousal and more fundamental notions of change 
derived from Aristotelian physics. “Emotion is moved most effectively,” Crivellati writes, citing 
Zarlino, “in a disposed subject, because one should not introduce a form if the material is not 
well-disposed, as for example singing or representing something amorous to someone in love, 
 




something warlike to a soldier, something sad to an aggrieved person.”79 Taking up a point from 
Part 2, chapter 8, of the Istitutioni, Crivellati proceeds to explain how a musician can either 
arouse an emotion to which the listener is naturally inclined through the force of similarity, or 
pull the listener partway in a different direction by playing music “contrary to his disposition” 
(contrarie alla sua dispositione).80 
 Although the substance of Crivellati’s remarks differs negligibly from his source, his 
association of the listening subject with matter and emotion with form—terms absent in Zarlino’s 
account—points to a general principle lurking behind the musical, rhetorical, and physiological 
applications of the two-stage model we have examined so far in this chapter; namely, all soggetti, 
whether they be human listeners or inanimate matter, must be “well-disposed” in order to 
undergo change—or in hylomorphic terms, to receive the introduction of some new form.81 “The 
acquisition of new forms by matter,” David Cohen writes, “is what Aristotle understood as the 
essential nature of motion.”82 Without wading too far into the philosophy of hylomorphism 
(Crivellati certainly does not), we can understand how this general principle of motion extends to 
the psychic kind, a connection Aristotle himself makes in the De Anima.83 Moved by music, that 
 
79 “si moverà l’affetto, e massime in soggetto disposto, poiche non s’introduce forma, se la materia non 
sia ben disposta, come sarebbe cantare, ò rappresentar cose d’amore ad uno innamorato, cose di guerra ad 
un soldato, cose di pianto ad uno addolorato: e cosi discorrendo,” Discorsi musicali, nelli quali si 
contengono non solo cose pertinenti alla teorica, ma etiandio alla pratica… (Viterbo: Agostino Discep., 
1624), 61.  
 
80 Ibid., 61. 
 
81 For an introduction to the basic principles of Aristotelian physics within a music-theoretical context, 
see David E. Cohen, “‘The Imperfect Seeks Its Perfection’: Harmonic Progression, Directed Motion, and 
Aristotelian Physics,” Music Theory Spectrum 23, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 152–55. 
 
82 Ibid., 153. 
 
83 “But the natural philosopher and the logician will in every case offer different definitions [of emotion], 
e.g., in answer to the question what is anger. The latter will call it a craving for retaliation, or something 
of the sort; the former will describe it as a surging of the blood and heat round the heart. The one is 
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is, listeners “receive the introduction” of a passion, itself an immaterial form. The clearest 
sixteenth-century explanation for the relationship between form, matter, and disposition I have 
found, however, is within a sermon of Girolamo Savonarola’s, published in a vernacular 
translation from 1544. The “trite proposition” with which the passage begins belongs to Aquinas: 
Note the trite proposition of philosophers, who say, Quod actus activorum sunt in patiente 
bene dispositio. The acts and operations of agents are, he says, in the well-disposed 
patient. That is to say, when the agent wants to operate and introduce some form in a 
subject and in some material, which the philosophers call “patient”—because it suffers 
(patisce) this action and receives this form and perfection—it is required that this subject 
be disposed. Otherwise, the agent will not be able to operate nor introduce the form, e.g., 
when a teacher has a student and wants to introduce him the form of knowledge, but 
sometimes cannot because the material and the subject—that is, the student—is not 
disposed, because he is stupid and inept. And yet you see that little by little [the teacher] 
goes about disposing him, such that in the end the form is introduced to him. Sometimes 
you cannot introduce the form of knowledge completely, on account of the disposition of a 
student who is inept, stupid and unteachable beyond measure. And thus one could give 
many examples, that when an agent wants to introduce a form in some subject, the 
disposition of the subject is required.84 
 
 
describing the matter, the other the form or formula of the essence,” On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On 
Breath, trans. W.S. Hett (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 17 (De Anima 403a30–
403b5). 
 
84 “Nota quella propositione tano trita de philosophi, che dicono. Quod actus actiuorum sunt in patiente 
bene dispositio. Gli atti e le operationi degli agenti sono, dice, nel patiente ben disposto. Vuol dire, che 
quando l’agente vuola operare e introdurre, qualche forma in un subietto, e in qualche materia, la quale i 
philosophi domandano, patiente, per che patisce, cio e riceve in se tal forma e tal perfettione. Si ricerca 
che tal subietto sia disposto. Altrimenti, l’agente non vi potrebbe operare, ne introdurre la forma, 
verbigratia glie qua un maestro che ha un discepolo, e vorrebbe introdurre in quello la forma della 
scientia, e qualche volta non puo perche la materia e il subietto, cio e il discepolo, non e disposto, perche 
sara grosso, e inetto e pero tu vedi che apoco, apoco lo va disponendo. tanto che al fine vi introduce la 
forma. Qualche volta non vi potra introdurre la forma della sceintia, per la totale in dispositione del 
discepolo, che sara supra modum inetto, grossolano e indocibile. Et cosi si potrebbono dare di molti 
esempli, che a volere che uno agente introduca una forma in qualche subietto, si ricerca la dispositione di 
tal subietto,” Prediche del reverendo padre fra Girolamo Savonarola da Ferrara, sopra il salmo Quam 
bonus Israel Deus, predicate in Firenze, in santa Maria del Fiore in uno advento, nel 1493. dal medesimo 
poi in latina lingua raccolte. Et da fra Girolamo Giannoti da Pistoia in lingua volgare tradotte. Et da 
molti eccellentissimi huomini diligentemente reviste e emendate, e in lingua toscha impresse (Venice: 
Brandino e Ottaviano Scotto, 1544), 241v–242r. This passage is excerpted from a sermon on Psalm 73 
(Vulgate); here, Aquinas is glossing verse 3 of the Psalm. The Aquinas quotation is from Quaestiones 
disputatae de veritate 25.5.13. 
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Although Savonarola’s example of a well-disposed subject here is a nonmusical one, his 
description of the process by which a student receives the “form of knowledge” from a teacher is 
remarkably close to Zarlino’s theory of emotional arousal. Just as Zarlino’s listening subject 
must be favorably disposed toward the three components of melodia to be moved, so must 
Savonarola’s student be analogously disposed to learn (“the disposition of the subject is 
required”). Even if the student is not properly predisposed, however, the teacher can still “go 
about disposing him, such that in the end the form is introduced into him.” Savonarola, too, in 
other words, addresses both the “stable” and “temporary” kinds of disposition we have traced 
across the writings of Zarlino, Giacomini, and Cavalcanti. This passage also points up an aspect 
of the two-stage model only implicit in Zarlino, namely that the soggetti who undergo change in 
these contexts are passive participants. To take another of Savonarola’s examples of well-
disposed materia, we might say that Zarlino’s listener receives the form of an emotion as a 
diaphanous object receives light.85 While Zarlino’s two-stage model acknowledges listener 
difference via the notion of disposition, it does not give listeners an active role to play in musical 
perception and response.86 
 
85 “That which is in a better-disposed subject is more perfect than that which is in a less-disposed subject. 
And although the examples we have given could suffice, we could also take the example of light with 
respect to various diaphanous bodies. Whence the light in crystal is more perfect than the light in glass 
because it is in a better-disposed subject” (Quella che è nel subietto meglio disposto è piu perfetta, che 
quella che è nel subietto manco disposto. Et ben che noi potremmo stare ne gli esempli dati, tamen piglia 
lo esemplo della luca, per rispetto, a diversi corpi diaphani. Onde la luce che e nel cristallo e più perfetta 
che quella del vetro, perche è in subietto meglio disposto), Savonarola, Prediche, 242r. This discussion 
sets up a theological argument about being “well-disposed” to receive God’s grace. 
 
86 This fact accords generally with Renaissance understandings of sense perception, which was 
understood by many to be a passive phenomenon—more specifically, a reception by the soul of the 
immaterial species sent outward by objects. On sensible species, see Park, “The Organic Soul,” 471–72; 
and on debates regarding active versus passive sensation, ibid., 475. An exception to this passive model in 
the theory of affective disposition we have been tracing is the “consciously acquired” variety 
(Piccolomini’s disposition dell’animo, Aristotle’s hexis). 
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 The mid-seventeenth century theorist Severo Bonini, meanwhile, gives the soggetto 
disposto a pointedly social interpretation in his 1649 Discorsi e regole: 
I have said that the subject must be disposed and ready to receive the passions. And this 
can happen in several ways. The listener, or subject, will be either a person of quality or a 
humble person of little talent such as peasants, artisans, and the like. If he is a person of 
quality—that is, noble or virtuous—on hearing compassionate or joyful situations 
expressed in beautiful poetry and performed by an expert and graceful singer to the 
accompaniment of perfect and noble instruments, he cannot but be moved to that same 
joyfulness or tears, particularly when the listener is inclined towards this material or that. 
For if the material is warlike, the soldier will enjoy it; if peaceful, the religious and God-
fearing; if pitiful…it will move everyone to compassion; and if lewd, unbridled youth 
accustomed to lascivity will delight in it extremely. Therefore, it cannot be said that song 
moves all subjects absolutely, but only those inclined to this or that kind of material. 
Because if they are imbeciles and underhanded or obtuse (like lowly shopkeepers and 
peasants), they will not receive as much delight as the others. People such as these—
especially slowwitted women or other poor and simple little creatures—would do better to 
listen to blind men singing to the lira, the guitar, or the whistle.87 
 
Zarlino, too, averred that listeners of an overly lascivious character will fail to be moved by 
certain kinds of melodia, and so Bonini’s emphasis on the moral character of soggetti is not 
without a precedent in his source.88 Bonini takes the point much further than Zarlino, however, 
by suggesting that disposition flows directly from social class, separating the noble from the 
poor. These differences, in turn, demand different genres of music: solo song for the former, 
whistles for the latter. In the words of Andrew Dell’Antonio, who views this passage as 
characteristic of emergent seventeenth-century attitudes toward what he calls “proper listening” 
(recte sentire)—in short, a set of values around listening aimed at cultivating virtue through the 
spiritual contemplation of music—“the ability [for Bonini] to fully appreciate sophisticated 
 
87 Bonini’s Discorsi e regole: A Bilingual Edition, trans. MaryAnn Bonino (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young 
University Press, 1979), 124–25. Bonino herself notes the clear reliance of this passage on Zarlino’s 
Istitutioni. 
 
88 “And just as the lustful will fail to be moved by chaste discourses, so other [discourses] that are 
lascivious and dirty bore the temperate and chaste” (Et si come poco mover possono i casti ragionamenti 
il Lussurioso: cosi gli altri, che sono lascivi e sporchi annogliano il temperato e casto), Ist. harm. 2.7.84. 
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music is explicitly a mark of social class.”89 So did Zarlino’s theory prove itself adaptable to 
changing notions of taste. 
 
 The most intriguing, if indirect, instance of Zarlinian reception, however, comes to us by 
way of a poet. Consider the following stanza of Torquato Tasso, from his 1581 epic 
Gerusalemme liberata. In the present scene, the sorceress Armida, recently abandoned by her 
love-captive Rinaldo, has tracked him down on the beach with the intention of winning him 
back. Over seven stanzas, she proceeds to unleash a pathos-laden speech aimed at arousing the 
soldier’s pity. Before beginning to speak, however, Armida does some preparatory work, and 
Tasso’s narrator relates her actions using language that should by now be familiar: 
Qual musico gentil prima che chiara 
Altamente la voce al canto snodi, 
A l’armonia gli animi altrui prepara 
Con dolci ricercate in bassi modi; 
Cosí costei, che nel la doglia amara 
Già tutte non oblia l’arte e le frodi,  
Fa di sospir breve concento in prima,  
Per dispor l’alma in cui le voci imprima. 
 
[Just as a musician, who before unfurling his clear voice in a high register for song, 
prepares the souls of others for harmony with sweet ricercars in low modes, so she, who 
even in her bitter pain did not yet forget her arts and deceptions, made a brief harmony of 
sighs first to dispose the soul in which her words would impress.]90 
 
 
89 Dell’Antonio, Listening as Spiritual Practice, 82. In his chapter on recte sentire (chapter 3), 
Dell’Antonio makes reference to the concept of a “‘well-disposed’ recipient” (76), in this case a listener 
who “actively” disposes himself toward grazia by listening with an ear for the spiritual and virtuous 
content of both musical works and religious sermons. Drawing primarily on religious discourses, 
Dell’Antonio characterizes this concept as a seventeenth-century phenomenon. To my mind, the music-
theoretical, rhetorical, and physiological traditions around the well-disposed subject examined in this 
chapter provide a new context for his arguments, namely an historical precedent culled from a different 
set of sources. (Dell’Antonio does not, for example, mention Zarlino.) 
 
90 Gerusalemme liberata 16.43, ed. Angelo Solerti, vol. 3 (Florence: G Barbèra, 1895), 193. Translation 
mine; subsequent citations from the GL are transcribed from Solerti’s edition. 
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Through its direct comparison of musical and rhetorical techniques for disposing the soul, 
Tasso’s stanza pulls together the various threads we have so far traced in this chapter. The 
particular literary device here is simile (in Roman rhetorical theory, similitudo), signaled by 
“Qual” in the stanza’s first line and “cosí” in the fifth: just as a musico gentil “prepares the souls” 
of listeners with instrumental music before breaking into song, Tasso reasons, so does Armida 
“dispose” Rinaldo’s soul by directing a “harmony of sighs” at him before beginning to speak, 
unfurling a wordless exordium.91 It hardly needs mentioning that the phrases dispor l’alma and 
gli animi altrui prepara, used respectively in the simile’s two halves, are clear references to 
emotional predisposition, in particular the temporary kind. Their presence in turn calls to mind 
emotional arousal, which, although not named explicitly in this stanza, can be inferred from both 
the narrative context as well as the logic of the two-stage model itself. Where the musician’s 
ricercate (ricercars) and Armida’s breve concento di sospir (brief harmony of sighs) are 
techniques for disposing the soul, that is to say, it follows that the former’s canto (song) and the 
latter’s voci (words) are techniques for moving it. We might summarize the argument of Tasso’s 
stanza as follows: 
 
 
91 On the similitudo in rhetoric, see, e.g., Quintilian, Istitutio oratoria 5.11.22–35 and 8.3.72–82. In Book 
5, similitudo is discussed as a form of proof, whereas in Book 8 it is treated an ornament of style apt for 
putting both of its terms of comparison “before the eyes” of the listener. (“Some similes are inserted 
among Arguments for the sake of Proof, others are devised to make pictures of things,” 8.3.72; Russell, 
trans., 3:381.) Tasso’s simile in GL 16.43 arguably has both functions. Regarding proof, Armida’s 
sighing—on its face an obscure rhetorical technique—is clarified by the paradigm of musical 
performance, where the affective distinction between verbal and nonverbal sounds is more readily 
apparent. Regarding vividness, Tasso’s simile also has a clear “pictorial” thrust, setting both halves of the 
comparison before the eyes of the reader. That Tasso accords each half of his simile an equal number of 
verses only strengthens this pictorial function (see Institutio oratoria 8.3.77–80; Russell, trans., 3:383, 
3:385). I am grateful to Kathy Eden for drawing my attention to Tasso’s use of the similitudo here. On the 
relationship between Quintilian’s probative similitudo and its forebears collatio (Cicero) and parabolē 
(Aristotle), see Samuel McCormic, “Argument by Comparison: An Ancient Typology,” Rhetorica: A 





Music ricercate canto 
Rhetoric concento di sospir voci 
Table 3.1  Stimuli for moving the passions in Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata, 16.43. 
 Is Zarlino in the background here? The lessons are similar. Like Zarlino’s semplice 
harmonia, Armida’s sighs aim not to move her listener to the full expression of an emotion but 
rather to secure his receptivity and render him a temporary soggetto disposto—in Tasso’s words, 
to “dispose the soul in which her words would impress.” (Recall Zarlino: “Simple 
harmony…would have the power in a certain way to dispose the soul intrinsically to more easily 
express some emotions.”) The metaphorical modifier concento only strengthens the connection 
between poet and theorist: Tasso not only compares Armida’s sighs to music but in fact 
characterizes them as a species of musical harmony. The most important quality of these sighs, 
however, is their wordlessness, a lack Tasso brings to the fore by contrasting them to Armida’s 
voci—literally, her “words.” We can speculate whether Zarlino would consider sighs to be a 
species of voce or suono—that is, whether they stimulate the intellect or only reach the sense of 
hearing—but it is evident that they cannot persuade like an oratione does; they obviously do not 
have a moralizing component.92 
 The connection between Tasso and Zarlino extends to the arousal stage. Corresponding to 
the musician’s canto in Tasso’s simile, Armida’s ensuing speech aims for an emotional response 
akin to those the music theorist reports of listeners in the laus musicae anecdotes, namely a 
 
92 On Zarlino’s distinction between voce and suono, see above, p. 132. (Voce conveys significatione, 
while suono does not.) In 2.7 of the Istitutioni, Zarlino nevertheless writes that semplice harmonia can be 
constituted of either suoni or voci (see n. 6 for the passage), so in some respects the distinction between 
voce and suono with respect to Armida’s sighs is immaterial. 
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change in judgment accompanied by visible signs of emotion and often action. Her arousal of 
Rinaldo’s emotions, in other words, is not an end in itself but rather a means to one: winning him 
back. In the process, Armida takes the soldier through a whirlwind of passions including 
indignance, shame, pity, and more. And while her plea does not actually succeed in changing his 
mind, it does elicit those tears Zarlino and others hold up as the somatic index of psychological 
distress. Of Rinaldo’s response to Armida’s speech, Tasso writes: 
Non entra Amor a rinnovar nel seno, 
Che ragion congelò, la fiamma antica; 
V’entra pietate in quella vece almeno, 
Pur compagna d’Amor, benché pudica; 
E lui commove in guisa tal, ch’a freno 
Può ritener le lagrime a fatica, 
Pur quel tenero affetto entro restringe, 
E, quanto può, gli atti compone e infinge. 
 
[Love does not enter his breast, which reason froze, to renew the old flame; in its place 
enters pity at least, the modest companion of love, and moves him in such a way that he 
can only hold back tears with effort.93] 
 
Just as cantilena, for Zarlino, only acquires the power to produce “extrinsic effects” in listeners 
through the force of oratione, so does Armida induce her own extrinsic effect in Rinaldo with her 
words. 
 Zarlino’s chapter on music and the passions thus offers a powerful interpretive 
framework for Tasso’s stanza.94 Considered from the narrower perspective of influence, 
however, it seems more likely to me that Tasso lifted his analogy straight from the rhetorical 
tradition, as Kirkendale maintained, rather than adapting it from Zarlino.95 All the components of 
 
93 Gerusalemme liberata, 16.52. Translation mine. 
 
94 In chapter 4, I will suggest that the two-stage model is also a useful framework for music analysis. 
 
95 Kirkendale, “Ciceronians versus Aristotelians,” 7. 
157 
 
Tasso’s stanza, save for Armida’s musical sighs (surely a poetic invention), are in the manuals.96 
The number of shared terms between Tasso and Cavalcanti, to take a familiar example, is 
striking. Not only do both authors use the word ricercate for the instrumental genre but the two 
verbs Tasso uses to signal the dispositional stage of arousal also appear in Cavalcanti’s 
description of the exordium, as we have seen (Cavalcanti: “Prepararlo, et disporlo ad ascoltarci 
favorevolmente”).97 The action of the scene is also strictly speaking rhetorical rather than 
musical: music is the thing Armida’s arts are compared to rather than the subject of the scene 
itself. No matter the precise chain of influence between these texts, however, it is clear that all 
three authors—music theorist, rhetorical theorist, and poet—are in conversation with one 
another, each making his own use of the two-stage model for emotional arousal found in 
sixteenth-century discourses on the passions.98 And even if he was initially inspired by the 
rhetorical tradition rather than music-theoretical one, Tasso, in making Armida’s exordium a 
wordless musical performance rather than a mere spoken prologue, contributed something new to 
the discourse on music, language, and emotional arousal. To the list of musical stimuli capable of 
disposing but not moving the soul—semplice harmonia, harmonia propria, numero—we can add 
di sospir breve concento. 
 
 
96 See for example the passage in Cavalcanti’s treatise that compares demonstrative prologues to ricercars 
on p. 146, above. 
 
97 As further evidence for the influence of rhetoric on Tasso, the word ricercata seems to have been used 
more in rhetorical treatises than musical sources, which tended to use ricercar. See the passages in 
Kirkendale’s appendix to “Ciceronians versus Aristotelians,” 42–44. 
 
98 Although outside the musical purview of this chapter, physiological theories of the emotions like 
Giacomini’s could likewise inspire new readings of Tasso’s stanza. From Giacomini’s lessons about the 
mutual influence of body and soul, for example, we know that in disposing Rinaldo’s soul Armida must 
necessarily influence his bodily disposition (the “mother of the emotions,” in Giacomini’s words), her 
“harmony of sighs” perhaps heating his vaporous spirits and, through their mediation with the soul, 
thereby inducing in him a corresponding state of psychological receptiveness. 
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3.6 Conclusion: Artusi versus Ottuso on Tasso  
That Tasso’s stanza offers valuable evidence of late Renaissance beliefs about the relationship 
between music and the emotions was not lost on his late Renaissance readers. In a neat reversal 
of the flow of influence from theory to practice, we find, a few decades later, Tasso’s stanza 
influencing a debate between two of the period’s most storied music theorists: Giovanni Maria 
Artusi and the anonymous “L’Ottuso Accademico,” who sparred in print in the early years of the 
seventeenth century over certain madrigals by the young Claudio Monteverdi. Neither theorist 
interprets Tasso’s words in relation to the two-stage model, however, and so they will bring this 
chapter to an ambivalent conclusion. 
 The pretext for Ottuso and Artusi’s dispute, which constitutes one segment of what has 
come to be known as the “Artusi–Monteverdi Controversy,” after a famous article by Claude 
Palisca, hardly needs introduction here.99 By way of a brief introduction to the texts relevant to 
our purposes, the controversy began with Artusi’s publication, in 1600, of his dialogue treatise 
L’Artusi, overo Delle imperfettioni della moderna musica, which criticized a few then as-yet-
unpublished madrigals by Monteverdi.100 Through his fictional interlocutor Vario, Artusi took 
aim at the composer’s treatment of dissonance and mode, which either stretched or directly 
contradicted various compositional rules Artusi considered inviolable. Sometime after that 
publication—the exact dates are unknown—an anonymous academician who identified himself 
only as L’Ottuso (“the obtuse one”) addressed two letters to Artusi in defense of Monteverdi. 
Artusi then rebutted Ottuso’s letters in his next publication, the Seconda parte dell’Artusi, overo 
 
99 Claude Palisca, “The Artusi–Monteverdi Controversy,” repr. in Studies in the History of Italian Music 
and Music Theory, 54–87. On this dispute, see also Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 1–25; Suzanne G. Cusick, 
“Gendering Modern Music: Thoughts on the Monteverdi–Artusi Controversy,” Journal of the American 
Musicological Society 46, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 1–25; and Jenkins, “Metaphysics and History,” 281–426. 
 
100 (Venice: Vicenti, 1600). 
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Delle imperfettioni della moderna musica of 1603, quoting from the first letter and printing the 
second in full.101 It is through the Seconda parte dell’Artusi that we have access (if only partial) 
to those letters. 
 Although the exchange between Artusi and Ottuso centered on multiple points of 
disagreement, most of which lie beyond the scope of this chapter, an important one concerned 
whether and to what degree music should move the emotions. Both theorists agreed that the 
answer to this question had important implications for a fair evaluation of Monteverdi’s music. 
Taking the affirmative stance, Ottuso defends Monteverdi on the grounds that new varieties of 
musical harmony (concento), such as those that arise from the composer’s unusual treatment of 
dissonances, yield new affetti in listeners, and that therefore novelty is a desirable trait in any 
composition. But what does Ottuso mean by affetti in this context? The academician himself 
addresses this question directly. Conceding that affetto has multiple meanings—he cites 
instances of the word in Guarini, Petrarch, and Dante, all of whom use it differently—Ottuso 
defines affetto as desire, in particular that “desire caused by the novelty of [a piece of music’s] 
melody, to hear again a similar sort of harmony.”102 The anonymous theorist offers a medium-
specific definition of emotion, in other words, one centered on the pleasure listeners take in 
harmonic novelty. To experience affetto as a listener, for Ottuso, is to respond to some novel 
 
101 (Venice: Vicenti, 1603). 
 
102 “desiderio con la novità della sua modulatione d’udir bene spesso simil sorte di concento,” ibid., 17. 
On the relation between emotion and desire in Ottuso, see Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 47: “The novelty of 
sound [for Ottuso] produced in the new music will cause an ‘affetto, that is to say a desire’ to hear such 
new concenti, which will then be likely to move the soul. The ear is seduced, and the intellect, in Ottuso’s 
view, is a willing accomplice. Desire, which in Artusi’s aesthetic leads at best a marginal existence as the 
byproduct of a satisfied reason, is emancipated by Ottuso as an independent agent capable of operating in 
the pursuit of sensual pleasure, the very antithesis of reason.” 
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musical sound with desire for more of it—a definition, needless to say, that clearly supports his 
case for Monteverdi. 
 Nevertheless, immediately upon offering a somewhat unusual definition of affetto—one 
that differs from the way Zarlino characterizes the word passione in the Istitutioni, or Giacomini 
affetto in his lecture—Ottuso calls up three sources to corroborate his general stance that the 
arousal of affetti is one of music’s proper functions, no matter (it seems) how affetto is defined. 
Ottuso’s first source is Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, from which the academician 
quotes a few lines to demonstrate that music moves the body and soul in virtue of its own 
property of motion; the second is Pseudo-Aristotle’s Problems, section 19, which is devoted to 
music; and the third is stanza 16.43 of the Gerusalemme liberata: “And because [Artusi] desires 
authentic approbation, let him be appeased with the authority of the great philosopher [i.e., 
Ficino], to whom one could add the authority of Aristotle in his Problems, section 19; and that of 
our modern Tuscan Virgil in his Gerusalemme, canto sixteen, in the stanza that begins ‘Qual 
Musico Gentil.’”103  
 Ottuso’s analysis of Tasso begins and ends here, making it difficult to know how to 
interpret this citation. At the least, that he names the poem at all seems noteworthy; for Ottuso, 
that is, canto sixteen, stanza 43, of the Gerusalemme liberata is a living document testifying to 
music’s power over the emotions, one he justifies placing alongside two ancient authorities by 
calling Tasso the “modern Tuscan Virgil,” a common moniker for the poet during this period. 
Just as this chapter has mined Tasso’s stanza for evidence of the influence of music theory, in 
 
103 “Et ecco in uno concluso tutti gli moti, e le passioni si dell’animo, come del corpo; e perche ella ne 
desidera autentica approbatione, acquetasi con l’autiorità di cosi gran Filosofo, alla quale si può 
aggiungere quella d’Aristotele ne suoi problemi nella settione 19. e quella del nostro Moderno Virgilio 
Toscano nella sua Gierusalem al Canto 16. nella stanza, che incomincia. Qual Musico Gentil,” Seconda 
parte dell’Artusi, 18. 
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other words, so does Ottuso take the Tuscan Virgil’s lessons and spit them back into his own 
discourse. At the same time, the anonymous theorist does not seem aware of the two-stage model 
that Tasso’s poem (I have argued) invokes. Cited alongside Ficino and Aristotle, “Qual musico 
gentil” serves Ottuso as a commonplace attestation of music’s power over the emotions.104 
 In his rebuttal to the academician, Artusi turns each of Ottuso’s arguments on its head. 
Artusi does not see “moving the emotions,” no matter how affetto is defined, as a worthy goal for 
modern music. Instead, he holds that music should “please” (lusingare) listeners with smooth 
and sweet harmonies, an attitude for which the theorist finds seeming confirmation in the very 
same stanza of Tasso’s.105 Addressing Ottuso’s Ficino citation, first, before turning to Tasso, 
Artusi offers a diametrically opposed reading of the latter: 
[Ficino] does not say that [music] operates and renders effects, nor that it moves the souls 
of others to various emotions (passioni); but rather that it pleases (lusinga). This is 
confirmed by him whom [Ottuso] calls the “Tuscan Virgil” when in canto sixteen of the 
Gerusalemme he sang ardently: 
 
 
104 Cf. Cusick, who suggests that Ottuso is making a subtler point, linking the message of Tasso’s stanza 
to his own definition of affetto as desire: “To support his claim that music has good effects on the soul 
well prepared to receive it (again rendering the listener passive, and thus feminine) Ottuso refers to a 
stanza from Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata in which the evil maga Armida enthralls Rinaldo, partly by 
her singing. Indeed, the passage cited likens a ‘low ricercare’s’ preparation of the soul for music’s effects 
to Armida’s sighs as she prepares the laments by which she hopes to rap once again the liberated Rinaldo. 
Thus, even Ottuso manages to associate modern music with the changing, desire-inducing effects of 
contemporary literature’s most notorious and deceitful seductress. In doing so, he places modern music’s 
listeners alongside the adolescent Rinaldo, widely understood to have been seduced by deceit, luxury, 
sensuality, and his own narcissism—an incomplete man in the control of the object of his desire” 
(“Gendering Modern Music,” 12–13). Beyond the question of the gendered rhetoric behind Ottuso’s 
notion of affetto-as-desire, this interpretation seems hard to square with the citations of Ficino and the 
pseudo-Aristotelian Problems that directly precede it. I am likewise unsure of the textual basis for 
Ottuso’s (in Cusick’s words) “claim that music has good effects on the soul well prepared to receive it.” 
The soggetto disposto is adopted by Artusi (see my n. 107), but not to my knowledge by Ottuso. 
 
105 As Ossi argues (Divining the Oracle, 48–49), Artusi’s principle of pleasure serves his case for 
preserving the prima prattica norms of musical style: “For Artusi, the purpose of the musician was 
‘giovare e dilettare,’ but evidently not ‘movere’ and certainly not through novelty and the ‘meraviglia’ 
produced by the ‘inganni giudiciosi’of the seconda prattica….New compositions [for Artusi]….are ‘cose 
impertinenti’ that ‘offendono [l’udito] più tosto che lo dilettano’” (49). 
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Qual musico gentil prima che chiara 
Altamente la voce al canto snodi,  
All’armonia gli animi altrui prepara  
Con dolci ricercate in bassi modi;  
cosi costei; 
 
From these words one takes away two things. The first is that music should be sweet and 
not harsh, as I said above in regards to the seventh and other harsh harmonies used by 
these proponents of the seconda prattica. The second is that it pleases and prepares the 
listener. But it does not through this [action] render those effects that Ottuso is persuaded 
to understand it does.106 
 
In short, where Ottuso finds evidence in Tasso’s poem for the second stage of emotional arousal, 
Artusi finds evidence for the first. In so doing, the Bolognese theorist proves himself, at least in 
this instance, to be the better reader, for nowhere in these lines does Tasso actually refer to 
music’s capacity move the affetti; as we have seen, the second stage of arousal must be inferred 
from context. But Artusi does not make that inference. Where Tasso associates the soul’s 
“preparation” narrowly with wordless stimuli—the musician’s ricercars and Armida’s harmony 
of sighs—Artusi claims preparation and pleasure for music as a whole. 
 Both theorists, it seems, miss the point, which is that Tasso’s stanza draws on a two-stage 
model for emotional arousal. What should we make of their readings—or misreadings—of 
Tasso? For one, they suggest that the distinction between disposing and moving the soul through 
music was not a universal one among Italian music theorists. Artusi clearly does not feel the need 
to push back against this model; he does not even seem aware of it.107 (Of course, his 
 
106 “Non dice che operi, e facci effetti, ne mova gl’animi altrui à diverse passioni, ma che lusinga, la qual 
cosa confirmo il suo da lui detto Virgilio Toscano quando nel Canto 16 della sua Gerusalemme 
arditamente cantò. [The above quotation from Tasso follows.] Dalle quali parole si cavano due cose, la 
prima che la Musica vuole esser dolce, e non aspra, come poco fa ho detto in proposito della settima, e 
altre asprezze usate da questi fautori di questa seconda Pratica. La seconda, che lusinga, e prepara 
l’uditore, ma non per questo fa quelli effetti, che si persuade di darsi ad intendere l’Ottuso,” Artusi, 
Seconda parte, 40–41. 
 
107 Elsewhere in his writings, Artusi does take up the notion from Zarlino that listeners must be soggetti 
disposti for music to work its proper effects. See Jenkins, “Metaphysics and History,” 267. 
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interpretation of Tasso could be a willful one.) At the same time, both theorists looked to Tasso, 
as this chapter has, for evidence of the relationship between music and emotional arousal. Artusi, 
at least, attends carefully to the poet’s language, resting his case on the verb preparare. If 
nothing else, their divergent interpretations of Tasso, differing both from each other and from the 
conclusions drawn in this chapter, suggest that there is still more to learn about the two-stage 
model in sixteenth-century musical discourse. And within that discourse, if we construe it 
broadly, one composer’s polyphonic setting of the stanza over which Artusi and Ottuso tussled 
invites consideration of this model’s relationship to musical practice. 
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Chapter 4: Emotion, Pleasure, and Persuasion in Giaches de Wert’s 
“Armida” Cycle (1586) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Poi che lasciàr gli avviluppati calli, When they had left the self-enveloped ways 
In lieto aspetto il bel giardin s’aperse: the garden opened in glad countenance 
Acque stagnanti, mobili cristalli, with quiet pools and crystal-flowing streams, 
Fior vari e varie piante, erbe diverse, various shrubs and flowers, various plants, 
Apriche collinette, ombrose valli, soft open hills and valleys cool with shade, 
Selve e spelonche in una vista offerse; grottoes and forests, all in a single glance, 
E quel che ’l bello e ’l caro accresce a l’opre, and what made all of it more rare and dear: 
L’arte, che tutto fa, nulla si scopre. the art that fashioned it did not appear.1 
 
This ottava rima stanza from canto sixteen of Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata describes the first 
encounter of Charles and Ubaldo, two Christian soldiers, with the Muslim sorceress Armida’s 
garden. The men are on a mission. Their comrade Rinaldo, the most heroic of all Christian 
knights, has been seduced by the evil maga and taken far from the battlefields of Jerusalem to a 
secluded island somewhere in the Atlantic. There, she distracts him amorously, a ploy to prevent 
him, according to the narrative logic of the Romance epic tradition, from fulfilling his duty to 
country and kin. To reverse this catastrophe, Charles and Ubaldo have been sent to find and 
rescue their brother-in-arms. They have sailed, with the help of their guide Fortune, to Armida’s 
hidden island, and they have ascended from its rocky shores to the garden at its mountainous 
peak. Now they face a final test: rejecting the sensory and sensual delights that await within the 
garden’s gates. These temptations include nymphs who please the eyes, bounteous feasts that 
entice the gut, and gentle breezes that caress the skin.  
 
1 Italian text: Gerusalemme liberata 16.9, ed. Angelo Solerti, (Florence: G Barbèra, 1895), 3:179. 
Translation: Jerusalem Delivered, trans. and ed. Anthony M. Esolen (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000), 301. All subsequent transcriptions and translations from the Gerusalemme are 
taken (respectively) from these two editions. 
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Like all stanzas in ottava rima, this one follows a rhyme scheme, abababcc, whose built-
in repetitions stoke the reader’s anticipation for the final two verses, which introduce “the neat 
summation, the acute observation, or the epigrammatic twist.”2 Here, the twist is that Armida’s 
garden appears to be a product of nature rather than art. With its temperate streams and grottoes 
improbably situated atop a snowy peak, the enchanted enclosure is no question the work of 
witchery, a fact known to both the poem’s readers and its fictional characters. It is thus 
paradoxical that the reverse seems true. Using terms that ferry us back to themes from chapter 2, 
Tasso elaborates on this point in the next stanza: 
Stimi (sí misto il culto è co ’l negletto) So mingled was the art with carelessness 
Sol naturali e gli ornamenti e i siti. you’d think that Nature had arrayed the site. 
Di natura arte par, che per diletto It seemed an art of Nature’s playfulness 
L’imitatrice sua scherzando imiti. to mimic her own mimic for delight. 
L’aura, non ch’altro, è de la maga effetto, Among her other spells the sorceress 
L’aura che rende gli alberi fioriti: made the air mild, to keep the trees just right, 
Co’ fiori eterni eterno il frutto dura, eternal fruit beside eternal bloom. 
E mentre spunta l’un, l’altro matura. Pick one, another ripens in its room.3 
 
Verses 3–4 playfully trope the “art imitates nature” motto by turning it on its head. Armida’s 
garden is so convincing, so effortless, that it seems as though nature, in an inversion of the usual 
relationship, is now imitating art “for fun” (per diletto).4 The garden offers up a simulacrum of 
beauty so improbable, in other words, that one would think it could only be human-made—which 
it is—and yet by all appearances it has grown this way, unlikely grottoes and all, without human 
 
2 A. Preminger, et al., “Ottava Rima,” in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Roland 
Green, Stephen Cushman, and Clare Cavanagh, 4th ed (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/prpoetry/ottava_rima. 
 
3 Esolen, trans., 302 (16.10).  
 
4 As Esolen writes in his editorial note on this stanza (ibid., 474), “Art is supposed to imitate Nature, as 
Aristotle said, not supplant it; nor is Nature supposed to imitate Art. The operative word is ‘seemed.’” 
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intervention (“with neglect”—co ‘l negletto). Befitting Armida’s profession, it is no less than a 
feat of magic. 
This game of art, nature, and illusion is couched in language native not to magical 
discourse, however, but rather to the rhetorical tradition. The lesson that orators must conceal the 
mechanisms behind their persuasive power is found in oratory treatises from Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
onward. The most effective art, the rhetoricians teach, is that which conceals itself (ars est celare 
artem—“art is the concealing of art”).5 Over time, this advice entered other domains of criticism. 
The “art imitates nature” motto discussed in chapter 2 is itself close kin. In writings on the visual 
arts from the fourteenth century onward, for example, those portraits that so closely 
approximated their subjects that they “lacked only speech or movement” often earned the highest 
praise.6 In his Libro del cortegiano, from 1528, Baldassare Castiglione proposed that the 
 
5 “Authors should compose without being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially but naturally,” 
On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, 198 (3.2.4). George Kennedy, Aristotle’s translator, notes (p. 
198) that this sentence is “perhaps the earliest statement in criticism that the greatest art is to disguise art.” 
The idea is often characterized with the Latin motto ars est celare artem (art is the concealing of art) or 
the phrase negligentia diligens (negligent diligence), the latter seemingly echoed by Tasso’s use of the 
word negletto at 16.10. While ars est celare artem is of uncertain origin, negligentia diligens derives from 
Cicero’s Orator (78), in particular a passage where the author draws an analogy between the plain style of 
speech and a woman’s appearance: “For [in the plain style] the short and concise clauses must not be 
handled carelessly, but there is such a thing even as a careful negligence (sed quaedam etiam neglegentia 
est diligens). Just as some women are said to be handsomer when unadorned—this very lack of ornament 
becomes them—so this plan style gives pleasure even when unembellished: there is something in both 
cases which lends greater charm, but without showing itself.” Brutus. Orator, trans. G. L. Hendrickson, 
H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939), 363.  
 Picking up Cicero’s sexism, Tasso himself invokes the topos of negligent diligence with respect 
to a woman’s appearance at GL 2.14, writing of the virgin Sofronia (Esolen, trans., 39): “If chance or art 
has touched her lovely face,/ if she neglects or adorns herself, who knows—/ of nature, of Love, and of all 
the heavens impart,/ her artlessness is but the noblest art” (Non sai ben dir s’adorna, o se negletta,/ Se 
caso od arte il bel volto compose;/ Di natura, d’Amor, de’ cieli amici/ Le negligenze sue sono artifici). 
Tasso’s phrase “Se caso od arte” is in fact directly repeated (as “Sia caso od arte”) at 16.12, the “Vezzosi 
augelli” stanza (discussed below), but now in reference to a garden’s appearance rather than a woman’s.  
 
6 See, e.g., the quotations from Filippo Villani (late fourteenth century) and Guarino of Verona (1430) in 
Michael Baxandall, Giotto and the Orators: Humanist Observers of Painting in Italy and the Discovery of 
Pictorial Composition, 1350-1450 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 70 and 91, respectively. On imitatio 
naturae more generally, see idem, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy, 119. Tasso himself 
invokes this art-critical trope at 16.2, as Charles and Ubaldo first gaze upon the gates of Armida’s garden 
167 
 
principle equally holds true of a gentleman’s behavior at court. Rather than draw attention to his 
own status-jockeying, Castiglione’s ideal courtier dissimulates at every turn, cloaking his 
Machiavellian cunning with feigned carelessness, or sprezzatura, the author’s famous neologism 
for this behavior.7 In the present episode from the Gerusalemme, Tasso in turn extends the 
“artless art” to horticulture: as a symbol of its creator, Armida’s garden is itself a deceptive force 
of rhetorical persuasion.8 By beguiling the Christian knights with a perfect yet “carelessly 
arrayed” image of nature, the garden not only distracts Charles and Ubaldo (if temporarily) from 
completing their task but also renders the men favorably disposed toward the woman who is, at 
least for now, their enemy—and a consummate orator herself.9 
In what follows, I will argue that Giaches de Wert responded to this discourse in kind. 
Over a cycle of three madrigals in his Ottavo libro de madrigali a cinque voci of 1586, the 
composer set seven stanzas from the Armida episode in canto sixteen of Gerusalemme liberata: 
 
(Esolen, trans., 300): “The knights cast/ a steady gaze on the lifelike figures there,/ for the material was 
far surpassed/ by art: speech was the only thing they lacked,/ nor even speech, if eyes could judge of fact” 
(Le porte qui d’effigïato argento/ Su i cardini stridean di lucid’ oro./ Fermâr ne le figure il guardo 
intento;/ Ché vinta la materia è dal lavoro:/ Manca il parlar; di vivo altro non chiedi:/ Né manca questo 
ancor, s’a gli occhi credi). 
 
7 On Castiglione’s concept of sprezzatura, see among others Harry Berger, Jr., The Absence of Grace: 
Sprezzatura and Suspicion in Two Renaissance Courtesy Books (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), Part One. Berger’s book is excerpted in Javitch, ed., The Book of the Courtier, 295–307. 
 
8 Mario Praz suggests, not entirely convincingly, that the trope of negligentia diligens at GL 16.9–10 is an 
adaptation from Longinus’ On the Sublime, in particular his discussion of the rhetorical figure 
hyperbaton, which Tasso also addresses in some of his theoretical writings. See Praz, “Armida’s Garden,” 
Comparative Literature Studies 5, no. 1 (March 1968): 13. 
 
9 Distinguishing herself from her literary precedents (Alcida in Ariosto’s Orlando furioso, e.g.), Tasso’s 
Armida eventually converts to Christianity and weds Rinaldo. For Tasso’s unique take on the trope of the 
dangerous pagan woman in the Italian Romance epic tradition, see Jo Ann Cavallo, “Tasso’s Armida and 
the Victory of Romance,” in Renaissance Transactions: Ariosto and Tasso, ed. Valeria Finucci (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1999), 77–114; Melinda Gough, “Tasso’s Enchantress, Tasso’s Captive Woman,” 
Renaissance Quarterly 54, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 523–552; and Cavallo, Boiardo, Ariosto, and Tasso: 
From Public Duty to Private Pleasure (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), chapter 15. 
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the pastoral “Vezzosi augelli” (16.12), which describes the delightful sounds of birds and breezes 
in Armida’s garden; the musico-rhetorical “Qual musico gentil” (16.43–47), which relates 
Armida’s passionate appeal to Rinaldo shortly after he has escaped with his rescuers; and the 
compact “Forsennata gridava” (16.40), which records the sorceress’s initial shock upon realizing 
that Rinaldo has fled. (This third madrigal occurs earlier in Tasso’s poem than “Qual musico 
gentil’s” stanzas but is placed after that madrigal in Wert’s book, a point discussed below.) In its 
own way, each madrigal engages with the themes of art, persuasion, and concealment that Tasso 
introduces in the stanzas discussed above; together, they comprise a veritable treatise on these 
subjects. And while each of these madrigals has received commentary over the years, they have 
never been considered closely as a group—an interpretive move that, I hope to show, sheds new 
light on them both individually and as a set.10 
In the first place, Wert’s chosen stanzas from Tasso coalesce around a related set of 
themes and motifs.11 The texts of “Vezzosi augelli” and “Qual musico gentil,” for example, 
 
10 Their status as a trio is not in question in the secondary literature, however. The first scholar to suggest 
pairing them was Carol MacClintock, who writes, “Seven stanzas from Canto XVI of the Gerusalemme 
liberata (12, 40, 43–47) form a sequence that should be considered as a single dramatic action, though 
they do not appear in correct order in Wert’s volume. It is evident that Vezzosi augelli sets the scene, 
describing Armida’s enchanted forest; the second, the high point of the cycle, is Armida’s outcry 
(Forsennata gridava) upon finding that Rinaldo has fled, has abandoned her; and the five verses 
beginning Qual musico gentil is her lament”; Giaches de Wert (1535–1596): Life and Works ([Rome]: 
American Institute of Musicology, 1966), 111. Below, I will take issue with MacClintock’s claim that 
Tasso’s stanzas appear in an incorrect order in Wert’s Ottavo libro. 
 
11 Given that Wert worked at the pleasure of a patron (Guglielmo Gonzaga, the Duke of Mantua), we 
cannot be certain for any given madrigal that the composer himself chose the texts rather than his 
employer. Tantalizing in this regard is the letter Prince Vincenzo Gonzaga wrote to Wert in 1584 
requesting a copy of “Qual musico gentil”: “My dearest musico, you would do me the greatest favor if 
you could send me immediately a copy of the music you composed for the stanzas of Tasso that begin 
‘Qual musico gentil ch’al canto snodi,’ and I would like whatever other new madrigals of yours that you 
have, so that you send me lots of music” (quoted in Stras, Women and Music in Sixteenth-Century 
Ferrara, 259). Such a comment could suggest that a patron was responsible for the choice of poetry. In 
the absence of any conclusive evidence, however, I will write throughout this chapter of Wert’s poetic 
“choices.” At the least, the composer offers a personal interpretation of his texts, even if they were chosen 
by somebody else. 
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although separated in Tasso’s poem by 33 stanzas, both make more-or-less explicit reference to 
the technique of feigning artlessness so central to Tasso’s characterization of Armida and her 
garden. These same stanzas, moreover, both feature prominent musical metaphors, raising the 
question of whether and how music can participate in the rhetorical tradition of ars celare artem. 
As we saw in chapter 3, the first stanza of “Qual musico gentil” (16.43) is a rich discourse on the 
relationship between musical stimuli (song, instrumental ricercars) and emotional arousal, while 
“Vezzosi augelli,” a kind of prelude to the longer madrigal, compares nonhuman sounds in 
Armida’s garden (birdsong, the rustling of leaves) to a musical dialogue. Given both their 
nonlinguistic status and their ties to music, these natural sounds—I will argue—are kin to 
Armida’s preludial sighs in “Qual musico gentil.” (I will likewise suggest that the two-stage 
model for arousal is a useful interpretive frame for understanding their intended effects.) Wert’s 
selections for the remaining stanzas of “Qual musico gentil” (16.44–47) and for “Forsennata 
gridava” (16.40), meanwhile, show him concerned with representing human speech; all are direct 
quotations from the sorceress. With the whole set in view, Wert’s choice of stanzas from Tasso 
demonstrates his interest in the rhetorical potential of sound—its beauty, its deceptiveness, its 
capacity to move the soul. More precisely, it is the contrast between nonverbal sounds 
(instrumental music, sighs, natural murmurings, avian warbles) and speech that seems to have 
drawn the composer’s attention, and in turn the heightened persuasiveness of both when they 
approach—whether by metaphor, analogy, or some other literary device—the condition of 
music. 
If Wert’s stanzas are themselves a hall of mirrors on the themes of representation, 
emotion, sound, and music, the mirrors multiply when they are set to counterpoint. As countless 
prior commentators on these madrigals have noted, Wert takes strikingly different approaches to 
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setting the stanzas in third-person narration (“Vezzosi augelli” and the first stanza of “Qual 
musico gentil”) and those in first-person speech (the rest of the cycle, with the exception of the 
first two words of “Forsennata gridava”). For the former stanzas, word-painting and various 
other kinds of “madrigalistic” representational devices abound, often cast in imitative, 
melismatic polyphony. For the latter stanzas, Wert stylizes the sound of passionate speech by 
exchanging word-painting and melismas for rhythmically varied and declamatory homophony.12 
Even if the overall intention of the composer is clear—to distinguish modes of speech 
musically—the wager of this chapter is that the analysis need not stop there, as it usually has. 
Rather, the theories of imitation, representation, and emotional arousal we have surveyed in 
chapters 2 and 3 provide a new way of understanding Wert’s musical choices, in particular his 
tendency toward stylistic bifurcation (homophony versus polyphony, verisimilar speech-sounds 
versus madrigalian techniques of representation). More than that, I will suggest that the stanzas 
from canto sixteen that Wert did not set provide a new window into some of Wert’s decisions. 
The particular perspective that theorists like Zarlino, Giacomini, Piccolomini, and 
Buonamici offer is that of listener or audience response, of engaging with madrigals as heard 
phenomena rather than notated texts. The psychology of imitation from chapter 2, for example, 
suggests a new way of interpreting Wert’s madrigalism-heavy approach to Tasso’s narrative 
stanzas as a stimulus for eliciting cognitive pleasure—an effect, I will argue, not dissimilar from 
the one Armida aims to draw from the Christian soldiers. The two-stage model for emotional 
arousal, meanwhile, offers an explanation for the composer’s tendency toward stylistic contrasts, 
especially in the cycle’s centerpiece, “Qual musico gentil.” Viewed through the lens of Zarlino’s 
 
12 This line of interpretation was first forwarded by Alfred Einstein in The Italian Madrigal, 2:570–71. Its 




distinction between “disposing” and “moving” the soul, this madrigal’s striking shift from 
polyphony to homophony at its second stanza functions not just as a musical articulation of 
shifting modes of speech (third person to first) but also as a shift in intended listener effect or 
rhetorical design.  
 
4.2 Giaches de Wert’s Ottavo libro and a Madrigal Cycle 
To justify analyzing “Vezzosi augelli,” “Qual musico gentil,” and “Forsennata gridava” as a trio 
or cycle, one must first consider their placement within the composer’s Ottavo libro, which 
shows some signs of ordering along thematic lines.13 This madrigal book is famous for its high 
number of settings from Tasso’s epic poem, which had only been published five years prior. Of 
fifteen madrigals total in the publication, six are dedicated to Tasso, and three of the Tasso 
settings have more than one parte.14 In terms of sheer quantity of measures, then, the Tasso 
settings dominate the book, and their importance as a group is further supported by their 
grouping at its center. In a publication with no clear organizational scheme beyond a general 
grouping by system—the first five madrigals use cantus mollis (b-flat in the signature), the rest 
 
13 Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro di madrigali a cinque voci (Venice: Gardano, 1586). Print ordering is a 
complex topic in madrigal scholarship, and any given publication’s contents may reflect various possible 
schemes ranging from what we could call “poetic-authorial” to simply practical: ordering according to the 
modes, ordering according to a progression of themes in the poetic texts, ordering by tonal type (system, 
cleffing, and final), ordering by number of voices or performing forces, ordering by poetic genre 
(madrigals versus sonnets, e.g.). For an overview of some of the possibilities with respect to a Marenzio 
publication, see Richard Freedman, “Marenzio’s Madrigali a quattro, cinque et sei voci of 1588: A 
Newly-Revealed Madrigal Cycle and its Intellectual Context,” The Journal of Musicology 13, no. 3 
(Summer 1995): 322–23. For a concise account of ordering by mode, see Jessie Ann Owens, “Mode in 
the Madrigals of Cipriano de Rore,” in Essays on Italian Music in the Cinquecento, ed. Richard Charteris 
(Sydney: Frederick May Foundation for Italian Studies, 1990), 1–15. On print ordering as a kind of poetic 
authorship, see Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 58–110. 
 
14 The word parte refers to a complete section (marked by a double bar line) of a multipart madrigal. In 
“Qual musico gentil,” each parte lasts for one stanza of the text. 
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(with the exception of “Non è sì denso velo”) use cantus durus (no flats or sharps in the 
signature)—the central placement of the Tasso settings leaps out.15 The table below lists the 
contents of Wert’s Ottavo libro along with each madrigal’s tonal type:16 
Incipit and Poetic Source System Cleffing Final 
1. Io non son però morto 
Anon. 
b C1, C1, C3, C4, F4 g 
2. Rallegrati mio cor 
Anon. 
b C1, C1, C3, C4, F4 g 
3. Sì com'ai freschi mattutini rai 
Anon. 
b C1, C1, C1, C3, F4 g 
4. Vezzosi augelli 
Tasso, GL 16.12 
b C1, C1, C3, C4, F4 f 
5. Fra le dorate chiome 
Anon. 
b C1, C1, C3, C4, F4 f 
6. Usciva omai dal molle e fresco grembo 
Tasso, GL 14.1 
– G2, G2, C2, C3, F3 c 
7. Sovente allor (prima parte) 
Tasso, GL 7.19 
– G2, G2, C2, C3, F3 d 
8. Poscia dicea piangendo (seconda parte) 
Tasso, GL 7.20 
– G2, G2, C2, C3, F3 a 
9. Misera non credea (prima parte) 
Tasso, GL 19.106 
– G2, G2, C2, C3, F3 a 
10. Ma che? Squallido e scuro (seconda parte) 
Tasso, GL 19.107 
– G2, G2, C2, C3, F3 d 
11. Non è sì denso velo 
Anon. 
b G2, G2, G2, C3, F3 f 
12. Qual musico gentil (prima parte) 
Tasso, GL 16.43 
– C1, C2, C3, C4, F4 a 
 
15 The position of the Tasso settings in Wert’s Ottavo libro might reflect the tendency among Venetian 
printers to place lighter madrigals at the start and close of publications otherwise devoted to sonnets, 
which were considered a more serious genre. (Here, of course, ottava rima stanzas are at the center, not 
sonnets.) See Feldman, City Culture and the Madrigal at Venice, 266, n. 12, who makes this observation 
with regard to Cipriano de Rore’s Madrigali a cinque voci (1542). Needless to say, Wert’s Ottavo libro is 
not modally ordered. 
 
16 For the foundational article on tonal types—roughly defined, a set of choices regarding the organization 
of tonal materials a composer must make at the start of the compositional process—see Harold S. Powers, 
“Tonal Types and Modal Categories in Renaissance Polyphony,” Journal of the American Musicological 




13. Poi cominciò: Non aspettar (seconda 
parte) 
Tasso, GL 16.44 
– C1, C2, C3, C4, F4 a 
14. Se m'odii (terza parte) 
Tasso, GL 16.45 
– C1, C2, C3, C4, F4 e 
15. Aggiungi a quest'ancor (quarta parte) 
Tasso, GL 16.46 
– C1, C2, C3, C4, F4 a 
16. Sia questa pur (quinta parte) 
Tasso, GL 16.47 
– C1, C2, C3, C4, F4 e 
17. Forsennata gridava 
Tasso, GL 16.40 
– C1, C2, C3, C4, F4 e 
18. Non sospirar, pastor 
Anon. 
– C1, C1, C3, C4, F4 d 
19. Questi odorati fiori 
Anon. 
– C1, C1, C3, C4, F4 d 
20. Vener, chi'un giorno avea 
Anon. 
– C1, C1, C1, C4, F4 d 
21. Con voi giocando Amor 
Anon. 
– C1, C1, C3, C4, F4 d 
Table 4.1  Contents of Giaches de Wert’s Ottavo libro de madrigali a cinque voci, with tonal 
types and color-coded cleffing. 
 
In addition to the three Armida madrigals under discussion, the Tasso cluster at the center 
of the book (Nos. 6–17, except for No. 11) includes “Usciva omai dal molle e fresco grembo,” a 
nature scene from canto fourteen, and two madrigals focused on the Erminia/Tancredi plotline, 
“Sovente allor che su gl’estivi ardori” (Nos. 7–8, GL 7.19–20) and “Misera! non credea ch’a 
gl’occhi miei” (Nos. 9–10, GL 19.106–7).17 Adjacent in the book and sharing multiple structural 
features—high cleffing, the cantus durus system, a two-parte structure—the Erminia madrigals 
clearly form a pair. The three Armida madrigals, on the other hand, are less self-evidently 
grouped as a trio. While “Qual musico gentil” (Nos. 12–16) directly precedes “Forsennata 
gridava” (No. 17), suggesting a close association between them in the mind of the composer, 
 
17 For a synoptic overview of the contents of Wert’s Ottavo libro with an eye to the book’s dedicatees, the 
Duke and Duchess of Ferrara, see Stras, Women and Music in Sixteenth-Century Ferrara, 260–61. As 




“Vezzosi augelli” (No. 4) is placed eight pieces earlier. Cleffing and system further distinguish 
“Vezzosi augelli” from the other two: “Vezzosi” uses two sopranos (as indicated by its two C1 
clefs) and the cantus mollis system, while “Qual musico gentil” and “Forsennata gridava” feature 
one soprano (i.e., one C1 clef) and the cantus durus system.  
These musical differences can be justified easily enough by differences in the madrigals’ 
source texts, however. Regarding system and final, the garden setting of “Vezzosi augelli” likely 
explains Wert’s use of cantus mollis with F final, whose combination suggests a transposed 
Ionian mode; Einstein calls this arrangement the composer’s “pastoral mood, his F major.”18 The 
heightened emotional charge of the latter two madrigals, meanwhile, is an obvious match for the 
natural system with E finals Wert uses for both—a clear representation of the Phrygian, the mode 
most often reserved for pathetic texts among Wert and his contemporaries.19 Regarding the 
differences in cleffing between these madrigals, an argument recently made by Laurie Stras 
about the Ferrarese performance practices that informed aspects of Wert’s Ottavo libro provides 
one plausible explanation. Arguing that Wert’s use of a single C1 clef for both “Qual musico 
gentil” and “Forsennata gridava”—the only pieces with this cleffing in the whole book—
suggests a performance practice distinct from the polyphonic arrangements in Wert’s 
publication, Stras argues that these two madrigals in particular might have been composed with 
accompanied solo performance in mind rather than five voices a cappella, as the print suggests.20 
 
18 Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 2:574. Wert’s madrigal, overflowing with what we could 
anachronistically call dominant prolongations, is indeed strikingly tonal in sound. 
 
19 On the affective character of the Phrygian mode, see Giuseppe Gerbino, Music and the Myth of Arcadia 
in Renaissance Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 283 n. 44 and the literature cited 
therein. 
 
20 See Stras, Women and Music in Sixteenth-Century Ferrara, 286. This particular claim speaks to Stras’ 
general (and convincing) argument that madrigal book publications associated with the Ferrarese concerto 
delle dame do not necessarily constitute evidence of performance practice (ibid., 262). 
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This claim makes some sense: it is easy to imagine a solo singer taking on the role of Armida for 
these two madrigals, at least their stanzas in direct speech.21 “Vezzosi augelli,” on the other 
hand, is clearly polyphonic in conception, as we will see below. Absent any human subjects, its 
text does not call for a verisimilar presentation as the later stanzas do. 
On ordering and placement, finally, the question of why “Vezzosi augelli” stands so 
much earlier in the book than the other two madrigals probably has a quotidian explanation: it is 
placed near three other pieces that share its cleffing. The reason “Forsennata gridava” follows 
rather than precedes “Qual musico gentil” in Wert’s Ottavo libro, on the other hand, is less clear. 
For her part, MacClintock simply calls the ordering “incorrect”; more recently, Stras has called 
“Forsennata gridava” a “coda” to the longer madrigal, suggesting she thinks the ordering is 
intentional.22 With Stras, it is hard for me to believe that the ordering here is a careless error: no 
practical demands bore on Wert’s placement of these two madrigals with respect to each other, 
and evidence suggests that he was careful about preserving chronology elsewhere. (All four 
Erminia madrigals in the Ottavo libro are ordered chronologically, for example.) It therefore 
seems more likely, per Stras, that Wert deliberately placed “Forsennata gridava” after “Qual 
musico gentil.” I will explore some internal musical evidence for this claim in more detail, 
below; for now, it suffices to note that nothing Armida says in “Forsennata gridava” is logically 
incoherent as a consequent to the “Qual musico gentil” stanzas.  
 
 
21 It makes less clear sense for a solo singer to stand in for Tasso’s narrator in GL 16.43, the first stanza of 
“Qual musico gentil,” however. I am grateful to Massimo Ossi for this observation. 
 
22 MacClintock, Giaches de Wert, 111; Stras, Women and Music in Sixteenth-Century Ferrara, 261. 
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4.3 “Vezzosi augelli” 
Like “Qual musico gentil,” “Vezzosi augelli” concerns the rhetorical effect of various sounds on 
fictional men. In the case of the latter madrigal, however, this context only becomes clear upon 
considering the stanzas that surround the one Wert set to music. Indeed, at first glance, the 
madrigal’s text (GL 16.12) reads as unassuming pastoral verse: 
Vezzosi augelli infra le verdi fronde  And pretty birds under the greenwood shade 
Temprano a prova lascivette note.  temper their merry notes in harmony, 
Mormora l’aura e fa le foglie e l’onde  and the wind murmurs, and the leaves and streams 
Garrir, che variamente ella percota. chatter, as the wind strikes them variously, 
Quando taccion gli augelli, alto risponde;  for when the birds are still those sounds are deep, 
Quando cantan gli augei, piú lieve scote;  but when they sing they strike a lighter key. 
Sia caso od arte, or accompagna, ed ora By chance, or art, the music of the air 
Alterna i versi lor la musica ora. accompanies or responds to the voices there.23 
 
On internal evidence, only the reference to the designs of “chance or art” (caso od arte), a veiled 
nod to Armida’s magic, suggests that the action described here may be less neutral than it seems. 
As we have seen, however, the stanzas that immediately precede this one (16.9–10) 
unambiguously describe Armida’s garden as an illusory enchantment in which nature, despite 
appearances to the contrary, plays no role. To readers of Tasso’s poem, then, the “Vezzosi 
augelli” stanza simply recounts one further temptation the Christian soldiers must reject in order 
to rescue Rinaldo. Tasso states this point plainly a few stanzas later, at 16.17: 
Fra melodia sí tenera, fra tante Among enchanting loveliness, among  
Vaghezze allettatrici e lusinghiere, allurements, and such tender melody, 
Va quella coppia; e rigida e costante the pair proceeded, rigid, constant, strong, 
Se stessa indura a i vezzi del piacere. hardened against the pleasing luxury.24 
 
 
23 Esolen, trans., 303. 
 
24 Esolen, trans., 303. Note the echo of “Vezzosi” at “vezzi” in v. 4: what is merely charming in 16.12 
becomes charm against which the soldiers must “harden” themselves in 16.17. I am grateful to Kathy 




Hardly neutral, the music of the birds and the breeze in “Vezzosi augelli” is a sinister force, 
alluring in its sensuality and, for this reason, dangerous to the men who hear it.25 
Despite its importance for understanding the meaning of the madrigal’s text, however, 
this poetic context has tended to be overlooked in the secondary literature on Wert’s madrigal. In 
an analysis that may be taken as representative, for example, Jessie Ann Owns describes the text 
of “Vezzosi augelli” as follows: 
Vezzosi augelli, a light-hearted competition between birds and the breezes that stir leaves 
and waves, belongs to the description of Armida’s magic garden and foreshadows the 
amorous play between lovers. Its action—a performance whose players are animals 
(birds) and natural forces (breeze)—is idyllic and non-threatening. Its imagery is 
descriptive, without overt emotion. It represents, in idealized fashion, sounds from the 
natural world.26 
 
While acknowledging the role of magic in the scene arrayed before Charles and Ubaldo, Owens 
elides the garden’s narrative function within the epic, instead characterizing Tasso’s verse as 
“descriptive, without overt emotion.”27 Her subsequent analysis of Wert’s madrigal reflects this 
same attitude toward the text: highlighting the means by which the composer “graphically 
represents the competition that is the subject of the text as a whole,” Owens interprets Wert’s 
setting at face value, as a sincere musical expression of its text.28 In a similar way, Gary 
Tomlinson calls Tasso’s stanza a “description of the enchanted garden of Armida,” but then goes 
 
25 The parallel between the garden’s concealment of its artifice and Armida’s is strengthened by Tasso’s 
use of the phrase “caso od arte” earlier in the GL to describe the appearance of another woman, Sofronia; 
see n. 5. 
 
26 Jessie Ann Owens, “Marenzio and Wert Read Tasso: A Study in Contrasting Aesthetics,” Early Music 
27, no. 4 (1999): 558. 
 
27 It is possible that Owens’ use of the word “overt” is meant to connote a rhetorical or emotional subtext 
to the stanza, however. 
 
28 Ibid., 561. This is not to say that Owens’ analysis of the madrigal is an ineffective one. As will become 
clear below, my own is indebted to hers. 
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on, in his own analysis of Wert’s madrigal, to highlight the various techniques by which the 
composer achieves a “composite sonorous nature picture” in music, like Owens moving quickly 
past the magical artifice to which Tasso alludes with the phrase “Sia caso od arte.”29 And 
Einstein, as we have seen, calls the piece representative of the composer’s “pastoral mood” 
without further qualification.30 
  What happens if this poetic context moves into the foreground? In short, Wert’s 
madrigal looks less like a straightforward musical idyll, as it has tended to in recent scholarship, 
and more like a meditation on the persuasive, and possibly dangerous, appeal of musical 
pleasure. Of course, it is not simply the “meta” premise of setting a stanza about music to music 
that makes “Vezzosi augelli” interesting; numerous pastoral madrigals from the 1580s feature 
singing and dancing nymphs situated in idealized natural settings who elicit attendant melismas 
on words like cantare or musica.31 Rather, as I hope to have shown in the preceding, this 
madrigal is unusual in virtue of its text’s implicit thematization of musical pleasure as a 
technique of rhetorical persuasion. This poetic background in turn invites a reconsideration of the 
rhetorical stance of Wert’s music, which transforms the fictional music in Armida’s garden into 
real music. 
Before we turn to Wert’s setting, however, consider once more Tasso’s stanza, but now 
from the perspective of Zarlino’s two-stage model, in particular the theorist’s requirements for 
 
29 Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance, 50. 
 
30 Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 2:574. Giuseppe Gerbino has shown that “Vezzosi augelli” in fact sits 
uncomfortably within the Cinquecento madrigalian pastoral topos, at least from a textual standpoint, due 
to its lack of human characters. Most madrigals on pastoral subjects (those of Marenzio, e.g.) feature 
humans or nymphs—Clori, Tancredi, and the like—who act out narratives of seduction or heartbreak. 
“Vezzosi’s” human-less brand of naturalism is therefore “more the exception than the rule” (Music and 
the Myth of Arcadia, 312). 
 
31 For an analysis of meta-musical topoi in the pastoral madrigal, see ibid., 312–13. 
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those musical stimuli that “prepare and dispose” (but do not move) the soul toward an emotion.32 
Key for Zarlino is the presence of harmony, which he understands broadly to include both 
simultaneous and successive sounds, but absence of language. And indeed, like Armida’s 
concento breve di sospir (brief harmony of sighs) in “Qual musico gentil,” the birdsong and 
music of the breeze in “Vezzosi augelli” are nonlinguistic; neither communicates rational content 
to listeners.33 Tasso nevertheless bequeaths the status of music to both through metaphor: the 
birds in Armida’s garden cantan, and its breeze creates musica. At least in a loose sense, then, 
both these sounds resemble Zarlino’s semplice harmonia, the theorist’s paradigmatic stimulus for 
“disposing the soul.” They also share its weaker affective capacity, for neither birds nor breeze 
aims to produce any Zarlinian “extrinsic effect” (effetto estrinseco) in Charles and Ubaldo—
tears, laughter, and so on—but rather to render the pair favorably disposed toward the sorceress 
before they meet her in person. These sounds of an artificed nature are, in short, preludial. 
Indeed, with chapter 3’s lessons on the speech prologue in mind, we might analogize Armida’s 
garden itself to an exordium: like an attention-grabbing summary at the outset of a long speech, 
the verdant grounds of the sorceress’ palace aim to procure from Rinaldo’s would-be rescuers 
that state of emotional predisposition Bartolomeo Cavalcanti calls the amica dispositione 
d’animo (friendly disposition of the soul) or benivolenza.34  
 
32 Istitutioni harmoniche, 2.7.84. For a discussion, see chapter 3, section 3.3, of this dissertation. 
 
33 An examination of the peculiar ontological status of birdsong in European musical discourse, although 
likely a fruitful line of inquiry for Wert’s madrigal, lies beyond the scope of this chapter. Through the late 
Middles Ages, birdsong was not considered music because, although like music sweet and melodious, it 
was produced by a nonrational animal who could not understand the science (i.e., ratios) behind its own 
creation. See Elizabeth Eva Leach, Sung Birds: Music, Nature, and Poetry in the Later Middle Ages 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), Introduction and chapter 1. 
 
34 For Cavalcanti’s theory of the exordium, see chapter 3, section 3.4. 
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In what follows, I suggest that we hear the madrigal’s polyphony, which evokes the 
music of the birds and breeze in Armida’s garden through a series of vivid imitazioni delle 
parole, as a prompt for an audience response similar to the one Armida aims to elicit from 
Charles and Ubaldo. Considered from the perspective of listener response, that is, “Vezzosi 
augelli” is not only an effective and vivid representation of the literal action of its text (the birds 
sing, the breeze stirs leaves) but also a musical embodiment of the human psychology of Tasso’s 
fiction. And where chapter 3 has provided our frame for Tasso’s techniques of the affetti, Wert’s 
own are best understood through precepts culled from chapter 2: by inviting listeners to parse the 
mimetic relation between music and text in real time, that is, the composer’s imitazioni provoke 
the so-called “pleasure of inference.”35 This pleasure gives rise in turn to an amica dispositione 
d’animo similar to the one Armida aims to elicit from the Christian soldiers. Put differently, the 
cognitive pleasure that I previously posited as central to the very premise of “imitating the 
words” is here seen to serve a more specific purpose, one that stems from the rhetorical function 
of the music within Tasso’s fictional scene. For as we saw in that chapter, literary theorists often 
held that the pleasure inherent to the experience of imitation or mimesis is not an end in itself, 
but rather a means toward one—purging the emotions, for example, or moral instruction. 
Alessandro Piccolomini, for one, subordinates the pleasure of fiction to its moral utility with an 
old adage of Lucretius: 
To this utility pleasure is given for company, as a servant and companion, so that man 
may more willingly allow himself to receive that usefulness (giovamento); in the [same] 
way that for sick children who have to take some medicine, [the medicine] is sweetened 
 
35 For the “pleasure of inference,” see chapter 2, section 2.4. I borrow this phrase from Charles 
McNamara (“Quintilian’s Theory of Certainty,” 34–39), who addresses Aristotle’s theory of inference 




either with sugar or with honey on the rim of the glass…as Lucretius puts it very well in 
his beautiful verses.36  
 
Although it is difficult to speak of “utility” in the same breath as Armida’s garden—within its 
gates, perhaps “immoral utility” is apt—we have seen how its deceptive sensory pleasures serve 
a greater end, namely detaining Charles and Ubaldo from completing their mission.37 And in its 
own turn, the garden of pleasures tended by “Vezzosi augelli” serves a similar one. 
 
 As Owens demonstrates in her analysis, Wert dramatizes the rivalry between birds and 
breeze in “Vezzosi augelli” by pitting various groups from his five-part ensemble against each 
other in a kind of musical “competition”; this is the basic technique by which he represents the 
text. Take the famous opening, which sets the upper three voices declaiming the stanza’s first 
verse in a homophonic, villanella-like texture against the lower two voices “murmuring” the 
beginning of the third—well before the second verse has sounded in any part.38 The 
simultaneous setting of nonconsecutive verses is, as Gary Tomlinson notes, a technique that 





36 “al quale utile è dato per compagnia il diletto, come ministro, e compagno, accioche più voluntieri 
l’huom si ponga à ricever quel giovamento; nella guisa, che à i fanciulli infermi, che han da prender 
qualche medicina, s’addolisce ò con zuccaro, o con mele l’orlo, o ver il labro del vaso…come benissimo 
dice Lucretio in quei soavissimi versi suoi,” translation adapted from Weinberg, A History of Literary 
Criticism, 1:546 (Piccolomini, Annotationi, 372). See also a discussion of this passage on pp. 94–95 of 
this dissertation. The Lucretius reference is to De Rerum Natura 1.936–51. 
 
37 Thanks are due to Giuseppe Gerbino for the phrase immoral utility (personal communication). 
 
38 For the identification of the upper-voice arrangement as “villanella texture,” see Tomlinson, 
Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance, 50. The trait in the music here reminiscent of the villanella is 
not only homophony but also, more importantly, the parallel motion between Canto and Quinto (see 
example 4.1, mm. 1–2). 
 
39 Ibid., 50.  
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Example 4.1  “Vezzosi augelli,” Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, mm. 1–5. Text: “Vezzosi augelli 
in fra le verdi fronde/ Tempran a prova lascivette note.” Note the Tenore’s entrance in m. 
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Vez so- si_au- gel- li_in- fra le ver di- fron de- Tem pran- a pro va- la sci- vet- te,-
Mor mo- ra- l'au ra,-
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This opening captures central event of the poem, the musical tug-of-war between singing birds 
and rustling breeze, with a remarkable economy of means.40 A synthesis of the poetic argument 
in musical terms, these bars distill the essence of the stanza before very much of it has even been 
heard. As the madrigal proceeds, Wert maintains his focus on this central rivalry and its back-
and-forth quality, albeit largely through more traditional techniques. The composer’s setting of 
the word “garrir” (chatter, v. 4), which characterizes the sound of leaves and waves bustled by 
the breeze, is typical (example 4.2). 
Example 4.2  “Vezzosi augelli,” Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, mm. 12–13. Text: “Garrir.” 
 
“Garrir” literally chatters its way across the ensemble in a rapid call-and-response motif that 
enacts the word’s meaning in real time for listeners. In a similar way, Wert assigns the line 
“Quando taccion gli augelli” (When the birds are silent) to one singer on a monotonal melody, 
and then has a pair of others jump in on “alto risponde” ([the wind] replies loudly, example 4.3). 
 








rir, gar rir- gar rir,- gar rir,- che
gar rir,- gar rir,- gar rir,- che va ria- -
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Example 4.3  “Vezzosi augelli,” Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, mm. 17–20. Text: “Quando 
taccion gl’augelli, alto risponde.” 
 
 From one perspective, of course, these examples simply record madrigalisms—text-
setting tropes one could find in any number of pieces from the 1580s. Only the opening passage, 
with its multiple counterpoint on nonconsecutive verses of the text, represents something new in 
the stylistic development of the late Cinquecento madrigal. Considered from the perspective of 
the “pleasure of recognition” as theorized by Piccolomini, Buonamici, and other literati of the 
period, however, they acquire a different charge. 
Imagine any given listener’s encounter, for example, with the madrigal’s opening (see 
example 4.1). What begins as a pleasant if unassuming exposition of the first verse quickly 
becomes something more complex when the tenor enters in measure 2, its monotonal 
declamation of the phrase “Mormorar l’aura” (the breeze murmurs) situated somewhere between 
description and onomatopoeia. If this listener had a copy of the text, he or she might realize with 
delight that the composer is evoking the stanza’s central concetto by making a collage of its 
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craft.41 Even in the absence of the printed text, however, it is readily apparent to any listener that 
the Tenore and Basso enter on words that are different from those carried by the upper three 
voices, naturally prompting an inquiry into the grounds for this compositional choice. 
Further audible cues in the music enhance this passage’s evocation of a competitive 
spirit. Wert’s setting of “Mormorar’s” second two syllables to a pair of fusae (transcribed in 
example 4.1 as eighth notes), for example, likely has an onomatopoetic tinge, mimicking with its 
rapid-fire r’s the sound of nature’s babble. As Ruth DeFord has shown in her study of rhythmic 
developments in the late Cinquecento madrigal, fusae were only set syllabically in madrigals 
from about 1580 onward, a trend she traces to the increasing influence of the villanella on the 
more “serious” genre.42 Although the practice of setting strings of fusae to two or more syllables 
of text was common enough by the time Wert’s Ottavo libro was published, it seems more than a 
coincidence that in this particular madrigal no other fusae pairs are set syllabically. At least 
within “Vezzosi augelli,” then, Wert reserves text declamation at the rate of the fusa for the sake 
 
41 For a discussion pleasurable moments of recognition, see chapter 2, section 2.4, of this dissertation. My 
use of concetto reflects the discussion of this concept vis-à-vis Wert’s madrigal in Owens, “Marenzio and 
Wert Read Tasso,” 569. 
 
42 Ruth DeFord, “The Evolution of Rhythmic Style in Italian Secular Music of the Late Sixteenth 
Century,” Studi musicali X, no. 1, ed. Leo S. Olschki (Rome/Florence: Accademia Nazionale di Santa 
Cecilia, 1981), 43–74. See also chapter 14 (“Popular Songs and Dances”) of her book Tactus, 
Mensuration and Rhythm in Renaissance Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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of imitating the text.43 By limiting his use of texted fusae to this single soggetto, in other words, 
the composer allows its mimetic quality to stand out audibly.44 
An astute listener may also notice the composer’s careful manipulation of the harmony in 
this opening passage to dramatic effect. Although “Vezzosi augelli” rarely strays far from its F 
tonal center—three out of the four major structural cadences in the madrigal are to F—the 
opening ten bars are suffused with C sonorities, with the first of them introduced at the moment 
the Tenore enters for the first time (see example 4.1, m. 2).45 The effect is, to my ears at least, 
similar to what theorists of tonality call dominant prolongation: by hugging the bass note C, the 
“murmuring” soggetto in the Tenore and Basso adds tension to the proceedings, a tension 
perhaps reflective of the third verse’s literal interruption of the first one. Only on the downbeat 
of measure 10, indeed, does the piece settle into F, with the “Mormorar” figure discharging the 
pent-up energy packed into its two fusae by leaping up from C to F and then bouncing around an 
F triad on the words “fa le foglie e l’onde/ Garrir” (makes the leaves and waves/ Chatter; see 




43 In Tactus, Mensuration and Rhythm, DeFord makes a similar observation with respect to the only 
madrigal in Rore’s first book of five-voice madrigals (first published in 1542) that features consecutive 
texted fusae, “Per mezz’i boschi,” writing, “The device is straightforward text painting illustrating the 
words ‘fuggir per l’herba verde’” (417). That is to say, where texted fusae were in common use by the 
1580s, before that decade they were reserved in the madrigal repertory, so it seems, for representing the 
text. 
 
44 There is one (to my ears, insignificant) exception: the Basso has a pair of texted fusae in m. 14. This is 
a clear adaptation of the soggetto introduced in m. 10, however (see example 4.4), which features a string 
of four melismatic fusae. 
 
45 The major cadences in “Vezzosi augelli” occur at the ends of verses 2, 4, 6, and 8. Only the cadence in 
verse 6, to C, is off-tonic. 
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Example 4.4  “Vezzosi augelli,” Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, Quinto, mm. 9–11. Text: 
“Mormora l’aura e fa le foglie e l’onde/ Garrir.” Note the soggetto’s sudden switch from 
monotonal declamation to disjunct leaping in m. 10. 
 
The downbeat of m. 10 provokes its own musico-textual moment of recognition, namely the 
realization that both the sequence of verses and their attendant harmonic tension have untangled 
themselves in tandem. 
Of course, the exact pathway of thought by which any listener assimilates musical 
imitante to textual imitata (to recall Buonamici’s terms for the medium and object of imitation) 
is individual and ultimately unknowable, a fact Renaissance theorists of imitation acknowledged, 
albeit in passing.46 It is rather the general pattern that interests us here, as well as the emotional 
quality of pleasure that follows. As the madrigal proceeds beyond the opening passage, the 
pattern continues: virtually every verse (with the exception of one discussed below) receives 
mimetic treatment in Wert’s setting. As with any piece packed with madrigalisms, the 
stimulation of these delightful moments of recognition seems, indeed, to be the madrigal’s 
purpose. But the psychology of pleasure in “Vezzosi augelli” is subtler than that. Because the 
text itself concerns the emotional effect of musical sounds on fictional listeners, the listening 
experience as a whole takes on a quality of self-reflection. As listeners enjoy Giaches de Wert’s 
polyphonic garden—and it is worth stressing that the piece is genuinely enjoyable to listen to—
they may note similarities between their own delighted response and the parallel one Armida 
aims to provoke, albeit with sinister intentions, in Charles and Ubaldo. Their emotional 
 
46 For one such acknowledgement, see Piccolomini’s comment about the “quick and imperceptible 
thought, and almost a syllogism” (veloce, e impercettibil discorso, e quasi sillogismo) listeners use to 
decode metaphors, as quoted on p. 109 of this dissertation. For Buonamici’s imitante and imitata, see 
chapter 2, section 2.3. 
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identification with the Christian soldiers may in turn prompt reflection on the poem’s broader 
themes—Tasso’s association of musical hedonism with a Muslim sorceress, for example.47 In 
addition, listeners may appreciate that Wert’s ingenious use of imitazione delle parole reflects 
the garden’s status as an illusory and deceptive fiction. 
Can a madrigal actually suggest such subtle trains of thought? A winking moment of self-
reflection late in the piece seems to gesture toward some of them (example 4.5). 




47 This point draws from Gough’s “Tasso’s Enchantress, Tasso's Captive Woman,” which argues that the 
“artful deception and deceptive art” of sorceresses like Armida in the Italian vernacular epic tradition 
served as allegories for the dangers of poetry itself: “Poets such as Dante, Trissino, and Ariosto…warn 
against poetry’s dangers by exposing a sorceress’s filthy ‘nether parts,’ displacing the potentially harmful 
effects of their own medium onto a fictional female double who can then be banished, at least 
imaginatively, along with the literary dangers she embodies” (525). The sensual pleasures of “Vezzosi 
augelli” could have been appreciated similarly, as dangerous in virtue of their association with a female, 
non-Christian, and unnatural Other. (Of course, as Gough observes, Tasso breaks with this tradition by 
having Armida convert later in the poem. This context does not seem to bear meaningfully on Wert’s 
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Landing about two-thirds of the way through the madrigal (verse 6 in the text), this passage 
poses the central question of the stanza—is this beautiful scene a product of chance (i.e., nature) 
or art (i.e., magic)?—and with the admittedly limited resources of musical contrast available to 
him, Wert underlines it as such. First, example 4.5 is the only fully homophonic passage in the 
entire madrigal, i.e., the only homophonic passage involving all five singers. Second, the words 
it sets, “Sia caso od arte,” are the only words in the madrigal not repeated by any of the voice 
parts at least once. (As soon as this half-line is declaimed, the singers move on to a new soggetto 
on the words “or accompagn’ ed ora,” which like the other soggetti in the madrigal repeats 
liberally.) The phrase “Sia caso od arte,” in other words, is the only phrase in the text that Wert 
does not represent in some fashion. In a madrigal otherwise packed with all manner of imitazioni 
delle parole, measures 28–29 stand out for their modesty; rather than pointing to the composer’s 
skill at representing sights and sounds vividly in polyphony, they simply present the text. For this 
reason, we might hear them as a commentary on what has come before, perhaps (for example) an 
implicit acknowledgement of the arte behind Wert’s own setting of Tasso. The effect is almost if 
the composer momentarily breaks the fourth wall within the fiction of the scene to address his 
listeners directly.  
Of course, that is what Tasso is doing here, too: recall that in ottava rima form, the sixth 
verse often introduces an “epigrammatic twist” alongside its new rhyme ending (abababcc).48 As 
in the stanza that opened this chapter (GL 16.9), the twist here is the author’s acknowledgement 
that the music of the birds and the breeze is anything but natural. (By this stanza in canto sixteen 
of the Gerusalemme liberata, that is, it is perfectly clear to any reader that the answer to “Sia 
caso od arte” is “arte,” despite appearances otherwise.) By dramatically shifting the relationship 
 
48 See above, p. 165. 
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between music and text at this very moment, Wert thus introduces his own version of the literary 
device.49 Even the harmony in example 4.5 contributes to the passage’s projection of self-
consciousness: by tonicizing C, where the previous phrase recently cadenced in m. 28 (the only 
major off-tonic cadence in the entire piece), Wert lets Tasso’s subjunctive clause hang 
inquisitively. One could even imagine performers of the piece pausing expectantly on the minim 
rest in m. 29, while Tenore and Basso sustain their G–C fifth, before proceeding. All told, the 
result is something like irony, a fleeting recognition of the artifice standing behind both 
Armida’s “effortlessly arrayed” garden and the composer’s own. 
 
4.4 “Qual musico gentil” 
Where “Vezzosi augelli” reveals its thematization of music, pleasure, and rhetorical persuasion 
only in the context of those stanzas that precede and follow it within Tasso’s epic, “Qual musico 
gentil” foregrounds these themes. It also does so in a manner more explicitly in dialogue with the 
two-stage model for emotional arousal. As I argued in chapter 3, Tasso’s description of Armida’s 
preparatory “sighs” in the madrigal’s first stanza uses language that that more or less explicitly 
refers to emotional predisposition as theorized in rhetorical, physiological, and musical writings 
of the sixteenth century. Tasso’s analogy between Armida’s preludial actions and those of a 
“refined musician,” moreover, is directly compatible with Zarlino’s teachings on moving the 
passions through music: those stimuli without language (ricercate, breve concento di sospir) aim 
to dispose Rinaldo’s soul, while those that make use of language (canto, voci) seek to move it. 
 
49 Wert was not unique in this respect: representing the poetic acumen or “point” (not only in ottave rime 
but also in other poetic genres) by means of musical contrasts is a well-mapped phenomenon in the late 
Cinquecento and early Seicento madrigal. For a discussion of Monteverdi’s use of this technique, see 
Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance, chapter 4, especially p. 91. 
191 
 
After this introductory stanza, the rest of the madrigal sets the first four stanzas of Armida’s 
speech, which—following the logic of the two-stage model—aims to move Rinaldo’s emotions 
and thereby change his course of action. The full text of the madrigal reads as follows: 
Qual musico gentil, prima che chiara As cunning singers, just before they free 
Altamente la voce al canto snodi,  their voices into high and brilliant song, 
A l’armonia gli animi altrui prepara  prepare the listener’s soul for harmony 
Con dolci ricercate in bassi modi; with sweet notes sotto voce, low and long, 
Cosí costei, che nel la doglia amara so in the bitterness of sorrow she 
Già tutte non oblia l’arti e le frodi, did not forget the tricks and arts of wrong, 
Fa di sospir breve concento in prima,  but gave a little prelude of a sigh 
Per dispor l’alma in cui le voci imprima. that his soul might be more deeply graven by 
  
Poi cominciò: Non aspettar ch’io preghi,  
Crudel, te, come amante amante deve. 
Tai fummo un tempo: or se tal esser nieghi,  
E di ciò la memoria anco t’è greve, 
Come nemico almeno ascolta: i preghi  
D’un nemico talor l’altro riceve. 
Ben quel ch’io chieggio, è tal che darlo puoi 
E integri conservar gli sdegni tuoi. 
these words: “Don’t think I’ve come, you cruel 
man, 
to beg my lover—it’s what we used to be, 
lovers—or if you want to deny that, 
if you can’t even stand the memory, 
call me an enemy then, but hear me out! 
Hearings are even granted the enemy! 
And I’m not asking a great thing from you— 
for you can give me it, and hate me too! 
  
Se m’odii, e in ciò diletto alcun tu senti,  
Non te ’n vengo a privar; godi pur d’esso.  
Giusto a te pare, e siasi. Anch’io le genti  
Cristiane odiai, no ’l nego, odiai te stesso.  
Nacqui pagana; usai vari argomenti,  
Che per me fosse il vostro imperio 
oppresso. 
Te perseguíi, te presi, e te lontano  
Da l’arme trassi in loco ignoto e strano. 
“If you gain some delight from hating me 
I’m not here to deprive you—go and hate! 
Seems right and just to you, so let it be! 
I hated you and all the Christian state. 
I was born pagan—and I used my skill 
that through me you might meet a dreadful fate. 
I followed you, caught you, took you from the 
war 
to this strange, unknown island. But there’s more. 
  
Aggiungi a questo ancor quel ch’a maggiore 
Onta tu rechi, ed a maggior tuo danno:  
T’ingannai, t’allettai nel nostro amore; 
Empia lusinga certo, iniquo inganno,  
Lasciarsi côrre il virginal suo fiore; 
Far del le sue bellezze altrui tiranno;  
Quelle, ch’a mille antichi in premio sono  
Negate, offrire a novo amante in dono! 
“Add what can only fire the rancor of 
your hatred, the worst loss you could endure. 
I lied to you, I lured you to fall in love— 
oh such deception, evil, wicked, sure— 
and let you cull my virgin flower, to prove 
the tyrant of its beauty. Its allure 
was prized by many lovers, all in vain, 
and then to a new lover I gave it, plain! 
  
Sia questa pur tra le mie frodi; e vaglia  
Sí di tante mie colpe in te il difetto 
“Count that among all my deceptions too! 
So many sins—they weigh so heavily 
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Che tu quinci ti parta, e non ti caglia 
Di questo albergo tuo già sí diletto. 
that you must leave and never give a thought 
to the place where you once rejoiced to be. 
Vattene, passa il mar, pugna, travaglia,  
Struggi la fede nostra: anch’io t’affretto. 
Go sweat and toil and fight across the seas, 
destroy our faith—I’ll even help you flee! 
Che dico nostra? ah, non piú mia! fedele Our faith? Not mine, not now. My cruel one, 
Sono a te solo, idolo mio cruele. you are my faith, my idol—you alone.”50 
 
Even if “Qual musico gentil” engages more directly with emotional arousal than 
“Vezzosi augelli” does, as seems clear, these madrigals’ two texts are nevertheless closely 
linked. Both record Armida’s use of nonlinguistic “musical” sounds—birds, breezes, ricercars, 
sighs—to provoke a favorable emotional predisposition in listeners. Both likewise refer to the 
theme of feigning artlessness that I have posited as central to Wert’s Armida cycle. In “Vezzosi 
augelli,” this reference coincides with the stanza’s epigrammatic twist; in “Qual musico gentil,” 
the reference occurs in the second half of Tasso’s analogy between Armida and the musico gentil 
(16.43, verses 5–8): “So she, who even in her bitter pain/ did not forget her arts and deceptions 
(l’arte e le frodi),/ made a brief harmony of sighs first/ to dispose the soul in which her words 
would impress.”51 Just like the birds and breeze in the garden, Armida’s sighs are an imitation of 
the real thing disguised as genuine. Their persuasiveness is, moreover, defined as a musical 
quality—a concento—echoing Tasso’s characterization of the sound of the breeze as musica in 
“Vezzosi augelli” (“la musica ora”). In subtle but clear ways, then, these two selections from 
Tasso form a coherent pair, addressing themes of music, persuasion, arousal, and concealment 
from complementary perspectives. 
 Of course, the text of “Qual musico gentil” goes much further than that of “Vezzosi 
augelli” in exploring the persuasive power of sound. By setting four stanzas of Armida’s speech 
 
50 Esolen, trans., 308–9 (16.43–47). 
 
51 This translation is mine. 
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in direct quotation, Wert establishes a stark contrast between the introductory stanza’s 
nonlinguistic, “preludial” stimuli and the scene’s main event—spoken words—which dominate 
the madrigal both proportionally (four stanzas versus one) and in terms of affective charge 
(emotional arousal versus predisposition). Wert’s setting likewise goes further. In contrast to 
“Vezzosi,” which focuses its musical energies on a central poetic conceit, namely competition or 
dialogue, “Qual musico gentil” ranges over a wider stylistic palette to animate the drama of 
Armida’s passionate appeal, itself a varied and capricious testament to the sorceress’ rhetorical 
ingenuity.  
 Despite these differences, the general outline of my argument for “Qual musico gentil” is 
similar to that which I forwarded for “Vezzosi augelli”: in light of the theoretical discourses 
examined in chapters 2 and 3, Wert’s madrigal can be heard as a stimulus for an audience 
response similar to the one recorded of Tasso’s fictional listeners. Here, however, that response 
is not unitary, as it is in “Vezzosi,” but rather multiple, tracking with Rinaldo’s psychological 
progression from a favorable predisposition (stanza 1) to a state of pained emotion we might best 
characterize as sympathy or pity (stanzas 2–5).52 Also departing from “Vezzosi,” the homology 
of fictional and real-life audience response I am proposing for “Qual musico gentil” stems 
directly from the meta-discourse on persuasion and arousal in its text. Where Tasso maps out a 
theory about the varying levels of affectivity inherent in certain musical stimuli, that is, I suggest 
we hear Wert’s music as putting that theory into practice. More specifically, I contend that the 
composer evokes the progression from predisposition to arousal via two contrasting approaches 
to setting Tasso’s stanzas. The first, as in “Vezzosi augelli,” highlights the pleasures of musical 
 
52 Although Rinaldo’s arousal is only implied within the stanzas that Wert sets—indeed, his very presence 
is only implied throughout the madrigal—recall that in Tasso’s poem, the soldier “can only hold back 
tears with effort” (può ritener le lagrime a fatica, 16.52) after listening to Armida’s speech, a sign that her 
words have moved his emotions. 
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mimesis through various imitative devices, and the second subordinates music’s representational 
prerogative to the persuasive demands of rhetorical speech, thereby allowing Armida’s words to 
move the soul. 
 
 Similar to “Vezzosi augelli,” Wert subjects the first, introductory stanza of “Qual musico 
gentil” to a series of imitazioni delle parole: the word canto stretches over a long melisma in all 
five parts (mm. 5–10, see example 4.6); armonia briefly establishes a new tonal center (mm. 11–
13); ricercate inspires a quasi-improvisatory figure in quick rhythms, in imitation of the 
instrumental genre (mm. 15–20); doglia amara rides a prolonged wave of dissonant suspensions 
(mm. 20–30, example 4.8); sospir calls up breathy rests (mm. 32–37; example I.1); and so on.   
 
Example 4.6  “Qual musico gentil” (prima parte), Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, mm. 3–11. 
Text: “Altamente la voce al canto snodi.” Note the melismas in all five parts for canto 













ma che chia ra- Al ta- men- te- la vo -
chia ra- Al ta- men- te- - la vo ce_al- can - - -
che chia ra- - Al ta- men- te- la vo ce,-
ma che chia ra- - Al -






ce_al- can to- - - - - - - - sno di,- - Al -
7
to- - sno di,- al can to- - sno di,- - - Al -
al ta- men- te- la vo ce_al- - can to- - - sno di,- - Al -
ta- men te- la vo ce_al- can to- - - sno di,- -
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To an even greater degree than the imitazioni delle parole in “Vezzosi augelli,” these are 
paradigmatic madrigalisms. Each phrase of the text receives its own readily perceptible 
analogue, which is to some degree isolated in character from its neighbors.  
When Armida begins her lament, by contrast, the voices snap to a declamatory and 
homophonic mode of delivery, the madrigalisms all but disappearing for stanzas two through 
five. Although this later section of the madrigal is more varied than secondary commentaries 
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Example 4.7  “Se m’odii e’n ciò diletto alcun” (terza parte), Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, mm. 
22–24. Homophony for Armida’s speech. 
 
In these later stanzas, Wert is making a clear attempt to imitate the sound of Armida’s speech 
rather than the semantics of its individual phrases. Tasso’s words no longer call up musical 
analogues that elicit pleasurable moments of recognition in listeners, as they do in the madrigal’s 
prima parte. Rather, the music approximates, within the conventions of Cinquecento madrigalian 
style, the cadence, timings, and “melody” of oratorical speech. 
Zooming out to consider the madrigal as a whole, it is thus evident that Wert’s 
compositional plan is sharply divided between two musical styles, on the one hand, and two 
objects of mimesis—to recall the Aristotelian category from chapter 2—on the other. These 
divisions are closely linked: in the madrigal’s first stanza, the object of mimesis is the meaning 
of the words at an individual or phrasal level (in sixteenth-century parlance, le parole), which 
calls up imitative polyphony, melismas, chains of suspensions, and other such devices. For the 









no Dal l'ar- mi- tras si_in- lo co_i- gno- to_e- stra no."- -
no Dal l'ar- mi- tras si_in- lo co_i- gno- to_e- stra no."- - -
no Dal l'ar- mi- tras si_in- lo co_i- gno- to_e- stra no."- -
no Dal l'ar- mi- tras si_in- lo co_i- gno- to_e- stra no."- -





















œ œ œ ˙ œ œ# œ# œ# ˙#
œ œ œ œ# œ ˙#
w
w Œ
œ œ œ œ œ œ œ ˙
˙ w w
œ œ œ œ ˙™
œ œ œ w
˙
w# w#
˙™ œ œ œ ˙ œ




 How do these contrasts reflect an emotional progression patterned on the two-stage 
model? Before proceeding, we should note that virtually all prior commentators on this madrigal 
have attributed Wert’s bifurcated compositional plan not to the poem’s emotional content but 
rather to the shift between the first and second stanzas from third-person narration to first-person 
speech. According to this reading, Wert’s melismatic first stanza draws back the curtain, as in a 
dramatic scene, for his declamatory treatment of the others, Armida herself stepping to center 
stage in quasi-verisimilar fashion. This line of interpretation has persisted essentially unchanged 
from Alfred Einstein’s The Italian Madrigal forward: 
Wert sets the first stanza quite differently from the following four, as differently as the 
restricting, neutral medium of the five-voice texture will allow. The first stanza is full of 
“objective” tone-painting—one might even call it “naïve”: canto has its long melisma, 
ricercate its positive rhythm, sospir its customary quarter rest. But Armida’s lines are 
dependent, not on tone-painting, but on an animated declamation that rises at the end to 
the point of violence.53 
 
While eschewing Einstein’s critical (and, one might argue, Galileian) language, this madrigal’s 
most recent interpreter nevertheless maintains the thrust of his argument: 
The first stanza is descriptive narration, setting the scene for Armida’s lament; 
accordingly, it is set in fully imitative polyphony. Armida’s speech begins in the second 
stanza, after the introductory words (taken by the Alto), “Poi cominciò:”. At this point the 
texture changes to sparse, syllabic quasi-homophony.54 
 
Like Einstein, Stras takes the mapping of musical style onto narrative mode essentially for 
granted (“accordingly…”). The assumption is a fair one: the use of musical contrasts to evoke 
different poetic speakers, whether two characters in a dialogue madrigal or a narrator and 
 
53 Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 2:570. Note Einstein’s use of the word “naïve” here, a word prevalent in 
the Galileian critical tradition discussed in chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
 




speaker, is a foundational technique for representing poetry in the Italian madrigal tradition.55 
The text’s toggling between narration and direct speech, moreover, figures into its own identity 
as epic, for the mixed mode served as one of this genre’s differentiae in sixteenth-century 
taxonomies of fiction.56 All the same, narrative voice, at least in the case of this madrigal, is not 
the only way to appreciate Wert’s bifurcated compositional plan. What follows is a 
complementary but alternative reading that takes as its point of departure the content of Tasso’s 
text rather than its shifting narrative modes.  
Regarding the first stanza’s madrigalisms, the model of listener response I propose to be 
operative here echoes my argument for “Vezzosi augelli”—namely, the pleasure elicited by a 
listener’s real-time parsing of Wert’s imitations of words approximates, through means particular 
to the polyphonic medium, the same amicable predisposition that Armida fosters in Rinaldo with 
her “harmony of sighs.” The pleasure listeners take in Wert’s polyphonic mimesis, in other 
words, mirrors the pleasure Rinaldo takes in Armida’s rhetorical fiction, for both experiences 
“prepare and dispose” their respective listeners for the more forceful emotional impact of the 
music/speech that follows. To more directly tie this argument to the conditions for “disposing the 
soul” in Zarlino’s two-stage model, however, I also suggest that Wert’s madrigalisms, in addition 
to eliciting the “pleasure of inference,” highlight the pleasure of music as such—that is, music as 
a phenomenon independent of language. (Recall that for Zarlino, the soul is “prepared and 
disposed” by semplice harmonia, or harmony without text.) This point may seem 
 
55 The secondary literature on the role of the poetic voice/speaker in the Italian madrigal, especially in 
Monteverdi’s madrigals, is vast. See, most recently, Mauro Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera: 
Monteverdi’s Staging of the Self (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Tim Carter, “Beyond 
Drama”; and Roseen Giles, “The (un)Natural Baroque: Giambattista Marino and Monteverdi’s Late 
Madrigals” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2016), 206–52. 
 




counterintuitive given madrigalisms’ obvious ties to whatever text they set. A quick glance 
through Wert’s prima parte, however, demonstrates the sheer variety of musical techniques that 
his imitazione delle parole inspire: long melismas, abrupt changes of harmony, invertible 
counterpoint, dissonant chains of suspensions. Although these passages do, of course, represent 
words, each also communicates its own, music-specific pleasure—sheer vocal sonority in the 
case of melismas on “canto” and “voci,” the satisfaction of dissonance resolving to consonance 
in Wert’s suspensions on “doglia amara,” delicate contrapuntal artifice in the case of the 
composer’s close imitative setting of “dolci ricercate.” Put differently, Tasso’s words license the 
composer’s use of musical techniques that might be considered indecorous otherwise, techniques 
that arguably point to music itself as much as they do their verbal referents.57 Although certainly 
a far cry from either Zarlino’s semplice harmonia or Tasso’s ricercate, Wert’s madrigalisms 
nevertheless approach their status as “dispositional” stimuli through a certain flair for musical 
artifice and all its attendant, medium-specific interest. 
We might say, then, that a double psychology of pleasure is at work in Wert’s first-stanza 
madrigalisms: the general pleasure of imitation or mimesis, on the one hand, and the medium-
specific pleasure of music, on the other.58 Moreover, I suggest that both in tandem catalyze a 
favorable emotional predisposition that serves as a kind of “gateway” for listeners to Armida’s 
speech.  
 
57 I am cognizant of the Monteverdi-Artusi debate overtones to this argument (as well as in my use of the 
word “license”). 
 
58 Of course, Aristotle wagers in Poetics chapter 4 that these two pleasures are best experienced together, 
writing that the enjoyment of medium-specific craft (his example is a painter’s brush strokes) ought to be 
mediated through an understanding of this craft’s mimetic significance (say, flower petals). To enjoy the 
former without the latter is a poor way to engage with a mimetic fiction. For the quotation and a 
discussion, see chapter 2, section 2.4, and Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, chapter 6. Although I am 
introducing this analysis of music’s “double pleasure” vis-à-vis “Qual musico gentil,” it could equally 




 For an example that invites consideration of the madrigalism’s “double pleasure” in more 
detail, consider the composer’s setting of the first stanza’s fifth verse, “Così costei, che nella 
doglia amara” (so she, who even in her bitter pain; example 4.8). 
 
Example 4.8  “Qual musico gentil” (prima parte), Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, mm. 20–30. 













Co sì- co stei,- co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do - - - -
si mo di:- Co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do glia_a- -
bas si- mo di:- Co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do glia_a- - - - -
bas si- mo di:- Co sì- co stei,- co sì- co stei,-






glia_a- ma- ra,- co sì- co stei,- co sì- co -
24
ma- ra,- - co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do -
ma ra,- co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do - -
co sì- co stei,- che nel la-
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The main event in this passage is “doglia amara’s” chain of suspensions, which is first heard 










Co sì- co stei,- co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do - - - -
si mo di:- Co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do glia_a- -
bas si- mo di:- Co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do glia_a- - - - -
bas si- mo di:- Co sì- co stei,- co sì- co stei,-






glia_a- ma- ra,- co sì- co stei,- co sì- co -
24
ma- ra,- - co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do -
ma ra,- co sì- co stei,- che nel la- do - -
co sì- co stei,- che nel la-
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stei, che nel la- do glia_a- ma- ra- Già tut te- non o -
27
glia_a- - - - ma- - ra- Già tut te- non o -
glia_a- ma- ra,- che nel la- do glia_a- ma- ra- Già tut te- non o -
do glia_a- - - - ma- ra- Già tut te- non o -
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against itself among the other singers in mm. 26–30.59 Attending to the counterpoint, it emerges 
that the Canto—in Artusian terms, the suspension’s “agent”—anticipates its dissonance-
catalyzing descent with a pair of semiminims at each stage of the chain (see mm. 22–24), thereby 
creating a series of pungent, if briefly heard, parallel seconds with the Alto (the “patient”).60 
Although the resultant unprepared dissonances are technically legal according to the prima 
prattica rules of counterpoint, they add a sting of genuine pain to the passage, one reflective of 
the pained emotion the sorceress (we are to understand) genuinely feels.  
 What kind of experience does this passage offer to its listeners? On the one hand, the 
discourse on the psychology of imitation examined in chapter 2 allows us to hear example 4.8 as 
a representation of something unpleasant—bitter pain—that nevertheless stimulates pleasure in 
listeners in virtue of their recognition of the passage’s mimetic significance. (Recall 
Piccolomini’s velocissimo sillogismo and its resultant notitia-cum-diletto.) Although listeners 
may to some degree feel the pain Armida feels as the passage’s dissonances grate the ears, this 
line of reasoning goes, their pain is filtered through a pleasurable awareness that it has been 
stimulated by a musical fiction.61 What is more, theorists of imitation like Piccolomini and 
Buonamici assign this pleasure a heuristic value. In appreciating the relationship between Wert’s 
counterpoint and the emotion it represents, they might argue, we come to actually learn 
 
59 For the invertible counterpoint, compare Canto and Alto in mm. 22–25 to Basso and Alto (respectively) 
in mm. 27–30. The inverted passage is also transposed to a different pitch level. Canto and Tenore then 
begin to imitate Basso and Alto, albeit loosely, beginning on the final minim of m. 27. Quinto provides 
contrapuntal filler. 
 
60 For Artusi’s theory of the suspension, including his use of the terms agente and patiente to describe the 
suspension’s component parts, see Jenkins, “Metaphysics and History,” 332ff. 
 
61 On the relationship between the pleasure of recognition and other emotions that may arise 
“accidentally” (Piccolomini’s term), see chapter 2, n. 107. 
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something of what bitter pain is, perhaps even how it should be felt.62 But the opportunity to 
empathize with the sorceress is short-lived. Sandwiched on either side by music of strikingly 
different affective character—the rapid-fire soggetto on “dolci ricercate” beforehand, the 
animated homophony on “Già tutte non oblia l’arte e frodi” afterward—the passage seems to 
highlight the very fact of musical representation as much as it does its dolorous object. 
With the medium-specific psychology of music in mind, the words doglia amara might 
also be considered a pretense for the pleasure of dissonance resolving repeatedly to consonance 
in a chain of suspensions.63 Herein lies the connection I am proposing between madrigalisms like 
this one and Zarlino’s semplice harmonia, from which listeners “take pleasure…through the 
proportion that is found in the distance between the instrumental sounds or voices” and thereby 
become “prepared and disposed” to receive an emotion.64 Music has its own psychology. 
Although that psychology, in the case of the present passage, is enriched by the music’s object of 
imitation, it also stands on its own as a musical experience—one, moreover, applicable to 
various poetic contexts beyond “Armida’s bitter pain.” Wert himself uses precisely the same 
semiminim suspension embellishment discussed above, for example, in his motet “Vox in 
Rama,” at the words “Rachel plorans” (Rachel is weeping, Matthew 2:18). Here, the device 
 
62 This lesson, of course, is normative, learned over time through appreciating various musical and 
fictional representations of “bitter pain.” 
 
63 On the psychology of the suspension, Gioseffo Zarlino writes: “Although the ear is offended [by the 
suspension] to a certain degree, it is compensated by the consonance that immediately follows. Not only 
does this dissonance not displease, but it is very agreeable to the ear, for the dissonance makes the 
consonance seem sweeter and smoother. This perhaps results because any quality is best perceived and 
appreciated by comparison with its opposite” (The Art of Counterpoint, trans. Marco and Palisca, 97). For 
the original, see Ist. harm. 3.42.197 (1558 ed.). 
 
64 For the full quotation, see Ist. harm. 2.7 and p. 116 of this dissertation. As I discussed in chapter 3, with 
his conspicuous reference to proportion Zarlino suggests that the underlying cause of semplice 
harmonia’s pleasure is musica humana, the harmony within the human soul. Musica humana has little to 
disclose about the psychology of music–text relations, however. 
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occurs not within a chain of suspensions, as it does in “Qual musico gentil,” but rather as part of 
a chromatic soggetto that creates a single suspension when set against itself (see example 4.9). 
Example 4.9  “Vox in Rama,” Giaches de Wert, Il secondo libro de motetti a 5 (1581), mm. 25–
35. Text: “Rachel plorans.” The dissonant semiminim figures Wert would later reuse in 
“Qual musico gentil” (see mm. 20–30 in example 4.8) are boxed in red. The pathos of 
this passage results not only from its suspensions but also from its chromaticism, a 
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That both passages describe the pained emotional states of women may or may not be 
coincidental. (That both pieces are in the Phrygian mode is surely not.) The point to emphasize, 
rather, is that they communicate the same psychology of unprepared dissonance tied to their 
shared semiminim figure, despite the clear differences between the texts. (Among more obvious 
ones, note that “doglia amara” names an emotion while “Rachel plorans” relates an action.) This 
all may seem to belabor the obvious regarding the nature of madrigalian musical signs, which, 
being relatively general, can accommodate a variety of poetic objects. But semiotics is not what 
interests me about these examples. Rather, it is that they exemplify the double pleasure inherent 
to madrigalisms, the one a result of mimetic recognition, the other a result of counterpoint that is 
to some degree separable from its poetic referent. For this reason, indeed, it is difficult at least 
for me not to hear the first stanza of “Qual musico gentil” as a showcase of musical pleasure as 
such through which listeners might become, like Rinaldo, favorably disposed for the music to 
follow. 
 
 The best case for hearing Wert’s setting of the first stanza as a stimulus for a favorable 
emotional predisposition, however, is a comparison with the rest of the madrigal. From the outset 
of the madrigal’s seconda parte (“Poi cominciò: Non aspettar”) nearly to its final double bar, 
contrasts to the prima parte leap off the page.65 Collectively, they position Wert’s polyphony as 
an affective heightening of Armida’s oratione that nevertheless refrains from superimposing an 
additional semantic layer through madrigalisms. And in so doing, Wert’s declamatory style 
 
65 My observations about the musical style of partes two through five are indebted to Tomlinson’s 
account of Wert’s “heroic style” in Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance, 58–67. In contrast to 
Tomlinson’s emphasis on harmony, however, I focus on melodic profile, rhythm, and textural variety.  
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inevitably represses the “double pleasure” of the prima parte in favor of catalyzing a stronger 
effetto estrinseco in which pleasure plays no part. 
First, the pacing of the text. Whereas the prima parte, at 48 breves long, repeats most of 
its soggetti at least once, and sometimes more than once, Armida’s speech flies by with little 
repetition of the text in any of the voice parts. (When repetitions do occur, they are quick.) As a 
result, the second, third, and fourth partes all last about half as long as the first, despite the fact 
that all of them set the same number of verses; the fifth parte is about two-thirds as long. Second, 
the texture throughout these sections is, in contrast to the prima parte, largely homophonic.66 As 
a result of this choice, Wert sets the text syllabically with few exceptions. Third, the melodic 
compass of the various voice parts, while similar in overall range to those in the prima parte, 
tends to be narrower at the level of the individual soggetto or phrase. Compare, for example, the 
rapid downward sweep of a twelfth in the Canto in example 4.6, mm. 7–8, to the same voice 
part’s gradual traversal of a ninth over ten measures in example 4.10, which shows the Canto 
part at the beginning of the seconda parte.67  
 
Example 4.10  “Poi cominciò: Non aspettar” (seconda parte), Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, 
Canto, mm. 1–10. Text: “Non aspettar ch’io preghi,/ Crudel, te, come amante amante 
deve/ Tai fumm’un tempo; or se tal esser nieghi,/ E di ciò la memoria anco t’è grave.” 
 
 
66 I will complicate that label below, however. 
 
67 Not coincidentally, the text in example 4.6, mm. 7–8, is canto. Madrigalisms are not the only context 
for wide registral sweeps in the prima parte, however: the representationally-neutral soggetto on “così 
costei” (so she), for example, traverses the octave from C4 to C5 over just six semiminims, with each note 
a disjunct leap away from the previous one. 
Canto
"Non a spet- tar- ch'io pre ghi,- Cru del,- te, co me_a- man- te_a- man- te- de ve- Tai fum -
C.














˙ œ ˙ ˙™ œ ˙ ˙ œ œ w ˙
207 
 
The Canto’s registral arc is even more extreme in the terza parte: for the first 21 measures (of 24 
total), it ranges over no more than the major sixth between G4 and E5, for the most part hovering 
just above and below C5. Only in measure 22 does the Canto reach the lower boundary, E4, of 
its Phrygian modal octave. 
Each of these compositional choices contributes to the speech-like quality of Wert’s 
music in obvious ways, allowing the message of Armida’s speech to come through clearly. As a 
consequence, the overall character of the music is austere, almost self-effacing in its 
subordination of contrapuntal interest to a clear presentation of the text. All the same, there is 
subtlety to Wert’s setting of these stanzas, above all in his manipulations of rhythm and texture, 
and it is through the composer’s treatment of these two elements in particular that stanzas two 
through five register not only as a polyphonic approximation of speech but also as a musical 
representation of oratorical skill. Consider, for example, the metrical disposition of the soggetti 
in the madrigal’s seconda parte, “Poi cominciò: Non aspettar.” Gary Tomlinson has observed 
that Wert’s Gerusalemme settings tend to feature rests in all the parts at the ends of phrases, a 
trait that reaches back to the composer’s early settings of stanzas from Ariosto’s Orlando furioso 
in the Primo libro a 4 of 1561.68 Phrase-end rests are present in the seconda parte, too, for the 
most part coinciding with verse endings. (Verse 5 is an exception—Wert places rests after the 
word “ascolta” rather than after “preghi,” the verse’s final word, to reflect the stanza’s syntax 
instead of its line breaks.) More unusually, all the soggetti in the seconda parte except for the 
 
68 Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance, 61, where Tomlinson argues that Wert’s 
phrase-end rests are intended to “shape a rhythmically effective declamation of the text.” This 
declamatory style in turn harks back to oral traditions of epic poetry declamation. James Haar makes a 
similar observation with reference to Wert’s homophonic settings of Ariosto’s Orlando furioso in the 
Primo libro a 4 of 1561: see his “Arioso and Canzonetta: Rhythm as a Stylistic Determinant in the 
Madrigals of Giaches de Wert,” in Giaches de Wert (1535–1596) and His Time, ed. Eugeen Schreurs and 
Bruno Bouckaert, Yearbook of the Alamire Foundation 3 (Leuven: Peer, 1999), 98. 
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first one begin off the semibreve tactus; moreover, most of them are audibly syncopated against 
it. To my ears, at least, the music sounds breathless as a result, a musical representation of 
Armida’s heightened emotional state (whether feigned or real) as she begins to address Rinaldo. 
Example 4.11 shows the entire Canto part for the madrigal’s seconda parte, with red arrows 
indicating the rests between verses (and sometimes at caesuras).69 
Example 4.11  “Poi cominciò: Non aspettar” (seconda parte), Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, 
Canto (complete). 
 
 In example 4.11, the soggetti at “Crudel” (m. 3), “E di ciò” (m. 8), and “Come nemico” 
(m. 11, repeated at m. 13) are syncopated against the minim subdivision of the semibreve tactus, 
while those at “Tai fumm’un” (m. 5) and “i preghi” (m. 15) obscure the meter through their use 
of what James Haar and others have called arioso rhythm—as Haar defines it, “Additive long-
short rhythmic values (semibreve-minim or, more often, minim-semiminim) residing within but 
 
69 To appreciate how unusual the syncopations are here, compare example 4.11 with “Misera! non 
credea,” another Tasso setting in the Ottavo libro whose text consists largely in direct discourse. 
Although that madrigal uses some of the rhythmic tropes also seen in “Qual musico gentil” (e.g., a 
semiminim rest followed by three or more semiminim notes), its soggetti are on the whole less 
syncopated with respect to the tactus. 
Canto
"Non a spet- tar- ch'io pre ghi,- Cru del,- te, co me_a- man- te_a- man- te- de ve- Tai fum -
C.
m'un tem - po; or se tal es ser- nie ghi,- E di ciò la me mo- ria_an- co- t'è gra ve,-
6
C.
Co me- ne mi- co_al- me- no_a- scol- ta,- co me- ne mi- co_al- me- no_a- scol- ta:- i pre -
11
C.
ghi D'un ne mi- co- tal or- l'al tro- ri ce- ve.- Ben quel ch'iochieg gio_è- tal che dar lo- puo i- ben quel ch'io
16
C.










































Œ œ œ œ
œ œ
œ œ œ
œ ˙ w ∑ Œ
œ œ ™ œ
J
œ œ ˙ œ œ ˙™ œ ˙ ˙ ˙ w
209 
 
unfettered by the duple mensuration.”70 The latter rhythmic pattern was a staple of the 
composer’s earlier works, in particular the aforementioned Ariosto settings, but had become less 
common by the Ottavo libro. In “Qual musico gentil,” arioso rhythms seem to serve as a 
technique for creating rhythmic variety, itself a musical approximation of Armida’s elocutionary 
varietas. And the overall effect, again, is a quality of urgency, as if we are hearing Armida think 
on the spot. 
 Wert’s deployment of texted fusae, meanwhile, shows the composer sketching a longer 
narrative arc over the madrigal’s five partes that correlates to the emotional temperature of the 
moment. In the madrigal’s first three sections—when Armida makes her preparatory sighs 
(prima parte); when she beseeches Rinaldo to listen to her, even if as an enemy rather than as a 
lover (seconda parte); when she begins to admit some of her own faults in a bid to earn his 
sympathy (terza parte)—they are absent. Only at her confessional declaration “I deceived you, I 
enticed you” (T’ingannai, t’allettai), in the fourth parte, does Wert first introduce them, and 










70 Haar, “Arioso and Canzonetta,” 91. These observations are also true of the other voice parts.  
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Example 4.12  “Aggiungi a quest’ancor” (quarta parte), Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, mm. 6–




Armida’s blunt admission to the Christian soldier opens the floodgates to rapid declamation. 
Texted fusae appear twice more in the quarta parte—at the verses “Far delle sue bellezza,” in 










T'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a- -
T'in gan- nai,- t'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a- -
gior tuo dan no:- T'in gan- nai- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a- mo- -
mag gior- tuo dan no:- T'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a- -






mo re,- t'in gan- nai,- t'in gan- nai- nel no stro_a mo- re;- Em -
8
mo re,- t'in gan- nai,- t'in gan- nai- nel no stro_a mo- re;- Em -
re, t'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a mo- re,- t'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a mo- re;-
mo re,- - t'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a mo- re;- -





















œ œ ˙ œ œ œ
œ ˙
Œ œ






























˙ ˙ Œ œ œ
˙
Œ œ œ
























œ œ œ w ™ ˙
















T'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a- -
T'in gan- nai,- t'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a- -
gior tuo dan no:- T'in gan- nai- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a- mo- -
mag gior- tuo dan no:- T'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a- -






mo re,- t'in gan- nai,- t'in gan- nai- nel no stro_a mo- re;- Em -
8
mo re,- t'in gan- nai,- t'in gan- nai- nel no stro_a mo- re;- Em -
re, t'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a mo- re,- t'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a mo- re;-
mo re,- - t'in gan- nai,- t'al let- tai- nel no stro_a mo- re;- -
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madrigal’s first exclamation point—and then again in the quinta parte, spectacularly and now in 
rapid succession, at Armida’s climactic command to Rinaldo: “Away, then: cross the seas, fight, 
struggle,/ Destroy our faith; I too will speed you on” (example 4.13).71 
Example 4.13  “Sia questa pur tra le mie frodi” (quinta parte), Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, 
mm. 11–15. Text: “Vattene: passa il mar, pugna, travaglia,/ Struggi la fede nostr’:anch’io 
t’affretto.” 
 
Although Armida means the opposite of what she says—she wants Rinaldo to remain, not 
leave—Wert’s texted fusae attest to the power of her rhetorical performance, which hinges at this 
moment on her projection of contrition. And as in the quarta parte, the general point to take 
away from this example is that Wert’s rhythmic pattern mimics the sound of the sorceress’ 
speech rather than its semantics. To drive home this point, we might fruitfully compare the 
texted fusae in “Qual musico gentil” to those in “Vezzosi augelli.” In “Vezzosi,” this device has 
 
71 In her 2003 dissertation on Wert, Lynn Treloar makes the useful observation that this line also heralds 
the first fully homophonic passage in the madrigal: “For the first time all five voices declaim at once, 
culminating in separately-texted fusae, followed by a complete break in all parts, the first such complete 
break in the entire piece.” See “The Madrigals of Giaches de Wert: Patrons, Poets and Compositional 
Procedures” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2003), 160. It does seem worth noting, however, that 








to. Vat te- ne:- pas sa_il- mar, pu gna,- tra va- glia,- Strug gi- la fe de- no str':an- ch'io t'af fret- to.-
to. Vat te- ne:- pas sa_il- mar, pu gna,- tra va- glia,- Strug gi- la fe de- no str':an- ch'io- t'af fret- to.-
to. Vat te- ne:- pas sa_il- mar, pu gna,- tra va- glia,- Strug gi- la fe de- no str':an- ch'io- t'af fret- to.-
te ne:- pas sa_il- mar, pu gna,- tra va- glia,- Strug gi- la- fe de- no str':an- ch'io- t'af fret- to.-
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an onomatopoetic tinge, evoking the breeze’s murmuring. In “Qual musico gentil,” it is instead a 
more abstract marker of Armida’s level of agitation—absent at first, then appearing with 
increasing frequency as her appeal grows more impassioned.72 
 Texture, too, provides the composer a means of spinning out variety and interest within 
an otherwise highly constrained musical style. Although secondary commentaries on Wert have 
sometimes characterized his declamatory techniques in broad brush strokes—Tomlinson calls 
this texture “supple recitational homophony”—there is in fact a high degree of textural variation 
across “Qual musico gentil,” including more imitative polyphony than one might expect.73 In the 
madrigal’s terza parte (“Se m’odii, e’n ciò diletto alcun”) for example, Wert uses strict 
homophony in four parts (mm. 19–20), villanella-like three-voice homophony with the upper two 
voices moving in parallel thirds (mm. 1–2); homophony with one voice part (almost always the 
tenor) staggered by a minim (mm. 5–8, mm. 22–23); imitative polyphony on monotonal soggetti 
(mm. 3–4, mm. 11–12); and imitation with two-part, homophonic soggetti alternating between 
voice pairs (mm. 9–11, mm. 13–15)—and all within 24 measures. In most cases, it is difficult to 
 
72 To recall an earlier point (see above, pp. 185–86), texted fusae are not in themselves noteworthy: Wert 
uses them throughout his Ottavo libro in a variety of contexts, and not always with a discernable mimetic 
charge. As Haar—who characterizes Wert’s texted fusae rhythms as canzonetta-like—observes, 
“Canzonetta rhythm, emphasizing the semiminim-plus-two-fusae rhythm…is used in [Wert’s Ottavo 
libro] for texts of canzonetta lightness (Fra le dorate chiome), for pastoral verse (Non sospirar Pastor, 
non lagrimare), and for very serious poetry (Tasso’s Forsennata gridava: O tu che porte),” “Arioso and 
Canzonetta,” 118. My argument is that Wert seems to be controlling their use carefully within single 
madrigals as well as across the Armida cycle as a whole. 
 
73 Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance, 61. MacClintock (Giaches de Wert, 112) does 
refer to the presence of “brief stretto imitation” in these sections. Anticipating my argument here, 
Anthony Newcomb calls attention to the polyphonic basis of Wert’s homophonic style in his study of the 
composer’s early madrigals, writing (of a madrigal from Wert’s Second Book), “Here, as almost always 
(the exceptions are in the first Book a 4), Wert is not writing pseudo-monodic settings, but settings in 
which a polyphonic group projects the expression of a lyric or dramatic persona to a separate audience—a 
truly polyphonic cantar recitando.” See Newcomb, “Wert: A Re-Evaluation of the Early Years in 
Particular,” in Giaches de Wert (1535–1596) and His Time, 16. This assessment of Wert’s homophonic 
style contradicts Stras’ recent claim that “Qual musico gentil” is monodic in conception; see n. 20, above. 
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correlate Wert’s use of these textures directly to the meaning of the text, given that each of them 
appears in myriad contexts throughout Armida’s speech. Instead, it is the fact of their variety that 
seems significant, another device Wert uses to approximate the unpredictable cadences of 
speech. 
 One texture-making technique in particular is worth highlighting both for its ubiquity in 
this madrigal as well as for its possible hermeneutic significance: stretto fuga. As Peter Schubert 
and others have shown, stretto fuga is a method for improvising canons of two or more voices 
evidenced in notated polyphonic repertories from the early fifteenth century onward.74 Its rules 
are simple but strict: the voices must enter at regular time intervals of one unit of consonance—
in “Qual musico gentil,” that unit is the minim—and the “leader” must progress within a limited 
set of melodic intervals in order to create good counterpoint with the other voices when they 
enter. Albeit in small doses, this technique abounds throughout partes two through five of “Qual 
musico gentil.” Take, for example, mm. 18–19 in the seconda parte, heeding the activity of 







74 For a summary of the rules for stretto fuga in two and three parts, see Peter Schubert, “From 
Improvisation to Composition: Three 16th Century Case Studies,” in Improvising Early Music: The 
History of Musical Improvisation from the Late Middle Ages to the Early Baroque, ed. Dirk Moelants 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2014), 93–130, esp. 108–17. The first scholar to identify stretto fuga 
technique (and name it as such) was John Milsom. See his “‘Imitatio,’ ‘Intertextuality,’ and Early Music,” 
in Citation and Authority in Medieval and Renaissance Musical Culture: Learning from the Learned, ed. 
Suzannah Clark and Elizabeth Eva Leach (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell and Brewer, 2005), 141–51. 
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Example 4.14  “Poi cominciò: Non aspettar” (seconda parte), Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, 














ve. Ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che dar lo- puo -
ve.
Ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che
Ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che dar lo- puo - -






i, ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che dar lo- puo i,-
20
Ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che dar lo- puo i,-
dar lo- puo i,- che dar lo- puo i,-
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ve. Ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che dar lo- puo -
ve.
Ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che
Ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che dar lo- puo - -






i, ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che dar lo- puo i,-
20
Ben quel ch'io chieg gio_è- tal che dar lo- puo i,-
dar lo- puo i,- che dar lo- puo i,-
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This passage is a textbook case of three-voice stretto fuga, with strict imitation lasting for seven 
semiminims (quarter notes in the transcription).75 Following the rules for three-voice stretto fuga 
“at the fifth below” (the second voice enters a fifth below the first, and the third voice an octave 
above the second), the Tenore moves either by melodic unison or downward by third, such that 
when Basso and Canto enter on the same soggetto, good counterpoint results. In mm. 20–21, the 
module is then repeated between the Alto, Tenore, and Canto at a different pitch level.76 More 
subtle but no less significant are instances where the Tenore and Basso follow the rules for two-
voice stretto fuga in a context that is otherwise homophonic (example 4.15). 
Example 4.15  “Se m’odii, e’n ciò diletto alcun” (terza parte), Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, 




75 The Quinto, although it enters on the same soggetto in m. 19, is not part of the stretto fuga module 
because it enters two minims after the Canto (rather than one). Likewise the Quinto strictly imitates the 
soggetto for only four semiminims, rather than seven. 
 
76 By “module,” I mean, following Peter Schubert and Julie Cumming, “repeated contrapuntal 
combinations of two or more voices.” See their co-authored “Another Lesson from Lassus: Using 
Computers to Analyse Counterpoint,” Early Music 43, no. 4 (September 2015): 577. The term was first 
introduced by Jessie Ann Owens in “The Milan Partbooks: Evidence of Cipriano de Rore’s 
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In example 4.15, mm. 7–8, Basso imitates Tenore (at the words “anch’io le genti”) according to 
stretto fuga rules for four minims, through the Tenore’s initial leap down of a third.77 The 
passage sounds homophonic, of course, but the homophonic texture is built on a foundation of 
imitation—and more specifically, stretto fuga. Given this strict foundation, it seems possible that 
a passage such as example 4.15 could have been composed from the Tenore-Basso pair up, to 
some degree complicating Tomlinson’s “supple recitational homophony.”78 I would even suggest 
that the stretto fuga here is to some degree audible, although perhaps more to singers than 
listeners. Those singers carrying the Tenore and Basso parts would surely notice the strictness of 
the rhythmic imitation binding their parts together, if not necessarily the identity of their melodic 
intervals.79  
To what end, to what effect, does Wert use stretto fuga? On the one hand, it seems 
possible that this technique abounds throughout the second through fifth sections of “Qual 
musico gentil” simply because it is an easy way to write a lot of polyphony quickly.80 But the 
technique, especially in cases involving three or more voices, also has a characteristic sound; 
compare a point of imitation like the one recorded in example 4.14 to the point on “Altamente la 
voce al canto snodi” in example 4.6, from the prima parte. In example 4.6, the voices enter at 
 
77 For other instances of Tenore-Basso stretto fuga, both lasting longer than the fuga does in example 
4.15, see mm. 2–4 of the terza parte, where strict imitation lasts for seven minims (in these measures, the 
overall texture is imitative, although the other parts do not follow stretto fuga rules); and mm. 22–23 of 
the terza parte, where strict imitation lasts for five minims. 
 
78 Of course, a label such as Tomlinson’s characterizes the passage’s rhetorical effect rather than its 
contrapuntal craft, but my point is that the latter necessarily underpins the former, even in cases like 
example 4.15 where the soggetto is monotonal or otherwise simple. Put differently, one cannot compose 
“supple recitational homophony” in the Renaissance without following the rules for imitation/fuga.  
 
79 I owe this observation to Eamonn Bell (personal communication). 
 
80 This explanation would accord with Stras’ argument that the version of “Qual musico gentil” preserved 
in Wert’s Ottavo libro is a polyphonic arrangement of a monodic original (Women and Music in 
Sixteenth-Century Ferrara, 286). 
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irregular time intervals, often at pitch intervals other than a fifth or octave, and with each 
entrance subtly varying the soggetti’s rhythms. In example 4.14, by contrast, the entrances are 
regular and the rhythms identical (not to mention square) between the three voice parts. It 
therefore seems possible to correlate Wert’s use of stretto fuga to the speech-like quality we have 
been tracing across various musical features in Wert’s setting. Just as Armida improvises her 
own speech to Rinaldo, so does Wert spin out imitative polyphony in an essentially 
improvisational and formulaic style. 
 
 In all, Wert’s music for partes two through five of “Qual musico gentil” is honed to 
maximize the madrigal’s emotional impact, which, according to the two-stage model for 
emotional arousal, flows principally from its oratione. Unlike in the prima parte, where Wert’s 
polyphony foregrounds music’s representational capacity—its ability to evoke sights, sounds, 
and emotions such that these objects may be recognized and their musical renderings appreciated 
by listeners—the later sections offer up music aimed instead at communicating the message of 
the text, with few opportunities for listeners to access the cognitive pleasure that flows from 
mimetic devices like the madrigalism. The pleasure of music as such, too, is largely absent from 
Wert’s setting of Armida’s speech. Through formulaic techniques like stretto fuga, and restrained 
melodic writing, Wert’s music avoids drawing attention to itself.  
To frame this avoidance in more positive terms, we might say that Wert’s declamatory 
music mimics Armida’s strategy of concealing artifice for persuasive purposes.81 Although 
Wert’s music for the madrigal’s second through fifth partes undeniably increases the affective 
charge of the sorceress’ words, it does so inconspicuously, without highlighting (for example) 
 
81 For a discussion of this rhetorical strategy, see this chapter’s introduction. 
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sonority, as in a melisma, or contrapuntal complexity, as in a chain of invertible suspensions. Put 
differently, these sections of “Qual musico gentil” are rhetorical ars celare artem made 
musical.82 And given its storied efficacy in the rhetorical tradition, it should not surprise us if 
Wert’s polyphonic persuasion-by-concealment moves his audience to the same degree that 
Armida does hers, namely the soggetto ben disposto Rinaldo. Like Lorenzo Giacomini’s soul-
moving oggetto, Wert’s polyphony compels the mind to make some kind of judgment of the 
sorceress—one accompanied, no doubt, by a sensation of pain.83 
 
4.5 “Forsennata gridava” 
At 23 breves, Wert’s “Forsennata gridava” is shorter than any individual parte in “Qual musico 
gentil.” But its text packs a punch: 
Forsennata gridava: O tu, che pórte  Madly she cried, “O you who take one part 
Teco parte di me, parte ne lassi, and leave the other part behind, 
O prendi l’una, o rendi l’altra, o morte  take the rest too, or give me back my heart, 
Dà insieme ad ambe: arresta i passi,  or kill them both! Oh, stop, please stop, and mind 
Sol che ti sian le voci ultime pôrte;  the last words I will ever speak to you— 
Non dico i baci: altra piú degna avrassi  no kisses, oh no, I’m assured you’ll find 
Quelli da te. Che témi, empio, se resti?  someone more worthy of them! Afraid to stay? 
Potrai negar, poiché fuggir potesti. You can deny as well as run away!84 
 
Within Tasso’s poem, this stanza precedes those of “Qual musico gentil,” occurring at the 
moment that Armida has caught up to the trio of fleeing soldiers on the beach, where their ship is 
 
82 For a very different argument about the possible relevance of ars celare artem—more specifically, 
Castiglione’s sprezzatura—to the madrigals of Wert’s Ottavo libro, see Laurie Stras, “‘Non è sì denso 
velo’: Hidden and Forbidden Practice in Wert’s Ottavo libro de madrigali a cinque voci (Venice: 
Gardano, 1586),” in Eroticism in Early Modern Music, ed. Bonnie J. Blackburn and Laurie Stras 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 156. 
 
83 For Giacomini’s definition of affetto, see pp. 124–26 of this dissertation. 
 
84 Jerusalem Delivered, trans. Esolen, 308 (16.40). 
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docked.85 Her aim here is simply to detain Rinaldo a bit longer, lest he sail off before she gets a 
final word in. (Verses 4–5, “mind/ the last words I will ever speak to you,” presumably refer to 
her subsequent speech, the one set in “Qual musico gentil.”) But “Forsennata gridava,” we have 
seen, follows “Qual musico gentil” in Wert’s Ottavo libro—why? There is likely no definitive 
answer. Armida’s plea to Rinaldo is generic enough that it is difficult to find a narrative 
justification for its shuffled placement in Wert’s book. Musically, too, “Forsennata gridava” for 
the most part resembles the second through fifth partes of “Qual musico gentil,” making use of 
the various speech-like devices surveyed above. 
 All the same, there are connections both textual and musical to Wert’s two other Armida 
madrigals that make this piece an intriguing conclusion to the cycle. Regarding the text, the 
“Forsennata gridava” stanza shares with Wert’s other Tasso excerpts its rhetorical frame: 
whether in person or by horticultural proxy, Armida is trying to convince somebody of 
something in all three madrigals.86 More than that, “Forsennata gridava” echoes, in highly 
compacted fashion, “Qual musico gentil’s” thematization of the contrast between nonlinguistic 
utterance and speech. In “Forsennata,” the former are the sorceress’ cries, as recorded by the 
text’s first two words, and the latter are her spoken words, which follow in direct quotation. With 
the full cycle in view, we might also group Armida’s gridi with the natural sounds in “Vezzosi,” 
such that five nonverbal sonic stimuli emerge across the three madrigals: birdsong, breezes, 
 
85 It does not directly precede “Qual musico gentil,” however, for two stanzas intervene between them. In 
16.41, a stanza Tasso eventually excised from his poem (see the editorial notes in Solerti, ed., 3:192), 
Ubaldo counsels Rinaldo to listen to Armida’s entreaty. In 16.42, Tasso’s narrator records the moment of 
unbearable emotional intensity just before Armida makes her “harmony of sighs,” as she looks at Rinaldo 
and he, embarrassed, avoids her gaze. I am grateful to Massimo Ossi for drawing my attention to the 
importance of this stanza. See also n. 87. 
 
86 This consistency is in keeping with her characterization as a deceitful orator throughout the 
Gerusalemme liberata. Persuasion is Armida’s main activity. 
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ricercars, sighs, and cries. Two key differences intervene between the first four and the last one, 
however. Armida’s cries are not compared to music (nor are they, like ricercars, literally music) 
and they do not seem to serve the purpose of disposing Rinaldo favorably à la Zarlino’s two-
stage model. To me, these differences suggest that, within the narrative fashioned by Wert’s 
rearrangement of Tasso’s stanzas, Armida’s musico-rhetorical strategies are beginning to falter 
in this final madrigal. In “Vezzosi augelli,” the birdsong and breeze-music are tacitly 
acknowledged to be products of “art”; in “Qual musico gentil,” Armida’s harmonious sighs are 
one of her “arts and deceptions.” “Forsennata’s” gridi bear no qualifiers. The sorceress’ cries are, 
rather, signs of genuine emotion. She is, on Wert’s reading, no longer an orator, but a 
forsennata—a madwoman.87  
 To this line of reasoning, one could reasonably object that Tasso’s verb gridava does not 
refer to a nonverbal cry, much less a musical one. Given that it is followed by seven verses of 
direct speech, this verb might instead characterize Armida’s manner of delivering her words—
her pronuntiatio. Just two verses earlier, however, Tasso uses the noun gridi in a context that 
seems clearly nonverbal (16.39, v. 7): 
Or negletta e schernita, in abbandono Now she was left behind, neglected, scorned 
Rimasa, segue pur chi fugge e sprezza; Yet she pursued the scornful man who fled. 
E procura adornar co’ pianti il dono Her gift of loveliness might be adorned 
Rifiutato per sé di sua bellezza. (rejected in itself) by tears she shed— 
Vassene; ed al piè tenero non sono so she hoped—and the ice and the sharp stones 
Quel gelo intoppo e quella alpina asprezza; cut her soft foot—and still she sent ahead 
E invía per messaggieri inanzi i gridi, her cries as messengers, which could not reach 
Né giunge lui pria ch’ ei sia giunto a i lidi. her loved one’s ears till he was on the beach.88 
 
 
87 On Tasso’s reading, by contrast, Armida arrives on the beach a forsennata but then regains her 
composure—and along with it, her rhetorical arte e frodi—over the course of 16.42 (on which see also n. 
85): “She looks at him, she stares, says not a word./ Perhaps she scorns to, or is thinking, or/ dares not” 
(Lui guarda, e in lui s’affissa, e non favella:/ O che sdegna, o che pensa, o che non osa), Esolen, trans., 
308. 
 
88 Esolen, trans., 307. 
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More important than any (admittedly inconclusive) evidence internal to the poem, however, Wert 
clearly agrees with this interpretation of gridava. His famous setting of the stanza’s opening two 
words are as distant from speech as the expressive resources of Cinquecento polyphony allow 
(example 14.16). 
 
Example 4.16  “Forsennata gridava,” Giaches de Wert, Ottavo libro, mm. 1–7. Text: 
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To quote Einstein on this passage, “Wert’s music embodies Armida’s hysterical outcry 
directly.”89 Indeed, with its hyperbolic leap upward of a tenth following directly on the heels of a 
monotonal incipit—the latter, with its conspicuous texted fusae, a kind of warped echo of the 
opening “Mormorar l’aura” motif in “Vezzosi augelli”—Wert’s music unambiguously assigns 
Tasso’s verb a nonlinguistic valence. (Say any word across a melodic tenth to understand my 
point.) The gesture is almost comically extreme, a madrigalism on steroids.90 But a madrigalism 
all the same. As in “Vezzosi augelli” and the prima parte of “Qual musico gentil,” albeit here 
more ostentatiously, Wert’s approach to setting these two words underscores polyphony’s 
representational power by making Armida’s cry literal.91  
 
89 Einstein, The Italian Madrigal, 2:571. Einstein’s association of Armida with hysteria is, of course, a 
dated and misogynistic trope. 
 
90 MacClintock (Giaches de Wert, 112) observes that this madrigalism echoes two others from the Primo 
libro a 4 of 1561 (Nos. 13 and 20), which evoke “gridare” with octave leaps. 
 
91 As a side note, it is interesting to me that Wert’s opening seems to contradict, or ignore, the fact that the 
words “Forsennata gridava” are spoken by a narrator: it is difficult to hear these measures as anything but 
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What seems to me all the more remarkable about this famous passage, however—and a 
feature less commented upon in the secondary literature—is how abruptly the music transitions 
into Wert’s “declamatory mode,” familiar from partes two through five of “Qual musico gentil.” 
The first seven bars of “Forsennata gridava” are almost a microcosm of that madrigal’s large-
scale stylistic bifurcation. Whereas in “Qual musico gentil” the transition between styles occurs 
between two partes, here they crash into each other in a single measure, as the final note of the 
soggetto on “gridava,” a minim on “-va,” simply becomes the first note of a new soggetto, itself 
monotonal and in the new style, on “O tu che porte” (see m. 4 in example 4.16).  One could 
easily miss the moment of transition. By measure 7, however, the composer’s priorities have 
clearly shifted toward an effective presentation of the text: the texture becomes all but 
homophonic, the melodic compass suddenly narrow, the rhythms suddenly speech-like. (Note, 
for example, the rhythmic parallelism Wert makes use of in mm. 6–7 to evoke the sonic 
parallelism of “parte di” and “parte ne.”) For the rest of the madrigal, Wert sticks to this 
declamatory mode as Armida spins out her verbal appeal. 
 
 How might this madrigal reflect the discourses on imitation and emotion that informed 
my readings of “Vezzosi augelli” and “Qual musico gentil”? Does Wert’s setting of the opening 
words evoke the pleasure of recognition, the rest of them emotional arousal? Given its brevity, I 
am disinclined to offer a similar “bifurcated” reading of “Forsennata gridava”; it is difficult to 
imagine any meaningful emotional progression taking place in listeners over 23 breves. The 
extravagant gestures of its opening, too, seem to preclude the relevance of favorable emotional 
predisposition, and its attendant pleasure, to the madrigal. If anything, “Forsennata” continues 
the path toward full-on arousal taken by “Qual musico gentil,” its opening cries a sign that 
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Armida has thrown careful rhetorical tactics out the window in favor of a sincere disclosure of 
her emotional state.  
For this reason, in fact, “Forsennata” serves as an effective capstone to the trio, 
heightening the stakes of what came before it. With “Vezzosi augelli,” Wert explores the power 
of natural sounds to allure and entice. In “Qual musico gentil,” his focus shifts to the capacity of 
human utterance to earn sympathy from an audience disinclined to give it. Both texts feature 
musical metaphors, lending their polyphonic settings a self-reflexive quality. (To some degree, 
these madrigals are about their own capacity to move listeners.) In “Forsennata gridava,” finally, 
Wert shifts the emphasis from sympathy to fear, and from meta-musical metaphor to 
verisimilitude: Armida’s cries, as rendered by the composer, bowl over the ears, nearly 
collapsing the gap between musical imitante and poetic imitata. In so doing, the composer 
concludes his cycle with a rhetorical flourish worthy of the sorceress herself. 
 
4.6 Conclusion (Methodological Thoughts) 
It has not been the intention of this chapter to suggest that actual listeners reacted to Wert’s 
music according to the models for audience response I have outlined. As should be clear, my 
arguments center the composer’s scores and poetic texts rather than historical documentation 
regarding how audiences listened to Giaches de Wert’s music at Ferrara in the 1580s. At the 
same time, I have endeavored to avoid attributing intentionality to the composer himself. There 
is no way to know, for example, whether Wert consciously sought to stimulate the quasi-
syllogistic “pleasure of inference” with his musical imitations of words; to the contrary, it is 
unlikely that a composer like Wert would have been versed in the latest wave of vernacular 
Aristotelian philosophy. The scope of my various claims about listener response in this chapter is 
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therefore both broad and narrow—broad because my arguments lie at the level of cultural 
assumptions or givens rather than individual intentions, narrow because they stem from the 
discussions and debates of learned writers, men all. Cinquecento philosophers held certain 
assumptions about the emotive and ethical power of works of art to move the body and soul; this 
chapter has demonstrated one method for bringing these assumptions to bear on the way we 
study a specific artistic practice of the same period, namely the Italian madrigal. And even if 
madrigals themselves only speak indirectly to sixteenth-century understandings of mimesis and 
emotion, I hope to have shown that with a few leaps of mind and method they can be treated as a 
kind of historical evidence for them all the same. 
 There is some direct evidence regarding both the composer’s intentions for, and an actual 
audience’s reception of, the Ottavo libro that I would be remiss not to address, however. This 
evidence is Wert’s famous dedicatory letter: 
To my most serene Lord, most esteemed Lord and Patron, the Lord Duke of Ferrara, etc. 
I would have committed a most notable error if, in bringing into light these my musical 
compositions written for the most part in Ferrara, I had directed them to a person other 
than Your Highness—for to whom more worthy could I have dedicated them than to such 
a great prince, such a friend of the virtues, such a patron of the virtuous, and such a 
benign protector of my works [things]? And in what part of the world could these be 
better sung than in Your Highness’s court, where I do not know how to decide which is 
greater—the mastery of those who sing or the judgment of those who listen? … [T]o 
whom today are not notable the marvels of art and nature, the voice, the grace, the 
disposition, the memory, and the other comparable and so rare qualities of the three most 
noble young ladies of the most serene Lady Duchess of Ferrara? In this respect alone it 
would be enough to induce all the composers of the world to direct their works to Your 
Highness, because from such divine voices and such a noble ensemble they would 
receive the true and natural spirit of Music.92 
 
In praising the virtues of his patron’s court, Wert offers rare testament of a sixteenth-century 
musical culture that valued listening as much as participatory music-making, a culture that would 
increasingly become the norm. The particular listeners described here belonged to the court of 
 
92 Quoted and translated in Stras, “Hidden and Forbidden Practice,” 143–44. 
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Duke Alfonso II d’Este, at Ferrara, where the madrigals in Wert’s Ottavo libro were almost 
certainly performed by the Duke’s concerto delle dame for a small audience of his closest 
associates.93 As Stras writes, Wert’s madrigals “were composed within and for a unique 
environment of virtuosity—not just of performance, but also of connoisseurship—in which the 
audience could be expected not only to understand and appreciate, but also to critique the 
aesthetic and the technique of both composition and performance.”94 By praising the “judgment 
of those who listen” (giudicio di chi l’ascolta), Wert draws back the curtain, if only slightly, on 
courtly listening practices. These madrigals were not listened to idly, but rather attentively, and 
presumably with an ear toward the composer’s representation of the poetic text. That this 
comment was made by a composer is worth stressing; Wert wrote the madrigals in his Ottavo 
libro with a particular kind of listener—indeed with particular listeners—in mind.  
The composer’s statement is nevertheless tantalizing in its vagueness: what form did this 
giudicio take at Duke Alfonso’s court? For one answer, readers may consult Newcomb’s The 
Madrigal at Ferrara or Stras’ Women and Music in Sixteenth-Century Ferrara, both exemplary, 
textured studies of elite Ferrarese musical culture. This chapter has sketched a different answer 
by recourse to another elite culture, namely the intellectual tradition represented by the literary 
critics, academicians, and music theorists studied in chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation. Where 
Wert writes in concise praise of his audience’s “judgment,” a theorist like Giacomini attests to 
“the noble relaxation of the mind [acquired] through knowledge of the exquisiteness of the 
 
93 On the concerto delle dame and musical culture at Ferrara in the 1580s, see Anthony Newcomb, The 
Madrigal at Ferrara; and Stras, Women and Music in Sixteenth-Century Ferrara. 
 
94 Stras, “Hidden and Forbidden Practice,” 144. 
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work.”95 (Moreover, as we have seen, Giacomini describes the psychosomatic processes that 
underlie this mode of appreciation in detail.) Where various reports about the music-making at 
Alfonso’s court attest to the splendor and pleasure of the concerto’s performances, Alessandro 
Piccolomini lists the quasi-syllogistic mental steps by which a spectator comes to access this 
pleasure. This is not to establish a hierarchy between these two kinds of discourses, as if the 
theorists are revealing the rhetorical and psychological assumptions that lie behind the vaguer 
statements of composers or courtiers. Rather, they speak to two different sixteenth-century ways 
of understanding and describing similar kinds of experiences. And if I have privileged one of 
these discourses over the other in the preceding pages, the few that remain build a bridge 
between the two by examining a unique theory of musico-rhetorical persuasion in its social 
context.
 
95 “il nobile diporto de la mente per la conoscenza de la esquisitezza de l’opera,” Giacomini, “De la 




Conclusion: Notation and Musical Speech in a Forgotten 
 Florentine Manuscript 
 
This dissertation began with Vincenzo Galilei’s attack on the madrigalism in his 1581 Dialogo. 
In place of the word-by-word or phrase-by-phrase representation of poetic texts commonly seen 
in madrigals, the Florentine theorist implored musicians to represent the sounds of speech, the 
better to move listeners’ souls to a “corresponding affection.” In chapter 1, I argued that Galilei’s 
condemnation of the madrigalism and its long critical legacy have closed our ears off to other 
possible emotional valences of this device. Given both its ubiquity in the late Cinquecento 
madrigal and the seriousness of the contexts in which it is used, critics’ repeated dismissals of 
the madrigalism as “childish” and “pictorial” ring false. People must have heard it differently. 
With the help of one composer and a number of sixteenth-century writers, I have in the 
preceding pages offered an alternative. Our efforts culminated in chapter 4, where I suggested 
that we hear the madrigalisms in Giaches de Wert’s “Vezzosi augelli” and “Qual musico gentil” 
as fulfilling a crucial role in stimulating the emotions, namely “disposing” listeners favorably à 
la the two-stage model for emotional arousal. For as we learned from Zarlino in chapter 3, 
musicians cannot simply move the emotions at will; listeners must first become soggetti ben 
disposti, subjects who are prepared to be moved. Zarlino, for his part, pairs this “dispositional” 
effect with textless music, or semplice harmonia. Within the polyphonic purview of the 
madrigal, I have suggested that madrigalisms elicit a similar one by inviting the “pleasure of 
inference,” that rational experience of pleasure theorized in the commentary tradition around 
Aristotle’s Poetics we examined in chapter 2. If with a wink to the fiction of dialoguing with a 
historical interlocutor, these arguments about Wert’s “Armida” cycle constituted a response to 
Galilei’s provocation. At the same time, Galilei might have approved of my conclusions 
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regarding partes two through five of “Qual musico gentil.” Only these sections of Wert’s 
madrigal, so I argued in chapter 4, are calibrated to move a listener’s soul to a fully emotional 
state, and they do so by imitating the sound of Armida’s rhetorical performance rather than the 
meaning of Tasso’s words. Wert’s music for Armida’s speech, in other words, looks not unlike 
Galilei’s vision for a musical style that expresses the concetti dell’animo by imitating a speaking 
voice. 
Perhaps this dissertation can therefore endorse at least part of Galilei’s critical legacy. 
More than his critique of the madrigalism did anything to stymie composers’ use of this device 
(it did nothing of the kind), Galilei’s advice that musicians should model their compositional 
practice on the variable tone and speaking styles of commedia dell’arte actors clearly presages, 
and likely influenced, the emergence of operatic recitative at the end of the sixteenth century.1 
Rather than cast aside as a cantankerous dissenter unable to appreciate the music of his day, on 
the Artusi model, Galilei has earned pride of place in Western classical music historiography in 
large part because of this prescient directive.2 And in their own way, my arguments about the 
relationship between Wert’s homophonic style and Zarlino’s two-stage model for emotional 
arousal provide another context for, and confirmation of, Galilei’s belief in the passions-moving 
capacity of elocutionary song. 
 
 By way of conclusion, I would like to revisit Galilei’s remarks once more, but this time 
not from the perspective of later developments in musical criticism but rather from an earlier 
 
1 See Palisca, Music and Ideas, 62–64. 
 
2 Galilei’s legacy is due not only to his participation in the invention of recitative but also to his 
contributions to theories of tuning and to his research on ancient Greek music, on which see Palisca’s 
“Introduction” in Galilei, Dialogue on Ancient and Modern Music. 
230 
 
one. About a decade before the Dialogo was published, another writer addressed the possibility 
of representing speech through music at a gathering of the Accademia degli Alterati, a Florentine 
literary academy that met between 1569 and about 1625. Constituted mainly of noblemen but 
also some musicians, poets, and university professors, this group is known to music historians 
for its ties to the Florentine Camerata, the informal musical academy often credited with the first 
experiments in opera.3 Lorenzo Giacomini was a member, as were Ottavio Rinuccini (Dafne and 
L’Arianna librettist), Jacopo Corsi (one of the Dafne composers), and Girolamo Mei, Galilei’s 
mentor and an expert on ancient Greek music.  
As the Alterati’s minutes record, their meetings included debates at which two members 
delivered oral arguments on either side of a question, or “proposition” (propositione).4 These 
debates covered a wide range of topics including history, rhetoric, poetics, politics, and 
occasionally music. (Examples of debated propositions include “that imitating is nothing other 
than feigning,” “that the definition of poetry is imitation with words,” “[that] the proemium is the 
most important part of a speech,” “that all the modes of persuasion are artificial,” and “that for 
the excellence of poetry the help of nature is more necessary than that of art.”5) One day early in 
 
3 On the Alterati’s ties to music, and in particular opera, see Palisca, “The Alterati of Florence”; Hanning, 
Of Poetry and Music’s Power, chapter 2; and, most recently, Blocker, “The Accademia degli Alterati and 
the Invention of a New Form of Dramatic Experience.” Literature on the Alterati is still scant, although a 
monograph on the group by Blocker, a literary historian, is being released later this year. 
 
4 The Alterati’s minutes are preserved in two manuscripts held at Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana in 
Florence, Ashburnham 558.1 and 558.2. 
 
5 “Che l’imitare non è altro che fingere” (50r), “Che la Diffinitione della Poesia è questa imitazione fatta 
con sermone” (50r), “se l’Proemio è la più necessaria parte che sia nell’orationi,” (59v–60r), “che tutti i 
modi di persuadere sono artifitiosi” (59v), “che all’eccellenza dlla Poesia era piu necessario l’aiuto di 
Natura, che quello dell’Arte” (64v), ibid. Some of these propositions are transcribed in Bernard 
Weinberg, “Argomenti di discussione letteraria nell’Accademia degli Alterati (1570-1600), Giornale 
Storico della Letteratura Italiana (April 1954): 175–94. As he notes (176), Weinberg only transcribes 
those minutes of literary interest, leaving out (for example) most of the rhetorical discussions. As Palisca 
reports (“The Alterati of Florence,” 417), a debate was held on December 10, 1574, over the proposition 
“that music is better than conversation with friends.” 
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the academy’s history (the exact date is unknown) a debate was held over the proposition “that 
speeches should be directed entirely at listeners rather than readers.”6 Tommaso Del Nero (lo 
Sconcio, 1544–72), one of the Academy’s founding members, assumed the affirmative stance, 
and Cosimo Rucellai (il Travagliato) took the negative.7 Del Nero’s speech survives in a messy 
set of lecture notes bound into a manuscript collection of the Academy’s prose writings now held 
at the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana in Florence; Rucellai’s response is not extant.8 
Although the proposition is phrased somewhat ambiguously, its pitting of “listeners” 
against “readers” cues the debate’s real subject: rhetorical delivery, or pronuntiatio. In 
comparison to the other parts of rhetoric (inventio, dispositio, elocutio, and memoria), how 
valuable is pronuntiatio for persuading listeners and moving their emotions? Can the most 
powerful aspects of speechmaking be recorded in writing, or do they belong solely to the arts of 
performance? Del Nero’s speech makes a passionate case for the importance of delivery, which 
he usually calls attione. For Del Nero, rhetorical “action” includes bodily gestures, facial 
expressions, and vocal modulations, all of which he considers instrumental for moving listeners’ 
passions. More than that, he argues that these aspects of rhetoric are fundamentally incapable of 
being “represented” (rappresentare) in writing. Hence his position, repeatedly cued in his speech 
by the refrain “Who could ever write down…?”, that orations should be directed at listeners 
rather than readers. Taking up bodily gestures, for example, Del Nero asks, “Who could ever 
 
6 See n. 8 for the Italian. The debate must have taken place sometime between 1569, when the Academy 
was founded, and 1572, when Tommaso Del Nero, one of the debate’s participants, died. 
 
7 Alterati members took pseudonyms, as was traditional for academies. For a list of them, see Palisca, 
“The Alterati of Florence,” 430–31. 
 
8 Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana Ashburnham 559, 65r–74r. The title of Del Nero’s speech (on 65r) 
records the debated proposition: “Orazione recitata in difesa della [illegible] Propositione Che l’orazione 
debbe essere interamente indiritta à gl’Uditori, non à i Lettori.” 
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write down the many and varied movements of the head or the body, which have pride of place 
in delivery? With these we affirm, we deny, we menace, we beseech…”9 The question is 
rhetorical: Del Nero systematically denies writing a role in each of delivery’s subspecies.  
To the music historian, Del Nero’s speech is interesting in the first place for its clear 
resonance with musical sources from the period that call attention to the limits of music notation. 
Among theorists of both rhetoric and music, that is, it was openly acknowledged that writing 
could only go so far as a technology of representation; some of each art’s essential features, 
especially those pertaining to performance or delivery, were simply non-literate. In his 1555 
L’antica musica ridotta alla moderna prattica, for example, Nicola Vicentino relates that 
“sometimes a composition is performed according to a certain method that cannot be written 
down, such as uttering softly and loudly or fast and slow, or changing the measure in keeping 
with the words, so as to show the effects of the passions and the harmony.”10 He explicitly 
associates these techniques with the art of delivery in rhetoric: “The experience of the orator can 
be instructive, if you observe the technique he follows in his oration. For he speaks now loud and 
now soft, now slow and now fast, thus greatly moving his listeners.”11 These arguments, likely 
adapted from a rhetorical manual, clearly parallel Del Nero’s own about the limited utility of 
writing for capturing techniques of performance.12 It is also a known historical fact that 
 
9 “Chi potrà mai scrivere i tanti et diversi movimenti del capo i quali sì come questi nel corpo, così hanno 
nell’attione il primo luogo? Con questo affermiamo, neghiamo, minacciamo, supplichiamo…”, ibid., 70r. 
 
10 “qualche volta si usa un certo ordine di procedere, nelle compositioni, che non si può scrivere, come 
sono, il dir piano, e forte, e il dir presto, e tardo, e secondo le parole, muovere la Misura, per dimostrare 
gli effetti delle passioni delle parole, e dell’armonia,” (Rome: Antonio Barre, 1555), 94v. Translation 
from Ancient Music Adapted to Modern Practice, trans. Maniates, 301. 
 
11 “la esperienza, dell’Oratore l’insegna, che si vede il modo che tiene nell’oratione, che hora dice forte, e 
hora piano, e più tardo, e più presto, e con questo muove assai gl’uditori,” ibid., 301 (94v in original). 
 
12 Some further examples of musical sources that draw attention to non-literate aspects of musical practice 
include Giulio Caccini’s Preface to Le nuove musiche (1602), which is famous for recording in notation 
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sixteenth-century singers made use of some of the attioni Del Nero discusses. Recall from 
chapter 2, in this regard, that Zarlino expressly dismisses attioni as inappropriate to musical 
performance, writing, “But musicians do not need these attioni. Those imitations that can be 
made with the voice and heard with the senses are enough.”13 These connections between 
rhetorical and musical discourses are nevertheless not too surprising. If this dissertation has 
affirmed anything, it is that music theorists often turned to rhetoric for concepts and vocabulary 
to help define and discuss aspects of their own art.  
But Del Nero’s speech goes further, in one place drawing upon an unlikely musical 
resource to advance his argument about the role of writing in rhetoric. I believe Del Nero’s 
comments here—hitherto unknown among musicologists or literary historians—are 
 
vocal ornaments that were widely understood to be part of an oral tradition, as well as Jacopo Peri’s 
comments about Vittoria Archilei’s singing in his Preface to The Music of Euridice: “I 
demonstrated…this new manner of singing, and it gave the greatest pleasure…to that celebrated lady 
whom one may call the Euterpe of our age, Signora Vettoria Archilei, who has always made my music 
worthy of her song, adorning it not only with those gruppi and with those long roulades both simple and 
double which, by the liveliness of her wit, are encountered at every moment…but also those sorts of 
delights and graces which cannot be written, and if written cannot be learned from the notation,” 
translated in Oliver Strunk and Leo Treitler, eds., Source Readings in Music History, rev. ed. (New York: 
Norton, 1998), 153. 
 
13 “Ma i Musici non hanno di bisogno di simili Attioni; percioche li basta solo quelle Imitatione, che si 
possono far con la Voce e udire col Senso,” Sopplimenti musicali 8.11.319. Zarlino does acknowledge the 
power of attioni in rhetorical contexts, however, writing that the musician “cannot use those actions that 
the orator uses in his speeches. Due to his seriousness, [the orator] can very effectively use those 
imitations with suitable action to express the material, not only with these qualities of vocal sounds (voci) 
and words but also by accompanying [the material] with gestures of the body and movements fitting for 
each thing. These [movements]…have great power to move listeners’ souls and persuade judges’ souls of 
some Cause” (non può usar quelle Attioni, che usa l’Oratore nelle sue Ringhe; il quale stando nella sua 
gravità, può bene e ottimamente usar quelle Imitationi col mezo dell’Attione, che convien nell’esprimere 
le materie, non solo con quelle qualità de voci e parole, che le conviene; ma etiando accompagnandovi i 
Gesti del corpo, con movimenti atti e convenevoli à cotal cosa: i qualli…hanno gran forza di commover 
l’Animo de gli Ascoltanti, e di piegar l’animo de i Giudici in alcuna causa), Sopplimenti musicali 
8.11.318. As will become clear below, Zarlino’s vocabulary here significantly overlaps with Del Nero’s. 
See also chapter 2, section 2.2, for a discussion of Zarlino’s rejection of gesture as a musical resource. 
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unprecedented for the period; they also open up new directions for research for this project. A 
translation of the relevant passage, which is reproduced in figure C.1, follows:14  
Perhaps il Travagliato would say that action can be represented with the pen! 
 
And who could ever write down the different alterations of the voice that are needed 
variously in operating according to the different qualities of causes and ideas [of a case]? 
Perhaps he will be like someone who is very knowledgeable in music, having found a 
new way of placing notes above or below words like they do in madrigals! I do not 
believe it. Because this would show either the lowering or raising of sounds but not the 
qualities of the voice. For it is proper in deliberating to use a pure and clear voice. In 
accusing or defending now a vehement, now a restrained [voice]. It is proper in blaming 
or praising to use now a sweet and now a harsh [voice]. Through these variations, the 
character of the orator is expressed marvelously, and as a consequence he procures 
through this method those words that he is looking for.15 
 
As a concession to his opponent’s position, Del Nero raises the possibility that aspects of 
rhetorical performance pertaining to the voice could in fact be represented in writing through the 
use of musical notation, “like they do in madrigals.” His vision is striking, perhaps unique in 
sixteenth-century rhetorical or musical thought: in music notation, orators might find the means 
to communicate in ink—either to other readers or, more likely, to themselves—those 
components of speechmaking traditionally left off the page. In a period when music was 
frequently discussed with vocabulary and concepts borrowed from rhetoric, Del Nero turns the 
tables. Now it is speechmaking that takes instruction from music—and in particular from 
 
14 The passage is written in the style of lecture notes rather than a completed oration, so not all of the 
sentences are grammatical. See figure C.1 below for an image of the relevant page in the manuscript. 
 
15 “Dirà forse il Travagliato che la attione si può rappresentare con la penna! E chi potrà mai scrivere le 
diverse mutationi delle voci le quali ha diversamente bisogno in operare secondo le diverse qualità delle 
cause, et de i concetti; sarà forse egli come il quale ottimamente sa di musica; trovato [uncertain] nuovo 
modo, di mettera sopra o sotto alle parole alcune note come a i Madriali si fa! io non lo credo, perché 
questo mostrerebbe o il più l’abbassare o l’alzare de i suoni ma non già la qualità delle voci, conciosia che 
nel deliberare si convenga usare la voce pure e chiara. Nell’Accusare o difendere hor vehemente [a̶l̶t̶a̶] hor 
rimessa [b̶a̶s̶s̶a̶], si convenga usare nel biasimare o nel lodare hor dolce hor aspra; Dalle quali mutationi 
viene espresso maravigliosamenti il costume dell’oratore, et per conseguente si procaccia per questa via 
quelle parole che egli [uncertain] va cercando,” Ashburnham 559, 69r.  
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madrigals, presumably referenced here because Del Nero associates this genre with a close 
music–text bond (extending to relevant features like good text alignment in printed madrigal 
books).16 But the prospect of annotating speeches with notation turns out to be a rhetorical 
fiction. Having entertained the possibility of its usefulness to rhetoric, Del Nero dismisses music 
notation because of its inability to represent “la qualità delle voci,” or what we would now call 
timbre, i.e., the property of a sound independent of its pitch and rhythm. Instead, Del Nero 
maintains, notation only captures “the lowering or raising of sounds,” that is, pitch. (He does not 
address notation’s relationship to rhythm.) As quickly as he calls up a tantalizing music-speech 
hybrid, Del Nero casts it out.17 
 
16 It could also be that Del Nero names madrigals because he associates them with the vernacular. 
 
17 Del Nero’s comments might also relate to an intriguing set of mid-century Florentine documents—the 
“Pasquinata” of 1544 and the responses it provoked—that record a virulent debate over music notation 
and improvised song in the Accademia Fiorentina. See Robert Nosow, “The Debate on Song in the 
Accademia Fiorentina,” Early Music History 21 (2002): 175–221. In that debate, the primary charge 
leveled against music notation was its artificiality, a quality which linked it in the eyes of its detractors to 
polyphony. Nosow writes (ibid., 187): “Artificiality inheres in the act of writing, which interposes itself 
between composer and musician, between musician and audience.” Those who leveled this charge 
supported singing all’improvviso to instruments like the lira da braccio over and against the polyphonic 
tradition. I am still working out how Del Nero’s speech might relate to this context; one major difference 
seems to be that Del Nero is not invested in “le note” as a vehicle for notating music, and so the charge of 
artificiality (a typical one for the period) would probably not interest him. His attitude toward notation is 




Figure C.1  BML Ashburnham 559, 69r. The passage transcribed above begins directly after the 




In a second twist to Del Nero’s argument, however, this very passage in his speech is annotated 
with music notation, presumably by the author himself. A few notes on a five-line staff with a 
tenor clef are penned into the margin directly to the left of the phrase “le diverse qualità delle 
cause, et de i concetti” (figure C.2). 
 
Figure C.2  BML Ashburnham 559, 69r, detail. My photo. 
Perhaps this annotation is merely flippant, a whimsical joke. Throughout his speech, Del Nero 
pens miniature drawings to the left of whatever he is discussing—a hand for the section on hand 
gestures, a tearful eye in the section on making listeners cry. I think it is possible, however, that 
Del Nero sang when he delivered this line to his fellow Alterati. As shown in the figure above, a 
non-lexical symbol sits directly above the word “qualità,” perhaps signaling that Del Nero 
intended to sing this word to the melody directly to its left. The Alterati’s surviving documents, 
as well as the limited secondary literature on this group, attest to their “burlesque” sense of 
humor and improvisational spirit.18 For this reason, it would not surprise me if the transcript of 
 
18 On the Alterati’s burlesque practices (so described frequently in the secondary literature), see Déborah 
Blocker, “Pro- and anti-Medici? Political Ambivalence and Social Integration in the Accademia degli 
Alterati (Florence, 1569–c. 1625), in The Italian Academies 1525-1700: Networks of Culture, Innovation 
and Dissent, ed. Jane E. Everson, Denis V. Reidy, and Lisa Sampson (New York: Routledge, 2016), 43; 
Henk Th. van Veen, “The Accademia degli Alterati and Civic Virtue,” in The Reach of the Republic of 
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Del Nero’s speech—itself, we must remember, an argument regarding the limited value of 
writing for oratory—relates only a partial picture of what actually transpired on the debate floor 
that day in the early 1570s. It seems fair to assume, in other words, that Del Nero supplemented 
the literate arguments recorded in his speech transcript with performative ones, including 
perhaps some recitar cantando to the melody written in the manuscript’s margin. 
 
 What to make of this document? I will offer only a few preliminary thoughts here. Read 
in light of late Cinquecento statements about the affections-moving potential of “speaking in 
song” like the famous passage in Galilei’s Dialogo, Del Nero’s diagnosis of the limited 
representational power of music notation is striking. Twenty-odd years before the fact, he seems 
to be denying tout court the very possibility of the speech-music the Florentine Camerata brought 
to life in the stile recitativo, wherein musicians (to quote the Dialogo) copy “in what manner and 
at what pitch (high or low), volume of sound, accents and gestures, speed or slowness of 
articulation” actors use when taking on various fictional roles.19 Particularly striking to me is Del 
Nero’s awareness of notation’s limits with respect to timbre, an awareness that probably 
stemmed from his status as a non-musician.20 Needless to say, I do not know of any other source 
 
Letters: Literary and Learned Societies in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, vol. 2, ed. Arian 
Van Dixhoorn and Susie Speakman Sutch (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 305–6; and the anecdote about Giovanni 
Bardi and Cosimo Rucellai in Palisca, “The Alterati of Florence,” 413.  
 
19 “in qual maniera parla, con qual voce circa l’acutezza e gravità, con che quantità di suono, con qual 
sorte d’accenti e di gesti, come profferite quanto alla velocità e tardità del moto,” Dialogo, 89. Translation 
from Dialogue on Ancient and Modern Music, trans. Palisca, 224. 
 
20 For a biography of Del Nero, see Giamblanco Concetta, “Del Nero, Tommaso,” in Dizionario 




from the period that discusses music notation’s relationship to vocal timbre so explicitly as Del 
Nero does here.21 
For the most part, however, this dissertation has been concerned not with musicalized 
speech (partes two through five of “Qual musico gentil”—and “Forsennata gridava”—
excepting), but rather with those text-setting devices like melismas, chains of suspensions, and 
mimetic rhythms that we call madrigalisms. Considered from their perspective, Del Nero’s 
argument about notation reads to me as both a warning and an invitation. It is a warning because 
it reminds us that music notation only goes so far toward representing music of the past. A lot, 
not least the variable “qualità delle voci” that must have accompanied any given performance of 
a madrigal in the late sixteenth century, is left out. It seems clear from the few sources consulted 
in this Conclusion, moreover, that both rhetorical and musical commentators valued these non-
literate aspects of their respective arts as particularly, perhaps uniquely, effective techniques for 
moving the emotions.22 At the same time, Del Nero’s comments are an invitation because they 
 
21 Vicentino comes close to making this point in the quotation discussed above, and it is surely no 
coincidence that he does so within the framework of rhetorical pronuntiatio. Nevertheless, Del Nero’s 
distinction between “the qualities of the voice” and the “raising or lowering of sounds” is more precise 
with respect to notation’s representational function and capacity. 
 
22 On the efficacy of delivery for moving the emotions, Artusi’s comments on Tasso’s “Qual musico 
gentil” in his Seconda parte dell’Artusi are also relevant (for the full quotation, see chapter 3, section 3.6). 
Directly after interpreting Tasso’s stanza as evidence that music should please listeners rather than move 
their emotions, Artusi attributes the latter power to the gestures singers make in performance: “The 
second thing [learned from Tasso’s stanza] is that [music] pleases and prepares the listener, but it does not 
thereby render those effects that Ottuso is persuaded to understand it does [i.e., moving the affetti], if not 
for those things that the singers themselves do while they sing their songs, including turning their heads 
slowly, batting their eyelashes, sweeping away their eyes, twisting their backs, letting themselves go in 
such a manner that it seems like they want to die, and making many other transformations that Ovid could 
never have dreamed up” (La seconda, che lusinga, e prepara l’uditore, ma non per questo fa quelli effetti, 
che si persuade di darsi ad intendere l’Ottuso: se non quelli che gli cantanti istessi mentre che cantano 
quelle loro cantilene fanno; che girano il capo pian piano, marcano le ciglia, travolgono gl’occhi, storcono 
le spalle, si lasciano andare di maniera, che pare, che morir voglino, e fanno molte altre trasformationi; le 
quali Ovidio non se le imaginò mai), Seconda parte dell’Artusi, overo Delle imperfettioni alla moderna 
musica (Venice: Vicenti, 1603), 41. Artusi’s implication here seems to be that techniques of delivery have 
a stronger emotional effect on listeners than those pertaining to composition. 
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point this project toward the legacy of pronuntiatio in sixteenth-century musical thought, an 
important and under-researched subject.23 How do those non-notated musical practices 
pertaining to the art of pronuntiatio complicate my arguments in the previous chapters? Do 
bodily gestures participate in the two-stage model for emotional arousal, in the pleasure of 
imitation? Did performers correlate their gestures in performance to a madrigal’s parole, or to its 
concetti?24 To quote this dissertation’s Introduction, these questions “do not invite single 
answers.” But they expand the possibility of what a musical representation of a poem can be, and 
in so doing nudge this project from the comfort of its humanistic thought experiments into the 





23 Don Harrán’s discussion of pronuntiatio vis-à-vis Zarlino and Galilei’s dispute over text expression is a 
good leaping-off point for such an endeavor: see In Search of Harmony, 193–96. Among more recent 
studies, Emily Wilbourne’s article on the performance of ethnicity in early seventeenth-century commedia 
dell’arte is a model for incorporating theoretical discussions of delivery in handbooks with the analysis of 
musical and theatrical works. See Wilbourne, “Lo Schiavetto (1612): Travestied Sound, Ethnic 
Performance, and the Eloquence of the Body,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 63, no. 1 
(Spring 2010): 1–43. 
 
24 This question, although framed in Galileian terms, calls to mind Cicero’s comments on the ancient 
orator Antonius in the Brutus: “If we divide delivery into gesture and voice, his gesture did not seek to 
reflect words, but agreed with the course of his thought—hands, shoulders, chest, stamp of the foot, 
posture in repose and in movement, all harmonizing with his words and thoughts; voice sustained, but 
with a touch of huskiness,” quoted in Kate Armstrong, “Sermons in Performance,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Early Modern Sermon, ed. Hugh Adlington, Peter McCullough, and Emma Rhatigan 
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